---
title: "New Bond King: Entering \"Capital Preservation\" Mode, Risk Exposure Cut to \"Historical Lows\"; \"Fed Rate Hikes, US Recession, US Debt Soft Default\" All Possible"
type: "News"
locale: "zh-CN"
url: "https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/280864779.md"
description: "Gundlach warns: the 40-year bond yield downtrend has ended; as US debt approaches $40 trillion, long-term rates will rise even in a recession, and the US even faces a \"soft default\" restructuring risk of mandatory coupon changes. His recommendation: dump US stocks and shift to emerging market equities, diversify into short-term fixed income, cash, and commodities, and wait for a buying opportunity after the bubble bursts"
datetime: "2026-03-28T05:12:43.000Z"
locales:
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/news/280864779.md)
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/news/280864779.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/280864779.md)
---

> 支持的语言: [English](https://longbridge.com/en/news/280864779.md) | [繁體中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/news/280864779.md)


# New Bond King: Entering "Capital Preservation" Mode, Risk Exposure Cut to "Historical Lows"; "Fed Rate Hikes, US Recession, US Debt Soft Default" All Possible

DoubleLine Capital founder and CEO, "New Bond King" Jeffrey Gundlach, issued a stern warning in his latest in-depth interview: **The 40-year interest rate decline cycle in the US has ended, massive debt is pushing the economy to an unsustainable edge, and the frenzied private credit market is brewing a huge liquidity disaster, much like the subprime mortgage crisis of 2006.**

On March 27, in an in-depth dialogue hosted by renowned financial anchor Julia, DoubleLine Capital founder and CEO Jeffrey Gundlach shared his explosive views on the global macroeconomy, the Federal Reserve's monetary policy path, private credit risks, and future asset allocation directions.

As one of the most influential fixed-income investors on Wall Street, Gundlach explicitly stated in the hours-long conversation that risks in the current financial environment are clearly accumulating. **He not only overturned market consensus expectations of the Fed "imminently cutting rates" but also proposed extreme scenarios where US Treasury bonds could face "restructuring" or "soft default" in the future.**

"Because of the debt burden we carry, and the way we are currently financing the government through a $2 trillion deficit, it is completely unsustainable. If something is unsustainable, it has to stop," Gundlach set an extremely cautious tone from the outset.

## **The Fed Has No Secrets; The Next Move Will Be a "Rate Hike," Not a Cut**

In response to the market's current fervent expectations for Fed rate cuts this year, Gundlach poured cold water on the idea. He frankly pointed out that the Federal Reserve has never been a leader in interest rates, but a follower.

**"I think we should abolish the Fed and use the 2-year Treasury yield as the short-term rate,"** Gundlach sharply stated. Comparing the federal funds rate and the 2-year Treasury yield over the past 30 years, the pattern is obvious: when the 2-year Treasury yield rises and exceeds the federal funds rate, the Fed will inevitably hike rates; and vice versa.

He explained the recent market dynamics in detail:

> "Just before the Fed announced it would keep rates unchanged, everyone was saying, 'The Fed will cut rates twice this year.' I said, no, they won't. The 2-year Treasury yield is higher than the federal funds rate. At the current level of the federal funds rate, and with the 2-year Treasury yield being more than 25 basis points above the upper limit of the federal funds rate, you cannot see the federal funds rate go down."

Gundlach predicted that if oil prices remain high (e.g., WTI crude at around $95 per barrel and sustained throughout the summer), **"the Fed will absolutely, positively hike rates. You will hear more and more about this, it has already started. Perhaps the Fed's next move will be a rate hike."**

## **Private Credit: A "Complete Disaster" Replaying the 2006 Subprime Crisis**

When discussing private credit, currently Wall Street's hottest asset class, Gundlach used the harshest language, drawing direct parallels to the subprime market that led to the 2008 global financial crisis.

"Last year, last year I told people, **I felt like I was in 2006, with all the bubbles.**" Gundlach stated that the current private credit market size of two to three trillion dollars is "strikingly similar" to the size of the subprime mortgage market before the global financial crisis in 2006.

He completely tore away the facade of "low volatility, high returns" in private credit, pointing out that its valuations are entirely based on opaque false prosperity. He shared a shocking industry insider detail:

> **"There was a very large insurance company client, they had eight managers who held the exact same position. The same holding, one was valued at 95, another at 8."**

Gundlach pointed out that the nature of private credit is to package illiquid assets to investors who require periodic redemptions, a fundamental mismatch destined for collapse. He warned:

> "When you ask for 14% redemption, and they only give you 5%, what you're going to do next is ask for 40%. **In June 2026, you're going to see some pretty wild redemption requests.** Private credit must undergo a significant shakeout."

## **Capital Preservation Paramount: Sell US Assets, Go Heavy on Emerging Markets and Gold**

Based on concerns about rising long-term interest rates and credit crises, DoubleLine Capital's current risk exposure has fallen to its lowest point in its 17-year history. Gundlach explicitly stated that times have changed: "We have left the world of ambition, the world of hype," and capital preservation is now the top priority.

Facing the S&P 500 Index, whose price-to-book ratio is more than double that of the rest of the world, Gundlach offered a disruptive "outlier" asset allocation recommendation: **Completely abandon US stocks.**

-   **40% in non-US equities:** "I've been telling US investors, they should own 100% non-US stocks, particularly emerging market stocks denominated in local currencies. For example, Brazil, Chile, and Southeast Asia."
-   **25% in short-term fixed income:** Entirely allocated to bonds with maturities within ten years and high credit quality.
-   **15% in commodities:** 10% linked to the Bloomberg Commodity Index, and 5% directly allocated to gold.
-   **20% in cash:** To wait until asset prices become cheaper in 2026.

Gundlach is extremely optimistic about gold:

> "Gold is real money. Central banks will be a sustained, huge source of demand for gold... Gold is no longer the domain of survivalists, eccentric crazy speculators. It is a real asset class."

## **Endgame Scenario: $40 Trillion in Debt Looms, US Treasuries May Face "Direct Coupon Cut" Restructuring**

Gundlach attributes his deepest concerns about the macro landscape to America's ever-expanding debt black hole. US national debt has now reached $39 trillion, and Gundlach believes, "When it reaches $40 trillion, this could become a psychological threshold."

He challenges the market's long-held inertia – the idea that economic recessions lead to lower interest rates. Gundlach warns that in the next recession, due to sharply widening deficits, long-term Treasury yields will not only not decrease but will rise. The US Treasury's annual interest payments have already reached $1.4 trillion, "heading towards $2 trillion in interest expenses."

When asked about the possibility of a recession, he noted:

> "I certainly think that **the likelihood of those in power announcing a recession starting at some point in 2026 is high. I would give it at least a 50% probability.**"

If long-term interest rates rise to around 6%, interest expenses will become completely unmanageable. Gundlach hypothesizes two endgame paths to resolve this crisis: **inflationary devaluation** or **soft default (debt restructuring)**.

Even more shockingly, he believes the possibility of the US government forcibly changing Treasury rules and directly reducing coupon rates is far higher than the market anticipates.

> **"I think investors need to consider the idea that the creditworthiness of US Treasury bonds could be compromised. People don't like to hear this. They think the idea is too radical."**

To hedge against this "rate cut" restructuring risk, Gundlach's team has taken extreme defensive measures: shorting all long-term Treasuries and exchanging any must-hold Treasuries for bonds with the lowest coupon rates within their respective maturities (e.g., 1.5%) to prevent high-coupon bonds (e.g., 6%) from suffering a principal collapse due to a government-mandated coupon reduction.

At the end of the interview, Gundlach predicts that a systemic "restructuring" or a major "reset" (i.e., the Fourth Turning) in the US system will occur around 2030. Until then, his strategy is summarized in four words: **"Wait for an excellent opportunity."**

**The full interview is as follows:**

> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Because of the debt burden we carry, and the way we are currently financing the government through a $2 trillion deficit, it is completely unsustainable, so something has to change. If something is unsustainable, it has to stop, and this has to stop. And politicians, of course, have shown absolutely no inclination to control spending. Therefore, the market will eventually have to be the enforcer. So, **risks are clearly accumulating in the current environment, and I am very interested in taking a low-risk strategy for the next few months and quarters.**
> 
> Julia
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach, founder and CEO of DoubleLine Capital. It is a great honor to have you on our show today. Thank you very much for taking the time to interview me.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Thank you for inviting me, Julia. We haven't talked in a long time.
> 
> Julia
> 
> It has indeed been a long time. It's been five years since we last spoke. You are one of the people I enjoy talking to most in the investment world. Again, it's an honor to have you, Jeffrey. So much has happened so far this year. I can hardly believe we're almost at the end of the first quarter. I've been telling my guests, so much has happened, so many twists and turns. Truly a lot.
> 
> Since it's been a while since you were last on the show, let's start with the big picture. Let's talk about how you view the world today, your assessment of the economy and markets, and what's on your radar? Jeffrey, one of the features of this show is that you can expound on the big picture and take as much time as you want.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Okay. Well, the economy seems to be slowing down. What's interesting is that bond yields are rising, Treasury yields are rising. While the economy is slowing, a core thesis that I've been developing - actually over the last five years or so - is that we are no longer in a long-term declining interest rate environment, particularly for long-term rates. I came to that conclusion about four or five years ago. I was opposed by many people at the time. They thought that rates would remain low for a long time due to generational reasons. But I think there are long cycles in rates, typically lasting about 40 years. Rates bottomed out around 1945, then started to rise in the '50s, and continued to rise until, I think you'd say, 1984. After that, rates began to fall, and that continued until 2000. **I have always believed that the long-term downtrend in long-term rates must have ended, due to Treasury interest expense.** Interest expense has ballooned due to the $2 trillion budget deficit that continues to grow annually, and higher interest rates. You know, the Fed raised short-term rates from zero to 5.375%, causing a significant increase in interest expense. So the US Treasury pays about $300 billion a year in interest. And now it's about $1.4 trillion, and there seems to be no end in sight.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Deficit spending. So we continue to add about $2 trillion in debt each year, and the maturing Treasuries currently have an average interest rate of about 3.8%. So, given that the 2-year Treasury yield is currently around 4%, and the 30-year Treasury yield is approaching 5%, if we maintain the status quo, those maturing bonds will be replaced by new bonds with higher interest rates.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I was very interested in the "taper tantrum" and the "tariff tantrum" that occurred about a year ago. It's interesting that during the "tariff tantrum," the S&P 500 fell 18%. If you look back at the last dozen or so drawdowns or bear markets in the S&P 500 over the decades, in each of the previous 12, the dollar appreciated by about 8% to 10%. I think it's very telling that when the stock market fell 18% last year, the dollar actually fell. This confirms my thinking that when the market is weak or the economy is weak, rates don't go down.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> What's really interesting now is that it's hard to discern the real reason for rising rates. Everyone says oil prices, and of course, that has some merit. But this is a pattern. Many patterns are being broken. In the past, when Treasury yields rose, credit product spreads typically narrowed. But in March of this year, one of the worst months in a long time. I mean, the 2-year Treasury yield went up 60 basis points this month, yet credit product spreads widened, not narrowed. So we're starting to see financial conditions tighten in a real way. Therefore, I have always believed that we will face an environment that is very unfavorable for financial assets. I know I sometimes listen to replays of your Saturday morning show, with Chris Whalen, I think it was. I think I started listening. Perhaps it's just confirmation bias, because I agree with a lot of what he says. But last year, last year I told people, I felt like I was in 2006, with all the bubbles, all these, you know, AI digital technologies and the narrowness of the market. It was too easy to make money last year. I mean, even bonds, investment-grade bonds were up 8%, and the S&P 500 was up, say, 17% or 18%. European stocks performed even stronger, and emerging market stocks performed the strongest.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> But this year, it's a year of caution and reflection. I noticed last year, while gold was up about 70% for the year, Bitcoin actually fell. My conclusion from that is that we have left the world of ambition. We have left the world of hype and everyone thinking, "you only live once," and so on. We've entered a world of reality, because Bitcoin. It's like something from three or four years ago, and I think one of the biggest insults to it is that millennials would say to baby boomers, it's only baby boomers who care about Bitcoin anymore, because it's no longer cool. **So we've entered a world of concrete and real things, away from the world of hype. And I think that's going to be a theme.** I'm looking at the financial news today, we're almost at the end of March, and they're saying this is the worst quarter for stock market performance since 2022. That's a long time. I mean, stocks have fallen that much. I mean, I think some indices are down 2% or 3%, some might be down 3% or 4%. But that means that in the last four years, we haven't had a single quarter where the stock market fell by 5%, which seems like it should have happened a long time ago. Going into 2026, the valuations of stocks remind me of the end of 2021, which led to a bad year the following year.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> In 2022, so I think we are in a world where capital preservation is paramount. At DoubleLine Capital, we have been continuously reducing risk, especially credit risk, for more than two years, continuously upgrading quality. In fact, in the funds where we are able to invest in things like BBB-rated corporate bonds, our exposure is at its lowest level in DoubleLine Capital's history (nearly 17 years old). We are not very optimistic about the outlook for financial assets, because I think even if we go into a recession, long-term Treasury yields will rise, not fall, which will break the pattern of the first 40 years of my career. I think that's what's going to happen. So we will face an environment where people are increasingly concerned about interest expense, and basically, the cost of interest on massive debt.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I hear many people say that if gasoline prices nationwide go above $4 a gallon, it will have a psychological impact on the economy. I think that may have some merit. Here in California this morning, our gas prices are about the highest. Hawaii may be higher, but our gas prices are high, and it costs me six dollars and seventy cents to fill up my tank now. That's really...
> 
> Julia
> 
> Regular gasoline?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Yes, regular gasoline. So prices are already high. But I also think these psychological thresholds are important. Most people don't realize that the national debt has exceeded $39 trillion. I have a feeling that when it reaches $40 trillion, it could become a psychological threshold, and people start thinking, you know, it could reach $50 trillion by 2030 or 2031.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> This is a very big problem. I think many of the things investors think they know are shaped by the experience of falling interest rates and always being able to get through cycles by refinancing, but that era is over. So what happens when the 30-year Treasury yield actually starts to rise in a weak economy? Think about it. If the economy is weak and bond yields are rising, think about what that means. It means interest expense grows faster. And of course, when the economy is weak, budget deficits expand, a significant percentage of GDP. In past recessions, budget deficits typically expanded GDP by 4%. Of course, the last two recessions were very severe. You know, there was the global financial crisis, and then there were the pandemic lockdowns, where budget deficits expanded by 8% and 12% of GDP. So if that really happens, I think one message I've been telling forward-looking investors is that we might see some fairly radical things have to happen to address this interest expense problem. One idea was put forward in a white paper at the end of 2024. And Scott Bessent, who wasn't Treasury Secretary yet, **commented that maybe we should restructure the US Treasuries held by foreign investors. His meaning was to extend maturities and reduce coupon rates. It's interesting that he said that because it's also an idea I've been mulling over, and I think it's more likely than most people are willing to believe, perhaps one way to deal with this problem is not only to do this for foreign investors, but possibly for all Treasuries.** So you go over and say, I know we will directly reduce the coupon rate on Treasuries, so that we can reduce interest expense. Think about it, the average coupon rate on Treasuries is about 3.8%. If you reduce it to, say, 1%, you can cut interest expense by nearly 75%. This way, we can get back to the spending levels of five years ago, thus having more room to push the problem further down the road. Because you cannot afford, if we are heading towards $2 trillion in interest expenses, which is where we are headed, it will be truly unsustainable.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So I think investors need to consider the idea that the creditworthiness of US Treasury bonds could be compromised. People don't like to hear this. They think the idea is too radical.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> But I'll tell you. You know, federal income tax used to be illegal. So they passed an amendment to make it legal. You know, the Fed is not allowed to buy corporate bonds under its charter, but after the pandemic lockdowns, they bought corporate bonds on a small scale.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So that was illegal. You know, in 2006, there were prospectuses for mortgage-backed securities that were unrated, valued at $2 trillion. It was written in plain English in the prospectus, these mortgages could not be modified under any circumstances. That's what the prospectus said, but they modified millions of US mortgages.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So rules can be changed.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Therefore, I am very nervous about the risk of holding long-term Treasuries. In our portfolio, the exposure in this area is actually close to zero. And for those we do hold, more than a year ago, I went to my government bond team and said, I want us to keep the maturity structure of our Treasury holdings unchanged. But in every maturity bucket, I want you to exchange the bonds we hold for the bonds with the lowest coupon rate in that bucket. By doing so, we reduced the coupon rate on 10-year and longer-term Treasuries from 4.75% to 1.5%. Thus, in case they decide to modify these Treasuries to reduce coupon rates. Well, if you hold a 6% coupon Treasury bond, that's a 30-year bond issued ten years ago, with a 6% coupon. If they reduce the coupon to 1.5%, you will suffer a loss of more than 50 points.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So, even if you don't think the probability of these risks is high, there's no reason to take them. I think we in the investment community all agree that if you take risks and get no return, don't take them. The flip side of the same coin is that if you can eliminate a risk at zero cost, even a negligible cost, you should eliminate that risk.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> That's how I see things. Because of our debt burden and the way we finance the government through a $2 trillion deficit, it is completely unsustainable, so something has to change. If something is unsustainable, it has to stop, and this has to stop. And politicians, of course, have shown absolutely no inclination to control spending. Therefore, the market will eventually have to be the enforcer. So, that's why I think the path of least resistance for long-term Treasury yields is upward. And, it's a bit concerning, because we're now seeing some credit stress emerge, because rates in March 2026 experienced one of the largest single-month increases ever. High-yield bond spreads have widened by about 75 basis points. So, risks are clearly accumulating in the current environment, and I am very interested in taking a low-risk strategy for the next few months and quarters.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Hey everyone, hope you enjoyed this interview. If you could take a moment to click that subscribe button, we're working towards our next goal of 100,000 subscribers, and your support really helps us reach that goal.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Thank you very much, and please enjoy the rest of the interview. Wow, Jeffrey, what a fantastic framework you've set up for our discussion. As you pointed out, you and I first met for an interview seven years ago. At that time, the debt was $22 trillion, and you pointed out it's now $39 trillion. That $40 trillion may indeed become a real psychological threshold. And your thesis is that in the next recession, rates will rise, and the dollar will fall. My goodness, you've certainly got my attention, because that sounds like a very painful awakening. I wonder, do you think investors are intellectually prepared for this? Are their positions appropriate? Because I also hear from you...
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> No. Yes, positions are appropriate. Most US investors, their positions are actually quite poor. For more than a year now, **I've been telling US investors they should own 100% non-US stocks, and in foreign currency.** That worked out very well last year, and it's working out well this year. My primary advice to US investors is to buy emerging markets, not emerging market stocks, but emerging market stocks denominated in local currencies.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> That's the only thing that has actually gone up this year. If you look at what's happened year-to-date, almost nothing has gone up. I looked at it just now. What's gone up this year is gold, up a few percent, the dollar index is up 1.7%, the commodity index is up, the Bloomberg Commodity Index is up 21%. The only other thing that's gone up is emerging market stocks, up 1.4%. And in contrast, you know, US stocks are down. I think it's time. It's not often for investors. So many people have been recommending US investors invest overseas, but that hasn't worked for many years, but it's starting to work now. I find the most exciting thing in investing is when something makes fundamental sense and then finally starts to really happen in reality, and that's what's happened now. These overseas investments are outperforming the US, and there's a long way to go. If you look at the Morgan Stanley World Index, you can break it into two parts, the Morgan Stanley US Index and the Morgan Stanley Rest of World Index. About 15 to 20 years ago, the US and the rest of the world (ex-US) had the same price-to-book multiples. And now the S&P 500 has more than double the price-to-book multiple of the rest of the world (ex-US). That's extreme overvaluation. Everyone seems to be saying one word, "American exceptionalism." That makes no sense to me. All they mean is that the US is outperforming other regions. When people say "American exceptionalism," they mean the US market, especially the stock market, is outperforming foreign markets. I think we're in a multi-year phase. We might be in the second inning, at most, of this baseball game analogy, where foreign markets will outperform the US. So I have an unusual asset allocation recommendation. **I basically recommend 40% in stocks, all non-US stocks. Some of them like Brazil, Chile, some Southeast Asian stocks, etc. I recommend only about 25% in fixed income, all within ten years, and all in the higher credit quality segment. Then I recommend about 15% in commodities. I might put 10% in the Bloomberg Commodity Index and 5% in gold, because I think gold is very attractive now**, it went up significantly last year to a very frothy $5,500 level, but it fell this week to $40,100. So I think gold will continue to be a strong performer. Then I think investors should hold the rest of their portfolio in cash, because as we move into 2026, asset prices will become cheaper. Of course, one thing everyone is talking about, and I've been very vocal about, is the situation in private credit. Yes. Its size is eerily similar to the subprime mortgages and unrated mortgages of 2006. People say it's not big, only two to three trillion dollars. Well, that was the size of that market in 2006, heading into the global financial crisis. I think this will be a very long, drawn-out story, and it won't spread as quickly as the subprime problem, because the subprime problem was priced daily, every hour of the day, because there was an index called the ABX index for subprime AAA-rated products. You could see it start to fall like a stone in early 2007. So you could see it fall from 100 to 93, then to 80. But this private credit thing, it's valued only about quarterly. So the data points will be sparse.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Yes, Jeffrey, when you say that, you... Speaking of that, it reminds me, do you see similarities between today's private credit market and the subprime market of 2006? Because in the summer of 2007, you said at a conference that subprime would be a complete disaster and would only get worse.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> That's right. That was at the Morningstar conference in June 2007. Yes. I was invited to speak at Morningstar this year. I couldn't go because of a scheduling conflict. But as I was pondering what to say for the keynote speech at Morningstar, I said to myself, maybe I should start with "Private credit is a complete disaster and will get worse," because that's what I ad-libbed about subprime in 2007. I didn't intend to say that. I just, it just came out, and I said it. But I'm glad I said it. But, my point is, the problem, obviously, everyone is increasingly aware that the valuations in the private credit market are not real valuations. I think the head of Apollo said that too. The valuations are not real. So everyone knows that, at best, you're facing a moving average situation. My point is, I really started paying attention to private credit about a year ago, when a client, an insurance company, a very large insurance company client, who was very heavily involved in private credit. They said they had several managers, and eight of them held the exact same position, exactly the same one. This is typical, it's sort of a clubby private credit, at least it was, and there's some internal squabbling now, but not long ago it was a harmonious family. **He said, I have eight managers who hold the exact same position. One is valued at 95, another at 8.** What? Wait, what?
> 
> Julia
> 
> Different mark-to-market values. Oh my goodness, one...
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> The same holding, one valued at 95, another at 8. That really opened my eyes, because I hadn't had as clear a picture of what was happening there before. But then, suddenly, you notice late last summer, or early last fall, you start seeing these weird things, like, you know, bonds going from 100 to zero in a few weeks. And then what really struck me was a fund managed by a very reputable sponsor, just a few months ago, announced one day they were adjusting the fund's valuation from 100 down to 81. That's a pretty significant write-down for a fund overnight. But what many people don't fully realize is that they are unlikely to have adjusted every single bond, every credit position they hold, from 100 down to 81. That probably didn't happen. So you have to ask yourself, what is the delta of these valuation changes? If half the fund is absolutely rock solid, and they only adjusted the other half of the fund, that means they adjusted that half of the fund by 38 points. If three-quarters of the fund is absolutely rock solid, and then I adjust 25% of the fund, that means that 25% of the fund was written down overnight from 100 to 24. So what exactly is going on here? It sounds like there's a lot of opacity in these valuations.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I have, I, I have always emphasized private credit as a candidate area for problems down the road because it's such a rapidly growing market. I've used the analogy, anything that grows from a small market to a booming market and becomes extremely popular. I said it's like a small town in the Wild West. Okay, suppose you are on the frontier in 1820, and you have an agricultural population, all God-fearing, and you have a sheriff like Gary Cooper in High Noon, who is good-hearted, and everything runs well. But then one day, somebody discovers gold three miles outside of this town. Suddenly, all these opportunists, some of them riff-raff, rush into town because they want to get rich. So suddenly, the population explodes with tremendous growth. Some of these are unscrupulous people. So you end up seeing a lot of crime, and everything starts to deteriorate. That's what happens. That's what happened in the CLO market in the early part of this century, and that's what happens in any market. Private credit is nothing special. It's just a booming market. So suddenly, you have a few firms, they do well, they have good risk controls, etc. They get good returns.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Then for some reason, the industry becomes super hot, like private credit in 2021. Why did private credit become super hot in 2021? Because rates were still zero. Then the government pumped $7 trillion into the economy. So anyone with even a rough understanding of basic economics should know that inflation was going to run hot. And zero rates were going to be a huge losing proposition. So, of course, rates went from about 1% to over 5% on the 30-year Treasury, meaning a 50-point loss. And of course, stocks, when you enter in 2022 at extremely high valuations, experience such a significant increase in interest rates, and also suffer huge losses.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So when you know that the subprime bonds, the public bonds are going to deteriorate, you know that traditional stocks are going to deteriorate, you look for something else. Remember how SPACs suddenly became popular? Yes, like blind pools. Like, I don't want stocks, I don't want public stocks, I don't want public bonds, because I know they're going to deteriorate. So give me something where I can't map the risks of public bonds and public stocks, because if I can map the risks of public bonds and stocks to some other new asset class, then I won't like that new asset class, because it will contain the risk mapping I don't want to take.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So give me something I don't know what it is, and better yet, not mark-to-market, because then I don't have to worry about volatility. That's the private credit market. It's a non-mark-to-market, totally opaque market. I'll feel better, because I don't know what it is. So, the argument for private credit became, hey, it's a low-volatility asset, which it isn't, or, hey, it's done well over the last four or five years. Well, that's because private markets... Public markets were down 12% in fixed income in 2022, and stocks were down even more.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So of course, something that's not mark-to-market outperformed the market. It's like saying a certificate of deposit outperformed a 30-year Treasury bond. That's because you don't mark it to market. So that's a fundamental flaw of that asset class. And there's a lot of, you know, it's gotten to the point now that even in financial news programs, there are advertisements saying, in the good old days, regular people like ordinary blue-collar Americans could buy a piece of great American companies like General Motors, Boeing. But now companies are private for longer. So poor, ordinary American people don't have the opportunity to invest in these extremely great private investment opportunities. So now we're doing an ETF that invests in private credit. Now the question is, for endowment funds, it's fine for money to be locked up in products like that, but these funds are now allowing people to withdraw funds quarterly. Of course, we're seeing, in March, in some cases, redemption requests were three times what the fund prospectus allowed. So they allow 5%, and they have to deal with 15%.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I heard today, to soften people's perception of this issue, there's a sponsor now discussing setting up a fund that would allow people to withdraw 7.5% per quarter, rather than 5% per quarter. And then they said, in fact, we might even look to get approval for monthly liquidity, so people could withdraw 2% per month, rather than 5% per quarter. This is starting to blur the lines between public and private in a very unsettling way. My point is, if these private products are going to offer monthly liquidity, why not offer weekly liquidity? Why not offer daily liquidity?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Well, at some point, you violate the concept that "private" means you don't have liquidity. For that, you have a longer investment horizon, and maybe you get a higher rate of return. But once you start turning something that should be an alternative to liquidity investment (and its mark-to-market disadvantages) into... a public market product, because you are now essentially creating a fundamental mismatch between private products and liquidity. It, it, it fundamentally cannot coexist. They cannot coexist. They are two different realms. So when you distort something in order to broaden the buyer base or to placate holders who are already unhappy about the lack of liquidity, you, you get something that doesn't work. It has no potential whatsoever. It doesn't even have the theoretical ability to work, which is why private credit must undergo a significant shakeout.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Do you think, well, if they're talking about "cockroaches," does that mean a full-blown outbreak? Are we headed for a crisis? How do you see this playing out?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I think this area is over-invested. When I give speeches, sometimes there are 2,000 people in the audience, and starting around 2023, up until the present, in the Q&A session, the first question is always, "What's your take on private credit?" It's been asked so many times that I've started to answer it like this: "I guess you're asking me because you hold a lot of private credit, right?" They all say, "Yes," everyone, they all hold private credit. Everyone is involved. So, there, there are no new buyers. There are only new sellers. So we saw a glimpse of illiquidity with the Harvard University endowment fund, which had to go to the bond market to raise money to pay for maintenance and salaries, because when protests occurred on campus and there were problems, their donors stopped donating. Harvard, with over $50 billion in its endowment fund, did not have enough liquidity to pay billions in expenses, which shows how tightly individuals, institutions, and pension plans are locked in. Another thing that's not talked about enough, but if you really want to delve into the details, there are podcasts made by former insurance examiners with 40 years of experience who talk about private equity owning private credit, private equity acquiring insurance companies, and then directing those insurance companies to buy private credit, and then transferring some of the insurance company's risk to reinsurers located in Bermuda, Barbados, or the Cayman Islands, which US regulators have no oversight over. In some cases, some private credit companies that own insurance companies have transferred these reinsurance risks to these islands, but they haven't fully funded them. So they've transferred, say, $50 billion in risk at the insurance company level to reinsurers, but they haven't funded it with $50 billion in assets. They should have actually funded it with $55 billion in assets, so there's a 10% surplus to maintain prudence, but instead, they are underfunded for these reinsurers. I'm sure not 100% of companies do this, but again, it's like the Wild West. You know, we, if they find gold in this reinsurance model, like, you know, Apollo owns Athena, so they have these captive insurance companies, kind of learned from Warren Buffett, who started doing this a long time ago and made a fortune, and then they claim to have transferred risk that was not actually transferred. So some of these insurance companies or reinsurers have a surplus of not 10% of their liabilities. They have more like 1% surplus.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> If, if the mark-to-market problems they are facing today turn into actual defaults, if the US economy goes into something more serious than a mild recession, something worse than a mild recession, then there could be a very big problem.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So I am very, I have been reducing risk for two years, and our risk level is at its lowest point in DoubleLine Capital's 17-year history, and I am far from approaching increasing risk. I think we need, we need. We need credit product spreads to widen significantly before we can really decide to start investing, say, in single B-rated securities or lower ratings prudently. So we are just trying to preserve capital and wait for a better opportunity, which, based on the setup going into 2026, will almost certainly come. It just may not happen this year, because as I said, the private credit thing, you don't get continuous information. It's actually only quarterly. So we'll see. There's one point I think. Anyone who has been around this business for even half as long as I have knows that redemption requests for private credit in June will be far higher than in March. Because when you ask for 14% redemption, and they only give you 5%, what you're going to do next is ask for 40%. Because maybe you'll get a little more then. It's like bond allocations. You know, I've been trading bonds for over 45 years, and when the market is good, when a company's credit is very desirable, if they issue $500 million in bonds, and you want $50 million. You wouldn't just subscribe for $50 million, because the demand would exceed $500 million. So you would subscribe for $200 million, so you would get $50 million. These redemptions will be similar. They want a certain percentage. They didn't get it this time. They know there will be more demand next time, so in June 2026, you will see some pretty wild redemption requests.
> 
> Julia
> 
> I know you're right, Jeffrey. Okay, I want to bring up another area that you've been very focused on. I find this interesting, this point you make. The Fed follows the 2-year Treasury yield, rather than leading it.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Without a doubt. Yes, without a doubt.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Okay, can you explain that to the audience?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Well, I'll tell anyone else, if they have access to charting tools, just go back 30 years, if you want, and plot the federal funds rate, the official federal funds rate, and the 2-year Treasury yield. What you will see is that after the federal funds rate has been stable for a while, you'll start to see the 2-year Treasury yield move, and if it starts to fall, it means the Fed is about to start cutting rates. If the 2-year Treasury yield rises, it means the Fed is about to start raising rates. When the Fed started cutting rates in September 2024, we had a huge discrepancy. The 2-year Treasury yield was about 175 basis points below the federal funds rate, and they finally started cutting rates. And then when they started raising rates in 2021, 2022, the 2-year Treasury yield was well above the federal funds rate. When the Fed finally raised rates, I remember it was 25 basis points. It was at a meeting in February, and after the Fed's press conference, I immediately went on a financial program and said they should have raised rates by 200 basis points because they were way behind the 2-year Treasury yield. The Fed simply follows the 2-year Treasury yield.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Really, you can see this in just six trading days of market action, because the Fed's press conference and the federal funds rate remaining unchanged was on Wednesday of last week, yesterday, the Wednesday of last week. What's very interesting is that before the Fed announced, I was watching financial programs, and everyone focusing on stocks was there saying, yes, you know, things are not convincingly better, but we have one thing in our favor. The Fed will cut rates twice this year. The Fed will cut rates twice this year. I said, no, they won't. The 2-year Treasury yield is higher than the federal funds rate. Well, since then, the 2-year Treasury yield has surged and is now basically around 4%. So, at the current level of the federal funds rate, and with the 2-year Treasury yield being more than 25 basis points above the upper limit of the federal funds rate, you cannot see the federal funds rate go down. So you will hear more and more about this, it has already started. You will hear people talk about, perhaps the Fed's next move will be a rate hike, which is such a radical change in rhetoric compared to the consensus just six trading days ago (two rate cuts), although I didn't believe it then. I, I, I. Because the 2-year Treasury yield was already higher than the federal funds rate. But that's only because the Fed has no secret super-secret information. They're just looking at all the things we're all looking at. And the 2-year Treasury yield is the collective wisdom of all those investors who invest in safe assets, who invest in relatively short-term funds, that's where they think rates should be. That's where the federal funds rate should be. I think we should abolish the Fed and use the 2-year Treasury yield as the short-term rate.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Okay, so you think, okay, the next move is a rate hike. Why do you think? Okay, most likely a rate hike. What do you think?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Of course. It looks that way. Okay. If, if, of course, **if West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices stay at $95 a barrel, and if that continues throughout the summer, the Fed will absolutely, positively hike rates.**
> 
> Julia
> 
> Okay. And then, as you also point out in your thesis, in the next recession, rates will also rise, and the dollar will fall. Regarding recession, do you have a probability in mind? Like, what's the likelihood of us entering a recession soon, or the timeline? I, I, I.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I don't, that's not the framework I think in, because there's no science behind that. But I, I, I, I, I, I think, I think, rising interest rates are facing upward pressure due to supply and still high inflation. I mean, I think, for example, mortgage rates are back to 6.5%. If this continues, mortgage rates will reach 7% again. The housing market cannot even withstand mortgage rates at a high of 5%. I mean, even with mortgage rates below 6%, the housing market is more than adequate. Now it's 6.5%? If this high inflation framework continues, they will continue to rise. So, yes, I, **I certainly think that the likelihood of those in power announcing a recession starting at some point in 2026 is high. I would give it at least a 50% probability.**
> 
> Julia
> 
> Hmm. Okay. I want to go back to our fiscal situation, because you also wrote an article in The Economist, and I will include a link for the readers. I think it was in December 2024, and in that article, you outlined two possible outcomes. You think, are we headed for monetary devaluation? Or the restructuring you mentioned earlier? I guess, my question is, what do you think the consequences will be? And what are the potential triggers?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Well, I think my base case is that long-term Treasury yields will rise until they reach a level where their impact is impossible to ignore, and I'd say that's around 6%. I think if long-term rates rise to about 6%, people will start calculating and realize they're heading towards over $2 trillion in interest expenses, which, it, it, it is unsustainable. So at that point, you might have this concept of restructuring emerge. Or we say, okay. We'll just tough it out with a soft default, we don't pay the coupon, right? What will happen is, we will be unable to borrow money for generations, because the prices of these long-term bonds will collapse. Nobody will trust us to issue long-term debt again, which will ironically become part of the solution. Because if we can't issue any debt, we'll actually have to balance our budget. And that, that's what we should really be doing. We shouldn't be running a debt-driven economy. You know, $2 trillion of our economy is just borrowed money at the federal government level. Just at the federal government level. So the trigger will be, you cannot ignore the looming interest expense, and you have to do something about it. **Another option is monetary devaluation, where you simply pay back with, you know, cheaper dollars. You pay back with inflation, relative to...**
> 
> Julia
> 
> Inflation.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> allowed, you would allow inflation to occur, which, by the way, Julia, is precisely what they did after World War II. The debt-to-GDP ratio at that time was about the same as it is today. Inflation was expected to be much higher after the war, and it was. But they kept interest rates at extremely low levels, with Treasury yields at 2.5%, while inflation climbed into the high single digits. So basically, you ended up dissolving the debt through inflation, and experienced a very severe negative real interest rate. This led to a 40-year bear market in the Treasury market. This is what will happen here.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> If we devalue. If we devalue, you will live in an environment of high interest rates for a long time. But the other option is this soft default. I can't think of any other tools available, basically some combination of devaluation and soft default.
> 
> Julia
> 
> I think, what's equally concerning is, technically, we are still in, if you will, "good times," and we haven't encountered a major emergency. And this is our fiscal situation.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Yes, that's right. Well, that's the whole problem. You know, we, we, we. You don't have a "rainy day fund" at all. You know, it's not raining, and we're already spending the "rainy day fund."
> 
> Julia
> 
> You know, listening to you, one thing strikes me. You've mentioned multiple times in this conversation that you're in capital preservation mode, you're cutting risk. It's sort of like, when I hear someone like you say that, it piques my interest.
> 
> Julia
> 
> What worries you the most? Like, what are the risks you're facing today? Yes, I know you're at DoubleLine Capital, you don't cross the line of risk. Like, what are the risks that worry you the most right now, or keep you up at night? If you're not, you know, not really keeping you up.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I, I, I, I really think that the interdependent relationship between private credit and private equity will not end well. I think it's unhealthy. So, I, I really, I've been saying this since around May of last year. It's been almost 10 months now, and the next question will be about these private markets. Of course, the headlines about the private credit market are out there. The alarms are ringing quite loudly there. Very loudly. And this is not a natural state of affairs.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So I think defaults in certain areas of the private credit market will lead to significant repricing, reducing credit risk at that level, say, single B or lower.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So, I, regarding investments, I rarely take risks. I want an excellent opportunity. Only then will I take risks, and I think high-yield bond spreads widening by 50 to 70 basis points from historically low levels is far from an excellent opportunity. I think, you know, high-yield bond spreads are 350. Now they're around 425. You know, call me when they reach 700. That's when I'll start taking risks.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Most people don't realize that the bank loan market, the triple-C rated bank loan market, has already been a disaster. Prices have fallen significantly, and the spreads on triple-C rated bank loans, generally speaking, at the index level, are almost 2,000 basis points. This means no one expects to be repaid. So defaults are imminent.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Yes, I love that. "Wait for an excellent opportunity." Okay, you mentioned another thing in the conversation, but you predicted it accurately. It was actually, it was called, I think Business Insider named it one of the best market predictions of the year, but in March 2025, on your webcast, you said gold, which was around $2915 at the time, could go to $4,000, and it actually reached that in October. And of course, we saw it touch $5,500 earlier this year. Now it's back to, I think I saw today. I own gold. So I looked today, it's above $4,300. But you said now is an opportunity, are you buying gold now? Or how are you playing gold?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I actually bought some. I bought some gold miners in June last year, that was the last thing I did related to gold, and I was super lucky. That was purely luck, because it was right when they started to take off, you know, but that was, there's an interesting story about my gold prediction. I was on a TV show, and gold was at $2970. The interviewer asked me, do you think it will break $3,000? I said, what kind of prediction is that? Predicting a 1% increase? Yes, so, I didn't intend to say it, but given the way the question was asked, I said, you know what, it will exceed $4,000 this year. Forget $3,000, it will exceed $4,000. It turned out that made me an honest person. I mean, it eventually went up to $4,500 around the fourth quarter of last year. It even exceeded $5,000 later. So, I, I think gold is real money. I think people are starting to realize that. Central banks will be a sustained, huge source of demand for gold. In the past, before Nixon abandoned the gold standard, about 70% of central bank reserves were gold, and then it declined to 20%. Then everyone turned to the dollar as the preferred reserve. Well, gold is now on the rise again. It has risen to about 30% of central bank reserves. I think there's every reason to believe that the proportion of gold in reserves will reach 50%, which will generate enormous demand for gold. So, here, gold is no longer the domain of survivalists, eccentric crazy speculators. It is a real asset class, being reintroduced into the central banking world, as a real asset class, worthy of putting one-third of your reserves into. So, I, I just don't see any reason for anyone to sell.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Gold. I'm not a silver enthusiast. I know many people like silver because it is, you know, it makes money make money. When gold's beta works in the positive direction, silver rises more. But silver is more of an industrial metal. I think gold is the real deal, so I'll stick to the standard, not the derivatives.
> 
> Julia
> 
> You've been in the investment world for 45 years. No. Is this, is this one of the more difficult environments from your perspective? Like, is it harder to make money?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> No, the most difficult environment for me was 2021, when there was no yield in the bond market. There was a moment when the only way to get 5% from US fixed income was to buy the junk bond index and leverage it by 50%, and hope there were no defaults, because the junk bond index yield was 3.5%, and hope there were no defaults. Believe it or not. If you had actually done that, if you had bought an index with a yield of 3.5% and leveraged it by 50% in order to get a 5% yield, you would have gone bankrupt, because your financing cost rose to 5.375%, and your coupon was still 3.5%. So you had a negative arbitrage of almost 2%, and you, you were bleeding money every day, you know, every moment, and the price of your junk bonds was well below cost. So you would have been margin called.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> So if you, in, in the fixed income arena, we all know in broad investing, there's fear and greed, and greed drives people. But fear becomes stronger than greed. But the most dangerous thing. Not fear or greed, but "need."
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> "I need to earn X% yield," because, in 1993, I was in the office of the treasurer of a major university, and the president happened to stop by. The president asked the treasurer, how can we get our endowment fund to earn 6%? Well, the endowment fund has to earn 6%. The treasurer said, that's impossible, because Treasury yields were 3% at the time, and nothing could generate a 6% yield. The president said to the treasurer, wrong answer. I want to know how we can earn 6%. He said he didn't want to hear the answer "we can't do it." He said, no, you will earn 6%. How are you going to do it? Well, the end result is that people end up doing crazy things. Like Orange County, and some weird Mae bonds that had quirky characteristics, and ended up falling from 100 to about 40 in the bond bear market of 1994, and that wasn't even too bad a bear market. So, to get 6%, they lost 60%. So, investing based on "need" is the most imprudent thing. You can only say, we will be below our target yield this year, we will earn this amount, and next year we will earn that amount, averaging 6%. Never invest based on "need," because you will always take on imprudent risk.
> 
> Julia
> 
> That's a very good lesson. Jeffrey, that's why you're the "King of Bonds." You are the "King of Bonds." I know you might not say that, but you're the one who stands tall.
> 
> Julia
> 
> So may I ask you about... may I ask you about California? You recently tweeted. Or made an X post, because people often ask you about municipal bonds, and you say you don't usually have anything to say. But now looking at the deficits caused by absurd spending and tax policies and accelerating revenue erosion, I can say, avoid all general obligation municipal bonds from California, Illinois, and New York. I've never bought a general obligation bond.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> We can...
> 
> Julia
> 
> As someone who lives in California, what's the situation? Are they doomed?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I hold California municipal bonds, but I don't hold general obligation bonds. I only hold those that are tied to a specific revenue stream, like a water project, you know, revenue streams that will exist. I only buy bonds rated investment grade single A or higher. Not because of insurance, but because there's actually this revenue stream attached to it. For general obligation bonds, I...
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I, I think, I, if, so what I would avoid the most, I think municipal bonds in Chicago. I, I just can't imagine why, anyone would be willing to take the risk of having the rules changed. I mean, anything could happen. These rules can be changed. They could say, if your income exceeds a certain level, then municipal bonds become taxable. They could say, if your income exceeds this amount, we'll cut your bond coupon. Anything could happen. And there's such tremendous wealth inequality, this inequality is increasingly reflected in political activities, so you have to be extremely mindful of these things.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Yes, California might try to impose a billionaire tax. I think it will be tied up in court for years before it's actually implemented, because there will be huge interest groups that want to drag it into litigation. So I'm not that worried about the billionaire tax issue, but it is a disturbing trend. I know Bernie Sanders wants to propose this nationwide.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Do you think California will go bankrupt?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> It's already bankrupt in a sense. I mean, we have too much... We're supposed to have a balanced budget, but we are nowhere near balancing the budget. You know, we, we, we embarked on projects like the high-speed rail project. It was supposed to run between San Francisco and Los Angeles. It was supposed to be completed in 2020. The last I checked, it's 2026, and they haven't laid an inch of track. So we are seriously behind schedule. The budget was supposed to be $30 billion. Now they say, if we want to complete the high-speed rail from Los Angeles to San Francisco, it will exceed $130 billion. So there's a $100 billion cost overrun. So they're no longer saying we'll spend $130 billion, but they've decided to build it between Merced and Bakersfield for about $30 billion to $35 billion. That's a segment of the route that absolutely no one has any demand for.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> It's absurd. So, yes, I think as California raises taxes, you talk about a billionaire tax, what they're doing is just eroding the tax base. In the last 12 months, we've already seen the five wealthiest billionaires in California leave California, and this will only accelerate. California thinks, if you leave, they will impose a wealth tax on you. Good luck. Good luck trying to track down people who live in Tennessee, because you, because you're going to send them a bill.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Oh my goodness, what are you going to do?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> What can you do? Don't move back?
> 
> Julia
> 
> Yes, you're going to drive so many people away. They're going to drive up our housing prices in North Carolina, where I live.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> If they impose a wealth tax, the cost of collection will be more than its tax revenue.
> 
> Julia
> 
> That's a good point too. Jeffrey, before I let you go, can I ask you one last question? Okay. I don't know if you're in a hurry. I'd love to chat more, but I also have to be mindful of your time.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Oh, the question is: What is something right now that if you make a prediction, it might seem not to be the consensus, and definitely not obvious. But maybe a year from now, if we have this conversation again, it will be more widely accepted.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I think the next presidential election will have candidates from three parties?
> 
> Julia
> 
> Do you think that candidate will be viable? Because...
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> It will be interesting, the Democrats and Republicans have created such huge hurdles for third parties to be successful. But people's interest in third parties will be high enough to overcome those hurdles.
> 
> Julia
> 
> I wonder if that means we're entering "The Fourth Turning"?
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> I, I, I spoke with Neil Howe 16, 17 years ago. That was interesting because I didn't know who he was and had never heard of "The Fourth Turning." But as we talked, we had exactly the same views, although expressed slightly differently. But I completely understood what he meant by "The Fourth Turning." I said, I think the big change, the big "reset," the "restructuring" of our system, if you will, is now seriously overdue. I said I think it will happen around 2030, and he agreed. I still think it's around 2030. I think Neil still thinks that's a reasonable timeframe. Yes, so we're very much in sync on that concept.
> 
> Julia
> 
> Yes, we also love Neil Howe very much on our channel, and we might see that crescendo soon. I have to say, Jeffrey Gundlach, it has been a tremendous honor to have you on the show again. I've always enjoyed our conversations. Again, you are one of my favorite people to interview, and it's truly a pleasure to have you on this show. This means a lot to me and is an important milestone for me as a podcast host, and I'm incredibly grateful. I hope this won't be our last conversation. I'd be delighted to welcome you back on the show anytime you're willing to give us your time. Thank you very much. Jeffrey Gundlach, founder and CEO of DoubleLine Capital, the "King of Bonds," I'm so grateful to you. Thank you again.
> 
> Jeffrey Gundlach
> 
> Thank you, Julia. I enjoyed our conversation.

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- [GLOBAL X Gold Explorers (GOEX.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/GOEX.US.md)
- [iShares Emerging Markets Equity Factor ETF (EMGF.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/EMGF.US.md)
- [iShares 7-10 Year Treasury Bond ETF (IEF.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/IEF.US.md)
- [VanEck Junior Gold Miners ETF (GDXJ.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/GDXJ.US.md)
- [Avantis Emerging Markets Equity ETF (AVEM.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/AVEM.US.md)
- [ISHRS Us Trsry Bd (GOVT.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/GOVT.US.md)
- [ChinaAMC Gold ETF (518850.CN)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/518850.CN.md)
- [iShares MSCI Global Gold Miners (RING.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/RING.US.md)
- [VanEck Gold Miners ETF (GDX.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/GDX.US.md)
- [VG Em Mkts (VWO.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/VWO.US.md)
- [iShares Core MSCI EM (IEMG.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/IEMG.US.md)
- [SPDR Gold Shares (GLD.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/GLD.US.md)
- [Sprott GLD Miners Etf (SGDM.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/SGDM.US.md)
- [SPDR Bloomberg 1-3 Month T-Bill ETF (BIL.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/BIL.US.md)
- [Abrdn Gold ETF Trust (SGOL.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/SGOL.US.md)
- [iShares Gold Trust (IAU.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/IAU.US.md)
- [Direxion Daily Jr Gold Miners Bull 2X (JNUG.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/quote/JNUG.US.md)

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