Some folks asked again how to evaluate that company. Let me put it this way: I think it boils down to one phrase—"dancing in shackles." They have to fight two entirely different battles simultaneously: one is the tough defensive transformation at home, and the other is a high-stakes breakout in overseas markets.

To put it bluntly, they might not be as ruthlessly pragmatic as imagined. At their core, they still cling to a kind of impractical fantasy—dancing in shackles. On one hand, they have a clear understanding of their own situation; on the other, they still hope to see how far this model can go under the dual pressures of politics and business.

First, it's clear that the European and American markets are closed to them. Another point: Southeast Asian experience can shatter illusions. While Alibaba's B2B model can achieve some success in Southeast Asia, its toC ventures stand "no chance at all"—literally no chance.

Local governments' attitude toward you is crystal clear—they see you as a cash cow. Unless you're willing to compromise and hand over at least half the pie to local giants as your backers. But for a giant like them, such harsh terms are unacceptable.

With B2B, local firms might let you nibble at the edges by addressing supply-chain gaps. But if you try to compete head-on? Forget it—you'll face a double whammy.

As for cash reserves, Baidu actually sits on plenty. But let's be real—we've said this a million times. Their net cash position isn't what it seems; strategic deposits tie up a big chunk, making it illiquid. Still, buying cash and getting the company for free would be a steal.

Like that naive investor who told me he'd buy at 70-80—that's essentially betting on panic-selling prices. The sweet spot? Get the company thrown in with the cash, because fundamentally, this is like investing in a pre-IPO startup. And as any early-stage bet, no profits mean no go.