---
title: "God of Stock, Xiao Gu: Trades like a model worker, risk control on vacation."
type: "Topics"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/topics/44398691.md"
description: "Looking at Xiao Gu's recent trading activity, a peculiar division of labor becomes apparent: long-term narratives drive entry, short-term sentiment dictates holding, and margin limits determine when to exit. But one set of numbers is more telling than the 'divine punishment' comments in the thread: he executed 176 trades in a single week, only to see his account lose HKD 10,696 the following week, wiping out 84.27% of the cumulative profits from the prior eight weeks. Small gains are picked up penny by penny; large losses accumulate week by week. Fingers buzz like a model worker, while risk management sits idle on vacation. Mocking him verbally adds little value; laying out the ledger reveals exactly where this 'stock god's' strategy falls short..."
datetime: "2026-10-16T16:31:10.000Z"
locales:
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/topics/44398691.md)
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/44398691.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/44398691.md)
author: "[阿米巴星人](https://longbridge.com/en/profiles/11255863.md)"
generator: "portal-rs"
---

# God of Stock, Xiao Gu: Trades like a model worker, risk control on vacation.

Looking at Xiao Gu's recent operations, it's easy to spot a peculiar division of labor: long-term narratives handle the orders, short-term sentiment manages the positions, and margin limits dictate when to call it a day.

But one set of numbers is more interesting than the "divine punishment" in the comments: **He executed 176 trades in a single week, only for his account to lose HKD 10,696 the following week, wiping out 84.27% of the cumulative profits from the prior eight weeks.**

Pick up pennies bit by bit, lose fortunes week by week. **Fingers busy as a model worker, risk management idle as if on vacation.**

Making fun of him verbally isn't very meaningful; laying out the books is the only way to see exactly where this "stock god's" strategy gets expensive. Below, we break down his publicly disclosed account P&L, price changes post-trade, and estimated commissions separately.

In the September 6 P8 weekly report, Xiao Gu disclosed that he made 176 trades that week, with most yielding less than HKD 10 profit; the account gained HKD 1,862 that week, bringing the cumulative profit over the previous eight weeks to HKD 12,693.

By the September 13 P9 report, the account had lost HKD 10,696 that week, leaving cumulative profits at just HKD 1,997. In the same article, he admitted to using "4x leverage".

10,696 ÷ 12,693 = **84.27%**.

**Eight weeks to build profits, one week to dismantle them. The stock god handed diligence over to trading, but left account safety to luck.**

The 176 trades here refer to the count he disclosed; the HKD 1,862 is the weekly account P&L, which may include unrealized gains/losses. You can't simply divide the two to fabricate an "average profit per trade." Similarly, you can't prove these 176 trades directly caused the next week's loss, but it is clear: frequent small wins did not protect the account from larger drawdowns. [Original P8 Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/43776920) | [Original P9 Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/43876980)

Linking P8, P9, and P10 across three weeks makes the ledger even clearer:

| Weekly Report Disclosed by User | New Deposits (HKD) | Weekly Account P&L (HKD) |
| ------------------------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------ |
| P8, released Sep 6              | 17,900             | +1,862                   |
| P9, released Sep 13             | 20,000             | −10,696                  |
| P10, released Sep 21            | 19,000             | +900                     |
| Total for Three Weeks           | **56,900**         | **−7,934**               |

Over these three weeks, the account net value rose from HKD 96,523 to HKD 145,489, appearing to gain HKD 48,966 on the surface. However, deducting the newly injected HKD 56,900 based on his disclosures, the actual trading P&L during this period was **negative HKD 7,934**.

**The account grew larger, yet the returns for these three weeks were negative. The main contributor to the growth was the user himself, constantly transferring money in.** Deposit transfers belong in the cash flow column; investment skill must be found in the P&L column.

We must also state facts favorable to him fully: As of P10, the cumulative P&L he disclosed for this round remains positive at HKD 2,897. The aforementioned negative HKD 7,934 only reflects the account movement over these three weeks; it cannot pass off as total historical losses, nor should it be called "total cut-loss amount." [Original P10 Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/43988631)

By October, he delivered another set of "bottom-fishing homework" for unified observation.

On October 12, he explicitly stated adding positions in Albemarle, Uber, Alcoa, Rocket Lab, while opening new positions in CoreWeave and SKHX. Including all six tickers from this post, using the Oct 12 close as the starting point, we observe performance over the subsequent one and three trading days:

| Ticker                           | Next Day Change, Oct 13 | Change After 3 Days, Oct 15 |
| -------------------------------- | ----------------------- | --------------------------- |
| Albemarle ALB                    | −0.87%                  | −0.33%                      |
| Uber UBER                        | −0.25%                  | −0.32%                      |
| Alcoa AA                         | −0.43%                  | −3.00%                      |
| Rocket Lab RKLB                  | −2.27%                  | −15.92%                     |
| CoreWeave CRWV                   | −3.05%                  | −13.17%                     |
| SKHX                             | −6.20%                  | −19.15%                     |
| **Equal-weight Avg (6 Tickers)** | **−2.18%**              | **−8.65%**                  |
| QQQ (Same Period)                | −0.33%                  | −2.42%                      |

**All six tickers fell, with a 3-day average decline of 8.65%, underperforming QQQ by 6.23 percentage points.**

**Six tickers, six codes, all moving in one direction after three days. The neatest aspect of this portfolio is their collective downward move.** [Original Buy & Add Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/44286742)

Note that SKHX is a 2x Daily Long Hynix ETF. Its risk profile differs from standard equities; one shouldn't just see "Hynix" and automatically skip the leverage column. [Product Prospectus](https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1976322/000182912626007281/themesetftrust_497k.htm)

This table shows **price statistics post-close on the day of public commentary**, not Xiao Gu's actual realized P&L. His entry prices, position weights, and subsequent exits are incomplete, so we cannot claim he personally lost 8.65%. Furthermore, since all six tickers moved on the same day amid a market downturn, we cannot inflate "6/6 downs" into a long-term 100% contrarian accuracy rate. QQQ serves merely as a market benchmark and does not adjust for industry differences or leverage risks among these stocks.

As for "how much they rise on average after selling," current public materials are unsuitable for forcing an average.

Western Digital is a ready-made counterexample: On Oct 2, he announced cutting his losses. Using that day's close as the baseline, the stock rose 6.34% the next day, fell 2.38% after three days, and dropped 14.17% by Oct 15.

Capture only the rebound day, and Xiao Gu looks like a contrarian indicator; post the subsequent drop, the onlookers' editing skills are exposed.

Alibaba was sold by him at $109 per his account; the Oct 15 close was $111.13, roughly 1.95% higher. However, the exact sell timestamp wasn't verified, so this cannot be mixed with Western Digital's different baselines and tenors to form an "average post-sell gain." [WD Cut-Loss Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/44175896) | [Alibaba Sell Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/44377841)

**To mock someone's trading, there's no need to turn your own statistics into a joke.**

There is also no complete answer in public data regarding how much meat was actually cut. For the WD trade, he said he lost "2000" but didn't specify the currency; when covering NBIS, he mentioned cutting a stock that lost ~20%, but didn't provide enough figures to recalculate. As for "not rotating would have cost at least 20k," that's his estimate for a hypothetical path and cannot be added to actual losses. [Cover Self-Report](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/44395055) | [Regretful Rotation Post](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/44397450)

Commissions can be roughly estimated in order of magnitude.

Assuming simplified IBKR small-order fees: **$1 per trade**. Treating his disclosed 176 trades as 176 one-way billable orders yields approx. **$176**. Converting at a indicative rate of 1 USD = 7.8 HKD, this is approx. **HKD 1,373**.

This is not his actual bill. IBKR's US stock pricing differs between fixed and tiered models, and stocks differ from options; here we only estimate magnitude, not wasting time on cents. The IBKR HK official fee sheet lists a minimum $1 commission for US stocks under the fixed model and $0.35 for the tiered model; we cannot assume which scheme he actually chose. [IBKR HK Fee Sheet](https://www.interactivebrokers.com.hk/en/pricing/commissions-stocks.php)

Based on this rough estimate, frequent trading does incur costs. But the weekly account P&L may already have deducted fees, so we shouldn't double-count them, nor mix stock declines, missed opportunities, and commissions into an exaggerated "total loss." Financing interest, slippage, and FX costs are also excluded from this estimate.

The most expensive part of Xiao Gu's strategy is turning the urgency to break even into a reason for accelerating trades. Before understanding the last loss, the next comeback battle is already impatiently launched.

Old positions rise slowly, so switch to more stimulating ones; new positions fall fast, so add more aggressively; when capital runs out, exit timing is dictated by margin pressure.

Stocks can be held for months, but rules might change daily. **In his reviews, discipline always appears timely; unfortunately, usually only after a loss, before disappearing again prior to the next order.**

Every reflection feels like an epiphany, yet the next round of operations seems as if he never read his own 检讨. Writing "I won't do this again" and actually doing it next time are separated by what is truly called investment discipline.

**176 trades prove busyness, six all-down tickers record one failure, and 84% profit retracement reveals account risk. No number proves that the next more aggressive trade will win back losses.**

Next time you see a "stock god" posting, don't rush to buy contrarian. Handing your money to "contrarian metaphysics" is no smarter than handing it to "guaranteed rebounds." 

**If you laugh at Xiao Gu, then turn around to find a more stimulating stock, hoping to make back previous losses in one shot, then this article might also be written about you. It's just that your operations aren't being livestreamed daily.**

*Data Note: Verified as of Oct 17, 2026. Account and trade records come from the user's public self-reports, unaudited settlement slips; market data consists of unadjusted daily K-lines from Longbridge regular trading hours, with a fixed window ending at the full close on Oct 15. Commissions are rough estimates under explicit assumptions; this article does not calculate full historical win rates, true realized total losses, or actual trading fees.*

### Related Stocks

- [ALB.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/ALB.US.md)
- [UBER.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/UBER.US.md)
- [WDC.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/WDC.US.md)
- [09988.HK](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/09988.HK.md)
- [89988.HK](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/89988.HK.md)
- [BABA.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/BABA.US.md)
- [CRWV.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/CRWV.US.md)
- [AA.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/AA.US.md)
- [SKHX.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/SKHX.US.md)
- [RKLB.US](https://longbridge.com/en/quote/RKLB.US.md)

## Comments (8)

- **新用护 · 2026-10-17T01:04:45.000Z**: Feels like it was written by AI.
- **豆条 · 2026-10-16T17:25:54.000Z**: I made over 100 trades a day and played ultra-short-term for a month. I've completely exited and won't play anymore; it's just not my thing.
  - **HanKin** (2026-10-16T18:04:01.000Z): The fees must be around 2,000-3,000 RMB; Longbridge isn't suitable for day trading.
- **Lpeng · 2026-10-16T17:17:36.000Z · 👍 1**: Your writing and observations are very detailed! ⊙∀⊙!
- **这浮躁的世界 · 2026-10-16T17:03:04.000Z · 👍 2**: You're really observant. A few days ago, he posted about opening a position in RKLB, and the crowd below rushed to clear their positions in 跟风. As expected, it plummeted sharply these past two days. I used to be indifferent to him, but this time really taught me a lesson.
  - **阿米巴星人** (2026-10-16T17:26:35.000Z): AI assisted 😆
- **大获全胜 · 2026-10-16T16:46:00.000Z**: Have you sold Hynix and NBIS?
- **阿米巴星人 · 2026-10-16T16:44:36.000Z**: I want to be the number one hater of the stock god 🥲🥲🥲


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> **Disclaimer: This article is for reference only and does not constitute any investment advice.**