---
title: "Investment Paradigm Inflection Point! \"New Bond King\" Gundlach: Stay Away from Dollar Assets and Private Credit, Gold Bull Market Extends to the Entire Commodity Market"
type: "News"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/277589991.md"
description: "Gundlach warns that the dollar-centric asset pricing system is facing a historic turning point, and the reversal of foreign net investment in the U.S. will lead the dollar into a long-term bear market. The AI hype has already exhausted expectations, and he advises a complete exit from U.S. stocks, stating that private credit is facing a volatility washout. He remains bullish on gold, stating, \"I won't sell gold at $5,000; my target price is higher.\""
datetime: "2026-03-03T08:56:53.000Z"
locales:
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/277589991.md)
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/277589991.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/277589991.md)
---

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# Investment Paradigm Inflection Point! "New Bond King" Gundlach: Stay Away from Dollar Assets and Private Credit, Gold Bull Market Extends to the Entire Commodity Market

Faced with the ineffective historical interest rate models and the approaching red line of the U.S. debt crisis, DoubleLine CEO Jeffrey Gundlach warned that **"the dollar is in a long-term bear market," calling on investors to fully shift towards emerging markets, gold, and physical assets, while being extremely cautious about the current private credit market.**

Recently, Jeffrey Gundlach, CEO of DoubleLine Capital and dubbed the "new bond king" by the market, conducted a comprehensive analysis of the global macroeconomy, the U.S. debt crisis, and asset allocation in a deep video interview.

Gundlach bluntly stated that **the traditional logic of macroeconomic operation has been broken, and the dollar-centered asset pricing system is facing a historic turning point.**

****

## **Asset Allocation: Escape from U.S. Stocks, Gold Bull Market Extends to the Entire Commodity Market**

Based on expectations of dollar depreciation and a resurgence of inflation, Gundlach provided a highly disruptive strategy for asset allocation. **He explicitly stated, "I hate the S&P 500, I don't want to touch it at all," and emphasized that the hype around the AI boom has exhausted expectations and valuations are too high.**

In contrast, he is very optimistic about physical assets represented by **gold, commodities, and emerging market local currency-denominated assets.**

> "The price of gold is the inverse of investors' confidence in central planning and central bank officials. **I won't sell gold at $5,000; my target price is much higher."**

Regarding the logic of holding gold, he pointed out:

> **Central banks have reduced their gold reserves to about 15%. I believe they are likely to double that. Gold reserves once reached as high as 70%. If they just increase it to 30%, that would mean huge demand for gold.**

For commodities, he noted that the Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCOM) has finally broken through after being below the 200-day moving average for two and a half years, **"Now we have a commodity bull market."**

> "**Once we see some industrial metals, like copper, start to rise, and the BCOM index begins to stand above the 200-day moving average, that could be a sign that something is happening. We are broadly optimistic about the commodity index."**

In addition, he personally bought a large amount of land with absolute value that generates positive cash flow. Gundlach provided a specific allocation framework:

> **"I would hold a bit more cash than usual (20% or 25%) waiting for opportunities; 20% in physical assets (gold, land, commodities); about 35% in stocks, but I will invest 100% in non-dollar, non-U.S. local markets (such as Latin America, India); the remaining portion allocated to a short- to medium-term, higher-rated bond portfolio.**

## **Historical Patterns Have Completely Failed, the Dollar Enters a Long-term Bear Market**

In a history spanning half a century, **the Federal Reserve's lowering of short-term interest rates typically leads to a decline in long-term rates, but Gundlach points out that this "roadmap is fundamentally broken."**

> "The roadmap that people relied on to plan for the future is actually not working at all. Interestingly, when the Federal Reserve starts cutting rates, long-term rates break the historical pattern that has lasted nearly 50 years."

Accompanying this breakdown of patterns is the **diminishing safe-haven attribute of the dollar**. He noted that during the adjustment of the U.S. stock market in early Q2 2025, it was the first time in 25 years that the dollar fell alongside the S&P 500 index.

Gundlach attributes this phenomenon to a net inflow of up to $25 trillion from foreign investors into U.S. assets over the past 15 years. **Currently, foreign net investment in the U.S. has reached $28 trillion, and this trend is reversing.**

> "If they withdraw $8 trillion over the next decade, it is very likely to lead to a reversal in U.S. stock market performance... In my view, **the dollar seems to be in a long-term bear market.**"

## **U.S. Debt Crisis Approaches the "Ferguson Red Line," Aggressive Restructuring May Occur**

As the total U.S. debt skyrockets, the interest expenses brought on by high rates are becoming a sword of Damocles hanging over the U.S. economy. Gundlach cited the "Ferguson Rule" to warn:

> **"Any major country where debt expenditures exceed defense spending faces the risk of no longer being a major power."**

Data shows that **the current fiscal revenue of the U.S. is about $5.4 trillion, while interest expenses have climbed to $1.2 trillion.**

> "We are now using **20% of fiscal revenue for interest expenses**... Unless rates really decline effectively, it will continue to rise."

If the 10-year Treasury yield approaches 6%, it will trigger extreme concern from the government.

To this end, Gundlach proposed a bold scenario that shocked the market: the U.S. government may **not only implement yield curve control (YCC) but may even take extremely aggressive debt restructuring measures.** He stated:

> "We announce that all government bonds with a coupon rate above 1% will have their coupon rate unified to 1% from today. And for those below 1%, we allow you to keep them... If you can reduce it from 4% to 1% or slightly below 1%, you will cut 75% of interest expenses."

Gundlach pointed out that while this would cause long bondholders to suffer heavy losses overnight, there was indeed a historical precedent during President Garfield's administration in 1881, where **the coupon rate was reduced from 6% to 3%.**

## **Severe Criticism of Private Credit: "Volatility Cleansing" and the Precedent of Subprime Mortgages**

When discussing the recent market hot topic of private credit, Gundlach's attitude was extremely harsh. He believes that in the context of **overvalued public market assets, capital is flooding into opaque blind pools and private credit, accumulating risks.**

> "Private credit is not marked to market. It is vague and opaque..." Gundlach pointed out bluntly that **the apparent stability of private credit is merely due to an accounting method similar to moving averages.**

He revealed a disturbing reality within the industry:

> “A very respected operator announced that they wrote down one of their private credit funds by 19% in a single day... I have also seen eight private credit managers holding exactly the same deal, with year-end valuations ranging from a high of 95 to a low of 8.”

Gundlach **compared the current private credit frenzy to the period leading up to the 2008 financial crisis:**

> “I listened to the (private credit giant) panel, and it sounded just like the CLO (collateralized loan obligation) panel of 2006 and 2007... The growth of private credit is akin to subprime.”

**Full translation of Gundlach's interview:**

> **The roadmap that people relied on in the past to plan for the future is fundamentally no longer viable.** Most people were firmly convinced of this. I have mentioned that when the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates, interestingly, long-term rates broke a historical pattern that had lasted nearly 50 years. In the past, when the Federal Reserve started to cut rates, short-term rates would naturally decline. In fact, the market usually anticipates the Federal Reserve's rate cuts in advance. Furthermore, the reason for the Federal Reserve's rate cuts is that, due to market forces, the short end of the Treasury yield curve would stop falling. However, since 1980, every time the Federal Reserve began to lower short-term rates, long-term rates would also decline, without exception. And I said a year ago that I believed this time would be different. I even pointed out that if the economy or the market weakened, we would see a pattern that was completely different from the past, **the dollar would no longer be a safe-haven asset; instead, other assets would become the choice for capital seeking safety.**
> 
> So, the timing of presenting this viewpoint a year ago was very good, as this theory was almost immediately put to the test last year. On April 2nd of last year, tariff measures were introduced, and prior to that, the market had already accumulated signs of weakness. But when the tariffs were announced, people were shocked by their far greater-than-expected magnitude. I believe this was largely a bluff, and it turned out not to be fully implemented. But the stock market subsequently entered... it's hard to recall now because the situation reversed quickly, but its severity exceeded most people's expectations. I remember the S&P 500 was almost entering a bear market—if we define a bear market as a 20% decline, I recall it was down about 18% at that time. That's right. But the key point is that the U.S. market was no longer performing well. This is unusual. Typically, people consider the U.S. market to be a safe-haven asset, but this time the dollar fell. Looking back at the S&P 500 adjustments since 2000, there have been a total of 13 adjustments with declines of 10% or more, some of which were larger. The decline in April of last year far exceeded 10%. However, in the previous 12 adjustments since 2000, the dollar index rose against foreign currencies every time, and during S&P 500 adjustments, the dollar index typically increased by about 8% to 10%. But in early Q2 2025, this was the first time in 25 years that the dollar fell alongside the S&P 500 index. That time, the dollar actually fell by about 8% to 10% I believe this viewpoint will continue to be validated, as it has been throughout 2025. I just cited the aforementioned period of volatility as an example.
> 
> However, for investors in dollar-denominated assets, that is, investors who base their investments in dollars, I mentioned about 18 months ago, and certainly a year ago, that my advice is: **they should invest in foreign markets and foreign currencies. Because in my view, the dollar seems to be in a long-term bear market.** This is largely related to global tensions and also to the excessive investment by foreign investors in the U.S. over the past 16 to 18 years. One very important aspect that I believe has not received enough attention, and that many investors are not even aware of, is: **over the past 16 to 18 years, foreign investment in the U.S. has seen historic growth. About 18 years ago, the net position of foreign investment in the U.S.—relative to U.S. investors' investments abroad—was that foreigners net held $3 trillion in U.S. assets. Since then, they have significantly increased these investments, with a net increase of about $25 trillion over approximately 15 years. This means an average net inflow of about $1.5 trillion per year.** No wonder, as is well known, during that period, the U.S. market consistently outperformed foreign markets. Don't you think there might be some causal relationship here? Of course, the U.S. economy might be better and sometimes managed better, but when you have such a massive net inflow, that in itself is net buying. Therefore, the U.S. market naturally performed exceptionally well.
> 
> But now, **this imbalance has become so enormous that foreign net investment in the U.S. has reached $28 trillion. We have reason to believe that this trend is certainly slowing down, and may even be reversing.** So, what will happen in the future? This means that a portion of foreign net investment is likely to flow out, returning to their own countries. It does not require an outflow of $1.5 trillion every year to have an impact. **If they withdraw, say, $3 trillion over three years, or $8 trillion over ten years, this could very likely lead to a reversal in the performance of the U.S. stock market.** This certainly happened last year. Many people saw the S&P 500 index rise nearly 20%, with the Nasdaq index rising even more, smiling broadly. These gains are indeed impressive. But if you are a dollar investor and you invested in an emerging market index fund, even just an index fund, your return would be about 37%. If you are a dollar investor and you invested in the UK, your return would also be much higher. If you are a bond investor and you invested in emerging market bonds instead of developed market bonds, certainly not U.S. bonds, your performance would be much better.
> 
> The best-performing investments are those I did not really recommend a year ago, but during that period of volatility, due to a stronger confidence in market behavior, I began to make a type of investment. I work at Double Line, which was founded about 17 years ago. In the first 16 and a half years, we did not hold any securities denominated in emerging market local currencies. But last June, we thought it was time to start investing in emerging market local currency bonds. Of course, not all strategies do this, as for some risk-controlled strategies, the volatility of these assets is too high However, for those more opportunistic strategies, we have increased our allocation to emerging market local currency bonds. Instead of buying index funds, we do not want to hold certain specific securities; we want to hold bonds from certain South American countries, and we have indeed made significant investments in more stable South American countries. This has been performing well. I strongly feel that this wave of outstanding performance is far from over; we may just be at the end of the first inning, not the seventh. So, I am quite confident about this.

The core argument here is central to my investment philosophy. In the investment industry, it can sometimes be exciting and at other times quite dull and uneventful. But when you start to feel that a fundamental shift may occur, if I interpret it correctly, we could see truly distinctive positive performance. And the core of this argument is the weakening of the dollar. I know I was alone in this regard a year ago, but not anymore, as people tend to follow the crowd. They do not want to make mistakes alone. One issue that plagues the investment consulting industry and the entire asset pool investment committee is that they prefer to stick together. They do not want to be pioneers because they would rather be right with the crowd, or more accurately, they would rather be wrong with the crowd than be wrong alone. So, now that dollar trading has been established, it makes me a bit uneasy. Similarly, my thoughts on the steepening yield curve were also a voice crying in the wilderness a year ago; I believe the long end of the bond market will not rise unless manipulated.

There are several potential ways to manipulate the long-term treasury market. Many people oppose this when I say it because it contradicts their experience. But one practice is that if long-term interest rates rise too much—what is too much? Today, long-term bond yields are about 4.85%, and I believe if it approaches 6%, they will really start to worry, especially about that little interest expense issue, which is no longer a small problem. We all know that national debt is enormous. But interest rates have been so low for such a long time that you do not really feel the pressure. It is masked by the fact that the average national debt interest rate is about 1.8%. When interest rates are that low, look at what Europe has done; they brought rates down to zero. If your interest rate is zero, you can borrow indefinitely without interest expenses. Of course, there will be trouble when it comes time to repay the principal in the future, but maybe you can refinance at zero interest rates. So, if interest rates rise too much, I believe action will be taken.

I do not think this is a particularly radical idea, as government officials have also talked about this. Scott Bessenet himself mentioned this before he was confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury. He said, perhaps you would implement yield curve control, which Japan has tried. Many people believe we would never do yield curve control. That is basically fixed rates. The Federal Reserve can clearly control short-end rates; if they pursue overly inflationary policies, the market may push back, but they can also suppress long-term rates through purchase programs. The U.S. has done this before. If you think the U.S. would not do it, they have indeed done it. They did it after World War II. At that time, debt was so high that people were worried about inflation, and the government was concerned about interest expenses. Although economists generally predicted that inflation would rise, in fact, from 1945 to the mid-1950s, inflation did rise significantly, from about 2% (our pre-pandemic starting point) to 8% or 9% But during this period, at least until 1951, they kept long-term interest rates fixed at 2.5% and maintained it through purchases. So, one way to control interest expenses is through artificial intervention. This may not be a long-term solution, but you know, for politicians, the long term is until the next election day. That's all they care about.

So, you can implement yield curve control, and they are talking about this. Another thing you can do, which is much more radical, and I faced almost universal opposition to this, but I have a trump card that I learned about after pondering this idea and studying history. That is, you can say, you know, we used to have an interest rate of 1.8%, and now the average yield on government bonds is about 3%. Since there are no interest rates at 3% or lower, the coupon rate of our overall bond portfolio has almost doubled. This means that even if you have no deficit (we are running about a $2 trillion deficit), even if you have no new debt, your interest expenses are already higher. For example, in the next 12 months, $10 trillion of government bonds will mature. If interest rates rise by 1%, that adds another $100 billion in interest expenses each year. Our interest expenses have increased from about $300 billion a decade ago to $1.2 trillion or $1.3 trillion, depending on which fiscal year you look at. So the interest expense issue has worsened by $1 trillion.

So what can you do? You can say, you know, we really wish we hadn't gotten into this situation, but we have to do something. **We are going to restructure the national debt. We announce that all government bonds with a coupon rate higher than 1% will have their coupon rate uniformly reduced to 1% from today. And for all those below 1%, we allow you to keep the coupon rate below 1%.** We are basically going to lower the coupon rates. One result of doing this is that since current interest expenses are around 3% and approaching 4%, if you can reduce it from 4% to 1% or slightly below 1%, you will cut 75% of the interest expenses. This could buy you countless years, allowing you to push the problem further down the road. People will say they would never do that. For anyone holding a 20-year bond with a 6% coupon rate, it would be a complete disaster. If that happens, you would suffer about an 80% loss overnight, and it would be an irreversible loss. It's not like, well, when will it come back? They won't give you your coupon rate back; they took it away as an economic management tool.

They might not be able to do this. And that's why it's actually not a bad solution because it forces you to go cold turkey. No one wants to detox. Our economy has relied on all this interest expense to operate, and everyone sees that trajectory as very scary, but they don't want to enter a detox state. They don't want to go to a rehabilitation center. But this restructuring that lowers all coupon rates to 1% could mean you might not be able to borrow any money for the next two generations. So, it's tough love, right? You would say this could never happen. But I tell you, **in 1881 in the United States, during President Garfield's term, this happened. At that time, they were burdened with Civil War debt, and the coupon rate was about 6%.** **This is truly a crazy coincidence because when I initially came up with this radical idea, I used 6% as an example for thought experiments, and it turns out that this is exactly what happened historically. At that time, the interest rate was indeed 6%. During the Garfield administration, they did not lower it to 3% and then to 1%. They lowered it to 3% and gave people a choice. They did not say, "We are lowering your coupon rate from 6% to 3%." They said,**"You can either choose to lower your coupon rate from 6% to 3%, or we will buy back your bonds now, pay you cash, and redeem your principal."\*\* The result is the same. If you hold a bond with a coupon rate of 6% for the next 6 years, they give you $100 in principal, and you have to reinvest it at the current market rate instead of the original high rate. So your ultimate investment return is still around 3%. So it doesn't matter; you are going from 6% to 3% anyway. One way damages the principal, while the other damages the interest, but in reality, they are equivalent.

> Neil Ferguson, a well-known and respected economic thought leader, often talks about Ferguson's Law. You might think it is named after him, but it is not; it is just a coincidence. It actually refers to the rules of Adam Ferguson, who lived from 1723 to 1816, so this goes back a long way. He made a point: **Any major power whose spending on debt service exceeds its defense spending faces the risk of no longer being a major power.** So when your interest payments exceed your defense spending, you reach a tipping point. He cited several historical examples at the time. One was the Spanish Empire in the 16th century, which had a crazy situation: 50% of fiscal revenue was used for interest payments, and incredibly, this ratio rose to 87% over 20 years. Obviously, the empire collapsed because they had no money to maintain their army. Of course, there was also a lot of corruption. Whenever you have such massive debt and interest payments, unfortunately, it breeds a lot of corruption, as we have seen in the United States over the past year or two in increasingly obvious ways. Another example occurred during Adam Ferguson's lifetime, which was the Bourbon monarchy in France. Their proportion of fiscal revenue used for interest payments reached 50%, and they were sent to the guillotine for this (and other reasons). Then there was the Ottoman Empire, which also reached 50% by the end of the 19th century and collapsed by 1922. Then there was a similar situation in the UK during the late stages of World War I.
> 
> So where does the United States stand now? **We are currently using 20% of fiscal revenue for interest payments,** possibly a bit higher, but roughly around 20%. Our fiscal revenue is $5.4 trillion, and the budget is about $7.3 trillion, resulting in a massive deficit of $1.9 trillion, which is still increasing. Interest payments have already reached $1.2 trillion. Unless interest rates really decrease effectively, it will continue to rise. This situation accelerates when GDP contracts. When GDP contracts, you face a double whammy: tax revenues decrease, while expenditures on unemployment benefits and other areas increase sharply. I believe that by 2030, we will almost certainly experience an economic contraction, so I believe that by 2030, we will be in trouble I basically predict it will be around 2029, but who can know for sure?
> 
> When I first entered the industry 45 years ago (or even longer), people were already talking about the dangerous path of the social security system, which is a pay-as-you-go system, and the baby boomer generation would eventually stop paying into the system and start withdrawing from it, and they are a large population. So around 1980, they predicted that this was unsustainable and would become a problem. The Congressional Budget Office made some fairly optimistic but not absurd predictions, saying that the Social Security Trust Fund would go bankrupt by 2060. People thought, well, that's an issue for 80 years from now. Who cares? I'm not worried about problems 80 years from now; I'm more worried about my bad habit of smoking four packs a day in 30 years. So no one was concerned about that. Then ten years later, by 1990, they had to recalculate because their assumptions were, as always, a bit optimistic. So they said, you know what, it's not 2060 anymore; it's 2050. Well, now it's a problem 60 years out, still not keeping people up at night. Then we got to 2020. We encountered stock market issues, and there was a global financial crisis, and suddenly, oh no, they would run out of money by 2035 or 2040. And now, the Social Security Administration basically says we will run out of money by 2032. They haven't even assumed a recession, and the projected deficits are lower than they are now, and the assumed interest rates are also lower than they are now. Maybe they will be right if some of the policies the president hopes for come to fruition. But you know, this is no longer a problem for your descendants; this is an imminent issue that we must face now. That is the crux of the problem.
> 
> Meanwhile, I am deeply shocked that even experienced and respected economists still have their thinking deeply rooted in old patterns: when the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates, all rates will go down. I listened to a podcast where the host was quite good, and the podcast was only 20 minutes long, speaking directly and understandably. He was talking about how people discuss that if the Federal Reserve lowers rates, housing will become more affordable. But I said, they actually cannot control long-term rates. He correctly pointed out in a podcast a few months ago that the Federal Reserve has lowered rates by 175 basis points, but long-term rates have actually risen, with the 30-year Treasury yield rising by 100 basis points. But he couldn't help himself and slipped back into the old thinking pattern. Because about 10 minutes into the podcast, he said, maybe if the Federal Reserve lowers rates the way Trump wants, we can bring down mortgage rates. I mean, even a respected and thoughtful person falls into that pattern. So I believe, **manipulating interest rates will not make housing more affordable because the market will take effect.** If miraculously, you could lower mortgage rates from just below 6% to just below 4%, say through some bond purchases or some magic, **a drop of 200 basis points, what would happen? The only result would be rising home prices.** This is a supply and demand issue, not an interest rate issue. If you lower rates, home prices will rise. Look at what happened during the pandemic; home prices soared. Rates were kept low for a long time when they should have risen, with the federal funds rate being zero until 2021 I remember during the Federal Reserve meeting at the Super Bowl in 2021, I said that the Fed should raise interest rates by 200 basis points today, but they only raised it by 25 basis points. So I casually said: Jay Powell, either paint or get off the ladder. Meaning, either do your job well or let someone else do it for you. He eventually started to act very belatedly. But you will notice that housing prices did not drop; they remained strong, only slightly correcting in some overheated areas, but not by much. What we need is supply, and the cost of supply cannot be that high.

I have been traveling and haven't seen the specific details. I mean, I think increasing supply is good, but when the government increases supply in government ways, many ideas ultimately turn into money laundering schemes. You know, we have seen what is happening. Over the past decade or so, California has spent $24 billion trying to reduce the number of homeless people. $24 billion, with zero effect; the number of homeless people has only increased. So, where did the money go? They have a plan to build micro-houses, about 300 square feet, with no kitchen, no plumbing, just a structure. They plan to build them on federal land, like near the Los Angeles Federal Building, to at least give the homeless a place to stay. Do you know what the estimated cost of such a house without a kitchen and plumbing is? About $1 million each.

I think of their so-called high-speed rail, which was supposed to connect Los Angeles and San Francisco, originally planned to be completed in 2020, with a budget of $30 billion. I euphemistically renamed it "High Greed," because they cannot complete this project due to a lack of engineering capability. It's unbelievable that our ancestors could build the Hoover Dam with technology far inferior to what we have now, yet we can't even complete a high-speed rail within budget. Now they say it will take another 15 to 20 years to build the high-speed rail from San Francisco to Los Angeles, with a cost overrun of $100 billion. So they simply do not have that capability. They have scaled back the project and are now only trying to connect Merced and Bakersfield, which is only a quarter of the distance from Los Angeles to San Francisco. Of course, no one is interested in this stretch. And now they say this segment will also cost $35 billion. So, it's a quarter of the original project's distance, yet the budget is higher than the total budget of the original project. Everyone knows this is happening, but I feel the severity of the problem is starting to be exposed. From what happened in Minnesota, it is now spreading to Maine. I can't wait to see the movie shot in California because California is much larger, and it seems, I don't know if it's managed worse, but there is certainly enough financial power to make this happen, and there is plenty of evidence that it is happening.

So, you know, this is where we are currently. Recently, there was also an interesting piece of news that Bessenet is talking about reaching some kind of agreement between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. This is a very alarming and historical deviation. The deviation from history is that they were supposed to be independent. I know that the issue of independence has existed since the Johnson administration when the Fed seems to have not been independent. Of course, the Fed was also not independent after World War II. President Trump has also repeatedly claimed that the Fed should not be independent. So now the incoming Fed chair and the Treasury Secretary are discussing cooperation, which to me looks very much like manipulation In fact, this is almost an admission of manipulation. It sounds a lot like we want to push down short-term interest rates and then borrow a large amount of short-term debt because we can control that rate, which is no longer driven by the market. And when long-term bond yields rise, say close to 6%, we will manipulate them down. By borrowing at some ridiculously low rate (like 3% or 2%) and then repurchasing government bonds. We issue short-term currency at low interest rates to buy back our own high-interest debt. This is somewhat like a variant of the previously mentioned reduction of coupon rates, essentially the same but more direct and slightly more covert.

Bostic has not always been hawkish. He has publicly stated in the past few months that he can certainly see the possibility of the federal funds rate being lowered in the short term. Historically, he is more known as a hawk on the balance sheet, which I appreciate. He believes that the Federal Reserve holding so many government bonds (once over $7 trillion) is a mistake, which is clearly manipulating the market and looks like an inflationary policy. If in fact Bostic has a hawkish tendency because he believes that deficits are inflationary and that the Federal Reserve's large balance sheet is imprudent and potentially inflationary, he wants to reduce the balance sheet. But to reduce the balance sheet, you need to fill that hole in some way. If you shrink the balance sheet, you are either reducing the deficit or letting the market, rather than the Federal Reserve, buy those bonds. If the private market buys the government bonds held by the Federal Reserve, where does the money come from? It would come from banks. I’m not saying banks will buy, but if Jeffrey Gundlach decides to buy some bonds because he thinks the yields are good, he will take money out of the bank, and then I will hold the bonds instead of keeping the money in the bank. That’s a problem for banks. Yes. So this is a real issue, and it’s one of the reasons I think banks have performed poorly on a trend basis.

So, he wants to reduce the balance sheet, but for that, I think for economic hedging, because that would shrink the banking system and have a tightening effect on the economy, you might need lower interest rates. But every action has consequences. You want the balance sheet to shrink, which is a good thing. But now you have lowered short-term interest rates, which could harm the economy, potentially below the inflation rate, leading us to negative interest rates while long-term rates are rising. All of this together explains why gold prices are rising so rapidly. The two recent trades I made with my personal funds are very anti-financial assets. A few months ago, I bought gold mining stocks, and fortunately, the timing was incredibly good. I also bought more barren land. These are things with absolute value that cannot be manipulated. In fact, as Jim Grant cleverly pointed out, the price of gold is the inverse of investors' confidence in central planning and central bank officials. Because they believe that fiat currency is likely to be devalued. Of course, the dollar is depreciating, and the dollar index has been hovering between 100 and 98 for quite some time, which is a trend line that dates back several years, providing support whenever the dollar is sold off. We have now fallen below that line, and the dollar is very weak now. So I am more bullish on gold than ever. A year ago, I was asked on a financial program whether I thought gold prices would reach $3,000 when gold was at $2,970 He said, do you think it will reach 3000? I said, what kind of prediction is that? Are you asking me if it will rise by one percentage point? Who cares? I said, I believe that by the end of this year, the gold price will exceed 4000 USD. At that time, I was a bit aggressive, but I was basically right. Although it did rise to 5500 USD in 2026, which seems a bit high relative to history, I don't think it will drop significantly. So I believe, **it is obvious that central banks are buying gold, which explains why... I mentioned foreign investment entering the S&P 500, and perhaps a portion of that 28 trillion will flow out.**

> But I think something is happening with central banks; they have been selling gold at low prices for a long time. About 20 years ago, they started selling gold to increase their dollar reserves. They sold gold when it was 300 or 400 USD an ounce to increase their dollar reserves. Now they realize that dollar reserves don't look as good, so they have been buying back gold. Central banks have bought back all the gold they started selling 20 years ago; they sold it at 400 USD and are buying it back at over 3000 USD. But central banks used to have a large amount of gold reserves. When we abandoned the gold standard, the dollar became the dominant currency. People held dollars, **and they reduced their gold reserves to about 15%. I think they are likely to double that. Gold reserves were once as high as 70%. If they just increase it to 30%, that would mean huge demand for gold.** I think everyone is starting to realize that holding manipulated currency is not safe. In this case, the dollar, I think it is likely to be accompanied by the Federal Reserve's overly dovish policies. I believe we will implement inflationary policies. This is another reason I am not optimistic about long-term government bonds until that manipulation occurs.
> 
> However, managing this kind of capital (at least partially) has made me realize that we will continue to lose money on long-term government bonds. The 30-year government bond lost 50% of its value in 2022, dropping from 100 to 50. You know? It is still there, with no rebound, almost right around that low point. So, I think these trends have been established. Another thing I think is worth learning from 2025 is that gold rose by 70%, while Bitcoin fell. I mean, you would think that if people are skeptical about the dollar, buying gold, and doubting central banks, you might think that with the stock market enjoying a speculative rebound, Bitcoin might perform as well, but it hasn't. It fell about 6% last year and is not doing much now. So, what is going on? We went through all this speculation, reaching a frenzy at one point, and now it seems to no longer work. We see the U.S. market no longer outperforming, Bitcoin no longer performing, and the last thing I think is worth noting, **and I think the winds may have shifted, is the enthusiasm for private credit.**
> 
> Private credit became very popular in 2020 and 2021 when the government was throwing money around. When people looked at traditional stocks and bonds, merely using the S&P 500 and the bond market as benchmarks, they didn't like what they saw. At that time, bond yields were below 2%, while inflation was clearly rising. The opening video quoted what I said at that time, "Inflation is clearly going to rise, you know So, the situation at that time was, you saw the S&P 500 at historical highs, almost at the same level as now, or at that time? Almost at the same level as now. You looked at bonds, and they looked terrible. So you would think, if I could map the public markets back, if I could map the combination of stocks and bonds to private credit, I might not like what I see. **But if I don’t know what’s in private credit, I can’t map it.** So when things are severely overvalued, people’s behavior becomes strange. They start flocking to blind pools, SPACs, and private credit. They are basically saying, 'I agree with you, publicly traded bonds look terrible, and publicly traded stocks are also looking bad relative to their historical valuations. But here’s the deal, I’ll put my money into your locked blind pool, SPAC, or private credit fund, but with one condition: don’t tell me what you’re doing. Because if you tell me, I can map it to those obviously overvalued public markets, and then I won’t like what you have either.'

But what ultimately happens is that people like to go with the flow. So large university endowments, they are pioneers in private credit and have done very well. When the bond market experienced its worst year ever in 2022, people said, 'Wow, look how well my private credit is performing!' Because it didn’t drop 50% like long-term bonds did. But I have a little secret in the industry: private credit is not marked to market. It is murky, opaque, and it borrows from the methods of private equity, which you could say is its father. Private equity is the father of private credit. They use a similar moving average approach. We at Double Line actually have a report that is being published for the first time today on doubleline.com, titled 'Volatility Cleansing in Private Credit.' Volatility cleansing. In other words, what they do is, I use the example of private equity. You sell the S&P 500 and buy $100 of private credit. The S&P 500 drops from 100 to 50, and private credit is marked down from 100 to 80. It might not be worth 80, but they are marking it down. So it looks like the direction is right. Then the market recovers, the S&P 500 goes back to 100, and private credit is marked back up. You both go back to 100. But what’s the difference? The returns for both are zero, but the volatility (as measured by the S&P) of one is more than twice that of the other, at least the marked volatility, because it’s the real daily mark. The other is just a moving average of actual prices. So we have seen headlines like this. We saw that starting last summer, private credit experienced a complete wipeout. There was a home improvement company doing subprime loans that went to zero in a matter of weeks. There were two private credit funds holding it, which at the end of a marking period were still marked at 100, but weeks later had to write it down to zero. From 100 to zero, that’s a cliff dive.

And then there are those insurance companies owned by private equity. And then the private equity folks go to fund private credit. So you have some sort of circular financing scheme that was never a problem until it started to go wrong. And it seems to have started going wrong. I mean, there is, I won’t name names, but there is a very respected operator who announced they wrote down one of their private credit funds by 19% in a single day I'm not talking about a position; I'm saying the fund overall has dropped 19%. So are you telling me that half of your fund is doing well, while the other half has dropped 38%? Or are you saying that three-quarters of your fund is doing well, while the remaining quarter has dropped 76%? You see, that's the problem with this kind of thing.

I visited a large insurance company client, probably last January. He had a very large private credit portfolio, which is quite common. He used many managers, so he said that his eight private credit managers held exactly the same trades, which is not unusual. Private credit is a closely-knit group. They used to be like a happy family, participating in the same trades together. So it's not surprising that many people hold the same trade. What’s strange is that they had a market valuation at the end of 2024, **for the same security, the highest valuation was 95, and the lowest was 8. That's a gap, from 95 to 8.** So, this doesn't mean the entire system is rotten to the core. But the problem during boom times is that private equity and private credit both experienced a boom. Private credit grew from almost zero in 2020 to today accounting for one-third of all leveraged financing. When you start out, you might indeed have a pioneering opportunity. It’s a new field, you might have higher spreads, you can control terms to some extent, and there aren’t many lenders, a bit like the Wild West. The town is filled with God-fearing people, there’s a good sheriff, everything is going smoothly, and people are relatively peaceful. Then they discover there’s gold five to ten miles away, and suddenly people flood into the town, some of whom are legitimate entrepreneurs, but there are also many rogues, cheaters, and those ready to plunder others, and suddenly the town is out of control. I’m not saying everyone in the town is immoral, but there are enough of those people to create a serious crime problem. This is what happens during the boom periods of emerging financial markets. Think about the subprime crisis that started in 2004, think about the loans and mortgage repackaging market during the boom in 2007. The growth of private credit is as significant as subprime. We are starting to see headlines like that. Of course, good operators are in a tough spot because they might be lumped in with the bad actors. Maybe they honestly say in press releases, “Our credit portfolio has no red lights; in fact, I don’t think there are even yellow lights, basically all green lights.” Well, then what about those headlines? What about those funds that wrote down 19%? This “don’t worry, be happy” narrative, I want to tell you, last summer I spoke at a conference in Hollywood, coincidentally, my fireside chat was after a panel of private credit giants. Those were big names. I was impressed because I arrived early and listened to their conversation. I think the benefit of experience is that you can sense how people twist their language. When things are going well, they have big smiles, and you can see their genuine optimism and bullishness. When things start to get a bit shaky, they begin to say things like, “Well, our trades need more runway,” “We can’t cash anything out because we told investors there’s a three-year holding period, but three years have passed with no returns, so we’re asking for more runway, we need more money, we can pay your dividends through a stock issuance.” This is referred to as 'physical payment' in the high-yield bond market. One of the warning signs in the high-yield bond market is a significant increase in physical payments. **This is exactly what is happening in this area. I listened to that panel, and their remarks sounded like the CLO panel from 2006 and 2007.** When you talk to high-yield bond people, the most pessimistic thing they could say at the beginning of the year is, 'The spreads are very tight, and we are starting to see more pressure in the system, so we don't expect price increases this year, but we think you can get the coupon.' This is a bearish judgment. For high-coupon asset classes, this is bearish. This is exactly what those people were saying on the panel. So I just feel that something is a bit off.

Then I gave a speech, and in front of me was a private credit person, mainly doing the market, very articulate, very smooth, very seasoned. Basically, it sounded like they had memorized the marketing pitch. But they all said this: the benefit of private equity is lower volatility. Maybe the returns are slightly higher, but the volatility is also lower. Well, this is the Sharpe ratio argument, and it's that kind of false volatility. So that's not a real reason. Then they moved on to the next argument, which at least a few years ago was real: look at past performance, see how well private credit has performed relative to public credit over the past few years. This was a true statement a few years ago. But this situation started to become untrue in October 2022. Since then, private credit, even if it may be marked optimistically, has underperformed public credit. So that argument, by the way, as the prospectus states, past performance does not guarantee future results. In my industry, I work in the public markets, and people can redeem at any time. If you underperform for four years, you should be thankful to your lucky stars that your clients are still around. When you underperform for one year, you can explain the past. Underperforming for two years, hopefully, they are still long-term oriented. Underperforming for three years, you will start receiving large redemption notices. Four years, it's over. **However, private credit has underperformed for four years, and you don't hear anyone talking about it.**

Then the third argument is a cynical repackaging of the initial Sharpe ratio argument. They say that another benefit of allocating a large amount of private credit in your portfolio is that when the market is volatile, it helps you weather the volatility of private credit and sleep soundly. Of course, this is just moving average pricing. At this juncture, I really think there is no reason left because the spreads in private credit were quite considerable in 2000 and 2001, and now the oranges have been squeezed dry. Although not completely dry, because private credit clearly demands higher rates than public credit. But wait, if the rates of private credit are higher than public credit, why not invest in public credit? Why? Because public credit won't take you; your risk is too high. So the question boils down to: you want to be compensated for potential losses with a 200 basis point excess return (just nominally), **but you hope the losses won't be worse, but they will be, because the ratings of private credit are far lower than public credit.** The B-rated and below sectors dominate private credit, far exceeding public credit, which only accounts for about 28%

> I believe both sides have a point in the first part of your question. I do think it will go higher, and I also believe it is a store of value. In fact, I think these two are two sides of the same coin. Currently, **I think holding gold mining stocks is fine. Of course, junior gold miners carry a lot of risks,** but their price increases are not too significant yet. As gold prices rise, junior miners are likely to be acquired by senior miners, and consolidation may occur. So you have two ways to profit from mining stocks: either through acquisition or the entire sector rising. **Physical gold is difficult to manage, but if you can do it, that would be the preferred way to hold gold. I wouldn't recommend gold ETFs as a long-term store of value. Gold ETFs are just a trading tool, a way to quickly gain exposure to the sector, which is fine. But don't think that if the dollar suddenly depreciates significantly, you will be immune to its effects. That's why I buy land.**
> 
> **For example, the land I bought is a timber ranch. It is basically farmland, and holding it is very efficient because you can get a lot of tax credits.** So, I operate a timber ranch, but I don't know how to manage it, how to control burning, or to what extent thinning is needed. So I hired a company to do it. The rent from the timber is very useful, so they conduct burning, thinning, and harvest in the optimal way, then pay me. Because they take away a significant portion of the timber, as I need far more than what my fireplace and boiler require. If the power grid has issues, it can be used to heat the house. So, this is very efficient, and I think my holding cost is even negative. I like farmland or another place with a quality of life. And it should be in an area where population growth can be reasonably expected, where despite population growth, the quality of life remains very high. Timber ranches fit this well because they are often in rural areas, where population growth tends to be faster than in urban areas. The quality of life there may be worse than it was 30 years ago, but it is still much better than in today's big cities, and the deterioration in the future will be much slower.
> 
> **First of all, the S&P 500 is at an absolute high relative to its own history.** This doesn't happen often; although there has been a pullback, valuations are still very high, such as the CAPE ratio being extremely high. Moreover, I believe foreign markets, especially emerging markets, have tailwinds. Look at Morgan Stanley's MSCI index, just looking at the U.S. portion, and then looking at the rest of the world, the price-to-book ratio in the U.S. is two and a half times that of other regions in the world. You can find reasons for this multiple, such as during the data center and AI construction boom, it makes some sense, but that is unsustainable. So I think from a valuation perspective, this is very obvious. Similarly, the core of all this is the anti-dollar view. As a dollar investor, you will gain from currency conversion. Where will this come from? Most likely from solid emerging market regions. This has already started to happen. That's why my view is good; I hate the S&P and don't want to touch it at all. Two or three years ago, you could make this argument quite convincingly, and at that time, you wouldn't be too far off, but it was indeed wrong, and the S&P continued to outperform. But now it has reversed. We see emerging markets outperforming, the UK outperforming, and many of these are outperforming. Growth stocks have stopped outperforming value stocks, although not very convincingly, but it is indeed the case Small-cap stocks are still relatively convincing compared to large-cap stocks. So it seems that a few basic pillars are already in place. Moreover, rather than saying I am waiting for it to start working, it is more accurate to say that it has already started to work, and this trend is far from over.
> 
> **Our emerging markets team has indeed done very well in recent years, and they are very focused on Latin America, which I think is a good starting point.** Although we have avoided Venezuela and Argentina for many years. If you were an investor in Venezuela, the day Maduro was ousted would have been a great day for you. Bonds rose by 20 points, but they had previously fallen by much more than that. So it’s a wash. For stocks, I like Southeast Asia as a U.S. investor, but other Southeast Asian countries can also be considered. Then for the long term, like for a child's college fund, I have been recommending Indian stocks for many years. This is a story of a demographic powerhouse with an educated population and the potential for progress through eliminating corruption, improving the legal system, and so on. I believe in it, not just this year, not just in the next three years, but in the next thirty years. I think you will see India develop like China did over the past 35 years. I think that is the trend. Just don’t look at your bills, because when it drops 20%, you will want to sell. But if you hold on, you might get a 10x return.
> 
> **This is the same with stocks. We want the real economy. Again, we want Latin America. We probably started holding some Indian bonds for the first time about two years ago, and they haven’t performed very well; India has been a bit quiet recently, but that means now is a good time to buy.** We have a Double Line roundtable meeting every early January, attended by some people. I really like Charles Payne, who participates almost every year. Last year, he talked about a company that manufactures small nuclear reactors that can power data centers, outputting a lot but not being very large. He recommended it last year, saying it rose a lot, and then it all fell back. He told me, so why don’t you buy it now? He said, buy, buy, buy, buy, buy. It’s that kind of thing. Sometimes the fundamentals are good, but huge gains can be completely reversed due to changes in speculative trends. For example, gold has a risk; we saw it drop $500 intraday one day. One issue with gold is that if the world is in trouble, usually in our current environment, you would expect gold to perform well, and it does perform well. But if there is a risk asset sell-off, if the stock market drops 15%, or if there are issues like credit defaults, what do people do? When an asset class they hold is in free fall, they will sell something that hasn’t started to drop yet. They will sell those things that haven’t started to drop just because of capital flows. Gold has vulnerability in this regard. But I wouldn’t worry about it. I wouldn’t sell gold at $5,000. I don’t know what its target price is now, but my target price is higher.
> 
> **Yes, I like commodities. In the first half of last year, we were only bullish on gold. But once we saw some industrial metals, like copper, start to rise, I looked at the BCOM index, the Bloomberg Commodity Index, and it finally started to break above the 200-day moving average.** After being below it for two and a half years, it broke through, which could be a sign that something is happening. Then the 200-day moving average started to move upward So now we have a commodities bull market. We are broadly optimistic about the commodity index, and of course, we are optimistic about gold, overweighting gold. We are optimistic about the BCOM index.
> 
> Yes, that opportunity was quite attractive three to four months ago. Since then, it has performed well, good performance over four months, but it means the opportunity is smaller than before. I still think it is the cheapest sector in the investment-grade bond market. So it still has that advantage. But the easy money has already been made. One positive factor in the commercial mortgage market is that market sentiment has improved significantly. When you mention that commercial mortgage securities might be a good thing, people no longer hang up the phone immediately. They are really seeing it now; in fact, a buying frenzy started a few months ago, with issued deals receiving 15 to 20 times oversubscription. This indicates a lot of positive sentiment. This alone is not a single-variable green light. When you start to move from three years of painful sentiment to something more acceptable, it means it may be in a positive performance cycle.
> 
> **Today, I would hold a little more cash than usual, waiting to deploy into higher-risk assets. I would set this ratio at 20% or 25%. For a typical investor, I would suggest a roughly similar allocation, perhaps 20% in physical assets (gold, land, commodities).** I personally hold more, but my situation is a bit unique compared to the average person. **Then for stocks, I would allocate about 35%.** I think stocks are overvalued, **but I would 100% invest in non-dollar, non-U.S. local currency markets.** So there is risk, but you have cash and physical assets as a hedge, with the remaining portion allocated to a medium to short-term, higher-rated bond portfolio, which is not very sexy but very stable. So our discussion scope is within a seven-year term, mainly investment-grade, possibly down to BB-rated. Because I think there will be better opportunities almost everywhere. But you don’t want... you want different allocations at different times, but overall. That’s my view, which hasn’t changed much over the past year. One of the hardest things in the investment industry is to make changes after you are right. It’s really hard to do that. So my mindset now is that I have been right. Over the past few years, especially last year, I was quite right and benefited greatly from it. But don’t get complacent because of that. Just because you are right doesn’t mean things will always go in one direction. Because when you are right, especially when managing other people's money, it’s difficult. If you buy Apple stock at $5 and it rises to $500, you have a good thing. Every client meeting you say, look at this, it cost $5, now $500, a 100-fold return. The meeting atmosphere is great. You made money, feel good, there’s emotional satisfaction. But if you sell it, suddenly it’s no longer in the portfolio, and you have nothing wonderful to talk about. And because it went from $5 to $500, you have a huge emotional attachment. I remember when I first bought bank stocks after years and years of not touching bank stocks, finally after the global financial crisis, I decided it was time to buy bank stocks. It felt very strange; I felt like I was in a different place. Suddenly I became an investor in bank stocks, while I had always been anti-bank. This can affect your own psychology. I know most investors won’t delve deep enough to understand what I’m saying, but making changes after being right is really hard, like losing an old friend That said, I haven't changed; I stand by my views because I believe we are still in the early stages.
> 
> **I believe that the massive deficit will ultimately lead to inflation.** So I think that by 2026, we won't have a serious inflation problem. In fact, it may be quite mild. Tariffs seem to have little impact, possibly affecting the CPI by only 0.3% to 0.4%. It looks like we won't see more of such impacts. The GDP reported now is heavily skewed towards a few industries, but inflation is too. So we have very diverse economic statistics. But I believe that ultimately the deficit will lead to inflation, so we will have inflationary policies. Therefore, I think inflation will be seen as, perhaps not a conscious choice, but something that permeates the air, viewed as a better solution than a complete debt collapse. This will cause incredible damage to old institutions and be highly destructive to most groups in society. But this is inevitable. I believe we will choose inflation, and any pressure from debt defaults will be a real problem that will lead to severe deflation and a collapse of the financial system. This will encourage a shift towards inflationary policies. Consequently, you will find that inflation is the answer to wealth inequality. If people are concerned about wealth inequality, if you have hyperinflation, then everyone is affected. This is one of the reasons why inflation is ultimately chosen during times of crisis, because it is better than the alternatives. What will actually happen is that we will have a society where individualism becomes less desirable, and community and social participation become more desirable. I feel this trend is already in its nascent stage or deeper, as people have become extremely pathological due to isolation from others. The closure of schools during the pandemic has been a devastating blow to an entire generation, leaving them with long-term, possibly lifelong psychological trauma. They will begin to see community, interaction, knowing neighbors, and caring for others as far more valuable than getting likes from people they don't know or who may not even be real. So, I think this is coming. There is a book, "The Fourth Turning" by Neil Howe, recommended to me, which talks about this trend and how it will reverse as we enter a new structure in the coming years. We talked about how in the 50s and 60s, people were keen on community involvement. They gathered for church dinners, bowled with bowling leagues, and participated in the Moose Club. Now, no one bowls unless they bowl alone. So it's all about a pendulum swinging back and forth; you can look at hundreds of years of data, usually about a generation, where for some reason, extreme individualism is encouraged until it becomes excessive, then swings back to more community awareness. Yes, that's the direction we're heading. It will be good. But we have to get through the trough.
> 
> **I believe that artificial intelligence has passed the first stage of enthusiasm among investors and business people. I think they are starting to realize that the pace of progress they were once very excited about is actually not achievable in a linear fashion.** I am not a heavy AI user; many people on my team are. But when I use Google Search, AI pops up automatically, and I find it inaccurate. And I also believe that AI will never be able to create anything. So I think it will take over some creative work ideas, but there is a very, very strong dead end Because I can't imagine what it would be like to submit papers in a university classroom, there may already be observations that professors receive ten identical papers, which definitely won't work. That's not productive and must be discarded. So, through attempts and explorations, we will find ways to implement it. I think this is one of the reasons for the S&P 500 (or more accurately, the narrow base within the S&P), but I am a bit reluctant to touch it because I think we have been overly optimistic and now need a correction. We don't have enough power to support it. It's like the wind turbine craze; I feel that it has been overly trusted. Now people are starting to realize that wind turbines generate negative energy. What are we really doing?

I feel optimistic because the frustration I felt six to ten years ago, when I thought I was the only one who saw the need to solve problems, while people thought everything was fine and could go on forever. What encourages me is that many people who have never thought about these issues are now recognizing them. This is exciting because it means you can start addressing problems and make positive changes, rather than continuing to spin in a vicious cycle of unsustainable financial and social relationships (especially wealth relationships)

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