---
title: "The \"middle-class milk\" popularized by Li Jiaqi has filed for bankruptcy"
type: "News"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/285906546.md"
description: "Maiqu'er has been applied for bankruptcy liquidation by creditors due to a default on equipment payment of 5.95 million yuan. Although the company claims it does not meet the legal conditions, market confidence has already been damaged. Once a \"white moonlight\" for the middle class, its market value once exceeded 7 billion yuan, but it has now accumulated losses of nearly 800 million yuan, with net profit plummeting by 1976.2%. Revenue has dropped from 1.146 billion yuan in 2021 to 601 million yuan in 2025, facing a bankruptcy crisis"
datetime: "2026-05-11T07:55:11.000Z"
locales:
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/285906546.md)
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/285906546.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/285906546.md)
---

# The "middle-class milk" popularized by Li Jiaqi has filed for bankruptcy

Original Release | Jinjiao Finance (ID: F-Jinjiao)

Author | Mai Yingzai

The "dairy giant" Maiqiu'er, whose market value once exceeded 7 billion yuan, ultimately lost its last semblance of dignity due to a debt of less than 6 million yuan.

Not long ago, due to the arrears of over 5.95 million yuan in equipment payments, Maiqiu'er was applied for bankruptcy liquidation by creditors. Although the company responded that it "did not meet the legal conditions," market doubts had already burst forth like a dam. Public information shows that **it has been listed as a dishonest person subject to enforcement, with a total amount involved of approximately 171 million yuan from 2024 to the present.**

For a long time, Maiqiu'er was the "white moonlight" on the tables of the middle class, praised as **"middle-class milk" and "the Moutai of milk"** for its labels of Xinjiang milk sources and rich flavor. During the 618 shopping festival in 2022, it once topped the Tmall pre-sale list for ambient dairy products, surpassing Mengniu and "Adopt a Cow."

However, the glorious illusion belonging to Maiqiu'er was shattered by cold financial reports in the spring of 2026.

The Q1 2026 report showed that its net profit attributable to the parent company plummeted by 1976.2% year-on-year. This was already the fifth year it had been mired in losses. **From 2022 to the present, Maiqiu'er has accumulated losses nearing 800 million yuan, almost losing half of its peak self.** Consequently, its stock abbreviation changed from "Maiqiu'er" to the glaring "ST Maiqiu."

**| Maiqiu'er Group Q1 2026 Report**

From shouting "to create the best milk in China" in 2020 to now stumbling towards the brink of bankruptcy, Maiqiu'er took less than six years.

Is it that the middle class can no longer afford high-end milk, or has Maiqiu'er itself "drunk" its high-end narrative to collapse?

In the capital market, losses are not a new phenomenon. Some are the pains of industry cycles, while others are the costs of proactive expansion. Looking solely at net profit is often insufficient to determine whether a company is truly in danger.

**But the problem with Maiqiu'er is that almost all of its key operational indicators are deteriorating simultaneously.** Compared to "how much money it lost," the outside world is more concerned about whether this once "Moutai of milk" still has the strength to climb out of the mire.

The first to collapse was revenue.

In 2021, Maiqiu'er reached a peak revenue of 1.146 billion yuan. Since then, the company's revenue has declined for four consecutive years, dropping to only 601 million yuan by 2025, nearly halving its revenue scale. By Q1 2026, its revenue was still declining year-on-year, indicating that the fatigue of its main business is not a short-term fluctuation but a sustained operational stall 
**| Tonghuashun**

More dangerous than declining profits is the deterioration of cash flow.

In the first quarter of 2026, the net cash flow from operating activities of MQR plummeted by 386.4% year-on-year, amounting to only -0.12 billion yuan. Over the four years from 2022 to 2025, there were three years of negative operating cash flow, especially in 2025, where this indicator plummeted by 408.7% year-on-year.

**| Tonghuashun**

For consumer companies, the importance of cash flow is often more direct than profits. While profits can be smoothed through financial manipulation, cash flow cannot be deceived. **When operating cash continues to flow out, it means that the money earned from the company's main business is no longer sufficient to cover daily operating expenses.** The company may appear to be operating on the surface, but internally it has already begun to bleed.

To survive, MQR has no choice but to borrow money. As of the end of the first quarter of 2026, its total liabilities reached 838 million yuan, with a debt-to-asset ratio as high as 89.3%, far exceeding the 80% debt repayment warning line, which means that **for every 1 yuan of assets, nearly 0.9 yuan is borrowed.**

**| Tonghuashun**

In this situation, MQR can only rely on borrowing to maintain operations.

As of the end of the first quarter of 2026, its total liabilities reached 838 million yuan, with a debt-to-asset ratio as high as 89.3%, far exceeding the 80% debt repayment warning line. In other words, today, nearly 0.9 yuan of every 1 yuan of assets at MQR is borrowed.

Where has the money gone?

From the financial report, MQR is still trying to maintain growth through expansion. In the second half of 2025 alone, the company added 62 directly-operated stores, which directly led to a 33.6% year-on-year increase in sales expenses in the first quarter of 2026; at the same time, the prepayments in the first quarter increased by 348% compared to the end of the previous year, mainly for goods.

**The problem is that although money has been spent, products are becoming increasingly difficult to sell.**

The 2025 financial report shows that the three core businesses of MQR—dairy products, baked goods, and holiday foods—have all seen revenue declines, with year-on-year decreases of 16.7%, 4.5%, and 20.8%, respectively. Only the relatively small other businesses saw a year-on-year revenue increase of 26.1% This is actually a dangerous signal. For consumer brands, growth in marginal businesses cannot change the overall decline; what truly determines the fundamental strength of a company is whether its core products still possess market appeal.

What’s more troublesome is that revenue from distribution channels is also declining, with a year-on-year decrease of 10.5% expected in 2025.

There is an old saying in the consumer industry: "He who controls the channels controls the world." Whether distributors are willing to continue promoting your products, willing to provide shelf space, and willing to hold inventory essentially reflects the market's confidence in the brand's future.

Under multiple pressures, Maiqiu'er's asset scale has also begun to shrink rapidly. By the end of the first quarter of 2026, **total assets were only 938 million yuan, a nearly 40% decrease from the peak of 1.551 billion yuan at the end of 2021.**

This all-encompassing operational dilemma ultimately crystallizes into a detail that is quite absurd:

Li Yong, the chairman of Maiqiu'er Group, who once helmed a company valued at 7 billion, saw his pre-tax annual salary plummet from 388,300 yuan in 2022 to just 14,400 yuan in 2025.

Please note, this is an annual salary, not a monthly salary.

In an era where even delivery riders can earn over 10,000 yuan a month, the chairman of a listed company is earning a monthly salary of just over a thousand yuan. Is this a "self-sacrifice" due to being burdened with huge debts, or is the company truly unable to afford even a decent business meal?

Maiqiu'er did not collapse suddenly.

Looking back, its real turning point actually occurred as early as 2022. Before that, Maiqiu'er had almost fully capitalized on all the dividends of China's consumption upgrade era.

In 1989, Maiqiu'er started with baked goods. Over the next decade, it gradually transitioned from baking to the dairy industry, forming a dual main business model of "dairy products + baking." In 2014, the company went public on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; by 2015, its market value had once exceeded 7 billion yuan.

At that time, Maiqiu'er was telling a very typical and successful "high-end consumption story."

As stated in its financial report, the company **"focuses on the national high-end and ultra-high-end dairy product market,"** targeting high-consumption demographics. Around this positioning, Maiqiu'er built a complete narrative about **"natural, healthy, and high-quality"** products: golden milk sources from Xinjiang, 100,000 acres of natural pastures, 50,000 Holstein cows, along with products that are "rich in milk flavor" and "smooth in taste," precisely hit the urban middle class's imagination of a quality life during the hottest years of consumption upgrade.

Especially in 2021, when live-streaming e-commerce entered its most frenzied phase, Maiqiu'er capitalized on a new wave of traffic dividends.

That year, the company invested 9 million yuan in live-streaming e-commerce, quickly gaining national recognition through top influencers like Li Jiaqi. During the 2022 618 shopping festival, its pre-sale revenue even topped the Tmall liquid milk ambient dairy products list, surpassing Mengniu and other competitors.

As growth driven by traffic accelerated, Maiqiu'er began to resemble a "marketing-driven company" more and more From 2021 to 2022, its sales expenses increased by 20% and 32.6% year-on-year, reaching 123 million yuan and 163 million yuan, most of which were invested in live streaming and KOL promotions. In contrast, the R&D expenses during the same period were only 5.188 million yuan and 6.64 million yuan, **with marketing expenses being approximately 24 times the R&D expenses.**

Everything changed in 2022 with the "propylene glycol incident."

In June of that year, the Market Supervision Administration of Qingyuan County, Zhejiang Province, announced that **two batches of pure milk from Maiqiuer tested positive for propylene glycol,** with contents of 0.318g/kg and 0.321g/kg, respectively.

The "National Food Safety Standard for Food Additives Usage" clearly states that propylene glycol cannot be used in dairy products, as it is a low-toxicity additive that **can cause kidney disorders if consumed in excess over a long period.** Additionally, propylene glycol has the characteristic of acting as a thickening agent and emulsifier, **improving the taste of food.**

However, the "strong milk flavor" and "delicious taste" are precisely one of Maiqiuer's core selling points.

As a result, public opinion quickly exploded. Questions such as **"Is the strong taste of Maiqiuer really due to the quality of the milk?"** arose one after another. For a dairy company that has long positioned itself as "natural, high-end, and healthy," such doubts were almost devastating.

In just one month, Maiqiuer lost hundreds of millions of yuan in orders, and both online and offline channels rapidly contracted. Meanwhile, the market supervision department issued a fine of 73.151 million yuan. In the previous year, 2021, Maiqiuer's net profit for the entire year was only 18.458 million yuan.

This means that the money it earned in a year was not even enough to pay the fine.

In the following years, Maiqiuer did not stop trying to save itself. It attempted to adjust its product structure, shifting more resources toward the baking business, hoping to alleviate pressure in the dairy industry through a second growth curve. However, the reality is that competition in the baking industry has changed dramatically.

By 2025, the industry leader, Tao Li Bread, achieved revenue of 5.45 billion yuan, with the industry average revenue also reaching 2.69 billion yuan. In contrast, Maiqiuer, with revenue of only about 600 million yuan, found it increasingly difficult to establish advantages in terms of scale, channels, or supply chain capabilities.

**Meanwhile, financial pressure began to further translate into operational challenges.**

Since 2026, in addition to being applied for bankruptcy liquidation due to the default of 5.95 million yuan in equipment payments, its subsidiary "Xinjiang Western Ecology" was also ordered by the court to pay approximately 26.266 million yuan due to a construction payment dispute, with Maiqiuer bearing joint liability for repayment.

And these may only be the tip of the iceberg.

According to media reports, the total amount of litigation and arbitration matters that Maiqiuer has not reached the information disclosure standard still amounts to 43.89 million yuan. The company's chairman, Li Yong, has also been restricted from high consumption.

To some extent, the "propylene glycol incident" has not only pierced Maiqiuer's profit and loss statement but also its brand credibility that it has painstakingly built over the years If it weren't for that misstep, Maiqiu'er could have become a legendary example in China's dairy industry.

Li Yong's father, Li Yuhu, the founder of Maiqiu'er, is in itself a story of "a beggar's rise."

In 1962, 24-year-old Li Yuhu faced long-term discrimination in his hometown in Shandong due to family background issues, making even basic survival a challenge. To survive, he cut down the last tree in his backyard, exchanged it for 5 yuan for travel expenses, and journeyed from Tengzhou, Shandong to Xinjiang.

It was an experience akin to exile.

Along the way, he slept in train stations, dug for medicinal herbs, and did manual labor. When he couldn't afford food, he even tried hitching rides on freight trains and begging along the way. Upon arriving in Xinjiang, due to language barriers, he could only work in agriculture for local farmers. Once, while working outdoors, a bullet from a hunting rifle grazed his body, nearly costing him his life.

He struggled for survival for 27 years. Until 1989, when the winds of reform and opening up reached Xinjiang, Li Yuhu scraped together 5,000 yuan and set up a small food workshop with only two rooms and an old oven, producing cakes and biscuits, naming it "Maiqiu'er."

**Li Yuhu, who was new to the business world, demonstrated sharp judgment and strong execution.**

In the early years of baking, to improve product quality, he was willing to take out loans to send employees to Shanghai for training; in 1997, when many regional food companies still lacked brand awareness, he had already attempted to use music for marketing, inviting Dao Lang to sing "Maiqiu'er Song."

Around 2002, Li Yuhu noticed that Xinjiang, located in the golden milk source belt at 45° north latitude, had a low incidence of disease in dairy cows, and the raw milk's fat and protein content was higher than the national average. However, local dairy companies were generally small in scale and the market was fragmented, with opportunities yet to be fully explored.

Li Yuhu immediately decided to expand into the dairy product business, investing 60 million yuan to introduce top international equipment and develop ultra-high temperature instant sterilized milk. This was considered a gamble at the time, and by the time of its listing 12 years later, in 2014, Maiqiu'er's net profit was only 41.42 million yuan.

It can be seen that **the early Maiqiu'er Group was advancing in both research and marketing. Its corporate DNA included business foresight, a spirit of exploration, and a fierce determination.** Looking back at Maiqiu'er's past success is not surprising.

With solid market trust and a technological foundation, Maiqiu'er survived the darkest period of China's dairy industry. After the melamine scandal erupted in 2008, the controversy surrounding "toxic milk" spread in public opinion, consumer trust collapsed, industry regulation tightened, and the industry entered a winter, forcing many dairy companies to halt, delay, or even sell their listing plans.

Maiqiu'er successfully landed on the A-share market six years later, becoming one of the first leading companies to resume listing. Based on a closing market value of 3.349 billion yuan on the first day of listing, the Li Yuhu family’s shareholding corresponds to a fortune exceeding 1.8 billion yuan. The young man who once begged his way to Xinjiang with 5 yuan finally became a millionaire.

This is also the cruelest aspect of the food industry.

\*\*Consumers may forget a marketing failure, but it is hard to forgive a food company's safety issues. Especially when "rich and creamy" is the core selling point, the "propylene glycol incident" almost equated to directly destroying the most important trust foundation of the brand \*\*

What is even more thought-provoking is that MQR was not completely without warning.

Around 2014, "self-supply of raw milk" had already become an important trend in the dairy industry, with companies like Yili, Mengniu, and Tianrun increasing their investments in upstream farm construction, hoping to firmly grasp their milk sources. MQR also mentioned in its listing application projects for fundraising to build fresh milk production lines and dairy cattle breeding bases.

However, by 2018, these projects still had not been completed, and the company even received an inquiry letter from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange because of this. Yet, that year, many people did not pay much attention to this matter.

Looking back from today, MQR's decline is certainly due to the collapse of operations following food safety issues, as well as deteriorating cash flow and channel contraction.

But the deeper issue may be a kind of backlash from the narrative of the times.

During the most fervent years of consumption upgrading, the Chinese market saw the emergence of a large number of "new Chinese brands." They excelled at telling stories about their origins, creating identity recognition, and quickly rising to prominence through live-streaming e-commerce and traffic algorithms.

The problem is that while traffic can shape the perceived value of a brand, it cannot reshape a company's industrial capabilities. The food industry, in particular, is one of the sectors that tests supply chains, quality control, and long-term trust the most.

What is lamentable about MQR is this: it was once among the enterprises that understood "serving the country through industry" the best, yet ultimately lost its direction under the pressure of capital and traffic.

Reference materials:

Shenzhen Commercial Daily · Read Innovation "In 2025, losses exceeding 100 million, first-quarter performance 'plummeting'! MQR's predicament continues: the company has become a person of untrustworthiness, compounded by major litigation and enforcement risks."

Winning Sales Power "A loss of 700 million, forced into bankruptcy, has the internet celebrity dairy drink brought to life by Li Jiaqi cooled down?"

Rongzhong Finance "The internet celebrity milk from Xinjiang promoted by Li Jiaqi is about to go bankrupt."

Market Boundary "Behind MQR, this family has a fortune of 600 million."

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