<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="1152" height="720" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png"/></p>
<p>在过去的二十年中，中国经济可以通过三种手段来解决缓慢增长的问题。它可以推动投资、提升房地产，或向世界其他地方销售更多商品。</p>
<p>如今，一种手段已经失效，另一种受到政治限制，而第三种则在国外引发抵制。</p>
<p>尽管经济仍在扩张，但可靠的选择正在迅速减少。</p>
<h2>投资不再能像以前那样产生反应</h2>
<p>投资曾是中国摆脱困境的最快方式。今年前 11 个月，固定资产投资与 2024 年同期相比下降了 2.6%。</p>
<p>拖累主要来自房地产，房地产投资在同期下降了近 16%。</p>
<p>曾经占经济活动四分之一的房地产，在相关行业被纳入后，已从增长引擎转变为结构性约束。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="631" height="341" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png"/></p>
<p>来源：彭博社</p>
<p>该行业曾大规模吸纳资本并迅速传递增长。现在却恰恰相反，拉低了信心。</p>
<p>基础设施曾是常规的后备选择，但现在也受到限制。</p>
<p>地方政府面临更严格的借贷限制，更多的融资能力用于再融资现有债务，而不是启动新项目。</p>
<p>投资并没有消失，但变得更慢、更具选择性，作为增长引擎的力量也减弱了。</p>
<p>减速背后也有意图。政策制定者已变得更加明确，旨在遏制低效投资和过剩产能。</p>
<p>这缩小了粗放型刺激的范围。增长不再是简单通过增加建设来加速的事情。</p>
<h2>尽管有针对性支持，消费仍然疲软</h2>
<p>家庭支出证明难以复苏。11 月份零售销售同比仅增长 1.3%。</p>
<p>这低于 10 月份的 2.9%，也是疫情期间以外的最低增速。</p>
<p>然而，更令人担忧的是，零售增长已连续六个月放缓，这是自 2020 年以来最长的持续下滑。</p>
<p>消费构成显示出问题。根据行业和官方数据，汽车销售同比下降约 8%，家电销售下降近 19%。</p>
<p>这两个类别之前曾因以旧换新补贴而受到提振。当这些效应消退时，需求也随之下降。</p>
<p>这并不是流动性短缺的问题。消费者只是对消费持谨慎态度。</p>
<p>11 月份城市失业率保持在 5.1%，而青年失业率仍高于 17%，限制了对收入增长的信心。</p>
<p>更重要的是，房地产价格下跌继续影响家庭行为。</p>
<p>11 月份主要城市的平均房价再次下降，延续了多年的下滑趋势。</p>
<p>国际货币基金组织估计，约 70% 的家庭财富与房地产相关，即使是适度的价格下跌也会对消费决策产生过大的影响。</p>
<p>补贴可以改变购买的时机，但无法抵消持续的财富感知侵蚀。</p>
<h2>出口支撑增长，并引发关注</h2>
<p>在国内需求承压的情况下，出口吸收了大部分的闲置产能。</p>
<p>11 月份工业生产同比增长 4.8%，表现优于消费和投资，得益于强劲的海外订单。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="737" height="420" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png"/></p>
<p>来源：路透社</p>
<p>根据海关数据，2025 年前 11 个月的贸易顺差创下约 1.1 万亿美元的纪录。</p>
<p>从增长核算的角度来看，出口在保持 GDP 接近政府 5% 目标方面发挥了决定性作用。</p>
<p>出口也带来了较少的直接财政成本。它们绕过家庭信心，不依赖地方政府的资产负债表，并迅速交付产出。</p>
<p>在政策环境受限的情况下，这使得出口变得具有吸引力。</p>
<p>但成本正在累积。持续的过剩供应使得生产者价格在三年多的时间里处于通缩状态。</p>
<p>在外部，贸易伙伴正以关税威胁和新壁垒作出回应，不仅在美国，还在欧洲和新兴市场。</p>
<p>曾经缓解压力的出口强劲，现在却越来越产生压力。</p>
<h2>市场改善速度快于基本面</h2>
<p>尽管实体经济努力恢复动力，中国的金融市场却朝着相反的方向发展。</p>
<p>股票、人民币和在岸政府债券都在 2025 年有望实现增长，这是近年来未曾见过的组合。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="644" height="352" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png"/></p>
<p>来源：彭博社</p>
<p>截至第三季度，外国投资者以自 2020 年以来最快的速度增加了对中国股票的持有，而尽管收益率较低，离岸主权债券的需求仍然强劲。</p>
<p>人民币正朝着自 2021 年以来首次对美元实现年度升值的方向发展。</p>
<p>也许这与政策有关，政府推出流动性工具以支持股票市场，减轻对私营部门某些部分的监管压力，并强调增长稳定。</p>
<p>估值也发挥了作用，中国资产仍以折扣价交易于全球同行。</p>
<p>然而，市场的反弹并没有转化为更广泛的经济提升。</p>
<p>家庭在过去两年中从股价上涨中获得了约 4.5 万亿元的收益，但与同期住宅物业价值约 20 万亿元的下降相比，这一数字显得微不足道，市场分析师的估计显示。</p>
<p>股票的财富效应被住房损失所淹没。</p>
<h2>为什么明年看起来比今年更困难</h2>
<p>政策制定者承诺通过财政支出、超长期债券和适度的货币宽松继续提供支持。</p>
<p>与此同时，他们也在实践克制。</p>
<p>大规模刺激有可能重燃债务问题，并削弱遏制过剩产能的努力。</p>
<p>直接的收入转移将促进消费，但需要财政和制度上的转变，而北京长期以来一直避免。</p>
<p>结果是一个专注于稳定而非加速的策略。</p>
<p>增长得到了支持，但并未重新设计。市场对此表示放心。家庭和企业依然保持谨慎。</p>
<p>中国正在耗尽过去生成增长的低成本方式。</p>
<p>数据显示，经济仍在生产、仍在出口、仍在吸引资本，但越来越难以将这些优势转化为国内信心。</p>
<p>中国能够做到的与其可以依赖的之间的差距，现在已成为其经济前景的决定性特征。</p>
<p>关于中国经济增长选项耗尽的文章最早出现在 Invezz 上。</p>

<p>中国经济面临有限的增长选择，因为投资、房地产和出口等传统杠杆受到制约。投资放缓，房价下跌，出口面临国际阻力。尽管有针对性的支持，消费依然疲软，零售销售和汽车销售均出现下降。出口曾推动增长，但在国外受到审查。金融市场有所改善，但这并未转化为更广泛的经济复苏。政策制定者专注于遏制低效投资，缩小刺激范围。经济对出口和市场收益的依赖与国内挑战形成对比</p>

<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png"/></p>
<p>For most of the past two decades, China’s economy could solve slow growth by pulling one of three levers. It could push investment, lift property, or sell more to the rest of the world.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在过去的二十年中，中国经济可以通过三种手段来解决缓慢增长的问题。它可以推动投资、提升房地产，或向世界其他地方销售更多商品。</p>
</div><p>Today, one lever is broken, another is politically constrained, and the third is provoking resistance abroad.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>如今，一种手段已经失效，另一种受到政治限制，而第三种则在国外引发抵制。</p>
</div><p>Though the economy is still expanding, the menu of reliable options is shrinking fast.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>尽管经济仍在扩张，但可靠的选择正在迅速减少。</p>
</div><h2>Investment no longer delivers the response it once did</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>投资不再能像以前那样产生反应</h2>
</div><p>Investment used to be China’s fastest way out of trouble. Fixed asset investment fell 2.6% in the first 11 months of the year compared with the same period in 2024.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资曾是中国摆脱困境的最快方式。今年前 11 个月，固定资产投资与 2024 年同期相比下降了 2.6%。</p>
</div><p>The drag is dominated by property, where investment fell nearly 16% over the same period.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>拖累主要来自房地产，房地产投资在同期下降了近 16%。</p>
</div><p>Once a quarter of economic activity when related sectors were included, property has shifted from growth engine to structural restraint.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>曾经占经济活动四分之一的房地产，在相关行业被纳入后，已从增长引擎转变为结构性约束。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Bloomberg</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>来源：彭博社</p>
</div><p>The sector once absorbed capital at scale and transmitted growth quickly. Now it does the opposite, pulling confidence down.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>该行业曾大规模吸纳资本并迅速传递增长。现在却恰恰相反，拉低了信心。</p>
</div><p>Infrastructure used to be the usual fallback, but now it’s also constrained.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>基础设施曾是常规的后备选择，但现在也受到限制。</p>
</div><p>Local governments face tighter borrowing limits and are using more funding capacity to refinance existing obligations rather than start new projects.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>地方政府面临更严格的借贷限制，更多的融资能力用于再融资现有债务，而不是启动新项目。</p>
</div><p>Investment has not disappeared, but it has become slower, more selective, and less powerful as a growth engine.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资并没有消失，但变得更慢、更具选择性，作为增长引擎的力量也减弱了。</p>
</div><p>There is also intent behind the slowdown. Policymakers have become more explicit about curbing inefficient investment and excess capacity.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>减速背后也有意图。政策制定者已变得更加明确，旨在遏制低效投资和过剩产能。</p>
</div><p>This has narrowed the scope for blunt stimulus. Growth is no longer something that can be accelerated simply by building more.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这缩小了粗放型刺激的范围。增长不再是简单通过增加建设来加速的事情。</p>
</div><h2>Consumption is weak despite targeted support</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>尽管有针对性支持，消费仍然疲软</h2>
</div><p>Household spending has proven stubbornly difficult to revive. Retail sales grew just 1.3% in November from a year earlier.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>家庭支出证明难以复苏。11 月份零售销售同比仅增长 1.3%。</p>
</div><p>That was down from 2.9% in October and the weakest pace outside the pandemic period.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这低于 10 月份的 2.9%，也是疫情期间以外的最低增速。</p>
</div><p>The worrying part, however is that retail growth has slowed for six straight months, the longest such run since 2020.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，更令人担忧的是，零售增长已连续六个月放缓，这是自 2020 年以来最长的持续下滑。</p>
</div><p>The composition of spending is telling. Auto sales fell around 8% year on year, and home appliance sales dropped close to 19%, based on industry and official data.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>消费构成显示出问题。根据行业和官方数据，汽车销售同比下降约 8%，家电销售下降近 19%。</p>
</div><p>Both categories had been lifted earlier by trade-in subsidies. When those effects faded, demand followed.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这两个类别之前曾因以旧换新补贴而受到提振。当这些效应消退时，需求也随之下降。</p>
</div><p>This is not a story of liquidity shortages. Consumers are simply hesitant to spend.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这并不是流动性短缺的问题。消费者只是对消费持谨慎态度。</p>
</div><p>Urban unemployment rate held at 5.1% in November, while youth unemployment remains elevated above 17%, limiting confidence in income growth.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>11 月份城市失业率保持在 5.1%，而青年失业率仍高于 17%，限制了对收入增长的信心。</p>
</div><p>More importantly, falling property prices continue to affect household behavior.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>更重要的是，房地产价格下跌继续影响家庭行为。</p>
</div><p>Average home prices across major cities declined again in November, extending a multi-year slide.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>11 月份主要城市的平均房价再次下降，延续了多年的下滑趋势。</p>
</div><p>With the International Monetary Fund estimating that around 70% of household wealth is tied to real estate, even modest price declines have outsized effects on spending decisions.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>国际货币基金组织估计，约 70% 的家庭财富与房地产相关，即使是适度的价格下跌也会对消费决策产生过大的影响。</p>
</div><p>Subsidies can shift the timing of purchases, but they cannot offset a sustained erosion of perceived wealth.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>补贴可以改变购买的时机，但无法抵消持续的财富感知侵蚀。</p>
</div><h2>Exports are carrying growth, and attracting scrutiny</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>出口支撑增长，并引发关注</h2>
</div><p>With domestic demand under pressure, exports have absorbed much of the slack.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在国内需求承压的情况下，出口吸收了大部分的闲置产能。</p>
</div><p>Industrial production grew 4.8% year on year in November, outperforming consumption and investment, supported by strong overseas orders.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>11 月份工业生产同比增长 4.8%，表现优于消费和投资，得益于强劲的海外订单。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Reuters</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>来源：路透社</p>
</div><p>The result has been a record trade surplus of roughly $1.1 trillion in the first eleven months of 2025, according to customs data.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>根据海关数据，2025 年前 11 个月的贸易顺差创下约 1.1 万亿美元的纪录。</p>
</div><p>From a growth accounting perspective, exports have been decisive in keeping GDP near the government’s 5% target.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>从增长核算的角度来看，出口在保持 GDP 接近政府 5% 目标方面发挥了决定性作用。</p>
</div><p>Exports also carry fewer immediate fiscal costs. They bypass household confidence, do not rely on local government balance sheets, and deliver output quickly.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>出口也带来了较少的直接财政成本。它们绕过家庭信心，不依赖地方政府的资产负债表，并迅速交付产出。</p>
</div><p>In a constrained policy environment, that makes them attractive.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在政策环境受限的情况下，这使得出口变得具有吸引力。</p>
</div><p>But the costs are accumulating. Persistent excess supply has kept producer prices in deflation for more than three years.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但成本正在累积。持续的过剩供应使得生产者价格在三年多的时间里处于通缩状态。</p>
</div><p>Externally, trade partners are responding with tariff threats and new barriers, not only in the United States but across Europe and emerging markets.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在外部，贸易伙伴正以关税威胁和新壁垒作出回应，不仅在美国，还在欧洲和新兴市场。</p>
</div><p>Export strength that once relieved pressure is increasingly generating it.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>曾经缓解压力的出口强劲，现在却越来越产生压力。</p>
</div><h2>Markets are improving faster than fundamentals</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>市场改善速度快于基本面</h2>
</div><p>While the real economy struggles to regain momentum, China’s financial markets have moved in the opposite direction.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>尽管实体经济努力恢复动力，中国的金融市场却朝着相反的方向发展。</p>
</div><p>Equities, the yuan, and onshore government bonds are all on track to post gains in 2025, a combination not seen in several years.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>股票、人民币和在岸政府债券都在 2025 年有望实现增长，这是近年来未曾见过的组合。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Bloomberg</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>来源：彭博社</p>
</div><p>Foreign investors increased holdings of Chinese equities at the fastest pace since 2020 as of the third quarter, while demand for offshore sovereign bonds remained strong despite low yields.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>截至第三季度，外国投资者以自 2020 年以来最快的速度增加了对中国股票的持有，而尽管收益率较低，离岸主权债券的需求仍然强劲。</p>
</div><p>The yuan is heading toward its first annual gain against the dollar since 2021.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>人民币正朝着自 2021 年以来首次对美元实现年度升值的方向发展。</p>
</div><p>Perhaps this was about policy, with authorities rolling out liquidity tools to support equities, easing regulatory pressure on parts of the private sector, and emphasizing growth stability.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>也许这与政策有关，政府推出流动性工具以支持股票市场，减轻对私营部门某些部分的监管压力，并强调增长稳定。</p>
</div><p>Valuations also played a role, with Chinese assets still trading at a discount to global peers.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>估值也发挥了作用，中国资产仍以折扣价交易于全球同行。</p>
</div><p>Yet the market rally has not translated into a broader economic lift.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，市场的反弹并没有转化为更广泛的经济提升。</p>
</div><p>Households have gained an estimated 4.5 trillion yuan from rising equity prices over the past two years, but that is small compared with the roughly 20 trillion yuan decline in residential property values over the same period, based on estimates cited by market analysts.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>家庭在过去两年中从股价上涨中获得了约 4.5 万亿元的收益，但与同期住宅物业价值约 20 万亿元的下降相比，这一数字显得微不足道，市场分析师的估计显示。</p>
</div><p>The wealth effect from stocks is simply overwhelmed by losses in housing.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>股票的财富效应被住房损失所淹没。</p>
</div><h2>Why next year looks harder than this one</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>为什么明年看起来比今年更困难</h2>
</div><p>Policymakers have pledged continued support through fiscal spending, ultra-long-term bonds, and moderate monetary easing.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>政策制定者承诺通过财政支出、超长期债券和适度的货币宽松继续提供支持。</p>
</div><p>At the same time, they are practicing restraint.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>与此同时，他们也在实践克制。</p>
</div><p>Large-scale stimulus risks reviving debt problems and undermining efforts to curb overcapacity.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>大规模刺激有可能重燃债务问题，并削弱遏制过剩产能的努力。</p>
</div><p>Direct income transfers would boost consumption but require fiscal and institutional shifts Beijing has long avoided.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>直接的收入转移将促进消费，但需要财政和制度上的转变，而北京长期以来一直避免。</p>
</div><p>The result is a strategy focused on stabilization rather than acceleration.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>结果是一个专注于稳定而非加速的策略。</p>
</div><p>Growth is supported, but not re-engineered. Markets respond to that reassurance. Households and firms remain cautious.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>增长得到了支持，但并未重新设计。市场对此表示放心。家庭和企业依然保持谨慎。</p>
</div><p>China is running out of low-cost ways to generate growth, as it has done in the past.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中国正在耗尽过去生成增长的低成本方式。</p>
</div><p>The data show an economy that still produces, still exports, and still attracts capital, but increasingly struggles to turn those strengths into confidence at home.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>数据显示，经济仍在生产、仍在出口、仍在吸引资本，但越来越难以将这些优势转化为国内信心。</p>
</div><p>That gap between what China can do and what it can rely on is now the defining feature of its economic outlook.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中国能够做到的与其可以依赖的之间的差距，现在已成为其经济前景的决定性特征。</p>
</div><p>The post China’s economy is running out of growth options appeared first on Invezz</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>关于中国经济增长选项耗尽的文章最早出现在 Invezz 上。</p>
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中国经济正在失去增长的选择