---
title: "Cathay Securities · Macro Focus | The Gold Bull Market of the 1970s: How It Started, How It Ended - A Historical Comparative Study Three"
type: "News"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/282449571.md"
description: "This article analyzes the beginning and end of the gold bull market in the 1970s, pointing out that it was influenced by factors such as the restructuring of the monetary system, uncontrolled inflation expectations, and speculative sentiment. From 1970 to 1974, the depreciation of the dollar and intensified inflation drove up gold demand; from 1975 to 1976, improvements in macro fundamentals and supply pressures led to a decline in gold prices; from 1977 to 1980, rampant inflation and geopolitical conflicts once again pushed gold prices up, until the bull market ended in 1980 with the Federal Reserve's interest rate hikes"
datetime: "2026-04-12T14:19:30.000Z"
locales:
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/282449571.md)
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/282449571.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/282449571.md)
---

# Cathay Securities · Macro Focus | The Gold Bull Market of the 1970s: How It Started, How It Ended - A Historical Comparative Study Three

·Investment Highlights·

1970-1974: The Initial Rise of Gold. The onset of the gold bull market in the 1970s was primarily influenced by factors such as the restructuring of the monetary system, uncontrollable inflation expectations, and speculative sentiment. First, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system led to a continuous weakening of the dollar, ushering in an era of free pricing for gold. Second, the excessively loose domestic monetary policy and the impact of geopolitical conflicts caused inflation expectations in the U.S. to spiral out of control, significantly increasing the demand for gold as a store of value. Third, the legalization of gold investment in the U.S. spurred speculative demand, with a large amount of speculative capital building positions in the second half of 1974, pushing gold prices to local historical highs before the lifting of the ban.

Bretton Woods System Oil Crisis

1975-1976: Who Pressed the Pause Button on Gold? The fervent rise of gold came to a "sudden stop" in 1975. First, improvements in macro fundamentals weakened gold's attractiveness. On one hand, U.S. inflation expectations significantly cooled. On the other hand, the dollar stabilized and rebounded, and the stock market recovered, reducing the appeal of gold as a non-yielding asset. Second, domestic demand for gold purchases fell short of expectations, reversing previous speculative sentiment. Third, the U.S. Treasury, IMF, and the Soviet government sold gold, increasing supply pressure on the market and affecting market expectations and investment sentiment.

1977-1980: How Did Gold Regain Its Upward Momentum? The resurgence of malignant inflation, frequent geopolitical black swan events, and the collapse of faith in fiat currency were all significant drivers for gold's rise again. First, in 1977, the U.S. experienced a second wave of even more intense inflation. Internally, the overly loose fiscal and monetary policies in the U.S. became a breeding ground for the resurgence of inflation. Externally, the supply shocks from the second energy crisis accelerated the uncontrollable inflation expectations. Even though the Federal Reserve continuously raised interest rates to curb inflation, the uncontrollable inflation expectations led to a downward trend instead. Second, in 1979, frequent geopolitical black swan events accelerated the demand for safe-haven assets, propelling the gold bull market. Third, the surge in speculative demand pushed the precious metals market into a frenzy. Ultimately, this gold bull market only came to an end in 1980 when the newly appointed chairman of the Federal Reserve violently raised interest rates, completely reversing the expectations for real interest rates.

Real Interest Rates Paul Volcker

Learning from History: What Experiences Are Worth Referencing? Experience 1: In times of crisis, gold is the best investment choice. During the periods of 1970-1974 and 1977-1980, gold's annualized returns reached 32.5% and 45.2%, significantly outperforming other assets. Experience 2: The core determinant of gold prices is not inflation itself, but the relative speed between inflation expectations and nominal interest rates, i.e., real interest rates. Looking ahead, whether conflicts in the Middle East will lead to a loosening of the market's long-term inflation expectations is an important factor affecting gold's trend. Experience 3: Central bank gold sales, technical overbought conditions, or leveraged cleanouts may temporarily affect market sentiment, but the long-term trend of gold is ultimately determined by whether there is a significant reversal in the core macro driving factors Experience Four: When speculative funds flood in, be wary of significant short-term fluctuations in gold and avoid blindly increasing positions at high points.

Stagflation

Overall, we believe that the macro core factors affecting the gold trend have not changed, the foundation of the gold bull market remains, and short-term adjustments and fluctuations can still provide good allocation opportunities.

Risk Warning: Continued unexpected escalation of geopolitical situations leading to significant adjustments in global assets, tighter-than-expected U.S. monetary policy, and high energy prices increasing global economic recession pressures.

In 2025, gold prices surged, with an annual increase of over 50%, and in January 2026, it broke through the $5,000/ounce mark, briefly approaching $5,600/ounce. However, since March 2026, with the sharp deterioration of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East and the impact of energy prices, gold prices rapidly fell to around $4,400, erasing all gains for the year. So, has the long-term gold bull market that started at the end of 2022 already peaked?

To better understand how the gold market will evolve under the backdrop of escalating geopolitical conflicts and inflation concerns, we can refer to the gold bull market of the 1970s to 1980s, which was similarly filled with high inflation, geopolitical conflicts, energy crises, and shaken trust in fiat currencies. At that time, gold prices rose sharply from $35/ounce in 1970 to around $183/ounce in 1974, then experienced a nearly 50% decline from 1975 to 1976, but regained upward momentum in 1977, skyrocketing to $850/ounce in 1980.

By reviewing the evolution logic of the 1970s gold bull market, we hope to answer the following questions: First, what factors pressed the "pause button" on gold's rise in the mid-1970s and triggered an eighteen-month deep adjustment? Second, how did gold reshape its macro logic and initiate a more vigorous rise after a near-halving correction? Third, what reference significance does the experience of the 1970s hold for the currently volatile gold market?

1

1970-1974: The Initial Rise of Gold

To understand the gold crash in the mid-1970s, we must first review the origins of this bull market. The onset of the 1970s gold bull market was mainly influenced by the restructuring of the monetary system, uncontrolled inflation expectations, and speculative sentiment.

First, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system led to a continuous weakening of the dollar, and gold entered an era of free pricing. After the 1960s, as the U.S. became mired in the Vietnam War and welfare spending surged, its fiscal deficit and international balance of payments deficit continued to expand A large amount of dollars flowed overseas, leading to foreign central banks accumulating dollar-denominated debts far exceeding the U.S. gold reserves. European countries frequently demanded to exchange dollars for gold, putting the U.S. gold reserves at risk of depletion. On August 13, 1971, Nixon announced the suspension of gold exchanges with foreign central banks, marking the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The dollar, losing its gold backing, faced a severe credit crisis, and market trust in fiat currency sharply declined, with the dollar index dropping from 160 at the beginning of 1971 to around 92 in 1973. In contrast, gold prices rose rapidly, ushering in an era of free pricing.

Secondly, uncontrolled inflation expectations weakened the purchasing power of the currency, significantly increasing the demand for gold as a store of value. Since 1972, alongside the rise in the year-on-year growth rate of the CPI, U.S. inflation expectations began to heat up. The loss of control over inflation expectations was influenced by both internal and external factors. Internally, Burns' relatively loose monetary policy from 1971 to 1972 laid the groundwork for inflation. Under political pressure, the effective federal funds rate in the U.S. quickly dropped from 5.6% in September 1971 to 3.3% in February 1972, while the year-on-year growth rate of M1 rose from 4.5% at the beginning of 1971 to 9.3% at the beginning of 1973, and M2 maintained a high growth rate of 12%-13% throughout 1972, resulting in a significant expansion of the money supply. Additionally, the Nixon administration attempted to curb inflation in 1971 through non-market means such as "wage and price controls," but once these administrative controls were lifted in 1974, the previously accumulated inflationary pressures were released more rapidly.

Externally, the oil crisis brought about by geopolitical conflicts accelerated the loss of control over inflation expectations. In October 1973, the fourth Middle East war broke out, and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed an oil embargo on Western countries, causing global crude oil prices to soar from about $3 per barrel to over $12 in just a few months, an increase of more than 300%. By October 1973, the U.S. CPI was already at a high of 8.1%, which further rose to a peak of 12.2% in November 1974 under the impact of energy prices.

Thirdly, the legalization of gold investment in the U.S. spurred speculative demand. On August 14, 1974, the U.S. announced that starting December 31, 1974, American citizens would regain the legal right to own and trade gold bars and coins. In the lead-up to the lifting of the ban, global investment sentiment in the gold market was quite exuberant, with widespread expectations that a large amount of private hedging demand would flood into the gold market, thereby driving up gold prices Driven by "bullish expectations," a large amount of speculative capital built positions in the second half of 1974, pushing gold prices to a local historical high of $195 the day before the ban was lifted.

2

1975-1976: Who Pressed the Pause Button on Gold

The frenzied rise of gold came to a "sudden halt" in 1975. After reaching a peak of $184 per ounce at the end of December 1974, gold prices entered a bear market that lasted nearly two years, ultimately hitting a low of $103.5 per ounce at the end of August 1976, a decline of 43%. Specifically, this deep correction was the result of improved macro fundamentals, policy interventions, and a cooling of speculative sentiment.

First, the improvement in macro fundamentals weakened the appeal of gold. On one hand, U.S. inflation expectations significantly cooled. After experiencing the severe impact of the first oil crisis in 1973-1974, the global economy and supply chains began to gradually adapt to the new energy price center. The U.S. CPI peaked at 12.1% year-on-year in December 1974, and began to show a significant cooling trend as commodity prices fell and demand decreased due to the economic recession. By the end of 1975, it had dropped to 7.1%, and further significantly retreated to a safe range of 5%-6% in 1976.

On the other hand, the dollar stabilized and rebounded, and the stock market recovered, reducing the attractiveness of gold as a non-yielding asset. With inflation peaking and receding, and panic sentiment dissipating, the dollar index saw a significant rebound from 1975 to 1976, restoring public trust in the dollar. Meanwhile, after experiencing the stock market crash of 1973-1974, the U.S. stock market showed strong recovery momentum in 1975. The Nasdaq index rebounded from 58 points in December 1974 to around 91 points in June 1976, an increase of 57%. When the inflation threat was lifted, the dollar strengthened, and stock market returns were relatively generous, the appeal of gold significantly declined.

Second, the demand for gold from residents fell short of expectations, reversing previous speculative sentiment. After the lifting of the ban on December 31, 1974, the anticipated public "gold rush" did not materialize. On one hand, American residents lacked a tradition of holding gold, and the previously soaring gold prices made gold bars too expensive for ordinary investors, lacking attractiveness. On the other hand, the U.S. economy was still in recession, with the unemployment rate reaching as high as 9% in May 1975, which also limited residents' ability to purchase gold. The weak demand, combined with the previously excessive price increases, led investors to sell gold on a large scale, and the decline in gold prices further undermined investment confidence, creating a vicious cycle 
Third, the U.S. Treasury, IMF, and the Soviet government sold gold, increasing the supply of gold. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, to maintain the authority of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve asset, the U.S. did not want gold prices to rise rapidly. In January and June 1975, the U.S. Treasury conducted two gold auctions, with scales of 2 million ounces and 500,000 ounces, respectively. Although the scale of the sales was not large compared to the total supply of gold, it sent a policy signal to the market that the U.S. government was unwilling to tolerate a continuous surge in gold prices.

To change the monetary attributes of gold and provide aid funds to developing countries, the IMF also decided in August 1975 to auction 25 million ounces of gold in batches in the open market over the next five years and "return" 25 million ounces of gold according to the quota ratio of member countries. As a result, gold prices plummeted sharply in September 1975. The results of the second gold auction organized by the IMF in July 1976 were not ideal, further increasing the pressure on the market to sell gold. Although in the long run, official selling behavior did not completely dominate market supply and demand, during the period of 1975-1976, the selling actions of the IMF and the U.S. Treasury significantly influenced market expectations and investment sentiment.

In addition to the U.S. Treasury and IMF, the Soviet Union was forced to sell a large amount of gold in 1976 to raise funds to purchase grain due to poor domestic agricultural harvests. This "rigid sale" also significantly increased the total global supply of gold at that time, increasing the instability of gold prices.

3

1977-1980: How did gold regain its upward momentum?

Although the mainstream view of the market was relatively pessimistic about gold in 1976, gold prices began a fierce second phase of increase after hitting bottom in August 1976, soaring from $110/ounce to $850/ounce in January 1980 within less than three and a half years, with a cumulative increase of 670%. The reasons for this include the resurgence of malignant inflation, frequent geopolitical black swans, and the collapse of faith in fiat currency, all of which were important drivers for gold's rise again.

First, the core macroeconomic support for the second round of gold's explosive rise after 1977 was the resurgence of a second wave of major inflation in the U.S. This wave of inflation was more intense and persistent than that of 1973-1974 The reason lies in the long-term loose monetary and fiscal policies within the United States, compounded by the severe impact of the second energy crisis externally, ultimately leading to a loss of control over inflation expectations across society. Looking back, the two surges in gold prices during the 1970s were highly correlated with inflation expectations.

Internally, the overly loose fiscal and monetary policies in the United States became a breeding ground for the resurgence of inflation. By the end of 1976, the U.S. CPI had fallen to around 5% year-on-year, leading macro decision-makers at the time to believe that inflation had been successfully contained. In terms of fiscal policy, after taking office in January 1977, President Carter pushed through the Economic Stimulus Appropriations Act of 1977 to fulfill his political promise of reducing unemployment, which included tax reduction plans for individuals and businesses, as well as a significant increase in government spending on public service employment. This policy kept the U.S. deficit rate above 2.6% even as economic growth had already recovered. In terms of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve's focus shifted towards reducing unemployment and maintaining economic growth, with the M2 year-on-year growth rate remaining high at 12% from 1976 to 1977, and excessive liquidity injection also laid hidden dangers for the resurgence of inflation.

Externally, the supply shock brought about by the second energy crisis accelerated the loss of control over inflation expectations. In early 1979, political turmoil in Iran led to a sharp decline in its crude oil production, triggering the "second oil crisis." Crude oil prices skyrocketed from $12.8 per barrel in 1978 to $40 per barrel in early 1980, an increase of over 210%. Under the influence of soaring oil prices, the U.S. CPI peaked at 14.6% in April 1980. The high energy costs not only forced businesses to raise product prices across the board but also triggered dissatisfaction among the labor class. At that time, U.S. labor unions, which had strong negotiating power, forced companies to significantly increase wages. Companies then passed the increased labor costs onto product prices, forming a self-reinforcing "wage-price spiral."

During this period, even though the Federal Reserve continuously raised interest rates to curb inflation, with the effective federal funds rate rising from 4.6% in early 1977 to 13.8% in early 1980, the actual interest rates did not rebound due to the loss of control over inflation expectations, but instead showed a downward trend. Therefore, the rise in inflation expectations and the decline in actual interest rates not only made gold an effective vehicle for resisting wealth erosion but also reduced the opportunity cost of holding gold 
Secondly, the frequent occurrence of geopolitical black swan events in 1979 accelerated the bull market for gold due to increased demand for safe-haven assets. A series of international crises caused the safe-haven properties of gold to peak in 1979. On one hand, Iran experienced a regime change in 1979, leading to a significant rise in uncertainty in the Middle East. On the other hand, by the end of 1979, the Cold War situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was also tightening, further reinforcing gold's safe-haven attributes.

Thirdly, a surge in speculative demand pushed the precious metals market into a frenzy. According to statistics from the British comprehensive gold mining company, speculative demand for gold globally was about 5 million ounces in 1978, but it surged to approximately 14 to 15 million ounces in 1979, with a year-on-year increase of nearly 200%.

At the same time, the gold derivatives market also experienced unprecedented prosperity. By the end of 1979, the trading volume of gold futures on major U.S. commodity exchanges had dramatically increased from about 400,000 ounces per day in 1975 to about 5 million ounces per day. A large influx of retail and speculative funds entered the market, and high leverage significantly amplified the volatility of gold market prices.

Extreme speculative sentiment not only drove up gold prices but was also clearly reflected in the silver market. A typical example was the Hunt brothers' attempt to monopolize the global silver market through a short squeeze. At that time, the Hunt brothers controlled a large inventory of silver and aggressively went long in the futures market, causing silver prices to skyrocket from $16 per ounce in November 1979 to $49 per ounce in January 1980. The irrational surge in silver prices created a strong spillover effect, stimulating bullish sentiment among speculators for gold. The prices of silver and gold both reached historical highs in mid to late January 1980.

Ultimately, this gold bull market came to an end in 1980 when the newly appointed Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, with great political resolve, violently raised the federal funds rate to a punitive level of 20%, completely reversing expectations for real interest rates.

4

Learning from History: What Experiences Are Worth Referencing

Experience 1: In times of stagflation, gold is the best investment choice. The experience from the 1970s shows that in a "stagflation" scenario where economic growth stagnates and prices soar, traditional stock and bond assets often perform poorly. On one hand, stock prices are pressured by rising risk-free interest rates and limited profitability; on the other hand, bonds can suffer losses due to discounts from rapidly rising interest rates and the erosion of coupon value by high inflation. Gold, however, has high value preservation and safe-haven properties when inflation expectations spiral out of control and fiat currencies face a crisis of trust. During the periods of 1970-1974 and 1977-1980, the annualized returns on gold reached 32.5% and 45.2%, respectively Clearly outperforming other assets, it has become the most valuable investment choice during the "stagflation" period.

Experience 2: The core factor determining gold prices is not inflation itself, but the relative speed between inflation expectations and nominal interest rates, which is the real interest rate. In the 1970s, gold was able to rise alongside inflation primarily because the market lost confidence in the Federal Reserve's ability to control inflation, leading to runaway inflation expectations. In this situation, even though the Federal Reserve continued to raise interest rates, the slow pace of rate hikes caused real interest rates to decline as inflation expectations spiraled out of control. Therefore, gold not only benefits from its anti-inflation properties during periods of soaring inflation but also reduces its holding costs when real interest rates are falling.

Since March 2026, military conflicts between the U.S. and Iran have driven energy prices to surge, increasing inflationary pressures, yet gold has clearly declined. This is because, after experiencing a significant easing of inflation, the Federal Reserve's credibility in combating inflation has become relatively solid. Even during the significant rise in inflation in 2022, inflation expectations did not clearly exceed 3%. Since March 2026, market concerns that high oil prices would lead to tightening monetary policies by global central banks, while inflation expectations remain stable, have driven real interest rates to continue rising, thus putting significant downward pressure on gold.

Looking ahead, whether the Middle East conflict will lead to a loosening of the market's long-term inflation expectations is an important factor influencing gold's trend. Historically, supply-side shocks have been catalysts for inflation, but not every surge in energy prices will evolve into runaway inflation expectations. To see a decoupling of inflation expectations, loose fiscal and monetary policies are still needed to provide a breeding ground for inflation, along with a strong labor market that contributes to a wage-inflation spiral.

The evolution of inflation expectations in the future requires attention to several dynamic aspects: First, whether the Middle East conflict will persist long-term and evolve into widespread attacks on energy infrastructure, which could keep oil prices elevated and have broader impacts on global inflation. Second, whether Walsh can maintain the credibility of the Federal Reserve's independence after taking office. If Walsh is pressured by Trump's political influence to implement larger-scale rate cuts, it could lead to runaway inflation expectations. Third, whether U.S. fiscal policy will show a marginal expansion trend under the pressure of Trump's midterm elections and the economic downturn risks brought about by high oil prices. Fourth, whether the U.S. labor market will continue to maintain a tight balance, thereby reducing the risk of a wage-inflation spiral.

Experience 3: Central bank gold sales, technical overbought conditions, or leveraged cleanouts may temporarily affect market sentiment, but what truly determines the long-term trend of gold is whether the core macro driving factors undergo significant reversals. Looking back at the pullback of gold in the mid-1970s, the gold auctions by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury were once significant psychological pressure factors in the gold market However, when the macro backdrop of stagflation emerges, even if major global central banks continue to sell gold, it does not affect the onset of the gold bull market.

Experience Four: When speculative funds flood in, one must be wary of significant short-term fluctuations in gold and avoid blindly increasing positions at high points. During the gold bull market of the 1970s, there were instances where a large influx of short-term speculative funds led to significant fluctuations in gold prices. For example, at the end of 1974, the market rushed to build positions before the U.S. gold ban was lifted, driving up gold prices. However, after the ban was actually lifted, the anticipated retail frenzy did not materialize, leading to a noticeable pullback in gold prices. At the end of 1979, speculative funds represented by the Hunt brothers flooded into the gold market, causing a rapid irrational spike in gold prices, which subsequently collapsed under the impact of changes in margin rules at exchanges, resulting in a sharp drop in both gold and silver prices.

Since 2025, the investment demand for gold from the private sector (including gold ETFs, gold bars, and coins) has significantly increased, becoming a more important pricing factor for gold. This shift in demand structure may also imply that the volatility of gold prices will rise significantly. In this context, attention should be paid to controlling investment leverage in gold, and a systematic investment approach or more rational gold investment methods should be considered.

From the standpoint of 2026, we believe the foundation of the gold bull market remains intact, and short-term adjustments and fluctuations can still provide good allocation opportunities. First, the global trend of central banks buying gold is likely to continue. Although there is pressure for some central banks to sell gold due to the current stalemate in the Middle East situation, for instance, the Turkish central bank has rapidly sold gold to stabilize liquidity and exchange rates, and Middle Eastern countries may also have a demand to sell gold for liquidity due to oil production halts and damaged energy infrastructure. However, we believe that global central banks are still in a strategic trend of increasing their gold holdings. On one hand, geopolitical risks continue to disturb the global landscape, fiscal pressures on major economies are increasing, and concerns about the credibility of the U.S. dollar have not dissipated. The world will continue to experience a reconstruction of the monetary system under a declining foundation of trust. Moreover, the current gold reserves of central banks in emerging economies remain low, indicating significant room for gold purchases. The short-term selling of gold by some countries may temporarily affect the rhythm of the market, but it is unlikely to reverse the direction of the bull market.

Second, the core macro factors influencing the gold bull market have not yet reversed. The end of the gold bull market may require fundamental changes in several macro factors: First, if energy shocks ultimately lead to uncontrollable inflation in the U.S., and the Federal Reserve demonstrates a willingness to control inflation at the cost of economic recession similar to the Volcker era, it could reverse the macro environment for the gold bull market. Second, if the technological revolution driven by AI substantially transmits to macro fundamentals, driving a leap in productivity and significantly raising the global economic growth center, then gold may no longer be the optimal investment choice. Third, a substantial easing of great power competition combined with a decrease in uncertainty regarding U.S. policies may drive a retreat of global risk-averse funds and the restoration of the fiat currency trust system. However, the above macro factors have not yet shown a significant turning point, and the environment for the gold bull market is still expected to persist 5

Risk Warning

The ongoing geopolitical situation continues to exceed expectations, leading to significant adjustments in global assets, the tightening of U.S. monetary policy beyond expectations, and high energy prices increasing the pressure of global economic recession.

Report Source

The above content is excerpted from the securities research report published by Guotai Junan Securities.

Report Title: The Gold Bull Market of the 1970s: How It Started, How It Ended - A Historical Comparative Study III; Report Date: 2026.04.10 Report Authors:

Wang Yuqing (Analyst), Registration Number: S0880525040119

Liang Zhonghua (Analyst), Registration Number: S0880525040019

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