---
title: "Domestic CIM small leader sprints for Hong Kong listing: Backed by SMIC, what is the real value of Gerui Li?"
type: "Topics"
locale: "zh-HK"
url: "https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/38941544.md"
description: "As is well known, under the grand narrative of the increasing self-sufficiency and controllability of the domestic semiconductor industry chain and the massive explosion of a new round of global technology cycle, in the past two years, the phenomenon of domestic semiconductor enterprises collectively accelerating their rush to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has been very hot. Against this backdrop, in mid-February, Shanghai Glorysoft Co., Ltd. submitted a listing application to the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, attempting to knock on the door of the capital market as the &#34;leader in pan-semiconductor intelligent manufacturing software.&#34; According to public information..."
datetime: "2026-02-27T11:40:40.000Z"
locales:
  - [en](https://longbridge.com/en/topics/38941544.md)
  - [zh-CN](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/38941544.md)
  - [zh-HK](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/topics/38941544.md)
author: "[港股研究社](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/profiles/3199113.md)"
---

> 支持的語言: [English](https://longbridge.com/en/topics/38941544.md) | [简体中文](https://longbridge.com/zh-CN/topics/38941544.md)


# Domestic CIM small leader sprints for Hong Kong listing: Backed by SMIC, what is the real value of Gerui Li?

As widely known, under the grand narrative of increasing domestic control over the semiconductor supply chain and the explosive new global tech cycle, the phenomenon of domestic semiconductor companies collectively accelerating their rush to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) has been extremely hot over the past two years.

Against this backdrop, in mid-February, Shanghai Glory Software Co., Ltd. submitted a listing application to the main board of the HKEX, attempting to enter the capital market as the "leader in pan-semiconductor intelligent manufacturing software."

According to public information, this is a very typical domestic semiconductor company that has caught the industry's tailwind: breakthroughs in 18nm wafer CIM (Computer Integrated Manufacturing) systems, endorsement from top-tier clients like SMIC, and support from SASAC and industry funds. However, judging from its financial data, it is also a complex case study that is "still in the early stages of commercialization," has sustained losses exceeding 360 million yuan, and has concerning blood-making capabilities.

Between the new major industry cycle and the company's technological barriers, how exactly should we measure the true value of this "quasi-leader"?

**Small Domestic Leader in Pan-Semiconductor CIM**

According to Frost & Sullivan data, measured by sales revenue, the market size for China's pan-semiconductor intelligent manufacturing software solutions is expected to grow from 1.1 billion yuan in 2020 to 6.6 billion yuan in 2029, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 25.4% from 2024 to 2029; the semiconductor segment's CAGR from 2024 to 2029 is 26.2%.

Specifically, in the field of semiconductor intelligent manufacturing software, the market size is projected to expand from 1.6 billion yuan in 2024 to 5.2 billion yuan in 2029.

This indicates that the sector is still in the "early volume expansion" stage, characterized by a not-yet-large absolute industry size but significant growth rates. At this point, capable domestic manufacturers almost all have a window of opportunity to enter.

Against this backdrop, Glory's "industry number one" label is particularly crucial. The company disclosed in its prospectus that, based on 2024 intelligent manufacturing software solution revenue, it ranked first among domestic manufacturers in China's pan-semiconductor intelligent manufacturing software market.

Specifically, Glory was founded in 2007 and launched an 8-inch semiconductor MES system in 2010. In early 2023, the company successfully delivered a domestic CIM system for 12-inch front-end 18nm process technology, including a core MES, becoming one of the first domestic suppliers to achieve a breakthrough in full-factory, fully automated intelligent manufacturing software solutions for 12-inch wafer manufacturing.

This milestone is still very significant. Firstly, 12-inch wafer production lines are the current mainstream capacity form; while 18nm is not the most advanced process node, it holds transitional strategic significance between mature and advanced nodes, and achieving full-factory-level automation signifies a leap in system complexity.

From a business structure perspective, almost all of Glory's revenue comes from Intelligent Manufacturing Software Solutions (IMSS), accounting for about 99% from 2022 to 2024 and the first four months of 2025. This indicates a clear core focus, but it also means the company has not yet formed a diversified revenue structure.

**Rapid Revenue Growth, Profitability Yet to Arrive**

Overall, Glory's revenue curve over the past few years has moved in sync with the industry cycle. Data shows its revenue surged from 111 million yuan in 2022 to 249 million yuan in 2024. This growth was precisely due to its multiple successes in the pan-semiconductor field, especially the accelerated landing of import substitution orders after successfully delivering the 12-inch front-end 18nm process CIM system in 2023.

However, the very real problem is that while revenue grew rapidly, profitability has been slow to arrive. During the reporting period, Glory accumulated a net loss exceeding 360 million yuan, and the loss trend did not narrow with revenue expansion, with a net loss of 43.343 million yuan in the first four months of 2025. For this reason, the company has chosen to apply for listing on the HKEX under Chapter 18C rules.

This typical phenomenon of "increasing revenue without increasing profit" exposes the fundamental flaw in its business model—extremely high, rigid R&D costs.

As a catch-up player, Glory must match or even surpass international giants like Applied Materials and IBM in technical parameters, forcing it to maintain high-intensity R&D investment. In 2024, its R&D expense ratio reached 26%.

Its drastic fluctuations in gross margin are even more alarming: from a historical low of 3.4% in 2023 to 13.2% in 2024, and then to 6.1% in the first four months of 2025. This is not merely seasonal volatility from project-based revenue recognition; it more importantly reflects the low standardization of its core products, unstable pricing power, and high vulnerability to being dragged down overall by individual high-cost projects.

This means that Glory is currently still in the cash-burning stage of "trading capital for time, trading losses for market share." Once external financing is hindered or cash flow breaks, its high-growth narrative could easily be affected.

As of the end of April 2025, the company's cash and equivalents had dwindled to only 33.328 million yuan. Based on the 2024 cash burn rate, its buffer period for maintaining operations is not long. This makes the necessity of Glory's IPO fundraising quite clear.

**SMIC's Investment, the "Small Crown" Yet to be Solidified**

According to Frost & Sullivan's report, Glory ranked first among domestic manufacturers in China's pan-semiconductor intelligent manufacturing software market in 2024. This "crown" is its biggest selling point. However, judging from its overall performance scale and growth, this crown sits rather uneasily.

Behind Glory stands a lineup of shareholders that can be described as impressive. Pre-IPO, the National Major Special Fund under SASAC, Guokai Manufacturing, Shenzhen Chenxin, and others collectively hold over 20% of the shares. SMIC also holds indirect stakes through its funds. This relationship provides Glory with strong credit endorsement and industry resource access, which is key to its ability to gain traction with top clients like SMIC.

However, the logic of the capital market is completely different from that of industrial support. The core challenge Glory currently faces is: how to prove to investors that it is not just a "domestic substitution" concept, but a commercial entity with sustainable profitability.

From a valuation of 755 million yuan after its Series B financing to 3.54 billion yuan after its Series D, Glory's valuation has achieved leapfrog growth over the past few years. However, in the Hong Kong stock market, which places greater emphasis on an international perspective and financial discipline, whether this pricing can gain recognition from global investors remains unknown.

The market will ask: After the policy-driven procurement dividends fade, where is the company's true profit-making ability? In direct competition with international giants, how can gross margins be repaired and stabilized at a healthy level?

### 相關股票

- [SMIC (00981.HK)](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/quote/00981.HK.md)
- [SMIC (688981.CN)](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/quote/688981.CN.md)
- [IBM (IBM.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/quote/IBM.US.md)
- [Applied Materials (AMAT.US)](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/quote/AMAT.US.md)
- [SMIC HK SDR 5to1 (HSMD.SG)](https://longbridge.com/zh-HK/quote/HSMD.SG.md)

## 評論 (1)

- **cc TT ww · 2026-03-02T11:15:07.000Z**: Calling this company a software company is the biggest red flag...
