Latest news indicates that both the U.S. and Iran have signaled a willingness to end the conflict in the Middle East. However, if the war ends, a critical question arises: who will clear the Strait of Hormuz?
On March 31, local time, U.S. President Trump stated at the White House that the U.S. would end its military operations against Iran within &#34;two to three weeks,&#34; adding that &#34;the hardest part is over.&#34; He also stated directly on social media that day: &#34;You have to start learning to fight for yourself; the U.S. will not help you anymore. Go get your own oil.&#34;
This statement has completely altered the market's expectation regarding the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. Strait transit data shows that as of March 29, the 7-day average transit volume was only 1.8 million barrels per day, roughly equivalent to Iran's own crude oil export volume, indicating no substantial improvement.
Deutsche Bank has outlined four scenarios. If the strait reopens in April, Brent crude will quickly fall back to $90 per barrel, and then gradually return to $75 with the release of IEA reserves. However, if the blockade continues until November (two quarters), the average price of Brent crude will reach $177 per barrel, with a range between $170 and $190.
<h2>The U.S. &#34;Passes the Buck,&#34; Strait Reopening Remains Uncertain</h2>
According to CCTV reporters on March 30, local time, U.S. officials reported that Trump has informed his aides that he is willing to end military operations even if the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed.
U.S. government officials assess that forcefully reopening the waterway would extend military operations beyond the planned four to six-week timeframe. Based on this, Trump has decided to gradually conclude current operations after achieving major objectives such as weakening Iran's naval and missile capabilities, and instead rely on diplomatic pressure to urge Iran to resume shipping traffic. If diplomatic means fail, Washington will urge its European and Gulf allies to take the lead in reopening the strait.
According to Xinhua News Agency, Trump also specifically named the UK on social media, stating it &#34;refused to participate in striking Iran&#34; and suggested: &#34;First, buy from the U.S., we have plenty; second, summon the courage to go to the strait and take it back.&#34;
<h2>Data Shows: Hormuz Transit Volume Has Hardly Improved</h2>
According to the Zhuifeng Trading Desk, Deutsche Bank analyst Michael Hsueh stated in a research report released on March 31 that since Trump described Iran's &#34;goodwill gift&#34; (i.e., increased commercial transit permits) on March 25, the eastbound crude oil and refined product transit volume through the Strait of Hormuz has not substantially increased.
As of March 29, the 7-day average transit volume was only 1.8 million barrels per day, which is nearly identical to Iran's crude oil export volume (about 1.5 million barrels per day).
This implies a significant gap between official statements and independently verifiable facts.
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And &#34;The disruption of the strait could persist even after the war ends.&#34;
Michael Hsueh believes that Trump's statement implicitly suspends the U.S. military's escalation threats against Iranian power generation facilities, but it might allow Iran to maintain long-term control of the strait through lower-intensity means, using it as a political bargaining chip against Gulf oil-producing countries. Some experts have described &#34;ending military operations before the strait is reopened&#34; as &#34;unbelievably irresponsible.&#34;
<h2>Four Scenarios, Oil Prices Could Reach $177 Per Barrel</h2>
Deutsche Bank has constructed four scenarios with the duration of the strait blockade as the core variable:
Scenario 1: Reopening in April
Reopening in early April coincides with the reaching of a ceasefire agreement. Regional crude oil exports are not constrained by infrastructure damage after the strait reopens. U.S.-Iran negotiations resume, and the U.S. sanctions regime allows Iran's crude oil exports to return to pre-conflict levels.
Brent crude rapidly falls back to $90 per barrel, then gradually returns to $75 with the release of IEA reserves.
Scenario 2: Reopening in May
Iran maintains the blockade. Iran insists the strait remains closed. Missiles, drones, fast attack craft, or midget submarines cause damage to commercial vessels. Mine deployment remains limited. A small amount of commercial traffic is allowed through direct negotiations with Iran. No military escort operations. Oil infrastructure suffers no permanent damage. De-escalation in April allows shipping to resume in early May.
Brent crude remains in the $100-$120 per barrel range, and further IEA reserve releases are needed by year-end to normalize oil prices.
Scenario 3: Reopening in June
Iran deploys mines extensively, prolonging the blockade. The U.S. is slow to counter this capability. Brent crude reaches $130 per barrel, with a range of $130-$150, and the short-term impact of IEA reserve releases is limited.
Scenario 4: Reopening in November (Most Extreme Scenario)
A protracted war of attrition, Houthi intervention and blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and attacks on Saudi Arabia's Yanbu port or the East-West pipeline. Brent crude averages $177 per barrel during the two-quarter blockade period, with a range between $170 and $190.
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It is worth noting that a Deutsche Bank survey shows that 64% of respondents expect the strait blockade to end between May and September 2026 (with 25% expecting May, 16% expecting June, and 23% expecting the third quarter).
<h2>Reopening the Strait Faces Far More Obstacles Than Imagined</h2>
U.S. Mine-Clearing Capabilities Are Not in Position. Deutsche Bank points out that among the U.S. Navy's three littoral combat ships equipped for mine countermeasures, the &#34;USS Tulsa&#34; and &#34;USS Santa Barbara&#34; were last reported docked in Malaysia and Singapore for routine maintenance, while the &#34;USS Canberra&#34; is in the Indian Ocean, none of which can immediately participate in reopening the strait.
Iran's Conditions Are Stringent. Iran has clearly stated that it will only end the war after all five of its conditions are met, including the closure of all U.S. regional bases and receiving security guarantees against further attacks. These conditions are almost impossible for the U.S. to accept.
According to Xinhua News Agency, Iranian President Pezeshkian stated on March 31 that Iran has the &#34;necessary will&#34; to end the war, provided that the other party meets Iran's demands, especially providing necessary guarantees against future aggression.
Coordination Difficulties Within the Iranian Leadership. According to U.S. media reports on March 30, coordination difficulties within the Iranian leadership will further delay the negotiation process, making the timeline for reopening the strait even more uncertain.
Significant Disagreement on Production Restart Time. Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser previously stated that restarting production would only take &#34;days, not weeks&#34;; however, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation stated last week that restoring production after the war would take three to four months. The significant gap between the two reflects differences in geological conditions and surface infrastructure among various oil-producing countries.
<h2>IEA Reserves: Enough for One Month, Then What?</h2>
Data estimates show that the 400 million barrels of reserves released in the first coordinated round by the IEA, after considering various mitigating factors, can cover approximately one month of the strait blockade gap, expected to last until September to November 2026.
The problem is: if the blockade lasts for two quarters, at a pace of releasing 400 million barrels every two quarters, a cumulative 2.4 billion barrels would be needed, while the IEA's actual reserves are only 1.8 billion barrels, leaving a shortfall of about 800 million barrels.
Deutsche Bank believes that possible options to bridge this gap include: IEA member states increasing production commitments, emergency production increases by OPEC after the strait reopens, and the deployment of massive reserves totaling approximately 1.2 billion barrels.
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<h2>The Houthis: The Biggest Variable of Uncertainty</h2>
The Houthi rebels have already launched missile attacks on Israel this week, and their level of involvement is the most critical uncertainty factor.
If the Houthis only blockade southbound shipping in the Red Sea, vessels can reroute through the Suez Canal at the cost of longer voyages and reduced cargo volumes. However, if the 2022 Saudi-Houthi ceasefire agreement collapses, the Houthis' missile capabilities could directly threaten Saudi infrastructure.
Historical precedents exist: in May 2019, Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline forced its shutdown for a &#34;status assessment&#34;; in September of the same year, Houthi attacks triggered a production halt at the Abqaiq oil processing facility. On March 19 of this year, Iran attacked Yanbu port, causing a temporary production halt.
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<h2>U.S. Domestic Production Increase: Insufficient to Fill the Gap in the Short Term</h2>
Within the timeframe of scenarios one to three, the U.S. production response speed is too slow to play a substantial role. Even within the two-quarter timeframe of scenario four, the U.S. upstream industry faces structural issues with the price curve—the Bloomberg WTI fair value is currently around $73 per barrel on average in 2027 and $70 in 2028, which is only slightly above or equal to the average upstream incentive cost in the Permian Basin.
More notably, from mid to late March, the number of U.S. oil rigs decreased slightly to its lowest level since December last year. Deutsche Bank judges that under the current curve structure, a U.S. supply response is unlikely to occur at a sufficient scale and speed—unless scenario four materializes.
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Trump has signaled a willingness to end the war even while the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, shifting the responsibility for reopening the waterway to his allies. Deutsche Bank warns that actual transit data shows no significant improvement; if the blockade persists until November, Brent crude prices could average $177 per barrel. Multiple obstacles—including the absence of U.S. minesweepers, potential Houthi intervention, and IEA reserves only lasting for one month—make the timeline for reopening the strait highly uncertain

- Recent developments indicate that both the U.S. and Iran express a desire to end the Middle East conflict, yet key questions remain regarding control of the Strait of Hormuz.  
- President Trump announced plans to conclude military operations against Iran within two to three weeks, while Deutsche Bank outlined four scenarios for oil prices dependent on the strait’s reopening timeframe, which could see prices soar to $177 per barrel if the situation extends.  
- Challenges include the U.S. military's limited capability to clear mines and Iran's stringent demands for ending hostilities, complicating potential negotiations and impacting global oil supply.

Trump "Hands Off" the Strait of Hormuz: What Does It Mean for Oil Prices?