---
title: "platform, merchants, riders, consumers, landlords"
type: "Topics"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/topics/29181518.md"
description: "This article was written after the famous piece "Food Delivery Riders, Trapped in the System" on May 12, 2021. Looking back now, landlords in some areas have started to reduce rents due to vacancy issues. However, as a relatively decentralized role in the cycle of redistributing existing interests, platforms remain the most centralized and convenient targets for public sentiment. ————————————————————————————————— 1 Public sentiment toward Meituan..."
datetime: "2025-04-27T03:11:26.000Z"
locales:
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/topics/29181518.md)
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/29181518.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/29181518.md)
author: "[戴某 DEMO](https://longbridge.com/en/profiles/993.md)"
---

# platform, merchants, riders, consumers, landlords

This article was written after the famous piece "Delivery Riders, Trapped in the System" on May 12, 2021.

Looking back now, landlords in some areas have started to reduce rents due to vacancy issues, but as a relatively decentralized role, in the cycle of redistributing existing interests, the platform remains the most centralized and convenient target for public sentiment.

————————————————————————————————

**1**

Public sentiment toward Meituan primarily stems from "merchants burdened by high commissions" and "riders trapped in the system"...  
 

In previous articles, I mentioned that in the local services sector, the core competition between Meituan and Ele.me revolves around the operational efficiency of three key roles: "merchants," "consumers," and "riders." From both process and outcome perspectives, Meituan is undoubtedly the more efficient party. However, the extreme pursuit of "efficiency" has its downsides, and the current PR crisis Meituan is facing is the consequence it must bear. In business operations, I believe this is almost inevitable because businesses like Meituan, which rely on ultra-low margins and extreme operational efficiency and scale to generate profits, often focus solely on one extreme goal in brutal competition, making it difficult to balance humanistic considerations. A higher-level boundary must be set to force adjustments.

> The article "Delivery Riders, Trapped in the System" reminds us that it’s difficult for the market to spontaneously avoid negative externalities—companies excel at superficial compliance and showcasing social responsibility, while their pursuit of profit distorts their actions.

Most of the time, I am cautious about such market interventions, but the same-day delivery sector might be different. In its pursuit of efficiency, Meituan has neglected labor protections, forcing workers to disregard their own traffic safety and creating risks for public safety. These costs have been shifted to society through various means, resulting in "negative externalities," which are inappropriate.

Emission caps, mandatory rest periods for bus drivers, the eight-hour workday, and tobacco production limits are all legislative measures to curb "negative externalities," preventing market participants from pursuing local optima at the expense of overall losses.

Administrative intervention can redefine competitive boundaries and protect workers, but we must also recognize that if the value of delivery services remains relatively unchanged, the "variables" introduced by new boundaries will be redistributed among other roles in the chain. Whether benefits or costs, the allocation mechanism is determined by "opportunity cost." For example, compared to the original "longer delivery times," consumers might bear the cost, or some consumers might refuse to wait and choose to cook at home, shifting the cost to restaurant operators. Alternatively, if the platform uses higher-cost methods to maintain consumer experience, the cost will still be allocated to delivery fees or merchant commissions.

Profits and costs only show unreasonable allocation in specific competitive scenarios, such as the "operational subsidy" phase. In the long run, all roles in the chain will reach a dynamic equilibrium based on "opportunity cost."

This leads to the next point of contention: "merchant commissions."

  
 

**2**

The vast majority of small and medium-sized restaurants are the main source of controversy. Their operating conditions are undoubtedly dire. Even before food delivery platforms emerged, the annual failure rate for this tier of restaurants was high. The commissions charged by delivery platforms, as a new cost item, naturally become the easiest target for frustration—especially for restaurants that experienced the lavish subsidy phase during platform competition. The emotional backlash from this 落差 is even more intense.

But 冷静思考一下，大家都在说外卖抽成「高」，那「高」的标准是什么，怎么样才算「高」呢？或者引申出更底层的一个问题，「价格由什么决定？」

In the previous section, I mentioned that prices are ultimately determined by "opportunity cost."

> Opportunity cost refers to the potential benefit an individual, investor, or business misses out on when choosing one alternative over another. By analyzing opportunity costs, businesses can make better decisions, ensuring that actual gains outweigh the costs of foregone alternatives, thereby optimizing limited resources.

When the total value and cost of a business remain relatively stable, the unacceptable costs will be pushed onto certain roles.

So, who are the main roles in the restaurant business chain?

"Restaurants," "platforms," "consumers," and another critical role: "landlords."

Now, let’s examine how the new operational cost "delivery platform commissions" came about.

The delivery experience, which better aligns with consumer demand, has shifted dining habits, altering the revenue structure of ordinary restaurants. The proportion of delivery orders has gradually increased. Note that this revenue is a migration, not purely 新增. Apart from 增量抢来的 from convenience foods, there’s also 存量抢来的 from dine-in. In this process, delivery platforms provided a series of infrastructure capabilities, forming the basis for commissions. The opportunity cost for merchants to leave is too high.

A rough example might make it clearer:

A brick-and-mortar restaurant originally had revenue of 100K，全部来自堂食. The foundation for this revenue was its team’s marketing, production, service capabilities, and the foot traffic determined by its location. Thus, the landlord naturally took a share of the "foot traffic value" attached to the property.  
 

But when this restaurant starts offering delivery, revenue becomes 150K. Dine-in revenue, affected by the overall shift in 消费习惯， drops slightly to 80K, while delivery contributes 70K. The delivery platform takes a commission based on the 70K delivery revenue, while the landlord still charges rent at the original rate.

For the merchant, revenue only increased by 50K, but they must pay commissions on 70K. Naturally, this feels high, and frustration is directed at the platform collecting the money. But who should ultimately bear this unreasonable operational cost?

Assuming 餐饮消费需求不变， commissions and rents remain unchanged, leading to widespread restaurant closures, which role in the chain is easier to replace?

My answer leans toward landlords with vacant properties.  
 

The foot traffic supporting property values is declining overall due to rising 出行决策成本 and the diversification of at-home entertainment options. After a wave of land grabs, commercial real estate is oversupplied.

If 商铺’s contribution to foot traffic declines in both proportion and absolute terms, there’s no reason for rents not to adjust downward.  
 

The platform, which relies on "instant delivery capabilities" to meet consumers’ "convenience needs," is very hard to replace. In the long run, it’s not that platform commissions are too high—it’s that rent pricing logic needs an overhaul.

  
 

**3**

What will Meituan face?  
 

Improved rider protections will lead to short-term efficiency adjustments, affecting consumer experience and slowing delivery growth. Increased rider costs will impact profits, but if these rules become industry standards, the costs will eventually be passed on to B2B and B2C players who rely on instant delivery.

Merchants, leveraging various forces, will engage in tug-of-war negotiations with the platform over commissions. In the long run, the demand for lower operational costs will shift to the relatively weaker landlords in the chain. Platform commissions will stabilize within a reasonable range, gradually forming a consensus and ending disputes.

Beyond this, Meituan’s local services business also faces competition from new players, as shown below.

![Image](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2025/4756ab7fd79d0d7030d1e56a54c21e76?x-oss-process=style/lg)

Is ByteDance the new competitor as Douyin enters local services?

I’ve discussed this with friends, and the conclusion is "not yet." Here’s the gist:

Meituan’s ad business has two main parts: "food delivery ranking ads" and "in-store marketing ads."

90% of delivery ranking ads are for 到家业务. Douyin currently lacks a same-day delivery network, and building this capability isn’t quick, so it can’t compete in 到家业务 or affect its ad rankings.

For in-store ads, which drive offline traffic, merchants previously lacked precise marketing channels, relying on primitive methods like nearby billboards. Thus, demand for online ads is high. Douyin, Kuaishou, and Meituan-Dianping can all meet this need. For consumers, finding 餐饮 or non 餐饮 merchants depends on 需求类型. Most are 即时性需求—offline outings are 随机， and people rarely revisit the same place. Thus, most offline choices, like which mall or restaurant to visit, are made on the spot, often just 2 hours or a day in advance. Many decide while already in a mall.

Hence, consumer 入口习惯 is crucial. Dianping has 18 years of history here, and Meituan merged with it 6 years ago, leveraging its resources to cultivate strong user habits and 心智。餐饮 is these platforms’ primary 心智， giving them an edge over aggregators like Alipay.

Douyin and Kuaishou’s user 心智 is "killing time," used during commutes or before bed—completely different from the 即时性需求 of Dianping and Meituan. This is also why Alipay’s integration of Koubei and Ele.me failed. Douyin/Kuaishou’s strength lies in cross-selling their massive user traffic. Video ads are more engaging than text，更容易刺激冲动消费， but the timing of 冲动消费 often doesn’t align with actual 消费时间. They can help new brands 冷启动， creating 印象 and offering coupons for early traffic. However, taste preferences are fluid, and long-term 消费习惯 requires 平台心智。

Thus, our current view is that Douyin/Kuaishou will 分流 some 冷启动 demand but won’t replace or rival Meituan-Dianping anytime soon. Building user 心智 takes time, especially in product aspects like managing 店铺口碑， user feedback, location matching, and indirect 需求匹配 (e.g., ride-hailing, delivery). Product refinement must be followed by 观察 user habit shifts, requiring 足够频次的直接消费 to solidify new habits.

As I write this, I check Meituan’s stock price—it’s down 8% today.

May 12, 2021

$MEITUAN(03690.HK) $JD.com(JD.US) $Alibaba(BABA.US)

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## Comments (4)

- **丁丁历险记 · 2025-04-28T04:00:48.000Z · 👍 3**: Long-winded and obscure sentences that create numerous conceptual terms.Simple statements are made unnecessarily complex, the author's writing style gives readers a headache, must be from an internet giant.
  - **无为之处** (2025-04-30T02:17:06.000Z): Want to express but don't want to spend time expressing properly, just half-ass it
- **不做咸鱼的小明 · 2025-04-27T04:07:59.000Z · 👍 1**: Without these articles, would Meituan's problems cease to exist? Recently, it seems like Meituan has many issues—offending and dissatisfying everyone in every aspect is quite impressive. Is the profit Meituan earns actually very little or a lot?
  - **新用户_Y07** (2025-04-27T04:10:20.000Z): Meituan always wants to take all the profits.