--- title: "SpaceX Challengers: Can Bezos and China Inc. Catch Up?" type: "Topics" locale: "en" url: "https://longbridge.com/en/topics/39769288.md" description: "In the prior report, we started with the prospect of a SpaceX listing and mapped the key threads behind the current wave of commercial space opportunities. In this installment, we focus on the main players in reusable rocket launches and satellite operations. We also break down the value chain to assess potential investment opportunities through the lenses of the competitive landscape and value-chain dynamics." datetime: "2026-04-08T10:32:04.000Z" locales: - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/topics/39769288.md) - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/39769288.md) - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/39769288.md) author: "[Dolphin Research](https://longbridge.com/en/news/dolphin.md)" --- # SpaceX Challengers: Can Bezos and China Inc. Catch Up? **SpaceX’s Challengers: Can Bezos and China Close the Gap?** In the prior report, we framed the commercial space opportunity around a potential SpaceX listing and mapped the core themes. In this note, we focus on reusable launch and satellite ops, spotlighting the key players and unpacking the value chain. We analyze the competitive landscape and the chain-level angles to identify investable ideas. **Main text:** **I. Competitive landscape in reusable launch** We profile the main participants in reusable rockets and address two questions. First, what does the competitive landscape look like. Second, how differing tech and operating models shape the key competitive levers and the related value-chain links. **(i) Bezos’s playbook** In reusable launch, SpaceX’s largest rival today is Jeff Bezos. He founded Blue Origin earlier than SpaceX, targeting lower access-to-space costs with a similar tech path. The company has achieved partial reusability, with New Glenn completing first flight and first-stage recovery in 2025 and slated to begin commercial missions in Apr 2026. We compare the two along several dimensions: **1) Philosophy** SpaceX aims to make humanity a multi-planet species, including Mars settlement. Blue Origin emphasizes moving heavy industry into space to lighten Earth’s load and make the planet more habitable. Different narratives, same root logic: Earth’s fragility and finite resources, and both are mega-projects that will not turn a near-term profit. Despite patient capital from Bezos selling about $1 bn of Amazon stock annually, Blue Origin still needs a sustainable biz. Gov. and defense contracts, commercial work, and its own Starlink-like program (Project Kuiper) are natural paths. Direct, all-front competition with SpaceX is therefore unavoidable. **2) Operating model** Targets and scope are similar, but execution differs. SpaceX runs fast iteration and agile dev, while Blue Origin takes a more traditional, long-termist, step-by-step approach. Progress has been slower, yet tangible. New Glenn achieved first-stage recovery in 2025, becoming the world’s second orbital-class rocket to land propulsively, touching down on a sea-based drone barge. Its LEO lift is up to 45 tons, well above Falcon 9 and near Falcon Heavy. This underscores material capability despite a measured pace. **Figure: New Glenn stage re-ignition and recovery** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/9bbf937549f695d83d2ef9c6eadbd76b?x-oss-process=style/lg) ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/9d65a9226ab3bd6ef1a8077ddc01a739?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Blue Origin, Dolphin Research** **3) Tech-route differences rooted in philosophy and model** **(1) Engines: the core determinant of recovery and low-cost reuse** **a) Propellants** Most orbital launch uses bipropellant liquids with a fuel and an oxidizer. The fuel provides energy while the oxidizer compensates for the lack of atmospheric oxygen in space. Blue Origin’s choices reflect an ‘advance yet prudent’ stance. SpaceX used LOX/RP-1 on Falcon and switched to LOX/CH4 on Starship. LOX/RP-1 is mature, reliable, and low-cost; LOX/CH4 avoids coking and improves reuse, and is theoretically in-situ resource utilisable on Mars, but is less mature. Blue Origin went straight to LOX/CH4, same as Starship. **b) Cycles** Blue Origin uses an oxygen-rich staged combustion cycle. SpaceX’s Merlin (Falcon) uses a gas-generator cycle, while Raptor (Starship) uses a full-flow staged combustion cycle. Engine ‘cycle’ describes how propellants reach the chamber and how the turbopump is powered, the turbopump being the rocket’s heart. In short, ORSC offers higher efficiency without coking, with a reasonably mature design and manufacturing base. It is a balanced choice. Merlin’s gas-generator cycle is simple and low-cost, with mature tech but lower efficiency and reuse limits; full-flow scores best on efficiency, safety, and life, but is extremely hard to design and build. The model gap between the two firms shows through here. **c) 3D printing** Rocket engines are complex, rapidly iterating, and made in relatively small volumes. Additive manufacturing fits this profile, but reliability and performance constraints remain. SpaceX pushes AM aggressively, especially on Raptor; Blue Origin applies it to critical engine components selectively. **Bottom line: Blue Origin targeted an advanced yet prudent path from day one. It took longer and cost more up front, but it has delivered milestones and adds real pressure on SpaceX.** **(2) Airframe: the No. 2 cost bucket, where materials matter** Excluding R&D and ground capex amortization, engines account for about 40–50% of a rocket’s cost, the airframe about 25%, and GNC about 15%. Propellants are under 3%. Cost structure drives material choices. **Figure: Falcon 9 structure** ![Gemini_Generated_Image_r6uwbrr6uwbrr6uw](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/7ab07e9ddc96153b7df8f806da184d13?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Orbital Today, Dolphin Research** **Figure: A basic launch vehicle layout** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/5242aab45a4fb8138765b7e74443b65b?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: China Space News, Dolphin Research** The airframe includes the fairing, tanks, interstages, and aft sections. Material choices differ across programs. New Glenn uses aluminum alloys and carbon fiber; Falcon 9 relies heavily on Al-Li; Starship is almost all stainless steel. This again shows Blue Origin’s inclination to balance performance and cost, optimizing atop mature choices. Starship, by contrast, pushes extreme cost-down. **(3) GNC** GNC covers guidance, navigation, and control. One highlight is landing mode. SpaceX uses a ‘hover-slam’ style, aiming straight for the landing point with continuous fine adjustments, which is fuel-efficient. Blue Origin opts for a ‘drift-in’ method, first targeting a safe off-platform point, then translating to center, prioritizing safety margin. **(ii) China’s progress** Most activity is in the US and China, with Europe and others moving slower. We focus on the two main hubs. As we noted earlier, while China has not yet flown a fully reusable orbital launcher, its unit launch costs are not orders of magnitude apart from Falcon 9. If reuse is mastered, China could take a cost edge. Given China’s manufacturing and cost strengths, Elon Musk has experienced this in autos and humanoid robotics: Tesla and Optimus tried full vertical integration in the US, then leaned on China’s supply chain. SpaceX is one of the few Musk ventures that can stay largely US-made thanks to a disruptive launch model. If China achieves reuse, the impact on SpaceX could be meaningful. China remains a fast follower in reusable tech. Copycatting is not flashy, but it matches the country’s engineering scale-up strengths. Several players are advancing quickly. We briefly review the faster movers: **1) LandSpace** Founded in 2015 by Zhang Changwu, an ex-banker (HSBC, etc.), with co-founder Wang Jianmeng from China’s satellite launch and TT&C system, who is also Zhang’s father-in-law. Versus SpaceX timelines, LandSpace is moving quickly. Zhuque-3, its reusable launcher, was greenlit in 2023 and reached a successful orbital launch in Dec 2025, a little over two years. Falcon 9 took about five years from 2005 project start to 2010 first success. That is a notable compression. **Figure: Zhuque-3** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/f9b3f16646df8b6dc22a205367f11939?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: LandSpace, Dolphin Research** On recovery, the Dec 2025 mission achieved high-altitude attitude control, reentry relight, supersonic aero-glide, and precision guidance. The final braking failed and the stage crashed, but the miss distance was only ~40 meters. Falcon 9 hit similar milestones mostly in 2012–2014, or 7–9 years after project start. **2) SAST (8th Academy)** Long March 12A started in 2021 on a LOX/CH4 path. It reached a successful orbital launch in Dec 2025, slightly later than Zhuque-3, but recovery failed. Recovery progress seems a bit behind Zhuque-3. **3) CALT (1st Academy)** Long March 10A was first disclosed in 2024. In Feb 2026, it completed a dual-test mission with the first stage returning for a controlled sea splashdown. The recovery differs from SpaceX by using a net-capture system. Grid fins and a final short retro-burn slow the stage, before a net device catches it, a potentially more reliable and lower-cost solution. **Figure: Long March 10A sea splashdown** ![640](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/481b429288da6b67d42d4e1d7d0b01a9?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: CASC, Dolphin Research** **Figure: Long March 10A and its sea net-recovery platform model** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/2bed6bb289ec79b56d2eb6158edafd3a?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: CGTN, Dolphin Research** **(iii) Rocket Lab** If China matures reusable launch, it will likely win some commercial work from SpaceX first. Commercial orders are relatively less critical to SpaceX. Gov. and defense work is harder to dislodge, but besides Blue Origin, there is another strong contender. Our focus here is $Rocket Lab(RKLB.US). Rocket Lab took a different route. Founded by Peter Beck in 2006 in New Zealand, it soon partnered with DARPA and later set up a US HQ in California while keeping R&D and launch in NZ. Electron, its small launcher, reached orbit in 2018. In 2021 it unveiled Neutron, a larger reusable rocket positioned against Falcon 9, and listed on Nasdaq the same year. Why did Rocket Lab break out. We see three main reasons: **1) Differentiated positioning** **Figure: Size comparison** **Figure: Spacenews, Dolphin Research** Falcon 9 can rideshare many satellites per launch, lowering unit cost, but each payload must conform to the manifest, reducing flexibility. Electron targets dedicated orbital insertion for smallsats, offering a taxi vs. a bus. **2) US gov./defense security needs** Demand exists for frequent, reliable launch. At the same time, policymakers will not tolerate a single-supplier monopoly. Second and third sources must be nurtured, which is why Rocket Lab could work with the US DoD early on. **3) A hands-on engineering culture, deep vertical integration, and ruthless cost-down** Peter Beck has no university degree but deep manufacturing experience across yachts, appliances, and more. He pinpointed the US space sector’s lack of innovation and high costs and set out to build low-cost launch. He stays deeply involved technically and pivots quickly. For instance, he once dismissed recovery, then shifted once SpaceX proved it out. This pragmatism shows in Electron’s design. Given its positioning, Rocket Lab chose an Electric Pump-Fed Cycle with lithium batteries driving electric motors for the pumps, well-suited to small launch. It also 3D-prints most Rutherford engine components, taking AM even further than SpaceX. **Figure: Electric Pump-Fed Cycle** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/69b972bd8c2b1edb355261688d4cb0c8?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Wikipedia, Dolphin Research** **Figure: Rocket Lab’s carbon-fiber 3D printer** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/8514a58b2f2c3bad7a0862352d703f2d?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Rocket Lab, Dolphin Research** Execution has been crisp. Electron reportedly cost only about $100 mn to develop, and the firm quickly built launch, manufacturing, and R&D hubs across two hemispheres. It also achieved a high degree of vertical integration. **Figure: Rocket Lab launch sites in NZ and Wallops, VA** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/dd8ae3cbe802f08a52930893f16959d0?x-oss-process=style/lg) ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/e7244ae8ab5de0f2a4775adbf76e2085?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Rocket Lab, Dolphin Research** Beyond launch, Rocket Lab manufactures satellites and offers turnkey satellite platforms. It sells core subsystems and components to third parties, including GNC parts such as star trackers and reaction wheels. It also supplies comms, separation systems, solar arrays, and even on-orbit software. **Figure: Star trackers and reaction wheels by Rocket Lab** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/7148270fc97e8975c608a77d124eb8a4?x-oss-process=style/lg) ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/0bd938148610e5b1cd3eab98632f0882?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Rocket Lab, Dolphin Research** **Figure: Rocket Lab solar array systems** **Source: Rocket Lab, Dolphin Research** Much of this integration came via M&A, showing strong consolidation chops. For example, Geost added electro-optical/IR capabilities, and SolAero brought rad-hard solar cells and array manufacturing. These bolt-ons deepen the stack. **Looking ahead, Rocket Lab may compete head-on with SpaceX, not just in a niche.** On launch, Neutron directly targets Falcon 9 use cases such as mega-constellation deployment and deep-space missions. First flight is planned for Q1 2026. Its design is unconventional. Neutron’s ‘Hungry Hippo’ fairing is integrated with Stage 1. After lift-off, it opens like a hippo’s mouth to release Stage 2, then returns with Stage 1 to boost fairing recovery efficiency and cut costs. Because Stage 2 rides inside the fairing, it does not need a robust outer airframe, allowing downsizing and shifting mass and cost into Stage 1, which benefits reuse amortization. **Figure: Neutron fairing opening and Stage 2 release** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/a1389d35b1ee1ca1711069f1f753ed7c?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: Rocket Lab, Dolphin Research** On satellites, Rocket Lab has launched the Flatellite platform to maximize batch deployment. Combined with its manufacturing base, it could evolve into a service provider and build its own constellation. Competition with Starlink would then broaden. **II. Constellation-ops competitive landscape** SpaceX also faces rising competition in constellations. Starlink offers multiple services, with the core being global broadband comparable to fixed-line internet. Users need a dedicated ground kit, the Starlink Terminal, centered on a phased-array antenna, functionally akin to a fiber modem. **Figure: Starlink Terminal** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/65eb3ed95e33459131b10568f920bab5?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: SpaceX, Dolphin Research** Another line is D2D (Direct to Device), also called D2C (Direct to Cell) by SpaceX. It mirrors cellular service, allowing phones to link directly to satellites. This expands the addressable market materially. **1) Global broadband: Bezos is closing in** **a) Blue Origin’s plan** Project Kuiper is progressing rapidly and directly targets Starlink. Over 100 satellites have already reached orbit. Amazon also plans TeraWave for higher bandwidth and faster service aimed at premium enterprise use. **b) China’s plan** China is advancing GW (China SatNet), Qianfan (Shanghai Yuanxin), Honghu, and other constellations. Qianfan is positioned as a commercial service for consumers and enterprises. China SatNet and Shanghai Yuanxin have received mainland satellite-internet licenses. In late 2025, China submitted frequency and orbital filings to the ITU for 14 constellations including GW and Qianfan, totaling 203k satellites, far exceeding Starlink’s current in-orbit count. **2) D2D: phone-to-satellite competitors are emerging** US startup $AST SpaceMobile(ASTS.US) is pushing ahead with D2D. Its constellation targets only a few dozen satellites. AST says giant phased-array antennas will offset lower satellite counts, but a large gap vs. Starlink’s tens of thousands likely remains. Major backers like Google could still add pressure on SpaceX, and several other US D2D efforts are underway. This field is getting crowded. **Figure: AST SpaceMobile uses giant phased arrays for D2D** ![IMG_256](https://pub.pbkrs.com/uploads/2026/523e515e32b2b0b22167d45f5dae6233?x-oss-process=style/lg) **Source: AST SpaceMobile, Dolphin Research** That said, while satellite and comms tech involves capability and manufacturing, there is no single disruptive moat. Pure-play constellation operators pose a more limited direct threat to SpaceX. As Blue Origin and others mature in launch, satellite operators will have more cost-effective options, which is the real battleground. Reuse race outcomes will be decisive. **3) Spectrum and orbital slots are urgent prizes** **a) Finite resources** Spectrum and orbital slots are limited and follow first-come-first-served rules. LEO capacity is theoretically around 60k satellites. Starlink is already near 10k in orbit, but ITU filings now total in the hundreds of thousands. **Figure: Satellites in orbit (schematic)** **Source: NikkiAsia, Dolphin Research** Under ITU rules, within 7 years of filing, the first satellite must be launched, operate in orbit, and function for 90 days. By year 9, 10% of the filed satellites must be deployed. By year 12, 50% must be in place, and by year 14, 100%. **b) National security** Starlink’s wartime utility in the Russia–Ukraine conflict was clear. With terrestrial infrastructure degraded, Starlink maintained national connectivity in Ukraine and supported ISR and comms for drones. It also enabled long-range combined arms operations and persistent links with NATO. Hence spectrum and orbits are not only commercial assets but strategic ones. Control relates to communications sovereignty and national security. This raises the stakes substantially. **This is a critical window.** Whoever occupies more slots sooner gains future advantage. Both the US and China will see more reusable rockets entering flight-test in 2026, reflecting the current competitive phase. Speed to deploy is now strategy. **III. Where are the opportunities?** **1) Launch** SpaceX pioneered reusability, slashing launch costs and catalyzing demand. With many players accelerating and hitting milestones, full reusability should keep iterating quickly. It is a matter of time. Monopoly is unlikely. SpaceX has shown a viable path and shortened fast-followers’ cycles. Bezos’s more conservative approach is slower but has delivered, and demand-side dynamics favor multi-sourcing, aiding catch-up. That said, SpaceX still leads on launch. If Starship reaches full reuse, costs could step down again. Starlink’s network effects also help preserve first-mover advantages. In a blue-ocean market, we would watch SpaceX closely and also the chasers. Among challengers, Rocket Lab stands out for tech, iteration speed, and core positioning in gov./defense. Neutron’s maiden flight is the key milestone to watch. **2) Constellation operators** We rank satellite ops after launch. For LEO operators under the SpaceX and Blue Origin overhang, the question is whether they can carve out price, performance, or service differentiation. For traditional GEO comsat operators, the challenge from LEO broadband is existential, and their transition bears watching. Key US-listed satellite operators include the following: **3) Upstream supply chain** Surging demand lifts upstream opportunities. Focus on: **(a) Core components enabling reuse and radical cost-down** such as engines, airframe materials, GNC, and AM/3D-printing. SpaceX is highly vertically integrated. Blue Origin in-sources engines and structures, while Rocket Lab internalizes engines, structures, GNC parts, and some composites. External buys are mainly bulk materials and select chips/electronics. **(b) Satellite component demand as volumes explode and capability rises**, especially with potential growth in compute satellites. Given lower per-launch costs from reuse and cost-down, satellite components may grow faster than launch hardware. Representative areas include: **i) Solar arrays:** compute satellites could draw far more power. If a single-satellite load reaches ~100 kW, that is roughly 4x a Starlink-class comsat. **ii) Thermal management:** higher power means greater heat and far more complex systems, lifting thermal hardware value. **iii) Laser links:** inter-satellite bandwidth is rising fast. Starlink reportedly reaches ~100 Gbps, about 5x a GEO HTS, but compute satellites could need ~10 Tbps. That implies orders-of-magnitude growth. For solar arrays, SpaceX and Rocket Lab currently self-supply. A future shift to silicon PV could open room for external sourcing. For thermal hardware, SpaceX procures materials and parts externally. For laser comms, SpaceX builds terminals in-house, but chips, sensors, and modules still come from suppliers. Across the US/EU supply chain, many assets sit within conglomerates or private hands. Pure-play, listed manufacturers are fewer after decades of consolidation. In China, multiple listed companies participate in upstream components. Their potential Hong Kong listings could be worth monitoring. For related stock lists compiled by Dolphin Research on the Longbridge app, see: [https://longbridge.cn/sharelist/31528177?app\_id=longbridge&utm\_source=longbridge\_app\_share&locale=zh-CN&share\_track\_id=37d01a3d-7f74-40a3-802f-b2b6abcc1689&invite-code=032064](https://longbridge.cn/sharelist/31528177?app_id=longbridge&utm_source=longbridge_app_share&locale=zh-CN&share_track_id=37d01a3d-7f74-40a3-802f-b2b6abcc1689&invite-code=032064) ### Related Stocks - [MRLN.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/MRLN.US.md) - [BLUE.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/BLUE.US.md) - [AMZN.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/AMZN.US.md) - [TSLA.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/TSLA.US.md) - [DXYZ.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/DXYZ.US.md) - [RKLB.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/RKLB.US.md) - [ASTS.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/ASTS.US.md)