---
title: "2008 déjà vu? The spillover of the private credit crisis may cause the insurance industry to become the first \"domino\" to fall!"
type: "News"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/278347799.md"
description: "BlackRock's redemption limit has triggered a private credit crisis, with the insurance industry being the first to feel the pressure due to deep bundling, stemming from its investment allocation of about one-third in this area, and a large number of highly leveraged products being incorrectly rated as investment grade. Goldman Sachs has warned that the insurance debt spread has widened significantly. This wave of redemptions, caused by the impact of AI on tech loans and rating failures, has made the trillion-dollar insurance industry the most vulnerable transmission node, raising market concerns that it could evolve into a systemic risk similar to that of 2008"
datetime: "2026-03-09T07:34:40.000Z"
locales:
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/278347799.md)
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/278347799.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/278347799.md)
---

> Supported Languages: [简体中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/278347799.md) | [繁體中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/278347799.md)


# 2008 déjà vu? The spillover of the private credit crisis may cause the insurance industry to become the first "domino" to fall!

The crisis in the private credit market is breaking boundaries and spreading to the broader financial system, with the insurance industry—a trillion-dollar sector deeply intertwined with private credit—potentially becoming the first "domino" to fall in this round of turmoil.

This week, BlackRock officially announced redemption restrictions (gating) on its $26 billion HPS corporate loan fund, marking the most iconic event in this round of private credit crisis. Prior to this, Blue Owl and Blackstone had taken emergency measures to avoid triggering redemption thresholds, while UBS raised its forecast for private credit default rates to a shocking 15%. Meanwhile, according to Bloomberg index data, the average yield premium on bonds from U.S. life insurance companies has widened by about 45 basis points compared to the overall investment-grade corporate bond spread in the U.S., doubling the gap from a year ago.

The pressure on the insurance industry stems from its heavy reliance on private credit. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported last October that private credit has long been a significant component of insurance company portfolios, particularly in North America, accounting for about one-third of their total investments. **This means that once the asset quality of private credit deteriorates or the rating system fails, the capital of insurance companies will face severe erosion, and liquidity gaps may also emerge.**

****

Market concerns are no longer limited to private credit funds themselves. Goldman Sachs credit strategist Spencer Rogers acknowledged in a recent report that the multiple headwinds surrounding the disruptive impact of artificial intelligence and private credit risks are driving the spreads of U.S. investment-grade insurance bonds wider, and this trend has already gone through two distinct acceleration phases, with the current diffusion trend far from over.

## Private Credit Crisis: From "Boiling Frog" to Total Loss of Control

In recent months, the cracks in the private credit market have continued to widen, ultimately evolving into a multi-point redemption crisis.

**The trigger was the market's increasing awareness of private credit exposure in the software and SaaS industries.** As artificial intelligence agents rapidly replace traditional software developers, the repayment ability of a large number of tech loans, previously regarded as "stable cash flows," has come into question, leading to a reassessment of the net asset values (NAV) of related private credit funds by investors.

According to reports, **about a month ago, this panic began to evolve into organized capital flight:** Two funds under Blue Owl faced forced asset sales to avoid formally triggering redemption restrictions; Blackstone was subsequently forced to ask employees to dig into their own pockets to cover a $400 million redemption gap in its largest private credit fund—Blackstone Private Credit Fund This week, BlackRock officially "closed the door" on the HPS Corporate Loan Fund, becoming a key blow to market confidence. Notably, another private credit fund under BlackRock, TCP Capital, disclosed just one day before BlackRock announced the redemption limit that it had adjusted the valuation of a certain portfolio loan from a par value of 100 cents at the end of September to 0 by the end of December.

According to reports, publicly traded Business Development Companies (BDCs) are currently trading at an average discount of 20% to their net asset value. Goldman Sachs estimates that there are a total of 141 bonds issued by both public and private BDCs, with an outstanding par value of approximately $74 billion and an average rating of BBB-, with their spread levels even higher than the BB index.

If the aforementioned capital flight were to occur in traditional banks, it would be directly defined as a "bank run." **However, due to the structural limitations on redemption sizes in private credit funds, investors can only queue up and wait to see how much of their shares they can actually retrieve.**

## Insurance Industry: The Most Vulnerable Link in the Private Credit Chain

The deep binding between the insurance industry and private credit makes it the primary spillover target in this crisis.

**The IMF clearly articulated this structural risk in its report last October:** Private credit instruments provide insurance companies with long-duration assets that match their long-term liabilities and additional liquidity premiums; however, insurance companies are increasingly holding structured private credit products, including collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), commercial real estate CLOs, and high-leverage mortgage fund bonds, which impose higher demands on asset-liability management.

More critically, there is the rating issue. Most private credit held by insurance companies is rated as investment grade, which directly determines their risk capital usage and asset-liability matching qualifications. The IMF explicitly warned: **Once investment-grade tools are incorrectly classified as investment grade, the actual default losses under economic shocks will far exceed expectations, "leading to capital impairment for insurance companies and potentially triggering liquidity gaps due to insufficient cash flow from defaulting entities."**

Goldman's Spencer Rogers pointed out in his report that the widening of insurance bond spreads in this round can be divided into two phases—first, in late January, due to the overall market repricing of AI risks, and second, subsequently, life insurance companies faced more concentrated impacts, with the core narrative logic being "viewing life insurance companies as conduits for private credit risk, and the increasingly close ownership and distribution ties between insurance companies and alternative asset management firms."

Data shows that the bond spreads of U.S. life insurance companies widened to 132 basis points at one point this week, the highest level in recent months.

## Goldman Sachs "Market Support," but the Market is Not Buying It

In the face of deteriorating market sentiment, Goldman's Rogers attempted to provide investors with a relatively optimistic interpretative framework Rogers believes that the probability of private credit evolving into a systemic risk remains low, and the main channel through which the current distress spreads to the broader credit market is "risk sentiment," rather than a comprehensive deterioration of fundamentals. His review of the balance sheets of representative sample life insurance companies shows that their median allocation to alternative assets is only 6%, "less aggressive than market concerns." He estimates that these insurance companies have an average allocation of about 22% to "private securities" in their available-for-sale investment portfolios, but a significant portion of this consists of more liquid private placements (such as those issued under Rule 144A or Regulation S), rather than truly hard-to-price instruments.

Rogers concludes that the recent sell-off is "more driven by headline effects rather than fundamentals," believing that the current price levels do not support a sustained widening of spreads in the insurance sector.

**However, the market's reaction indicates that investors do not agree with this assessment.** Following BlackRock's formal announcement of redemption limits, the logic that private credit funds can rely on internal liquidity and ample capital within the ecosystem to absorb shocks is facing greater scrutiny. It is worth mentioning that Rogers still chooses to support his optimistic view with observations from rating agencies' watchlists, a strategy reminiscent of many analysts during 2007 and 2008.

## Rating Black Box: The Invisible Amplifier of Crisis

**In this round of private credit crisis, the reliability of rating agencies is becoming an increasingly critical variable.**

According to Bloomberg, in the private credit rating market, a single-family home located on Haverford Station Road in the suburbs of Philadelphia serves as the headquarters of the rating agency Egan-Jones—this small agency, with 20 analysts, has quietly become the most active player in the market for private credit ratings, boasting no fewer than 3,000 private credit rating assignments.

**However, Egan-Jones's own compliance record is not reassuring:** The agency has previously been charged by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for conflicts of interest and is currently facing a new round of SEC investigations into its rating practices. The Bermuda regulatory authority no longer recognizes its rating qualifications, and there are whistleblowers who have started competitive rating agencies.

The IMF report has clearly emphasized: "Reliable private ratings are key to the prudent regulation of insurance companies, and it is essential to ensure the robustness of private rating assessments and to require that rating methodologies and reports have sufficient transparency to minimize the risk of inflated ratings."

But the reality is that this warning was largely ignored during the market's euphoric phase. As the wave of redemptions continues to ferment, once rating agencies are forced to conduct substantial re-evaluations or face legal accountability from investors—as occurred after the 2009 crisis—**the large-scale emergence of "fallen angels" (bonds downgraded to speculative grade) will be difficult to avoid, and the impact on insurance bond spreads and the credit default swap market will far exceed current levels.**

## Shadows of Crisis and the Mirror of 2008

**This crisis resonates disturbingly with the 2008 global financial crisis across multiple dimensions.**

Mechanically, financial products that appear to have ample liquidity are assigned ratings that exceed their actual risk levels; similarly, a large amount of systemic risk exposure has accumulated in areas with relatively loose regulation and low transparency; and once again, insurance companies serve as the core nodes for risk transmission—one of the key drivers of the 2008 crisis, American International Group (AIG), was an insurance company, and the chain reaction triggered by its massive credit downgrade ultimately accelerated the full-blown outbreak of that crisis.

Currently, the $1.8 trillion private credit market and the $10 trillion insurance industry are forming deep entanglements through complex product structures and equity ties. The responses of regulatory agencies, rating agencies, and large asset management companies will largely determine whether this crisis can be contained within manageable limits or evolve into a broader systemic shock like in 2008

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