--- title: "A huge loss of 700 million, forced into bankruptcy, has the internet celebrity milk drink popularized by Li Jiaqi cooled down?" type: "News" locale: "en" url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/284897970.md" description: "Maiqiu'er was once the king of traffic on e-commerce platforms, with a market value of up to 5 billion, but now faces a bankruptcy crisis due to three consecutive years of negative net profit. The company's stock will be subject to risk warnings, with the abbreviation changed to \"ST MQR,\" and the daily price fluctuation limit adjusted to 5%. The decline of Maiqiu'er is attributed to various factors, including the \"propylene glycol incident\" in 2022, which damaged its high-end market positioning" datetime: "2026-05-01T12:01:39.000Z" locales: - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/284897970.md) - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/284897970.md) - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/284897970.md) --- # A huge loss of 700 million, forced into bankruptcy, has the internet celebrity milk drink popularized by Li Jiaqi cooled down? Have you ever tried Maiqiu'er? It was once hailed by countless consumers as the "Moutai of milk" and the "light of Xinjiang." On major e-commerce platforms, it has long been the king of traffic. But who would have thought that this listed company, once valued at 5 billion, known as the "milk myth of Xinjiang," is now facing another crisis. On April 28, Maiqiu'er announced that due to the net profit before and after deducting non-recurring items being negative for three consecutive accounting years from 2023 to 2025, and the 2025 audit report being issued with a "paragraph of significant uncertainty regarding continued operation," the company's stock trading will be subject to other risk warnings (ST). The stock was suspended for one day on April 28 and resumed trading on April 29 with other risk warnings. The stock abbreviation changed from "Maiqiu'er" to "ST Maiqiu," and the daily price fluctuation limit was adjusted from 10% to 5%. From a traffic darling to a capital orphan, the fall of Maiqiu'er is lamentable. **The Collapse of the "Internet Celebrity Legend"** Maiqiu'er's current predicament is due to a combination of multiple factors. Maiqiu'er is a private enterprise that started in 1988 from a baking workshop. From 2000 to 2014, it transitioned from baking to establish a dual-driven model of dairy + baking chain, going public in 2014 to raise funds for expansion. According to reports, Maiqiu'er adopted a new breeding model of "company + association + farmers," covering 67,000 dairy cows and over 20,000 dairy farmers. Maiqiu'er's 2024 annual report states that it has "100,000 acres of natural pastures," "a Holstein cow population of 50,000," and "key indicators far exceeding national standards." Based on different mechanisms and models, Maiqiu'er chose to take a differentiated path. According to Maiqiu'er's 2020 annual report: "Focusing on the high-end and ultra-high-end dairy product market nationwide" and "committed to creating 'the best milk in China.'" From 2014 to 2021, after going public, Maiqiu'er exploded with internet celebrity marketing (this marketing boom concentrated in 2020-2021, with Li Jiaqi promoting Maiqiu'er, and the so-called "Moutai of milk" marketing occurring in this context). In 2021, Maiqiu'er reached its peak with online traffic and high-end positioning: revenue of 1.146 billion yuan and a net profit of 18.4575 million yuan. However, one year later, in 2022, the "propylene glycol incident" broke out. The State Administration for Market Regulation and the Changji City Market Supervision Bureau ultimately determined that Maiqiu'er excessively used food additives containing propylene glycol in the pre-processing stage when producing pure milk for flavor enhancement. Based on the proactive addition behavior, some analysts speculate that propylene glycol may have been used to address the taste differences from dispersed milk sources while adapting to the market positioning of "high-end and ultra-high-end" "rich and pure milk." The direct impact of the "propylene glycol incident" is that MQR was confiscated illegal gains of 360,200 yuan, unqualified products, and fined 73.151 million yuan, with the legal representative and relevant responsible persons being fined. The confiscated amount far exceeds the peak profit of 2021, directly impacting cash flow. Due to crossing the food safety red line, MQR products were urgently removed from shelves and recalled, the persona of "rich and pure milk" collapsed, consumer trust plummeted, and channels in supermarkets and e-commerce shrank, resulting in the loss of B-end projects like student milk, with significant declines in sales and revenue. MQR's predicament is not a sudden occurrence. Financial data shows that the company has been in continuous losses for over three years: from a massive loss of approximately 351 million yuan in 2022, to a loss of 97 million yuan in 2023, and further expanding to 230 million yuan in 2024, along with 33 million yuan in the first three quarters of 2025, accumulating losses exceeding 700 million yuan over four years. Even more concerning is the company's asset-liability situation. As of the end of the third quarter of 2025, MQR's total assets were approximately 1.09 billion yuan, with total liabilities reaching 905 million yuan. According to Tianyancha data, MQR has currently been listed as a dishonest person subject to enforcement, with a total amount involved in cases since 2024 of approximately 171 million yuan, and the legal representative Li Yong has been restricted from high consumption. This is not MQR's only legal dispute. Announcements show that, in addition to this major lawsuit, the total amount of lawsuits and arbitration matters that did not meet information disclosure standards has reached 43.89 million yuan. Not long ago, creditor Guangzhou Minghui Machinery Co., Ltd. applied to the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People's Court for bankruptcy liquidation of MQR, triggered by MQR's overdue payment of over 5.95 million yuan for equipment (purchasing two sterile paper packaging flexible filling machines and supporting equipment, with a total contract amount of 8.507 million yuan, of which only 30% of the payment has been made). **Debt Crisis** A dispute over equipment payment of less than 6 million yuan is like the first domino that toppled, completely tearing open the financial black hole hidden within MQR. In response to the creditor's bankruptcy application, MQR urgently issued an announcement to defend itself, claiming that production and operations were normal, that it had not received any relevant court rulings, and that it did not meet the conditions for bankruptcy due to insolvency. At the same time, it quickly established a special task force to respond to the crisis, promising that executives would not reduce their holdings within six months to stabilize the stock price. However, the capital market has long been in turmoil, and many are puzzled: how could a listed company that once had a market value comparable to industry leaders be trapped by a mere few million yuan in debts? According to financial data: as of the end of September 2025, MQR had less than 19 million yuan in cash on its books, a decrease of over 40% from the beginning of the year; with a debt ratio of 83.04%, far exceeding the industry safety line, breaking through the 80% debt repayment warning line, meaning that for every 1 yuan of assets, 0.83 yuan is borrowed debt. Looking back at the peak past, only endless irony remains. Around 2019, relying on the regional halo of Tianshan Pasture in Xinjiang and its rich and thick taste, MQR gained popularity through influencers on Xiaohongshu and Douyin, firmly establishing itself as a trendy milk brand and becoming popular across the national market That year, revenue reached a historic high of 1.146 billion yuan, with cash flow on the books soaring to 370 million yuan, presenting a scene of prosperity. However, this prosperity built on the sandy beach of traffic was ultimately fleeting. **Achieved through traffic, destroyed by loss of control** Looking back at Maiqiu'er on the brink of 2026, this once-thriving business empire that rose at the foot of Tianshan Mountain has seen its decline almost as astonishing as its rapid rise. From a startup legend that began with 5 yuan to a capital darling with a market value of 5 billion, and now facing bankruptcy liquidation due to debts of less than 6 million yuan, Maiqiu'er's downfall is not accidental, but rather a slow suicide that has lasted for several years. During the initial startup and expansion period under the leadership of Li Yuhu, Maiqiu'er’s pursuit of quality was almost obsessive, reflecting the typical craftsmanship mindset of the first generation of private entrepreneurs. However, after successfully going public in 2014 and completing the power transition to the second generation, this mindset was replaced by an aggressive capital will. The most direct data reflects the extreme imbalance between R&D investment and sales expenses: in 2021, the year Maiqiu'er exploded in popularity, its sales expenses reached 123 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of nearly 20%, with most of it directed towards promotions in live streaming rooms and various KOLs; in contrast, the R&D expenses for the same year were less than 10 million yuan, accounting for less than 1% of revenue. This "heavy marketing, light R&D" structure made Maiqiu'er resemble a giant with a glamorous exterior but lacking skeletal support, losing sight of the most basic lifeline of manufacturing amidst the frenzy of traffic. This shift in operational focus directly led to the management's collective indifference to the bottom line of the supply chain. The "propylene glycol incident" erupted in 2022, resulting in a fine of 73.151 million yuan, with losses of hundreds of millions in orders within a month, while the net profit for 2020-2021 totaled only over 70 million yuan, with two years of hard work being overdrawn due to compliance negligence, leading to a complete collapse of brand trust. After the second generation took over, Maiqiu'er became overly reliant on leverage, with a debt-to-asset ratio reaching 83% in the third quarter of 2025, far exceeding the industry level of 40%-50%, resulting in extremely weak liquidity. After a sharp decline in cash on hand, the 6 million yuan equipment balance became a "death knell." The controlling shareholder's equity was repeatedly auctioned off judicially, and the turmoil over control intensified panic, forming a death spiral, with a market value drop of over 80%. Ultimately, what Maiqiu'er left the market was not only a chaotic capital aftermath but also an eternal lesson about the "bottom line." ### Related Stocks - [002719.CN](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/002719.CN.md) ## Related News & Research - [UraniumX shares on OTCQB gain DTC eligibility for US clearing and settlement](https://longbridge.com/en/news/290889220.md) - [Electro Aço Altona cancels 136,506 share issue leftovers after rights offering closes](https://longbridge.com/en/news/290874260.md) - [Solution International Nordics says year-to-date e-commerce sales jump 154%](https://longbridge.com/en/news/290797478.md) - [00:35 ETSilver Palace Opens Sign-Ups for "Dichotomy" Beta Test!](https://longbridge.com/en/news/290914214.md) - [Dynacor appoints Réjean Gourde as board chair, replacing Pierre Lépine](https://longbridge.com/en/news/290824030.md)