Time is not on Donald Trump's side. The surge in oil prices has already severely impacted Trump's election prospects. The latest Reuters/Ipsos poll shows his approval rating has plummeted to 36%, a new low for his second term, matching the levels seen before the Republican rout in the 2020 election and the Democratic rout in the 2024 election. Polymarket indicates that the probability of the GOP being swept in this year's midterm elections has risen to around 50%, with the loss of the House of Representatives being almost a certainty. Every day the war continues and the strait is blockaded, the global crude oil supply-demand gap increases by tens of millions of barrels. As oil prices rise over time, Trump's predicament becomes increasingly unfavorable.
Standing at a crossroads, Donald Trump is caught in a dilemma. If he retreats, he still has time to regain support through other issues; however, this would lead to significant losses in national interests, damage the US dollar cycle in areas like the Petrodollar and AI investments, and drastically reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. If he advances, not only will US forces face greater risks of casualties and Trump's political reputation suffer a bigger blow, but more importantly, it could lead to further escalation, drawing more countries into the conflict, making the war harder to end, and causing greater shocks to global shipping, energy prices, and supply chains.
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Despite this, Donald Trump still needs to take steps toward breaking the stalemate as soon as possible, whether through TACO, negotiation, or a landing operation. The next 1-2 weeks will be the critical phase.
TACO could allow him to escape the current situation quickly, but at the cost of significant damage to his personal political reputation and national interests. In the early stages of the war when Gulf nations were eager to mediate, a cessation of hostilities by Trump could have been seen as following the will of the people. Now, however, Gulf nations are increasingly wary of Iran and are looking to the US to lift the blockade of the strait and weaken Iran's strength. A direct withdrawal would undoubtedly shatter mutual trust, challenge the status of the Petrodollar, and potentially turn the trillions of dollars in AI investments promised by Gulf nations into empty checks. If this further impacts US stocks and the economy, it will trigger a chain reaction, essentially damaging the US dollar cycle. Additionally, withdrawal would mean Iran gains control over the Strait of Hormuz, and America's geopolitical influence in the Middle East would vanish like a military base obliterated by missiles.
The benefit is that Trump can extricate himself from the quagmire quickly. With six months left before the midterm elections, the public's pain will lessen over time once oil prices drop. He would still have time to repair his approval ratings through issues such as Cuba, visiting China, stimulus checks, and interest rate cuts to avoid being swept.
However, since World War II, successive US presidents have invested heavily in human and financial resources to establish three core interest areas: Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, even though the Middle East's importance to the US has declined somewhat since the shale oil revolution. For Donald Trump, assuming this historical responsibility requires both courage and a bit of &#34;Winology&#34; rhetoric.
Negotiation could solve the problem at a lower cost, but the probability of success is low unless a third-party major power is introduced. Within the Arab world, the sentiment of Gulf nations has changed along with the course of the war, making it difficult for them to participate in mediation further. Pakistan lost its strategic value following the Biden administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and has become increasingly distant from the US. This mediation is seen as a good opportunity to move closer to the US again. Furthermore, Pakistan has historically had good relations with Iran and has played an important role in this round of communication. Recent four-party talks held with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt could serve as a prelude to US-Iran negotiations.
However, fundamentally, there are clear differences in how both sides interpret the state of the war. In the eyes of the US, Iran's navy and air force have been eliminated, its military facilities have been largely destroyed, and its people are living in misery; therefore, the US holds the power, and Iran has every reason to accept the &#34;15-point plan.&#34; In Iran's view, the US is unable to clear the Strait of Hormuz, high oil prices will trigger anti-war sentiment, and time is on their side. Therefore, any plan must ensure the war will not recur and must include fees for passing through the strait—essentially a claim for control.
In terms of specific provisions, it is difficult for Iran to accept a &#34;15-point&#34; plan based on a pre-war template. In the short term, as the war continues, Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen are playing key roles on various fronts, making it impossible to discuss abandoning support for proxies now. In the medium term, missiles are Iran's primary means of deterring Israel and preventing it from taking rash action, so restricting the missile program is off the table. In the long term, if any agreement fails to restrain the next invasion, perhaps nuclear possession is the only solution. Consequently, the issues of nuclear capabilities, missiles, and proxies—on which Khamenei once made significant concessions before the war—have now become vital.
As for the &#34;maximum pressure&#34; tactics Donald Trump excels at, they are now difficult to implement. With the successive assassinations of highly prestigious figures like Khamenei and Larijani, the Iranian military has entered a state of &#34;decentralization&#34; to some extent. This allows Iran to maintain military operations, but it means few individuals possess the influence to take charge of the overall situation and negotiate fully with the Americans.
Overall, a great warrior's achievements are often unsung. Trump's constant pursuit of Hollywood-style spotlights and reality-show dramatics caused him to discard the generous terms offered by Khamenei before the war, which may now be impossible to achieve.
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Success comes to those with a righteous cause, yet this war was initiated by Trump and a small circle around him under circumstances where Middle Eastern stability did not directly affect US national interests. It was launched without notifying Congress or making sufficient logistical mobilization. Furthermore, it was the second time a surprise attack was carried out under the guise of negotiations, so the support it can garner is very limited. Consequently, the current deployment of two Marine units, one airborne division, and potentially 10,000 Army troops is close to the limit of Trump's capabilities. This means the options for a US landing operation are very limited. Whether it is cleaning up enriched uranium, occupying islands in the Strait of Hormuz, or occupying Kharg Island, they all face high risks of casualties and could trigger a chain reaction leading to escalation.
If the choice is to clean up enriched uranium, the advantage is solving the problem without direct head-on combat—specifically addressing Israeli concerns—but the disadvantage is the extreme difficulty. In the 1980 Tehran hostage crisis, then-President Carter launched Operation Eagle Claw to rescue hostages deep in the Iranian interior. The mission failed, resulting in the loss of several soldiers and aircraft, leading to his failure in the 1980 re-election campaign and Reagan's subsequent victory. Enriched uranium is buried in three underground nuclear facilities that were bombed last summer. For Trump, this would be equivalent to repeating Operation Eagle Claw three times, and the difficulty can only be imagined. Once the mission fails, Trump's political reputation will be severely damaged, and all plans will have to be scrapped and restarted.
If the choice is to occupy the islands in the strait, the goal would be to control the strait and restore navigation. The difficulty lies in the fact that even if the islands are captured, navigation may not necessarily be restored. Instead, there is a risk of the war becoming a long-term war of attrition, or even expanding its scope.
Key to controlling the strait are several important islands on the western side, including Qeshm Island, Abu Musa Island, and the Greater/Lesser Tunbs. If taking the sea route, passing the eastern side of the strait means passing Iranian territory and facing the risk of attack. If taking the land route, while it leads directly to the western side of the strait, it requires using the territory of Gulf nations like the UAE or even amphibious vessels, which Iran could interpret as intervention in the war. A spokesperson for the Iranian parliament recently stated, &#34;Intelligence shows Iran's enemies are planning to occupy an Iranian island with the support of a regional country. If the other side takes any action, Iran will attack key facilities of that regional country.&#34; Given that the UAE has territorial disputes with Iran over Abu Musa and the Greater/Lesser Tunbs, their involvement is possible.
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More troublesome is that even if the strait is controlled, it only opens a door. Oil tankers need to enter the Persian Gulf for refueling. Iran's coastline along the Persian Gulf exceeds 1,500 kilometers, and it is unlikely for the US military to set up defenses along such a vast coastline. Iran only needs to strike tankers within the Persian Gulf from near the coastline to effectively keep the shipping lanes closed. Meanwhile, for the US troops on the islands, they would not only face attrition from missiles and drones, but logistics on the islands would also be problematic. If they choose to retreat, they will face even greater risks of casualties, and by then the entire process could take over a month. During this period, shipping through the strait would be completely cut off, and Iran's original export of nearly 2 million barrels of crude oil per day would become a new supply-demand gap.
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If the choice is to occupy Kharg Island, it could control Iran's oil lifeline and force them into peace negotiations. The difficulty lies in the even higher operational complexity of the offensive, and it could similarly lead to an expansion of the war's scope.
Kharg Island is deep within the Persian Gulf. If using amphibious vessels by sea, capturing the Strait of Hormuz becomes a prerequisite. If using an airborne assault, the current available force is only the 2,000 soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division, making capturing and holding the island even more difficult. If taking the land route, it requires using the territory of Gulf nations like the UAE or Saudi Arabia, which also carries the risk of drawing more countries into the conflict and further escalating the situation. Additionally, Kharg Island is densely packed with oil storage tanks, pipelines, and other energy facilities. Iran has threatened to attack the energy facilities of neighboring countries if its own energy infrastructure is damaged during an attack.
Therefore, to achieve de-escalation via Kharg Island, the US military would need to fight a &#34;clean battle,&#34; occupying the island without damaging its energy facilities. It would also require Iran to be &#34;cooperative&#34; and willing to negotiate a ceasefire with the US after losing the island, rather than continuing attrition with missiles and drones—the prospects of which are unpredictable. In fact, Carter also considered occupying Kharg Island in 1980 to force the Iranians into negotiations but eventually abandoned the idea due to concerns over casualties and an energy crisis.
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Regardless of the form of landing operation, any of them could trigger the Houthi armed forces to join the battlefield. If the Houthis attempt to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, it means the &#34;Gulf of Aden - Bab el-Mandeb Strait - Red Sea - Suez Canal - Mediterranean&#34; route, which carries 12% of global maritime trade and connects Europe and Asia, faces the risk of disruption. Shipping would need to divert around the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, which would further drive up freight rates and prices while reducing the efficiency of the supply chain.
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In summary, as things stand, time is not on Donald Trump's side. Considering the 60-day military action authorization limit, the vision of visiting China in mid-May, and the second Marine unit arriving in the Middle East in two weeks, he will likely make a choice in the next 1-2 weeks, at which point the situation will gradually become clear. Advancing may not necessarily solve the problem and could instead lead to a protracted war and escalation. Retreating would certainly cost him political reputation and national interests, but with six months until the midterms, he would still have time to repair his approval ratings through issues like Cuba, visiting China, stimulus checks, and interest rate cuts once oil prices are stabilized. The TACO option is still on the table; this remains Trump's war alone.
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Recent escalation in Middle East conflicts has heightened market concerns over geopolitical risks. At the same time, international oil prices are fluctuating with the situation, impacting the global energy market and overall risk sentiment. Sectors such as energy, shipping, and technology could all face direct impacts.How long do you think the Middle East situation will affect the Hong Kong and U.S. stock markets? Is it a short-term fluctuation or a long-term impact? Feel free to share your thoughts!

Recent escalation in Middle East conflicts has heightened market concerns over geopolitical risks. At the same time, international oil prices are fluctuating with the situation, impacting the global energy market and overall risk sentiment. Sectors such as energy, shipping, and technology could all face direct impacts.How long do you think the Middle East situation will affect the Hong Kong and U.S. stock markets? Is it a short-term fluctuation or a long-term impact? Feel free to share your thoughts!

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The Middle East war has had a severe impact on Donald Trump's election prospects, with rising oil prices dragging his approval rating down to 36%, a record low. Polls indicate that the probability of the GOP being swept in the midterm elections has risen to 50%. Trump faces a dilemma: withdrawing troops could damage national interests and the US dollar's status, while continuing the war increases US casualties and political risks. The next 1-2 weeks will be critical, as Trump needs to act swiftly to reverse the situation

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