At the beginning of 2026, China has taken consecutive actions against Japan:
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On January 6, the Ministry of Commerce decided to prohibit the export of all dual-use items to Japanese military users, military purposes, and any other end users that contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities.
On January 7, the Ministry of Commerce initiated an anti-dumping investigation into imported dichlorodihydrosilane originating from Japan.
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This is China's systematic export control of dual-use items against specific countries.
Dual-use items refer to items that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. It is noteworthy that this export control covers over 900 types of items, encompassing many industrial chains including military industry.
This action clearly conveys a message:
The erroneous remarks and other trends from Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi expose her and the Japanese right-wing forces' ambition to challenge the post-war international order, which will inevitably harm regional peace and stability and threaten world peace and security. China is defending its national security and interests through concrete actions. To achieve this goal, China is concerned not only with a specific statement from Japan but also with the long-standing systemic and fundamental issues in Japan.
Now, China aims to regulate its &#34;remilitarization&#34; ambitions using internationally accepted rules.
China's recent actions against Japan highlight a key term worth noting— all dual-use items.
Implementing export controls on dual-use items is an internationally accepted practice.
This time, it targets a specific country while covering all dual-use items.
Many may think that &#34;dual-use items&#34; only involve some high-end equipment, with limited types and influence. However, this is not the case.
Looking through China's control list, there are over 900 items. Classified by industry sectors, there are 10 industry directions; categorized by the types of controlled items, in addition to materials, there are also software, technology, equipment components, and other items.
The Research Institute of the Ministry of Commerce has informed Tan Zhu that China has indeed felt the security risks and practical problems brought by some actions from Japan, which led to the corresponding measures.
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On one hand, Sanae Takaichi openly interferes in China's internal affairs and issues military threats to China;
On the other hand, Japan's defense budget has been continuously increasing. For the fiscal year 2026, Japan's total defense-related budget is approximately 9.04 trillion yen, an increase of about 70% compared to the fiscal year 2018.
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Against this backdrop, China cannot tolerate the escalating security threats. Previously, Japan imported a large number of items from China that appeared to be &#34;ordinary industrial raw materials,&#34; such as hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene polymer raw materials, tungsten powder, etc.
These materials have wide applications in civilian fields and are also indispensable in aerospace, missiles, and military equipment.
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Take hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene as an example; in the military aerospace field, it is one of the key materials for propellants.
Tungsten is also a typical dual-use item. In military applications, it is a core material for aerospace engines and nuclear reactor shielding materials. Japan is a major export destination for China's tungsten products.
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In addition, there are many well-known rare earths. They are widely used in civilian fields such as new energy vehicle drive motors, wind power equipment, and consumer electronics, while also being irreplaceable basic materials in key military equipment such as radar, guidance systems, and fighter jet engines
Simply regulating rare earths and critical minerals is enough to cause a significant decline in the Japanese economy.
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According to an analysis report by Daiwa Institute of Research, if China were to disrupt the supply of rare earths and other critical minerals to Japan for an extended period, Japan's real GDP is expected to decline by approximately 1.3% to 3.2%, amounting to about 7 to 18 trillion yen, and employment could decrease by about 900,000 to 2.16 million;
At the industry level, the manufacturing sector is expected to be severely impacted, with many industries projected to see output declines exceeding 5%, including the transportation machinery industry, which is expected to decline by as much as 17.6%.
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Of course, China will not affect normal civilian trade. A spokesperson from the Ministry of Commerce mentioned that China is committed to maintaining the stability and security of the global supply chain, and civilian uses will not be affected. Relevant parties engaged in normal civilian trade have no need to worry.
The reason for such careful consideration is that it targets Japan's long-standing practice of &#34;militarizing civilian industries.&#34;
To prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism, documents with international legal effect such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation clearly state that &#34;Japan must be completely disarmed and must not maintain industries that could enable it to rearm,&#34; and the Japanese constitution imposes strict limitations on military power, the right to engage in war, and the right to wage war.
However, in reality, Japan has not abandoned military capability development. Japan has adopted a vague approach to conceal its actions—hiding military production within the civilian industrial system.
Japan's &#34;dual-use&#34; is itself a typical manifestation of the incomplete reckoning with its wartime past. Many enterprises directly stem from the pre-war zaibatsu system and were deeply involved in militaristic aggression during World War II, and have not been genuinely severed from military ties after the war, but rather continued to exist hidden within &#34;civilian enterprises.&#34;
Many private enterprises in Japan have defense technology departments that have long engaged in military-related technology research.
The official website of Japan's Acquisition, Technology &amp; Logistics Agency clearly states that Japan's defense and technology production system largely relies on companies related to national defense, namely defense industrial enterprises, which generally possess special and advanced production capabilities and equipment.
Many of Japan's core defense projects are often led by the Ministry of Defense in terms of objectives and planning, and are contracted out to private contractors.
Japanese defense orders are concentrated in the hands of a few large contractors, mainly including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electric.
Moreover, these large enterprises often act as primary contractors, subcontracting projects through bidding to numerous subcontractors and component suppliers.
Take the F-15 fighter jet project as an example; it is a model authorized for production by the U.S. McDonnell Douglas Corporation under Japan's &#34;Peace Eagle&#34; program, and the project is produced in collaboration with multiple Japanese companies.
The F-15 fighter jet is precisely the aircraft that frequently interfered with China's operations during normal training exercises on the Liaoning aircraft carrier.
In reality, incidents of seemingly civilian products being used for military purposes have already occurred frequently.
If enterprises neglect the final use and end users, and even support military expansion, they may be held legally accountable.
In simple terms, in addition to users like the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, which directly reflect militaristic expansion intentions, this export control also covers a number of private enterprises that superficially engage in civilian business but are deeply embedded in Japan's military-industrial system.
This regulation targets not a single institution, but the entire military-industrial system of Japan from top to bottom.
This system is the &#34;reliance&#34; that Japanese right-wing politicians shout, &#34;If there is an issue in Taiwan, there is an issue in Japan,&#34; and is the &#34;wish&#34; of Japanese right-wing forces to revive militarism.
Now, China aims to cut off this support at its source.
The special aspects of China's actions essentially reflect one thing:
China dares to, and is increasingly adept at, safeguarding its own interests.
The Japanese government should understand this implication.
Yuyuantan Tian
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In January 2026, China will implement strict export controls on dual-use items to Japan, prohibiting all relevant items from being exported to Japanese military users, and launching an anti-dumping investigation into the import of dichlorodihydrosilane from Japan. This control covers over 900 items and involves multiple industrial chains, aiming to respond to the remarks of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the militarization trends of Japanese right-wing forces, safeguarding national security and interests

China tightens regulations on dual-use items to resolutely curb Japan's militaristic ambitions