--- title: "At the beginning of 2026, A-shares usher in a wave of \"one shoulder to carry\" reforms: 19 companies' chairmen resign as general managers, driven by both governance optimization and performance pressure" type: "News" locale: "en" url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/277352429.md" description: "At the beginning of 2026, the A-share market experienced a wave of \"one person in charge\" reforms, with 19 companies' chairmen resigning from their positions as general managers to focus solely on their roles as chairmen. This move is primarily driven by the dual pressures of company performance and the optimization of governance structures. For example, LONGDA's chairman, Yang Xiaochu, resigned from the general manager position due to significant pre-losses and financial violations. Data shows that about one-third of companies in the A-share market still have the same person serving as both chairman and general manager, but this trend is changing, and the process of optimizing governance structures is accelerating" datetime: "2026-03-01T11:18:14.000Z" locales: - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/277352429.md) - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/277352429.md) - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/277352429.md) --- > Supported Languages: [简体中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/277352429.md) | [繁體中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/277352429.md) # At the beginning of 2026, A-shares usher in a wave of "one shoulder to carry" reforms: 19 companies' chairmen resign as general managers, driven by both governance optimization and performance pressure Everyday Reporter: Eric Wu, Zhang Wan Editor: He Jianchuan On February 26, Longda Food, the "king of pork" under Lanrun Development, announced personnel adjustments. Yang Xiaochu resigned from the position of general manager due to work adjustments but will remain as chairman and in other roles; Liu Jing, born in 1988, will take over as general manager. It is noteworthy that this "change of generals" occurs under the dual pressure of Longda Food's massive anticipated losses and financial disclosure violations: on January 31, the company forecasted a net profit loss attributable to shareholders of 620 million to 760 million yuan for 2025, a significant increase in loss compared to the same period in 2024; at the same time, the company announced on the same day that it received a regulatory "penalty" from the Shandong Securities Regulatory Bureau due to inaccurate information disclosure in its periodic reports, and several current executives, including Yang Xiaochu, received warning letters. Yang Xiaochu has held both the chairman and general manager positions since April 2024, and after nearly two years of "dual roles," whether this resignation as general manager can resolve the company's performance and compliance issues is of great market concern. As is well known, the separation of the chairman and general manager is an important indicator of the independence of listed companies and a core requirement for the separation of ownership and management in modern corporate systems. However, in the A-share market, the "dual role" model of having the chairman also serve as the general manager has long existed. According to statistics from Tonghuashun iFinD, currently, over 1,800 companies in the A-share market have the same person serving as both chairman and general manager, accounting for about one-third of companies. However, this pattern is undergoing significant changes. According to incomplete statistics from the Daily Economic News, from the beginning of 2026 to the end of February, 19 companies, including Longda Food, have intensively announced that their chairmen have resigned from the position of general manager to focus solely on the role of chairman, indicating a wave of reform in the "dual role" structure in the A-share market, with the optimization of corporate governance structures accelerating significantly. ## Case Scan of Chairmen Resigning as General Managers: Balanced Age Structure, Differentiated Tenure, Governance Optimization as Core Direction First, from the perspective of age structure, among the aforementioned 19 companies, the chairmen resigning as general managers are mainly concentrated in the middle-aged range of 40-60 years, with a relatively balanced age distribution, indicating a high consensus among entrepreneurs of different generations on governance standardization. Among them, Lu Xiaorong, chairman of Ruidi Zhichu, is the oldest in this group, born in 1958, currently 68 years old, holding approximately 33.94% of the company's shares directly and indirectly, and she and her spouse Wang Xiao are the actual controllers of the company. On the other hand, Chang Yuanzheng, chairman of Disen Co., Ltd., is the only "post-90s" among the 19 companies, born in 1991, at just 35 years old. Since May 2023, Chang Yuanzheng has served as both chairman and general manager of the company until resigning as general manager in February of this year due to work adjustments, continuing to serve as chairman and in related positions on the board's special committees, with nearly 3 years of dual roles. According to the company's announcement, Chang Yuanzheng holds 4.9245 million shares of the company, which, based on the total share capital of 477 million shares, accounts for only about 1.03%, but he is one of the three founding shareholders of the company, Chang Houchun Li Zuqin and Ma Ge are the actual controllers of the company. Secondly, regarding the duration of holding dual positions, 19 companies exhibit a coexistence of short-term transitions and long-term dual roles, with significant differences in tenure. Considering that some companies had already experienced the "one person holding multiple positions" situation before going public, for the sake of statistical accuracy, the reporter from Daily Economic News uniformly used the company's listing date as the starting point for statistics. The results show that Pudong Construction, Fuling Zhacai, Zhongheng Design, and Nanxin Pharmaceutical had dual positions for less than one year, while Ruisi Kanda, Shenzhen Water Planning Institute, and 8 other companies had dual roles for 1-3 years, and Kaizhong Precision, Jingwei Huikai, and 7 other companies had dual roles for more than 3 years. The duration of dual positions among the companies ranged from less than 1 month to over 9 years, showing a wide disparity. Among them, Pudong Construction, under the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Pudong New District in Shanghai, will welcome its new chairman Zhao Weicheng on January 13, 2026. He had already assumed the position of general manager in March 2023. Less than a month after taking office as chairman, the company announced on February 7 that Zhao Weicheng resigned as general manager but continued to serve as chairman and other positions, making it the shortest dual tenure among the 19 companies. What considerations led to this ultra-short dual role? A reporter from Daily Economic News called the securities department of Pudong Construction as an investor, and the relevant staff stated that Zhao Weicheng was promoted to chairman because the previous chairman had other work arrangements. The dual roles of chairman and general manager were due to a transition period (the appointment of new personnel requires some time), hence there is a time gap. The company has always had different individuals serving as chairman and general manager because they manage different content, and the division of responsibilities is quite clear. In stark contrast, Kaizhong Precision has had Chairman Zhang Haoyu concurrently serving as general manager since its listing in November 2016, until the company announced the appointment of a new general manager in January 2026, at which point Zhang Haoyu resigned, marking a dual tenure of over 9 years, the longest among the 19 companies. It is noteworthy that Kaizhong Precision has maintained a steady growth trend in revenue since its listing, with performance fluctuations but consistently profitable, and the net profit attributable to the parent company for the first three quarters of 2025 has already exceeded 179 million yuan for the entire year of 2024. Given the stable fundamentals of the business, why did Zhang Haoyu suddenly resign as general manager? The company announcement did not disclose specific reasons. A reporter from Daily Economic News called the securities department of Kaizhong Precision as an investor, and the staff who answered the call responded that Zhang Haoyu is getting older, and he will focus on company affairs as chairman (his resignation as general manager) will not have a significant impact on the company. They also indicated that his future work focus may shift more towards decision-making, with a corresponding reduction in daily operational tasks. The newly appointed general manager Ma Zhaomeng has rich experience, having worked in the company for five to six years and held several key management positions in various departments According to the company's announcement, Zhang Haoyu was born in 1961 and is currently 65 years old. The new general manager, Ma Zhaomeng, previously worked at Tyco Group as the operations general manager for the Asia-Pacific region of the sensor division; after joining Kaizhong Precision, he held positions such as general manager of the commutator product line, general manager of the connector product line, and vice general manager, not only possessing solid professional experience but also being quite familiar with the company's business. In other words, Zhang Haoyu's resignation as general manager allows him to focus his limited energy on strategic planning and major decision-making, while also paving the way for the transition of the company's management team, enabling professional management talent to take over daily operations, which helps improve governance efficiency. The adjustments at Kaizhong Precision are a microcosm of the governance optimization of 19 companies, with the other 18 companies providing explanations for the resignation of their general managers, primarily revolving around the needs for long-term development and governance optimization. Among them, 12 companies cited "work (responsibility) adjustment" as the reason for resignation, while Guangda Tongchuang, Tianzhun Technology, Shengjian Technology, and Zhongwang Software provided more detailed explanations, further highlighting the core logic of "strategic control and operational division." Guangda Tongchuang, Tianzhun Technology, and Shengjian Technology all clearly stated that resigning from the position of general manager is to better fulfill the responsibilities of the chairman, focusing energy on the company's macro strategic planning and governance improvement. For example, Tianzhun Technology announced that Xu Yihua applied to resign as general manager to concentrate on fulfilling the responsibilities of the company's chairman, coordinating work such as strategic planning, optimization of the corporate governance structure, and major decision-making. After resigning, he will still hold core positions such as chairman and will continue to work with the new general manager and management team to promote the company's long-term development and market competitiveness. Zhongwang Software, starting from the company's development stage, stated that resigning as general manager is "to adapt to the needs of the company's strategic upgrade and business integration, further optimize the corporate governance structure, and enhance decision-making efficiency." ## Scanning the Fundamentals of 19 Companies: 8 Companies Have "One Person in Charge," 10 Forecast Losses or Year-on-Year Declines in 2025 In the first two months of 2026, 19 companies concentrated on separating the roles of chairman and general manager. What is the fundamental situation of these companies? First, from the perspective of the nature of the issuing companies, private enterprises are predominant. Among the 19 companies, 12 are private enterprises, accounting for over 60%; there are also 5 local state-owned enterprises and 2 Sino-foreign joint ventures, reflecting the synchronized response of different ownership enterprises to governance standardization. Secondly, in terms of equity structure, 8 companies have chairmen who also serve as general managers and are simultaneously the controlling shareholders, actual controllers, or one of the actual controllers, accounting for about 42%. For example, the controlling shareholder of Shengjian Technology is Zhang Weiming, and the actual controllers are Zhang Weiming and Wang Zhe, who together hold more than 60% of the shares. Since its listing in April 2021, Zhang Weiming has served as both chairman and general manager of the company until February 13 of this year, when the company announced that to better fulfill the responsibilities of the chairman, he would invest more energy into the company's strategic planning, In terms of standardized governance, Zhang Weiming resigned from the position of general manager but will continue to serve as chairman and other roles. Accordingly, Zhang Weiming has held the four important identities of chairman, general manager, controlling shareholder, and actual controller for a total of 4 years and 10 months. The personnel adjustment at Shengjian Technology is behind the company's short-term performance pressure: according to the company's latest performance forecast, the net profit attributable to the parent company in 2025 is expected to be a loss of 12 million to 18 million yuan. Since its listing, the company has maintained a net profit attributable to the parent company of over 100 million yuan for four consecutive years. If the audited net profit for 2025 is negative, Shengjian Technology will face its first loss since going public. It is reported that the new general manager, Chang Cheng, has extensive experience in the semiconductor industry and rich experience in areas such as enterprise operation management, team building, lean manufacturing, and business development. The actual controller's proactive transfer of management rights to introduce professional managers indicates Shengjian Technology's intention to improve performance through governance optimization. Finally, from the perspective of the company's operational performance, performance pressure has become a direct driving force for many companies to promote governance adjustments. According to statistics, as of February 28, 10 companies, including Shengjian Technology, have disclosed their performance forecasts or performance reports for 2025, among which 7 companies expect a negative net profit attributable to the parent company. The other 3 companies have achieved profitability, but their profit growth rates have all declined. For example, Xinnuowei expects a net profit attributable to the parent company of -170 million to -255 million yuan in 2025, a significant year-on-year decline of 416%-575%. Meanwhile, Zhongwang Software, Tianzhun Technology, and Fuling Zhacai released performance reports on February 28, all of which achieved profitability, but the profit scale has declined compared to the same period in 2024. Zhongwang Software's net profit attributable to the parent company in 2025 is 21.5315 million yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 66.34%. The remaining 9 companies that have not yet disclosed their full-year performance for 2025 also show differentiated operational performance. Among them, Caida Securities, Pudong Construction, and Kaizhong Precision have all exceeded 100 million yuan in net profit attributable to the parent company in the first three quarters of 2025, with Caida Securities achieving a profit of 664 million yuan in the first three quarters of 2025, a year-on-year increase of 79.5%, demonstrating excellent performance. In contrast, Pudong Construction's net profit attributable to the parent company during the same period was 241 million yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 47.73%, the most significant decline among the 9 companies. Additionally, the other 6 companies achieved profitability in the first three quarters, but the profit scale was relatively small, with net profits attributable to the parent company all below 100 million yuan. Among them, the Deepwater Planning Institute had the lowest net profit attributable to the parent company at 15.809 million yuan, but with a year-on-year increase of 504.47%, it became one of the few companies with high growth in performance. ## Behind the Wave of Corporate Restructuring: Supervision and Guidance + Internal Development Needs, the Separation of Chairman and CEO Returns to the Essence of Governance In the first two months of 2026, 19 companies have concentrated on separating the roles of chairman and CEO. This phenomenon is not accidental but a result of the deep alignment between regulatory policy guidance and the development needs of enterprises. Starting from January 1, 2026, the newly revised "Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies" (hereinafter referred to as the "Guidelines") issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission officially came into effect, becoming an important policy driver for this wave of corporate restructuring. In terms of internal checks and balances within listed companies, the "Guidelines" make clear targeted requirements: If the controlling shareholder and actual controller serve as both the chairman and CEO of the listed company, the company should reasonably determine the powers of the board of directors and the CEO, explain the rationale for this arrangement, and maintain the independence of the listed company. This provision does not directly prohibit the dual role but points directly to the pain points of some listed companies under the "one person in charge" model, such as the lack of internal checks and balances and the high concentration of decision-making power, bringing the "one voice" governance structure under stricter regulatory scrutiny. Regarding the concentrated governance adjustments in the A-share market, Zheng Zhigang, a professor at the School of Finance and Finance at Renmin University of China, conducted an in-depth analysis from the perspectives of role division, model advantages and disadvantages, and industry trends. He stated that the core starting point of this intensive corporate governance adjustment is to return to the traditional division of roles between the chairman and the CEO, allowing each role to fulfill its responsibilities and play its due role. When discussing the core role positioning of the chairman and CEO, Zheng Zhigang pointed out that there is a clear division of labor between the two: the chairman is the convener of the board of directors, with the core responsibility of leading the board to complete the selection, performance evaluation, and compensation setting of the CEO; the CEO, as the chief executive officer, is more focused on leading the management team to make important decisions regarding daily operations. In mature market economies, the CEO plays a more important role in the development of the enterprise, cultural construction, and brand image shaping, while the chairman takes on more functions related to the selection and supervision of the CEO. However, this logic has long been deviated in the A-share market, forming a unique governance model where the chairman has become the core of operational management, while the CEO has regressed to being the chairman's assistant. The concentrated adjustment of these 19 companies is a correction of this deviation and a rational recognition by enterprises of the advantages and disadvantages of the "one person in charge" model. Zheng Zhigang stated, "The 'one person in charge' model is not without reason; its core advantage is high execution efficiency. The board's decisions can be proposed and processed quickly under the CEO's promotion, thus facilitating rapid implementation. This model is particularly suitable for companies undergoing major asset restructuring, facing significant business adjustments, or dealing with high market uncertainty that requires quick responses; at this time, the 'one person in charge' model has practical adaptability." However, Zheng Zhigang also emphasized that for normally developing enterprises, the disadvantages and advantages of the "dual role" are equally prominent. Corporate governance needs to establish a checks and balances mechanism for error correction. When the general manager exhibits extreme behavior in management decisions, there needs to be an independent role to say "no," to avoid significant mistakes in corporate decision-making. The "dual role" may lead to a "one-man show," which is detrimental to the effective functioning of this error correction mechanism. From the perspective of industry development trends, the separation of the two roles has also become an inevitable direction for optimizing the governance of listed companies. Zheng Zhigang pointed out that, on one hand, regulatory authorities have clarified the reform direction for the separation of the two roles by introducing relevant guidelines, delineating a clear path for optimizing the governance of listed companies; on the other hand, enterprises are gradually realizing in their operational practices that maintaining the situation of the chairman also serving as the general manager for a long time easily leads to a "one-man show," which is extremely detrimental to the construction of corporate culture and the establishment of error correction mechanisms. Therefore, it is also necessary to timely adjust and arrange the company's system in line with policy trends. More importantly, the demand for sustainable development of enterprises has also become an important internal driving force for promoting the separation of the two roles. Zheng Zhigang stated that as companies gradually mature, to achieve long-term sustainability, it is essential to establish reasonable corporate systems and governance arrangements, "which includes the separation of the chairman and the general manager, thereby forming effective internal checks and balances." The reporter from Daily Economic News found that the concentrated adjustments of these 19 companies are a rational choice for each company to address its own development issues: whether it is due to some chairmen being older and lacking energy, needing to shift their focus to strategic decision-making; or multiple companies facing pressure on performance and needing to improve internal governance efficiency, the separation of the chairman and general manager can further clarify the responsibilities of strategy and operations, and introduce professional management teams to enhance operational efficiency, injecting new vitality into company development. This wave of reform towards the "dual role" also signifies that the governance construction of A-share listed companies is steadily advancing towards a more standardized, professional, and modern corporate system. Daily Economic News ### Related Stocks - [LONGDA (002726.CN)](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/002726.CN.md) ## Related News & Research - [Hindustan Copper eyeing Navratna status amid expansion push: CMD](https://longbridge.com/en/news/281701635.md) - [Q P Group Adds Executive Director to Nomination Committee to Boost Governance](https://longbridge.com/en/news/281173778.md) - [Hubei Dinglong plans to seek Hong Kong listing](https://longbridge.com/en/news/281176793.md) - [CATL's controlling shareholder to donate some A-shares](https://longbridge.com/en/news/281197776.md) - [Novosense Forms Board Remuneration Committee to Tighten Governance](https://longbridge.com/en/news/281054792.md)