---
title: "CICC: \"Monetary-Fiscal Coordination\" Under the Walsh Reform"
type: "News"
locale: "en"
url: "https://longbridge.com/en/news/295859600.md"
description: "CICC released a research report stating that Federal Reserve Chairman Waller is promoting reforms to the monetary policy framework, emphasizing \"monetary-fiscal coordination\" to help channel funds from virtual to real. Under the new framework, the policy interest rate will focus more on endogenous inflation, raising the threshold for interest rate hikes; in terms of the balance sheet, the Federal Reserve will shift from active management to coordinating with fiscal policy and banks for passive balance sheet expansion, with the asset structure transitioning from long-term U.S. Treasury bonds to short-term debt and bank credit instruments, achieving a steady flow of liquidity"
datetime: "2026-08-13T23:51:02.000Z"
locales:
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/295859600.md)
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/295859600.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/295859600.md)
---

# CICC: "Monetary-Fiscal Coordination" Under the Walsh Reform

According to the Zhitong Finance APP, China International Capital Corporation (CICC) released a research report stating that the Federal Reserve is promoting the reform of the monetary policy framework through five working groups, attempting to coordinate fiscal and targeted liquidity injections from banks under the new framework. This is aimed at facilitating the shift from virtual to real economy through the "monetary-fiscal coordination" that the Federal Reserve has repeatedly emphasized. Under the new framework, the Federal Reserve's reform aims to regulate and lower financing costs, align with fiscal goals, and direct funds to where they are most needed.

As the U.S. government and strategic industries increasingly rely on debt financing, monetary policy will have to trend towards a price-quantity coordination. CICC predicts the following adjustments to the monetary policy framework:

**In terms of policy interest rates,** there will be a greater focus on endogenous inflation primarily driven by the economic cycle, such as wages, while downplaying systemic shocks like geopolitical conflicts and structural inflation caused by the AI investment boom. This will raise the threshold for interest rate hikes and lower the threshold for cuts. Additionally, as fiscal financing increasingly relies on short-term debt, policy interest rates will also consider the burden of debt interest, rather than being based solely on economic fundamentals.

**In terms of the balance sheet,** the Federal Reserve will shift from actively managing liquidity during the QE/QT era to passively expanding the balance sheet in coordination with fiscal policy and banks, injecting base money. Specifically, in conjunction with the Treasury issuing short-term debt, the Fed will continue to use the Reserve Management Purchase (RMP) to trendily buy short-term debt to expand the balance sheet. At the same time, by deregulating banks, it will incentivize them to strengthen the use of Federal Reserve credit tools, activate bank credit and U.S. Treasury market-making functions, and release banks' duration space. In summary, CICC expects the Federal Reserve to trendily expand its balance sheet, but the asset structure will gradually shift from long-duration U.S. Treasuries and MBS to short-term debt and bank credit tools; thus, liquidity injections will transition from large fluctuations to a steady flow.

## Issues with the QE/QT Liquidity System

The dollar liquidity framework established after the 2008 financial crisis maintains "ample" absolute amounts of bank reserves in a narrow sense, with the Federal Reserve primarily adjusting the scale of reserves through QE/QT in a less frequent and larger manner, rather than frequently adjusting reserve supply to anchor the federal funds rate as it did before the financial crisis.

This system has three major structural issues:

1.  On the source of liquidity: The large fluctuations in liquidity can easily lead to excessive financial speculation and risk accumulation. For instance, the Federal Reserve's long-term QE (quantitative easing) actively releases liquidity at a large scale and fast pace, often resulting in overly loose liquidity that triggers excessive financial speculation; subsequently, a significant QT (quantitative tightening, balance sheet reduction) can overcorrect, ultimately leading to liquidity or even financial risks, which then initiates a new round of QE (see Chart 1).
    
2.  On interest rates and communication policy: Continuous high-frequency communication with the market leads to a feedback loop between market expectations and Federal Reserve policies. If the Federal Reserve tightens more than expected, it can trigger market volatility or even financial risks, forcing the policy to compromise and revert to a dovish stance (the so-called "Federal Reserve put option," see Chart 2).
    
3.  On regulatory targets: Excessive regulation of the banking sector, including requirements for the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR), Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), and Intraday Liquidity Monitoring, significantly limits banks' ability to stabilize financial markets (market-making activities) and expand credit (traditional deposit and loan businesses), while there is a lack of effective supervision over non-banks (such as hedge funds), leading to increased leverage and making risks less observable **Chart 1: The scale of reserves fluctuates significantly around ample levels, often triggering liquidity crises when insufficient**
    

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/631639bf14417ea19eb0a2e18beb0ca2.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: Federal Reserve, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

**Chart 2: The Federal Reserve's monetary policy increasingly cares about the stock market**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/f11d8a59a76d52606a2b59ac9b9cb7d3.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: Cieslak, A., & Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2021), China International Capital Corporation Research Department

These structural issues have fueled the U.S. shift from the real economy to the virtual:

For financial institutions, the excess liquidity during the QE phase led to a "search for yield," stimulating asset bubbles; excessive leverage increased the fragility of the financial system, and significant QT tightening liquidity triggered financial risks, which in turn forced new QE\[2\], resulting in larger-scale asset appreciation (Chart 1). Thus, monetary policy not only fell into the state criticized by Walsh of being overly interventionist ("mission creep")\[3\], but the policy itself became an important source of brewing and bursting financial risks\[4\].

For the real economy, strict bank regulations hindered traditional small and medium-sized enterprises from obtaining financing\[5\], while the rise of non-bank financing and lower long-term interest rates stimulated large enterprises capable of capital market financing\[6\]. The large amount of dollars released through QE flowed more into non-bank institutions for "arbitrage" and large technology platform enterprises, exacerbating the shift from the real economy to the virtual.

## Structural Constraints of Walsh's Reforms

In the face of the problems of the old system, reform seems imperative. Since being nominated as Federal Reserve Chairman, Walsh has frequently signaled a balance sheet reduction, causing market turbulence. However, China International Capital Corporation assesses that this "balance sheet reduction" is not the same as the previous one; Walsh faces structural constraints from various dimensions such as fiscal, economic, and market, making it difficult to achieve simply by "reducing the nominal size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet." These constraints may even force monetary policy to cooperate more.

First, the end of "small government," the restart of "big fiscal," and significant financing pressure on U.S. Treasury bonds. Since the 1980s, the trend of "heavy monetary, light fiscal" has accompanied the hollowing out, financialization, and wealth disparity in the U.S. (Chart 3), which triggered a strong public backlash after the 2008 financial crisis\[7\]. In recent years, the U.S. has seen pro-cyclical big fiscal policies, with important factors being increasingly strong demands for national security, functional industrial policies, and redistribution policies (such as the "three major bills" during the Biden administration and last year's "Big and Beautiful Act"). Looking ahead, even according to the CBO's conservatively high estimates, the deficit rate will persist long-term (Chart 4), and fiscal financing (U.S. Treasury bond issuance) imposes hard constraints on monetary policy from both price and quantity perspectives (Charts 5, 6), making it difficult for monetary policy to tighten substantially There may even be a need to expand cooperation with fiscal policy (such as the RMP initiated in December last year). Waller himself has repeatedly stated that the Federal Reserve under his leadership will strengthen coordination with fiscal policy\[8\]. Research within the Federal Reserve also believes that the impact of U.S. Treasury financing on liquidity should be emphasized, and that the tightening effect of bond issuance on liquidity should be hedged by purchasing short-term bonds\[9\].

**Chart 3: Since the 1980s, the "small government" in the U.S. has been accompanied by industrial hollowing out and widening wealth gap**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/5881a7dc0ecc7127c172bb7c7f9d05fa.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

**Source: FRED, CICC Research Department**

**Chart 4: Large fiscal policy in the U.S. is likely to continue**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/a7515d9f66954ac78afab56c5bde896b.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: CBO, Tax Foundation, CICC Research Department

**Chart 5: Pressure on U.S. fiscal interest expenditures is rising rapidly**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/0c37f25d33d86a52ecb148ae24aa9825.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: CBO, CICC Research Department

**Chart 6: Fiscal financing pressure triggers liquidity tightening**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/02f4e055220b86d0549267f63faebc15.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: FRED, CICC Research Department

Secondly, there is the financing pressure from AI and re-industrialization investments. Betting on AI investments to enhance productivity and drive re-industrialization in response to global geopolitical challenges has gradually become the main line of industrial policies in various countries ("Asset Big Shift: Redefining Safe Assets"). CICC believes this means that the prosperity led by AI investments may transcend typical economic cycles, and as the free cash flow of related companies gradually depletes, investments will increasingly rely on financing from financial markets. CICC expects that net financing of corporate bonds is likely to exceed $2 trillion in the coming year, and banks involved in private credit are expected to continue increasing non-bank loans by $330 billion (Chart 7, Chart 8). Correspondingly, bank market-making and credit demand will also increase. If banks excessively tighten cash (i.e., reserves) at this time, it will hinder smooth financing and even trigger liquidity risks.

**Chart 7: Net issuance of corporate bonds continues to rise**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/81f9351b3693a1bcfb58ae807b7e43d1.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg) Source: Bloomberg, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

**Chart 8: Rapid Growth of Bank Loans to Non-Bank Entities Reflects Strong Demand for Private Credit**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/6013e5a01a1d883264517be9a64cc437.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: FRED, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

The inherent fragility of the financial system dictates that liquidity reforms must be approached with caution. Mainstream central bank research indicates that the minimum size of a central bank's balance sheet is essentially determined by the financial system's minimum demand for reserves\[10\]. Currently, whether based on the empirical rule provided by Federal Reserve Governor Waller (ample reserves are about 10%-11% of U.S. nominal GDP\[11\], Chart 1) or the warning line given by Federal Reserve research (reserves account for 65% of banks' FedWire daily transfer volume\[12\], Chart 9), the scale of reserves is already on the edge of being relatively insufficient. During the U.S. Treasury issuance wave from July to December last year, the general account of the Treasury recaptured reserves, leading to a significant increase in the repo market spread (Chart 10), forcing the Federal Reserve to initiate RMP balance sheet expansion ("Fiscal Dominance, Restarting Balance Sheet Expansion"). In May of this year, Michael S. Barr, a Federal Reserve Governor responsible for overseeing banking and liquidity issues, publicly stated that solely aiming to reduce the size of the balance sheet is a mistake, and forcibly weakening bank liquidity regulatory rules would jeopardize the stability of the financial system\[13\].

**Chart 9: The Ratio of Reserves to FedWire Transfer Volume Has Fallen Below the Warning Line**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/557d8c46a8b851871483c3628a8b0c22.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: Haver, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

**Chart 10: Significant Financing Pressure in the Repo Market During the U.S. Treasury Issuance Wave Last July**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/6542083c4525421c36335b3177803668.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: FRED, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

## Walsh's Strategy: New Type of "Monetary-Fiscal Coordination"

**Breaking the Old and Establishing the New**

In response to these constraints, China International Capital Corporation has observed that Walsh has adopted a "breaking the old and establishing the new" reform path. This involves criticizing old rules, establishing new rules, and building independence on the new rules, which naturally meets the financing constraints and financial stability requirements mentioned earlier, preventing monetary policy from tightening excessively. This is reflected in the establishment of three working groups focused on inflation framework, economic data, productivity, and employment: Inflation Framework Working Group: The leader, Sargent, believes that inflation is the result of the joint effects of fiscal and monetary policies. If the fiscal deficit is out of control, monetary policy alone cannot restrain inflation. The leader, Mankiw, advocates for range inflation and inflation anchoring. In a K-shaped economy, investment inflation and wage disinflation occur simultaneously. If we adopt Mankiw's perspective and use inflation indicators provided by the private market to anchor wage levels, the weakness and disinflation in the lower half of the K-shape cannot be ignored (Chart 11, Chart 12);

Economic Data Working Group: The leader, Raj Chetty, believes that traditional macroeconomic aggregate data smooths out structural differences. Through micro big data such as credit card usage and real-time job postings, we can directly observe the real economic temperature of different classes and regions. Essentially, this is also a hope for re-anchoring. Moreover, from a structural perspective, the resilience of the traditional sectors of the U.S. economy is not optimistic and cannot withstand sustained tightening (see "Global Markets in the Second Half: Trading the 'Lagging Curve'");

Productivity and Employment Working Group: The leader, Anderson, emphasizes the long-term potential of AI investment to trigger a supply-side productivity explosion, thereby lowering costs and suppressing inflation. Therefore, a reasonable inference is that for such a supply-side disinflation factor, more patience should be given, rather than stifling investment demand in its infancy based on traditional policy thinking during its financing needs.

**Chart 11: Truflation Core Inflation Year-on-Year Trend Decline**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/dc131b2306a5b52e1ceed9dea27478e6.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: Bloomberg, CICC Research Department

**Chart 12: Unit Labor Cost Year-on-Year Trend Decline**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/2f1842689b542302c8bc60af8a11db4e.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: FRED, CICC Research Department

It can be imagined that the new framework ultimately provided by the leaders chosen and appointed by Walsh will largely be favorable to AI financing (as well as fiscal financing supporting industrial policies) and effectively nurture the lower half of the K-shape. Just as Walsh continues to criticize that monetary policy is too interventionist, CICC believes that the new rules may more often assign issues such as supply shocks (like oil prices) that the Federal Reserve cannot handle to the White House, returning monetary policy to its essence, as articulated by monetarism founder Friedman: providing a stable monetary background for economic operation and avoiding monetary policy itself becoming a source of economic turmoil.

## Liquidity Injection Mechanism: From Active Federal Reserve to Coordination with Fiscal and Banks

Clearly, neither excessive easing nor excessive tightening, as seen in previous QE/QT, meets this original goal. So, specifically, how would Waller adjust the liquidity framework? The answer lies in the Balance Sheet Working Group and the "Guide to Reducing the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet" (hereinafter referred to as the "Guide") authored by then-Fed Governor Milan in March. Jeremy Stein, co-chair of the Balance Sheet Working Group, advocates that there is no need to mechanically shrink the balance sheet; structural adjustments such as asset duration are more important than scale reduction, and the exit process should focus on financial stability. In terms of specific policies, China International Capital Corporation (CICC) believes that the so-called balance sheet reform essentially involves gradually correcting the liquidity framework by relaxing regulations on the banking sector, which may involve several core changes:

First, in terms of the method of releasing liquidity, the QE/QT model will be ended, and liquidity release will become passive, refined, and routine. Specifically, liquidity release will shift to a model where fiscal, banking, and other foreign institutions actively apply, with the Federal Reserve passively cooperating: on the fiscal side, both Article 12 of the "Guide" and an internal Fed study from last August suggest that during the period when fiscal debt issuance occupies reserves, liquidity will be released to the market in equal amounts through the purchase of Treasury bills (fiscal initiative, Fed cooperation); for banks, Articles 1, 3, and 11 of the "Guide" aim to encourage banks to actively and routinely borrow from the Fed when cash is needed by "de-stigmatizing" the discount window and SRF window and extending borrowing terms. Essentially, the Fed will cooperate with banks to expand their balance sheets and inject base money. The liquidity released through this method incurs costs (regulated by interest rate policy) and primarily meets the marginal liquidity needs of fiscal and banking sectors, with high adjustment frequency and small adjustment scale, making it more refined.

Second, in reducing the balance sheet duration, the Fed may hold more short-term debt while releasing long-term debt for banks and other financial institutions to hold. Waller's criticism of QE is more about the belief that purchasing long-term debt distorts asset pricing; therefore, the Fed may continue to release long-duration assets to the market. However, as mentioned earlier, "balance sheet reduction" must consider the capacity of financial markets, as any financial risk could force the Fed to repurchase long-term debt or even engage in QE. CICC believes Waller may achieve duration reduction through a long-short swap: after Waller took office, he did not suspend the RMP but continued to reduce MBS and increase short-term debt, which essentially shortens the asset duration. Articles 6 and 12 of the "Guide" also affirm the legitimacy of releasing liquidity through short-term debt.

Of course, relying solely on the Fed's purchase of short-term debt will still struggle to absorb the long-duration bonds released by the Fed, which brings us to the third point: deregulating banks (increasing their holding capacity) and creating profit space for banks to hold bonds (providing regulatory arbitrage space to increase their willingness to hold). Waller has publicly expressed support for relaxing bank regulations and hopes to strip the Fed of its regulatory role over banks, returning that power to the U.S. Treasury. Specifically, most policy recommendations in the "Guide" point towards relieving the banking sector of excessive liquidity and capital regulation requirements. The reasoning is evident: if the liquidity coverage ratio requirement decreases (not needing to hold too much cash), while allowing banks to leverage (increasing risk exposure), banks will reduce their cash ratio and hold more higher-yielding assets Furthermore, if banks can obtain long-term stable refinancing by pledging U.S. Treasuries at the SRF or discount window, there will be a demand for leveraged arbitrage (i.e., buying long-term bonds, pledging for refinancing at the SRF window, holding until maturity to earn the spread between long-term bonds and policy rates, and amplifying through leverage), which may also increase the demand for long-term bonds. When the yield on long-term bonds is thus roughly defined, domestic long-term funds in the U.S. will be more willing to hold long-term bonds, which is expected to stabilize or even lower long-term interest rates.

**Chart 13: Milan's "Balance Sheet Reduction Guide" provides key details on liquidity system reform**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/e144757c2340b37fe0838ca16122bc12.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: "User Guide for Reducing the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet," CICC Research Department

## A New Type of "Monetary-Fiscal Coordination"

Based on the above reform scenario, Walsh has actually achieved a new type of more covert monetary coordination with fiscal policy. Unlike the relatively simple, administratively ordered methods employed by Trump since last year to suppress the independence of the Federal Reserve, demand that the GSEs purchase MBS, and require banks to limit credit card rates, Walsh's monetary coordination is built on rules and institutions.

In terms of interest rate policy, according to the newly set inflation and economic data anchors, as well as considerations for improving long-term supply efficiency, the Federal Reserve may consider not raising interest rates when commodity inflation occurs under geopolitical conflicts and investment booms, but wages are deflating. However, once the oil price issue is alleviated, it may still continue to lower interest rates.

In terms of quantitative policy, on one hand, it restricts the large fluctuations in liquidity while ensuring that fiscal and financial institutions can continue to access funds in a small, frequent, and smooth manner at the margin. As a result, the Federal Reserve will cooperate with fiscal policy and banks to continue expanding the balance sheet, and banks will also accelerate their balance sheet expansion. The channels for liquidity provision are expected to be smoother and more precise.

In terms of financial regulation, by regulating banks, it increases their capacity to expand the balance sheet while transferring the regulatory responsibilities of banks to the fiscal side. While coordinating monetary and fiscal policies, banks expand their balance sheets under fiscal supervision, facilitating banks to act as market makers in cooperation with fiscal debt issuance or to direct funds to the real economy in line with industrial policies. This effectively provides specific financial tools for functional large-scale fiscal policies, facilitating the realization of the concept of shifting from virtual to real and the return of manufacturing.

**Chart 14: Under the new framework, the Federal Reserve's passive cooperation with fiscal and banking financing needs is expected to trend towards balance sheet expansion, with banks accelerating their balance sheet expansion**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/550847dac64490709a35d940f4e8279f.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Note: The chart simplifies the balance sheet significantly to show the framework changes.

Source: CICC Research Department

CICC would like to remind that even under the new framework, the Federal Reserve's role as the "lender of last resort" cannot be overlooked. Since the central tendency of long-term bond yields follows the central tendency of nominal economic growth, if this monetary coordination framework is implemented and short-term interest rates are further lowered to stimulate the economy, long-term bond yields may actually rise In this situation, without direct intervention or indirect guarantees from the Federal Reserve, and with private financial institutions such as banks solely absorbing U.S. Treasury bonds, it may be difficult to effectively suppress long-term bond yields and avoid a sell-off in risk scenarios (Chart 16). Therefore, the Federal Reserve still needs to play the role of the ultimate market maker; in fact, what Waller opposes is only the normalization of QE, not the initiation of QE to provide emergency liquidity to the market during a crisis\[30\].

**Chart 15: The central tendency of long-term bond yields follows the nominal growth central tendency**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/ee73b96c1fe716b33df7697cb4db52e2.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Source: Bloomberg, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

**Chart 16: Private debt holdings are difficult to avoid a sell-off, and the Federal Reserve's role as the ultimate market maker is hard to dismiss**

![Image](https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/http://img.zhitongcaijing.com/images/contentformat/e7c73d1663ab4f70d234489a629f84e8.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg)

Note: Elasticity is the percentage change in holdings corresponding to a 1bps increase in the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield; negative values reflect a reduction in U.S. Treasury holdings when yields rise.

Source: FRED, China International Capital Corporation Research Department

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