--- title: "BEKE: Slide Looks Bottomless. Can Policy Put a Floor? ---" type: "Topics" locale: "en" url: "https://longbridge.com/en/topics/39290421.md" description: "China's leading housing broker — $KE(BEKE.US) reported its last-quarter 2025 results pre-mkt tonight (Mar 16). Overall, given the very high base after the Sep. 2024 policy shift and a housing market that kept weakening in H2 2025, results were bleak amid heavy industry headwinds.Specifically: (1) revenue still provided some support, but profit was well into the red. With a sharp contraction in the core Track 1 brokerage GTV (down nearly 40% YoY), Track 2 continued to grow and partly offset the weakness. Even so, total revenue declined nearly 30% YoY this quarter..." datetime: "2026-03-16T15:44:44.000Z" locales: - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/topics/39290421.md) - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/39290421.md) - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/39290421.md) author: "[Dolphin Research](https://longbridge.com/en/news/dolphin.md)" --- > Supported Languages: [简体中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/39290421.md) | [繁體中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/39290421.md) # BEKE: Slide Looks Bottomless. Can Policy Put a Floor? --- China’s leading housing broker — $KE(BEKE.US) — reported results pre‑market tonight (Mar 16) for the last quarter of FY25. Overall, against an exceptionally high base post the Sept 2024 easing and a weaker market in H2 FY25, BEKE faced heavy industry headwinds this quarter. The print was decidedly weak, details below: **1) Revenue held up better than profit, which slipped deep underwater:** On headline metrics, core Track‑1 brokerage GTV contracted sharply (down nearly 40% YoY). Track‑2 still grew and cushioned some impact, but **total revenue still fell nearly 30% YoY** this quarter. On profit, while Track‑1 brokerage largely held GPM, the rising mix of lower‑margin Track‑2 dragged the **consolidated GPM materially lower**. At the same time, **despite opex declines, revenue fell faster, forcing de‑leveraging and margin compression**. Ultimately, **Adj. net profit came in at RMB 520 mn, down roughly 60% YoY and QoQ**. **2)** By segment, the core of the core — **existing‑home (secondary) brokerage — saw GTV down 35% YoY**. Part of that is the high base after Sept 2024, but **GTV also fell nearly 5% QoQ**, underscoring that **China’s housing market likely re‑tested lows in H2 FY25** and **set the stage for the latest round of supportive policies**. In addition, with a **higher mix of franchise‑led stores** and a softer market requiring **lower commission rates to spur transactions**, the **existing‑home take rate fell another ~5.6 bps QoQ**, deepening the revenue decline. **3) New‑home sales pressure was even heavier**, with **GTV down 42% YoY**. Given Top‑100 developers’ sales dropped 30%–40% YoY during Oct–Dec, **BEKE’s new‑home growth is no longer outperforming the sector**. **The new‑home take rate was 3.5% this quarter**, up QoQ on seasonality (year‑end developer push) but **down 17 bps YoY**. As a result, revenue fell more than GTV on a YoY basis. **4)** While Track‑1 was stuck in a tough external backdrop, **Track‑2 revenue reached ~RMB 9.5 bn, up 4% YoY**, offering limited offset for the group. Within Track‑2, **home improvement (装修/家装) revenue declined 12% YoY** as BEKE deliberately optimized traffic channels and reduced reliance on non‑brokerage sources. **Leasing revenue, supported by the 'Hassle‑free Rent' model, rose 18% YoY**. That said, growth has clearly slowed versus previous periods of high double‑digit gains. 5) On segment profitability, although Track‑1 commission/take rates were down YoY, store and agent optimization plus lower revenue‑sharing helped. **Track‑1 contribution margin ticked up YoY** (mainly in new homes). In Track‑2, **home improvement** saw **contribution margin down 100 bps YoY** on lower scale. **Leasing**, bolstered by growth and the higher‑margin 'Hassle‑free Rent' model, **continued to expand contribution GPM**. 6) Overall, excluding home improvement, most segments held or improved contribution margins. But with home improvement and leasing — both lower‑margin — taking a larger mix, the consolidated GPM still fell by 1.6 pct YoY. Meanwhile, **management tightened cost control, driving total opex down ~20% YoY**. However, with sharper declines in revenue and GP, the opex ratio rose. **GAAP OP swung to a loss of nearly RMB 150 mn**. 7) On capital returns, BEKE repurchased just over RMB 900 mn of shares in FY25 and declared ~RMB 300 mn in annual dividends. **Total shareholder return equates to ~6% of current mkt cap — moderately strong**. **Dolphin Research view:** In absolute terms, this was a weak quarter for BEKE. With an extremely high base in 2024 and deteriorating sentiment through H2 FY25, core brokerage scale contracted by nearly 40% YoY. Within new initiatives, home improvement — the most important — is in a channel transition and posted negative growth. Only leasing, with the lowest contribution margin (~10%), offered any support. Although management shifted from expansion in H2 FY24–H1 FY25 to a more defensive stance, optimizing stores and headcount and tightening costs, the **scale contraction was too large**. **Measures could not fully offset de‑scaling pressure on margins**. That said, the bigger swing factor is still the trajectory of the domestic housing market. As noted, **a very weak Q4 created room for further policy easing**. In late Feb, Shanghai substantially eased purchase restrictions: no cap on units outside the Outer Ring, an additional eligible unit inside the Ring, lower personal income tax/social security year requirements, and one unit allowed with a residence permit held for five years. This is the broadest and strongest easing since Sept 2024. Survey data show a surge in post‑policy transaction volumes in Shanghai. It remains unclear how long the effect lasts, and for now policy seems to lift volumes more than prices, which remain stable to slightly lower. Even so, it opens optionality on further policy support. On valuation, consensus expects BEKE’s cornerstone businesses — **new‑home and existing‑home GTV — to keep declining into 2026, but at a narrowing pace** (roughly −10% to 0%). With supply still exceeding demand, the **blended take rate should keep compressing** to facilitate transactions, implying revenue decline \>10%. However, given the defensive tilt and streamlining of stores/agents in Q4, **margins are expected to improve in 2026**. **Adj. net profit is projected at RMB 6.0–6.5 bn vs. RMB 5.0 bn in FY25**. On that basis, **pre‑print mkt cap implies ~21–22x FY26 Adj. NP**. As usual, despite pressure (shrinking GTV, lower YoY profit), **BEKE trades at a premium within China internet due to perceived competitive moats**. We do not expect a major shift in the valuation multiple. The key variable is whether 2026 transactions drift lower then stabilize as expected; watch for management’s outlook on the call. We will publish the call notes in due course. **Detailed take on this quarter:** **I. Existing homes: GTV and take rate both down** The core existing‑home business **posted GTV of RMB 482 bn, down 35% YoY**, still relatively better than new homes (secondary’s share of total transactions is rising). While the YoY slump reflects last Sept’s high base, **existing‑home GTV also fell nearly 5% QoQ**. This suggests **transaction activity cooled markedly again since H2 FY25**, re‑testing historical lows and **paving the way for recent support measures**. **Franchise channels again outperformed Lianjia self‑operated**. Lianjia‑led GTV fell 43% YoY, while franchise‑led GTV fell less than 30%. This mix shift **reflects BEKE’s strategic light‑asset tilt in a downturn to reduce risk and support margins**. Another negative: after a rebound last quarter, the **existing‑home take rate** **fell ~5.6 bps this quarter**. Beyond mix, **with the market cooling**, underlying **commission rates likely declined** even before mix, to stimulate transactions. **With both GTV and take rate down YoY, existing‑home revenue decline widened to 39% YoY this quarter**. **II. New‑home sales under greater pressure** **New‑home GTV fell 42% YoY**, worse than Bloomberg consensus of −39%. Top‑100 developer sales fell 30%–40% YoY in Oct–Dec FY25, and over multiple quarters, **BEKE’s new‑home growth has ceased to outperform**. **New‑home take rate was 3.5%**, up QoQ on seasonality but **down 17 bps YoY**. Therefore, **new‑home revenue fell 44% YoY, a deeper drop than GTV**. **III. Track‑2 offset was limited; total revenue fell nearly 30%** As Track‑1 swung negative amid structural headwinds, Track‑2 was expected to cushion group revenue. In practice, **Track‑2 revenue reached ~RMB 9.5 bn, up 4% YoY**, offering limited smoothing. Specifically, **home improvement stayed weak with revenue down 12% YoY**. Management noted that beyond a softer market, BEKE **optimized customer acquisition by reducing reliance on non‑brokerage channels**, which trimmed scale near term. **Leasing remains in scale‑up mode** with stronger alpha versus macro headwinds; **revenue still rose 18% YoY**. This is decent, **but slower than prior high double‑digit prints**, and again **driven by the 'Hassle‑free Rent' model**. Netting segments, the Track‑1 decline overwhelmed Track‑2’s buffer. **Group revenue was RMB 23.0 bn, down 29% YoY**. **IV. Streamlining supported Track‑1 contribution margin, but not profit dollars** By profit, **Track‑1 brokerage contribution margin** (after revenue‑sharing only) **rose YoY**, reflecting headcount/store optimization. **Track‑2 showed divergence**: home improvement weaker, leasing stronger. Details: 1) While existing‑home and new‑home take rates fell YoY, **contribution GPM held flat YoY in existing‑home and rose YoY in new‑home**. With fewer active stores and agents QoQ, **streamlining and lower sharing offset margin pressure**. However, given the sharp revenue drop, Track‑1 contribution profit still fell nearly 39% YoY. 2) In Track‑2, **home improvement** is in channel transition with lower scale; **contribution margin was 29%, down 100 bps YoY**. **Leasing** continued to scale, and the higher‑margin 'Hassle‑free Rent' model **lifted contribution GPM to 10.4%**. **As a result, Track‑2 contribution profit (home improvement + leasing + other new biz.) rose ~13.5% YoY**, partially offsetting Track‑1’s steep decline. **V. Despite tighter opex, de‑leveraging led to more than a halving in profit** On costs and opex: Even though Track‑1 contribution margin (post sharing) rose YoY, **the rising mix of lower‑margin home improvement and especially leasing**, plus **relatively sticky store costs down only ~10% YoY** (vs. nearly −30% revenue), **drove consolidated GPM down 1.6 pct YoY**. Facing a harsh backdrop, **BEKE accelerated opex cuts; total opex fell ~20% YoY**. Selling and G&A were each down around 20% YoY, while **R&D was relatively sticky, down ~3% YoY**, likely reflecting spend on AI features (e.g., panoramic viewing, AI renovation). Nonetheless, with revenue and GP falling faster, the opex ratio rose. **GAAP OP swung to a loss of nearly RMB 150 mn**. **Adj. net profit was RMB 520 mn, down about 60% YoY/QoQ**. On a single‑quarter basis, the print was clearly poor. **Dolphin Research | BEKE related work:** **Earnings reviews** Nov 10, 2025 Trans: [**BEKE (Trans): Cost‑down, efficiency‑up is the absolute priority**](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/36207078) Nov 10, 2025 Review: **[BEKE: Is there still hope?](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/36202772)** Aug 26, 2025 Trans: [**BEKE (Trans): Pruning low‑efficiency stores/agents in Beijing & Shanghai**](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/33356858) Aug 26, 2025 Review: **[BEKE: Market cooled again — can easing in Beijing/Shanghai turn the tide?](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/33355839)** May 16, 2025 Trans: **[BEKE (Trans): If the market weakens in Q3, expect more support](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/29761318)** May 16, 2025 Review: **[Ride out the roller‑coaster — BEKE still stands tall](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/29755387)** Mar 19, 2025 Review: **[Hot market, but BEKE earns attention more than profit?](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/28185179)** Mar 19, 2025 Trans: [**BEKE (Trans): Existing homes to keep repairing in 2025; new homes may keep adjusting**](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/28197450) Nov 23, 2024 Call: **[BEKE: How strong was the post‑Sept recovery?](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/25718704)** Nov 23, 2024 Review: [**BEKE: Q3 stalled — will tomorrow be better?**](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/25718540) Aug 13, 2024 Call: [**BEKE: How are home improvement and leasing progressing?**](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/23123498) Aug 13, 2024 Review: **[Can the 'One‑Body, Three‑Wings' strategy lift BEKE again?](https://longportapp.cn/zh-CN/topics/23113357?app_id=longbridge)** **Deep dives** Jun 30, 2022: [If the housing market revives, can BEKE stride forward again?](https://longbridgeapp.com/topics/3007908) Dec 27, 2021: [Market warming? Time to buy BEKE? Better wait](https://longbridgeapp.com/topics/1621145) Dec 15, 2021: [From disruptor to disrupted — can BEKE withstand the storm?](https://longbridgeapp.com/news/52080183) Dec 9, 2021: [The 'rebellious' BEKE: whose game did it change, and who did it save?](https://longbridgeapp.com/news/51728961) **Risk disclosure and disclaimer:** [**Dolphin Research Disclaimer & General Disclosure**](https://support.longbridge.global/topics/misc/dolphin-disclaimer) ### Related Stocks - [BEKE-W (02423.HK)](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/02423.HK.md) - [KE Holdings Inc. (BEKE.US)](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/BEKE.US.md) ## Comments (1) - **MDNSC · 2026-03-16T16:15:45.000Z**: It continues to fall.