<p>间谍软件制造商 Intellexa 被指控远程访问其部分政府客户的监控系统，使公司员工能够查看被其 Predator 间谍软件攻击的个人手机用户的个人数据，根据国际特赦组织发布的新证据。</p>
<p>周四，国际特赦组织与包括以色列报纸《哈雷茨》、希腊新闻网站 Inside Story 和瑞士媒体 Inside IT 在内的媒体合作伙伴发布了一系列基于 Intellexa 泄露材料的报告，包括内部公司文件、销售和营销材料以及培训视频。</p>
<p>或许最引人注目的揭露是，Intellexa 的工作人员据称可以通过 TeamViewer 这一现成工具远程访问至少部分客户的监控系统，该工具允许用户通过互联网连接到其他计算机。</p>
<p>泄露的培训视频显示了 Predator 间谍软件系统的特权部分，包括其仪表板，以及 “存储受害者照片、消息和所有其他监控数据的存储系统”，国际特赦组织在其报告中写道。（国际特赦组织发布了从视频中截取的屏幕截图，但没有发布完整视频。）</p>
<p>这家非营利研究机构表示，泄露的视频显示了明显的 “实时” Predator 感染尝试，“针对真实目标”，基于 “至少一次针对哈萨克斯坦目标的感染尝试的详细信息。” 视频中包含了感染网址、目标的 IP 地址和目标手机的软件版本。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://techcrunch.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/predator-target-dashboard.jpeg/query-dz02ODA?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://techcrunch.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/predator-target-dashboard.jpeg/query-dz02ODA"/></p>
<p>Intellexa 客户监控系统的仪表板截图，显示了客户和 Intellexa 支持人员可能访问的被攻击目标的敏感个人数据类型。（图片来源：国际特赦组织）</p>
<p>向政府机构销售间谍软件的公司，如 NSO 集团和现已解散的 Hacking Team，一直声称他们从未接触到客户目标的数据，也未接触客户的系统。这有几个原因。</p>
<p>从间谍软件制造商的角度来看，他们不希望在客户非法使用间谍软件时承担潜在的法律责任。而且，间谍软件制造商更愿意说，一旦他们出售了间谍软件，客户就对其使用负全责。从政府客户的角度来看，他们不希望将敏感调查的细节，如目标的姓名、位置和个人数据，暴露给可能位于海外的私人公司。</p>
<p>换句话说，这种类型的远程访问绝对不是 “正常” 的，间谍软件制造商 Memento Labs 的首席执行官 Paolo Lezzi 在接受 TechCrunch 采访时表示。“没有任何 [政府] 机构会接受这种情况，” 他说。</p>
<p>这就是为什么 Lezzi 对泄露的培训视频显示对实际客户的实时监控系统的访问持怀疑态度。他推测，这可能是展示环境的培训材料。首席执行官还表示，一些客户曾要求 Memento Labs 访问他们的系统，但公司仅在解决技术问题时才接受该请求。无论如何，他表示，“他们允许我们在必要的时间内进行 TeamViewer 访问，并在他们的监督下进行干预并离开。”</p>
<h4>联系我们</h4>
<p>您是否有关于 Intellexa 的更多信息？或者其他间谍软件制造商的信息？您可以通过非工作设备安全地联系 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai，电话是 +1 917 257 1382，或通过 Telegram 和 Keybase @lorenzofb，或发送电子邮件。</p>
<p>然而，国际特赦组织坚信泄露的视频确实显示了对实时 Predator 监控系统的访问。</p>
<p>“培训通话中的一名工作人员询问这是否是演示环境，讲师确认这是一个实时客户系统，” 国际特赦组织安全实验室负责人 Donncha Ó Cearbhaill 说，该实验室对泄露材料进行了技术分析，并调查了几起 Predator 感染案例。</p>
<p>Intellexa 员工能够看到他们的客户正在监视谁的说法引发了国际特赦组织对安全和隐私的担忧。</p>
<p>“这些发现只会增加潜在监视受害者的担忧。他们最敏感的数据不仅暴露给政府或其他间谍软件客户，而且他们的数据还可能暴露给一家在保管机密数据方面存在明显问题的外国监视公司，” 该非营利组织在报告中写道。</p>
<p>Intellexa 未能被联系以发表评论。代表 Intellexa 创始人 Tal Dilian 发言的律师告诉《哈雷茨》，Dilian“没有犯任何罪，也没有在希腊或其他地方操作任何网络系统。”</p>
<p>Dilian 是政府间谍软件领域中较具争议的人物之一。一位间谍软件行业的老兵曾告诉 TechCrunch，Dilian“在水晶商店里像大象一样行动”，暗示他几乎没有努力掩盖自己的活动。</p>
<p>“在这个间谍软件销售的特定领域，你必须非常平衡和谨慎……但他并不在乎，” 那个人说。</p>
<p>在 2024 年，美国政府对 Tal Dilian 及其商业伙伴 Sara Aleksandra Fayssal Hamou 宣布制裁。在此案中，美国财政部基于 Intellexa 的间谍软件被用于针对美国人，包括美国政府官员、记者和政策专家的指控实施制裁。这些制裁使得美国公司和国民与 Dilian 和 Hamou 之间的任何商业关系变得非法。</p>
<p>这是美国政府首次针对间谍软件 NSO 集团采取行动，针对行业内的特定个人。</p>
<p>在对《哈雷茨》的回应中，迪利安指责记者们是 “有用的傻瓜”，参与了一场 “精心策划的运动”，旨在伤害他和他的公司，这一切 “被灌输给了拜登政府”。</p>

<p>根据国际特赦组织的说法，间谍软件制造商 Intellexa 涉嫌能够远程访问其政府客户的监控系统，使员工能够查看被其 Predator 间谍软件针对的个人数据。泄露的材料，包括一段培训视频，表明 Intellexa 能够访问实时监控数据。这引发了重大的隐私和安全担忧。Intellexa 尚未对此发表评论，但其创始人否认任何不当行为。间谍软件制造商访问客户数据的做法极为不寻常且具有争议</p>

<p>Spyware maker Intellexa had remote access to some of its government customers’ surveillance systems, giving company staffers the ability to see the personal data of people whose phones had been hacked with its Predator spyware, according to new evidence published by Amnesty International.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>间谍软件制造商 Intellexa 被指控远程访问其部分政府客户的监控系统，使公司员工能够查看被其 Predator 间谍软件攻击的个人手机用户的个人数据，根据国际特赦组织发布的新证据。</p>
</div><p>On Thursday, Amnesty and a coalition of media partners, including Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Greek news site Inside Story, and Swiss outlet Inside IT, published a series of reports based on leaked material from Intellexa, including internal company documents, sales and marketing material, and training videos.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>周四，国际特赦组织与包括以色列报纸《哈雷茨》、希腊新闻网站 Inside Story 和瑞士媒体 Inside IT 在内的媒体合作伙伴发布了一系列基于 Intellexa 泄露材料的报告，包括内部公司文件、销售和营销材料以及培训视频。</p>
</div><p>Perhaps the most striking revelation is that people working at Intellexa could allegedly remotely access the surveillance systems of at least some of its customers via TeamViewer, an off-the-shelf tool that allows users to connect to other computers over the internet.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>或许最引人注目的揭露是，Intellexa 的工作人员据称可以通过 TeamViewer 这一现成工具远程访问至少部分客户的监控系统，该工具允许用户通过互联网连接到其他计算机。</p>
</div><p>The remote access is shown in a leaked training video revealing privileged parts of the Predator spyware system, including its dashboard, as well as the “storage system containing photos, messages and all other surveillance data gathered from victims of the Predator spyware,” Amnesty wrote in its report. (Amnesty published screenshots taken from the video, but not the full video.)</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>泄露的培训视频显示了 Predator 间谍软件系统的特权部分，包括其仪表板，以及 “存储受害者照片、消息和所有其他监控数据的存储系统”，国际特赦组织在其报告中写道。（国际特赦组织发布了从视频中截取的屏幕截图，但没有发布完整视频。）</p>
</div><p>The nonprofit researchers wrote that the leaked video shows apparent “live” Predator infection attempts “against real targets,” based on detailed information “from at least one infection attempt against a target in Kazakhstan.” The video contained the infection URL, the target’s IP address, and the software versions of the target’s phone.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这家非营利研究机构表示，泄露的视频显示了明显的 “实时” Predator 感染尝试，“针对真实目标”，基于 “至少一次针对哈萨克斯坦目标的感染尝试的详细信息。” 视频中包含了感染网址、目标的 IP 地址和目标手机的软件版本。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://techcrunch.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/predator-target-dashboard.jpeg/query-dz02ODA" alt="" original-src="https://techcrunch.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/predator-target-dashboard.jpeg?w=680"/></p>
<p>A screenshot of the dashboard of an Intellexa customer surveillance system, which shows the types of sensitive personal data of hacked targets that customers and Intellexa support staff may have access to. (Image: Amnesty International)</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>Intellexa 客户监控系统的仪表板截图，显示了客户和 Intellexa 支持人员可能访问的被攻击目标的敏感个人数据类型。（图片来源：国际特赦组织）</p>
</div><p>Companies that sell spyware to government agencies, such as NSO Group and the now-defunct Hacking Team, have long maintained that they never have access to the data of their customers’ targets, nor their customers’ systems. There are several reasons why.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>向政府机构销售间谍软件的公司，如 NSO 集团和现已解散的 Hacking Team，一直声称他们从未接触到客户目标的数据，也未接触客户的系统。这有几个原因。</p>
</div><p>From the point of view of the spyware makers, they don’t want the potential legal liability if their customers use the spyware unlawfully. And, spyware makers would rather say that once they sell their spyware, the customers are fully responsible for using it. From the government customers’ standpoint, they don’t want to expose details of their sensitive investigations, such as targets’ names, locations, and personal data, to a private company that may be based overseas.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>从间谍软件制造商的角度来看，他们不希望在客户非法使用间谍软件时承担潜在的法律责任。而且，间谍软件制造商更愿意说，一旦他们出售了间谍软件，客户就对其使用负全责。从政府客户的角度来看，他们不希望将敏感调查的细节，如目标的姓名、位置和个人数据，暴露给可能位于海外的私人公司。</p>
</div><p>In other words, this type of remote access is absolutely not “normal,” as Paolo Lezzi, the chief executive of spyware maker Memento Labs, told TechCrunch when contacted for this story to ask from the perspective of a spyware maker. “No [government] agency would accept it,” he said.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>换句话说，这种类型的远程访问绝对不是 “正常” 的，间谍软件制造商 Memento Labs 的首席执行官 Paolo Lezzi 在接受 TechCrunch 采访时表示。“没有任何 [政府] 机构会接受这种情况，” 他说。</p>
</div><p>That’s why Lezzi was skeptical that the leaked training video was showing access to an actual customer’s live surveillance system. Perhaps, he posited, this was training material showing a demo environment. The chief executive also said that some customers have asked Memento Labs to have access to their systems, but the company only accepts the offer if it’s necessary to solve technical issues. In any case, he said, “they enable us to have TeamViewer access for the necessary time and under their supervision we carry out the intervention and leave.”</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这就是为什么 Lezzi 对泄露的培训视频显示对实际客户的实时监控系统的访问持怀疑态度。他推测，这可能是展示环境的培训材料。首席执行官还表示，一些客户曾要求 Memento Labs 访问他们的系统，但公司仅在解决技术问题时才接受该请求。无论如何，他表示，“他们允许我们在必要的时间内进行 TeamViewer 访问，并在他们的监督下进行干预并离开。”</p>
</div><h4>Contact Us</h4>
<div class="lb-trans"><h4>联系我们</h4>
</div><p>Do you have more information about Intellexa? Or other spyware makers? From a non-work device, you can contact Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai securely on Signal at +1 917 257 1382, or via Telegram and Keybase @lorenzofb, or email.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>您是否有关于 Intellexa 的更多信息？或者其他间谍软件制造商的信息？您可以通过非工作设备安全地联系 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai，电话是 +1 917 257 1382，或通过 Telegram 和 Keybase @lorenzofb，或发送电子邮件。</p>
</div><p>Amnesty, however, is convinced that the leaked video does show access to live Predator surveillance systems.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，国际特赦组织坚信泄露的视频确实显示了对实时 Predator 监控系统的访问。</p>
</div><p>“One of the staff in the training call ask if it was a demo environment, and the instructor confirmed it was a live customer system,” said Donncha Ó Cearbhaill the head of Amnesty’s security lab, which did the technical analysis of the leaked material, and has investigated several cases of Predator infections.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>“培训通话中的一名工作人员询问这是否是演示环境，讲师确认这是一个实时客户系统，” 国际特赦组织安全实验室负责人 Donncha Ó Cearbhaill 说，该实验室对泄露材料进行了技术分析，并调查了几起 Predator 感染案例。</p>
</div><p>The claim that Intellexa staffers had visibility into who their customers were spying on raised Amnesty’s concerns about security and privacy.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>Intellexa 员工能够看到他们的客户正在监视谁的说法引发了国际特赦组织对安全和隐私的担忧。</p>
</div><p>“These findings can only add to the concerns of potential surveillance victims. Not only is their most sensitive data exposed to a government or other spyware customer, but their data risks being exposed to a foreign surveillance company, which has demonstrable issues in keeping their confidential data stored securely,” the nonprofit wrote in the report.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>“这些发现只会增加潜在监视受害者的担忧。他们最敏感的数据不仅暴露给政府或其他间谍软件客户，而且他们的数据还可能暴露给一家在保管机密数据方面存在明显问题的外国监视公司，” 该非营利组织在报告中写道。</p>
</div><p>Intellexa could not be reached for comment. A lawyer speaking on behalf of Intellexa’s founder Tal Dilian told Haaretz that Dilian has “not committed any crime nor operated any cyber system in Greece or anywhere else.”</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>Intellexa 未能被联系以发表评论。代表 Intellexa 创始人 Tal Dilian 发言的律师告诉《哈雷茨》，Dilian“没有犯任何罪，也没有在希腊或其他地方操作任何网络系统。”</p>
</div><p>Dilian is one of the more controversial people in the world of government spyware. A veteran of the spyware industry previously told TechCrunch that Dilian “moves like an elephant in a crystal shop,” implying he made little effort to conceal his activities.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>Dilian 是政府间谍软件领域中较具争议的人物之一。一位间谍软件行业的老兵曾告诉 TechCrunch，Dilian“在水晶商店里像大象一样行动”，暗示他几乎没有努力掩盖自己的活动。</p>
</div><p>“In that particular space of spyware sellers you have to be extremely balanced and attentive… but he didn’t care,” said the person.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>“在这个间谍软件销售的特定领域，你必须非常平衡和谨慎……但他并不在乎，” 那个人说。</p>
</div><p>In 2024, the U.S. government announced sanctions against Tal Dilian and one of his business partners, Sara Aleksandra Fayssal Hamou. In that case, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions based on allegations that Intellexa’s spyware was used against Americans, including U.S. government officials, journalists, and policy experts. The sanctions make it illegal for American companies and nationals to have any commercial relationship with Dilian and Hamou.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在 2024 年，美国政府对 Tal Dilian 及其商业伙伴 Sara Aleksandra Fayssal Hamou 宣布制裁。在此案中，美国财政部基于 Intellexa 的间谍软件被用于针对美国人，包括美国政府官员、记者和政策专家的指控实施制裁。这些制裁使得美国公司和国民与 Dilian 和 Hamou 之间的任何商业关系变得非法。</p>
</div><p>That was the first time the U.S. government, which has taken actions against spyware NSO Group, targeted a specific person involved in the industry.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这是美国政府首次针对间谍软件 NSO 集团采取行动，针对行业内的特定个人。</p>
</div><p>In his response to Haaretz, Dilian accused journalists of being “useful idiots” in an “orchestrated campaign” to hurt him and his company, which was “fed into the Biden administration.”</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在对《哈雷茨》的回应中，迪利安指责记者们是 “有用的傻瓜”，参与了一场 “精心策划的运动”，旨在伤害他和他的公司，这一切 “被灌输给了拜登政府”。</p>
</div>

研究人员称，被制裁的间谍软件制造商 Intellexa 曾直接接触政府间谍活动的受害者