<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2015/07/17/00/37/pump-jack-848300_960_720.jpg?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="960" height="540" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2015/07/17/00/37/pump-jack-848300_960_720.jpg"/></p>
<p><em>图片来源：Pixabay</em></p>
<p>在委内瑞拉最新的政治震荡之后，关于该国石油行业复苏前景的猜测激增。从纸面上看，委内瑞拉仍然拥有世界上最大的已探明石油储量。实际上，产量仍然只是曾经的一个小部分。</p>
<p>委内瑞拉的石油生产恢复速度在一定程度上将取决于制裁的情况。但委内瑞拉的崩溃并不是从制裁开始的，单靠解除制裁也无法弥补损失。然而，这可能会在短期内产生显著影响。</p>
<p>该国石油衰退有两个主要因素。一是早在几年前就开始的结构性损害，这需要许多年才能修复。另一个是后来的制裁驱动的干扰，导致产量迅速下降。理解这两者之间的区别对于理解接下来可能发生的事情至关重要，也解释了为什么制裁可能会在短期内影响委内瑞拉的石油未来。</p>
<h3><strong>结构性崩溃首先发生</strong></h3>
<p>委内瑞拉的石油衰退可以追溯到 2007 年的征用。那一年，政府迫使外国运营商处于少数股东地位，并在康菲石油和埃克森美孚等公司拒绝新条款时没收资产。</p>
<p>这些并不是简单的油田。奥里诺科带是世界上技术要求最高的重油地区之一。维持生产需要先进的油藏管理、稳定的稀释剂供应和数十亿美元的升级设施来使原油可用。当外国运营商离开时，他们带走了未来的投资资本、技术专长、运营纪律和项目管理系统。</p>
<p>委内瑞拉国有石油公司 PDVSA 获得了这些资产，但并没有获得相应的能力。维护工作恶化，设备故障，技术工人离开。生产在石油制裁实施之前的几年就开始下降，这一趋势在以下图表中清晰可见。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://www.rrapier.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Venezuelas-Oil-Production-1024x743.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://www.rrapier.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Venezuelas-Oil-Production-1024x743.png"/></p>
<p>2015 年后，委内瑞拉石油生产的急剧下降是由于 PDVSA 的内部崩溃，这一崩溃以政治清洗、管理不善、技术人员流失和关键基础设施恶化为标志。</p>
<p>这种损害无法迅速逆转。即使在政治稳定的情况下，重建基础设施和恢复技术劳动力也是一项需要多年的工作。</p>
<h3><strong>制裁稍后到来并加速了衰退</strong></h3>
<p>第二层制裁于 2019 年 1 月到来，美国直接制裁了 PDVSA。早期的制裁针对个人，对生产几乎没有影响。2019 年的措施则有所不同。</p>
<p>它们切断了委内瑞拉最大的客户，限制了支付，阻碍了稀释剂进口，并使运输和保险变得复杂。原本可以生产的重油几乎在一夜之间被困住。</p>
<p>没有稀释剂，原油无法运输。没有美国炼油厂，委内瑞拉失去了最自然的市场。没有可靠的支付渠道，合资企业难以运营。</p>
<p>到 2025 年底，美国的制裁和运输限制严重干扰了委内瑞拉的出口。路透社报道，在美国的干预后，油轮的移动几乎停止，而 Vortexa 的数据则显示仅在 12 月就下降了 36%。</p>
<p>但这是可以更快逆转的衰退部分。因商业原因停产的油井可以重新启动。合资企业可以恢复正常运营。稀释剂的流动可以恢复。这不会使委内瑞拉恢复到以前的高峰，但可能会带来显著的短期增长。</p>
<h3><strong>雪佛龙的结构优势</strong></h3>
<p>如果制裁放松，雪佛龙将独树一帜。它是唯一一家从未完全退出委内瑞拉的主要美国石油公司。通过豁免，雪佛龙维持了合资企业，保留了现场人员，并保持了运营连续性。</p>
<p>这种连续性很重要。雪佛龙不需要重新谈判入场条款或重建关系。它需要一个更清晰的商业框架。但如果制裁放松，雪佛龙可以比任何其他西方运营商更快地扩大规模，因为它从未失去立足点。</p>
<h3><strong>康菲石油与赔偿问题</strong></h3>
<p>康菲石油的处境则截然不同。它在 2007 年被征用，后来因在奥里诺科地区被没收的投资获得了 87 亿美元的仲裁裁决及利息。</p>
<p>正在进行的 Citgo 出售是复苏的一条途径。如果能够获得有意义的赔偿，重新进入市场就成为可能。康菲石油曾是奥里诺科地区的顶级运营商，但与雪佛龙不同，它将从零开始重建。</p>
<p>此外，康菲石油今天与 2007 年相比是一个根本不同的公司。在 2012 年剥离 Phillips 66 后，康菲石油成为一家纯粹的勘探和生产公司，不再是综合性大型企业。并且在退出委内瑞拉后，它将其长期重油投资组合的很大一部分转向了加拿大。因此，它可能对重新进入该国没有兴趣。</p>
<h3><strong>为什么制裁仍然最重要</strong></h3>
<p>委内瑞拉的石油行业能多快复苏？这取决于讨论的是哪一层。</p>
<p>结构性损害需要多年才能修复。解除制裁无法改变这一点。在最佳情况下，委内瑞拉的石油生产可能需要十年或更长时间才能恢复到 2007 年之前的水平。</p>
<p>但因商业和物流原因停产的油桶如果限制放松，可以更快恢复。这就是制裁仍然是变数的原因。它们不会使委内瑞拉恢复到每日三百万桶的水平，但可能会解锁显著的短期增长。</p>
<p>从长远来看，复苏需要政治稳定、可信的合同和数十亿美元的投资。在短期内，最重要的变量更简单。</p>
<p>委内瑞拉的即时石油未来与其地质条件关系不大，而在于制裁环境是否发生变化。</p>
<hr/>
<p><em>更多来自该作者的作品：</em></p>
<p>石油如何塑造委内瑞拉的经济与政治崩溃</p>
<p>2026 年能源展望：当石油充足而电力稀缺时</p>
<p>2025 年十大能源故事</p>

雪佛龙

<p>委内瑞拉的石油产业复苏依赖于制裁和结构性损害。尽管拥有世界上最大的石油储备，但由于多年的管理不善以及自 2019 年以来美国制裁的影响，产量急剧下降。虽然结构性问题需要数年才能解决，但放宽制裁可能会导致短期内产量增加。雪佛龙在维持业务的情况下，如果制裁被解除，可以迅速扩大运营，而康菲石油由于过去的征用面临挑战。总体而言，制裁是委内瑞拉石油行业潜在反弹的关键因素</p>

<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2015/07/17/00/37/pump-jack-848300_960_720.jpg" alt="" original-src="https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2015/07/17/00/37/pump-jack-848300_960_720.jpg"/></p>
<p><em>Image Source: Pixabay</em></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><em>图片来源：Pixabay</em></p>
</div><p>After the latest political shock in Venezuela, speculation has surged over the prospects of a recovery for the country’s oil industry. On paper, Venezuela still holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves. In reality, production remains a fraction of what it once was.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在委内瑞拉最新的政治震荡之后，关于该国石油行业复苏前景的猜测激增。从纸面上看，委内瑞拉仍然拥有世界上最大的已探明石油储量。实际上，产量仍然只是曾经的一个小部分。</p>
</div><p>How quickly Venezuela’s oil production ramps up will depend in part on what happens with sanctions. But Venezuela’s collapse did not begin with sanctions, nor can sanctions relief alone undo the damage. However, that could have a significant short-term effect.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>委内瑞拉的石油生产恢复速度在一定程度上将取决于制裁的情况。但委内瑞拉的崩溃并不是从制裁开始的，单靠解除制裁也无法弥补损失。然而，这可能会在短期内产生显著影响。</p>
</div><p>The country’s oil decline has two primary elements. One is structural damage that began years earlier and will take many years to repair. The other is sanctions-driven disruption that arrived later and shut in barrels much more quickly. Understanding the difference is essential to understanding what might come next, and why sanctions will likely impact Venezuela’s oil future in the near-term.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>该国石油衰退有两个主要因素。一是早在几年前就开始的结构性损害，这需要许多年才能修复。另一个是后来的制裁驱动的干扰，导致产量迅速下降。理解这两者之间的区别对于理解接下来可能发生的事情至关重要，也解释了为什么制裁可能会在短期内影响委内瑞拉的石油未来。</p>
</div><h3><strong>The Structural Collapse Came First</strong></h3>
<div class="lb-trans"><h3><strong>结构性崩溃首先发生</strong></h3>
</div><p>Venezuela’s oil decline traces back to the 2007 expropriations. That year, the government forced foreign operators into minority positions and seized assets when companies such as ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil rejected the new terms.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>委内瑞拉的石油衰退可以追溯到 2007 年的征用。那一年，政府迫使外国运营商处于少数股东地位，并在康菲石油和埃克森美孚等公司拒绝新条款时没收资产。</p>
</div><p>These were not simple oil fields. The Orinoco Belt is among the most technically demanding heavy oil regions in the world. Sustaining production requires advanced reservoir management, steady diluent supply, and multi-billion-dollar upgraders to make the crude usable. When foreign operators left, they took future investment capital, technical expertise, operational discipline, and project management systems.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这些并不是简单的油田。奥里诺科带是世界上技术要求最高的重油地区之一。维持生产需要先进的油藏管理、稳定的稀释剂供应和数十亿美元的升级设施来使原油可用。当外国运营商离开时，他们带走了未来的投资资本、技术专长、运营纪律和项目管理系统。</p>
</div><p>Venezuela’s state‑owned oil company, PDVSA, was awarded the assets but not the capabilities. Maintenance deteriorated. Equipment failed. Skilled workers left. Production began falling years before oil sanctions were imposed, a trend clearly visible in the following graphic.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>委内瑞拉国有石油公司 PDVSA 获得了这些资产，但并没有获得相应的能力。维护工作恶化，设备故障，技术工人离开。生产在石油制裁实施之前的几年就开始下降，这一趋势在以下图表中清晰可见。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://www.rrapier.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Venezuelas-Oil-Production-1024x743.png" alt="" original-src="https://www.rrapier.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Venezuelas-Oil-Production-1024x743.png"/></p>
<p>The steep decline in Venezuela’s oil production after 2015 was driven by the internal collapse of PDVSA, which was marked by political purges, mismanagement, loss of technical staff, and the deterioration of critical infrastructure.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>2015 年后，委内瑞拉石油生产的急剧下降是由于 PDVSA 的内部崩溃，这一崩溃以政治清洗、管理不善、技术人员流失和关键基础设施恶化为标志。</p>
</div><p>This damage cannot be reversed quickly. Rebuilding infrastructure and restoring a technical workforce is a multi-year effort even under stable political conditions.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这种损害无法迅速逆转。即使在政治稳定的情况下，重建基础设施和恢复技术劳动力也是一项需要多年的工作。</p>
</div><h3><strong>Sanctions Hit Later and Accelerated the Decline</strong></h3>
<div class="lb-trans"><h3><strong>制裁稍后到来并加速了衰退</strong></h3>
</div><p>The second layer arrived in January 2019, when the United States sanctioned PDVSA directly. Earlier sanctions targeted individuals and had little impact on production. The 2019 measures were different.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>第二层制裁于 2019 年 1 月到来，美国直接制裁了 PDVSA。早期的制裁针对个人，对生产几乎没有影响。2019 年的措施则有所不同。</p>
</div><p>They cut off Venezuela’s largest customer, restricted payments, blocked diluent imports, and complicated shipping and insurance. Heavy oil that could have been produced became stranded almost overnight.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>它们切断了委内瑞拉最大的客户，限制了支付，阻碍了稀释剂进口，并使运输和保险变得复杂。原本可以生产的重油几乎在一夜之间被困住。</p>
</div><p>Without diluent, crude could not move. Without U.S. refiners, Venezuela lost its most natural market. Without reliable payment channels, joint ventures struggled to operate.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>没有稀释剂，原油无法运输。没有美国炼油厂，委内瑞拉失去了最自然的市场。没有可靠的支付渠道，合资企业难以运营。</p>
</div><p>By late 2025, U.S. sanctions and shipping restrictions had severely disrupted Venezuela’s exports. Reuters reported that tanker movements nearly halted after U.S. interdictions, and Vortexa data showed a 36% drop in December alone.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>到 2025 年底，美国的制裁和运输限制严重干扰了委内瑞拉的出口。路透社报道，在美国的干预后，油轮的移动几乎停止，而 Vortexa 的数据则显示仅在 12 月就下降了 36%。</p>
</div><p>But this is the portion of the decline that could reverse faster. Wells shut in for commercial reasons can restart. Joint ventures can normalize operations. Diluent flows can resume. That would not restore Venezuela to its former peak, but it could produce a meaningful short-term increase.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但这是可以更快逆转的衰退部分。因商业原因停产的油井可以重新启动。合资企业可以恢复正常运营。稀释剂的流动可以恢复。这不会使委内瑞拉恢复到以前的高峰，但可能会带来显著的短期增长。</p>
</div><h3><strong>Chevron’s Structural Advantage</strong></h3>
<div class="lb-trans"><h3><strong>雪佛龙的结构优势</strong></h3>
</div><p>If sanctions ease, Chevron stands apart. It is the only major U.S. oil company that never fully exited Venezuela. Through exemptions, Chevron maintained joint ventures, kept personnel on the ground, and preserved operational continuity.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>如果制裁放松，雪佛龙将独树一帜。它是唯一一家从未完全退出委内瑞拉的主要美国石油公司。通过豁免，雪佛龙维持了合资企业，保留了现场人员，并保持了运营连续性。</p>
</div><p>That continuity is important. Chevron does not need to renegotiate entry terms or rebuild relationships. It needs a clearer commercial framework. But if sanctions ease, Chevron can scale faster than any other Western operator because it never lost its foothold.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这种连续性很重要。雪佛龙不需要重新谈判入场条款或重建关系。它需要一个更清晰的商业框架。但如果制裁放松，雪佛龙可以比任何其他西方运营商更快地扩大规模，因为它从未失去立足点。</p>
</div><h3><strong>ConocoPhillips and the Compensation Question</strong></h3>
<div class="lb-trans"><h3><strong>康菲石油与赔偿问题</strong></h3>
</div><p>ConocoPhillips occupies a very different position. It was expropriated in 2007 and later won an $8.7 billion arbitration award, plus interest, for seized investments in the Orinoco region.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>康菲石油的处境则截然不同。它在 2007 年被征用，后来因在奥里诺科地区被没收的投资获得了 87 亿美元的仲裁裁决及利息。</p>
</div><p>The ongoing Citgo sale is one pathway for recovery. If meaningful compensation is secured, re-entry becomes possible. ConocoPhillips was once a top-tier Orinoco operator, but unlike Chevron, it would be rebuilding from the ground up.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>正在进行的 Citgo 出售是复苏的一条途径。如果能够获得有意义的赔偿，重新进入市场就成为可能。康菲石油曾是奥里诺科地区的顶级运营商，但与雪佛龙不同，它将从零开始重建。</p>
</div><p>Further, ConocoPhillips is a fundamentally different company today than it was in 2007. After the 2012 spinoff of Phillips 66, ConocoPhillips became a pure‑play exploration and production company, no longer an integrated major. And it redirected a significant portion of its long‑cycle, heavy‑oil investment portfolio toward Canada after exiting Venezuela. It may therefore have no interest in re-entering the country.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>此外，康菲石油今天与 2007 年相比是一个根本不同的公司。在 2012 年剥离 Phillips 66 后，康菲石油成为一家纯粹的勘探和生产公司，不再是综合性大型企业。并且在退出委内瑞拉后，它将其长期重油投资组合的很大一部分转向了加拿大。因此，它可能对重新进入该国没有兴趣。</p>
</div><h3><strong>Why Sanctions Still Matter Most</strong></h3>
<div class="lb-trans"><h3><strong>为什么制裁仍然最重要</strong></h3>
</div><p>How quickly could Venezuela’s oil sector rebound? It depends on which layer is being discussed.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>委内瑞拉的石油行业能多快复苏？这取决于讨论的是哪一层。</p>
</div><p>Structural damage will take years to repair. Sanctions relief cannot change that. It will likely take a decade or more in the best-case scenario for Venezuela’s oil production to rebound to pre-2007 levels.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>结构性损害需要多年才能修复。解除制裁无法改变这一点。在最佳情况下，委内瑞拉的石油生产可能需要十年或更长时间才能恢复到 2007 年之前的水平。</p>
</div><p>But barrels shut in for commercial and logistical reasons could return much faster if restrictions ease. That is why sanctions remain the wildcard. They will not restore Venezuela to three million barrels per day, but they could unlock a noticeable short-term increase.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但因商业和物流原因停产的油桶如果限制放松，可以更快恢复。这就是制裁仍然是变数的原因。它们不会使委内瑞拉恢复到每日三百万桶的水平，但可能会解锁显著的短期增长。</p>
</div><p>Over the long term, recovery requires political stability, credible contracts, and tens of billions in investment. In the near term, the most important variable is simpler.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>从长远来看，复苏需要政治稳定、可信的合同和数十亿美元的投资。在短期内，最重要的变量更简单。</p>
</div><p>Venezuela’s immediate oil future hinges less on geology than on whether the sanctions landscape changes.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>委内瑞拉的即时石油未来与其地质条件关系不大，而在于制裁环境是否发生变化。</p>
</div><hr/>
<div class="lb-trans"><hr/>
</div><p><em>More By This Author:</em></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><em>更多来自该作者的作品：</em></p>
</div><p>How Oil Shaped Venezuela’s Economic And Political Collapse</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>石油如何塑造委内瑞拉的经济与政治崩溃</p>
</div><p>Energy Outlook 2026: When Oil Is Plentiful And Power Is Scarce</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>2026 年能源展望：当石油充足而电力稀缺时</p>
</div><p>The Top 10 Energy Stories Of 2025</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>2025 年十大能源故事</p>
</div>

制裁是影响委内瑞拉石油复苏的关键因素