<p>2026 年 2 月 6 日，原本被认为是春节前的普通一天，比特币在早晨暴跌，跌至接近 60,000 美元的低点。当天晚上，包括中国人民银行、国家发展和改革委员会、工业和信息化部、公安部、市场监管总局、国家金融监管总局、中国证券监督管理委员会和国家外汇管理局在内的八个部门联合发布了《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币相关风险的通知》（银发〔2026〕42 号，以下简称 “2.6 通知”）。&#34;2.6&#34;注定将载入虚拟货币的历史，似乎为此次剧烈下跌提供了理由。1. 与之前的监管文件如 94 公告和 924 通知不同，2.6 通知在最后增加了一条条款：本通知自发布之日起生效。中国人民银行及其他十个部门发布的《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币交易和投机风险的通知》（银发〔2021〕237 号）在此被废止。这是虚拟货币监管历史上首次废止之前的监管文件。在去年年底的金融街论坛上，中国人民银行行长潘功胜特别提到稳定币和 RWA，并强调自 2017 年以来的监管政策仍然有效。现在，随着八个部门联合发布文件废止 “924 通知”，早期的监管文件 “94 公告” 自然也应当被废止。从标题来看，924 通知的标题为《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币交易和投机风险的通知》，强调交易和投机的风险。而 2.6 通知则简单总结为 “与虚拟货币相关的风险”，范围显著更广。此外，关于发布机构，与涉及十个部门的 924 通知相比，2.6 通知缺少了最高人民检察院和最高人民法院，这让人颇感意外。自 2024 年以来，最高人民检察院和最高人民法院相继介入，以调查处理虚拟货币案件为切入点，开展了大量工作。在我看来，关于处理虚拟货币案件的法律政策可能是最早出台的。中央政法委员会的工作会议明确表示需要对虚拟货币进行前瞻性研究和立法，使得最高人民法院和最高人民检察院缺席此次会议更显得令人惊讶。然而，2 月 6 日的通知也明确指出，“在与中国网络空间管理局、最高人民法院和最高人民检察院达成一致，并经国务院批准后”，这一表述在以往的虚拟货币监管文件中并未出现。具体原因和意图目前难以解读和分析。我的理解是，虽然相关内容原则上达成一致，但具体措辞可能尚未最终确定。3. 与以往声明相比，2.6 通知最大的突破在于首次明确指出 “与法定货币挂钩的稳定币有效地履行了法定货币在流通中的某些功能。未经相关部门依法批准，任何国内外实体或个人不得在境外发行与人民币挂钩的稳定币。” 这句话的后半部分不难理解，字面意思清晰。最关键的部分是前半部分，“有效履行了法定货币的某些功能”。作为一名刑事辩护律师，我最担心的是，在司法实践中，这是否会被用作将法定货币与稳定币之间的交换视为 “变相外汇交易” 的依据。需要理解的是，变相外汇交易构成非法经营罪，可处以一至五倍的非法所得罚款，且非法所得必须上缴国库。该条款针对的是场外交易（OTC）。关键在于实施是否会被扭曲、偏离或过度解读。如果措施过于强硬，整个 OTC 行业的风险将激增。众所周知，OTC 是虚拟货币领域不可或缺的行业。关于 RWA（实时担保），简而言之，在中国境内是严格禁止的，国内实体被严格禁止参与。外国公司和个人也被禁止参与或为国内实体提供服务。然而，留有一个在海外参与的漏洞。中国证券监督管理委员会（CSRC）发布了《境内资产在境外发行资产支持证券代币的监管指引》，后续将进行解读。5. 与以往的监管文件相比，2.6 通知在规范和完善工作机制、加强风险监测、预防和处置方面投入了更多的篇幅。首先，遵循 “8+3” 原则，由中央政府对地方进行监督。八个部门与中国网络空间管理局、最高人民检察院和最高人民法院共同为各地区开展与虚拟货币相关的非法金融活动的风险防范和处置工作提供总体指导。其次，加强地方实施，形成中央与地方协调、纵向与横向结合的工作模式，积极防范和妥善处理问题，维护经济金融秩序和社会稳定。第三，加强风险监测，持续改善监测技术和系统支持，增强跨部门数据分析和共享，建立和完善信息共享和交叉验证机制，确保省级政府充分利用地方监测和预警机制。地方金融管理部门应与国务院金融管理部门的分支机构和机构，以及网络空间管理和公安等部门有效协调线上监测、线下调查和资金监测，建立快速响应机制，以高效准确地识别、调查和处理问题。科技公司可能会迎来业务的繁荣。第四，加强对金融、中介和技术服务机构的管理，禁止将虚拟货币及相关金融产品纳入抵押范围。加强对互联网信息内容和访问的管理，为相关调查和侦查工作提供技术支持和协助。加强对商业实体的注册和广告管理。继续整治虚拟货币 “挖矿” 活动，关闭现有的并严格禁止新的。严厉打击相关非法金融活动，并将涉嫌犯罪的移交司法机关依法处理。严厉打击与虚拟货币及真实世界资产代币化相关的非法和犯罪活动，如诈骗、洗钱、非法经营、传销和非法募资，以及以虚拟货币和真实世界资产代币化为幌子的相关非法和犯罪活动。6. 在海外开展相关业务的国内实体本质上受到一定限制。首先，他们不能发行虚拟货币，即使是在海外。其次，参与 RWA（实时担保）的国内实体应根据 “同业、同风险、同规则” 的原则接受监管。第三，提供 RWA 服务的国内金融机构的海外子公司和分支机构必须遵守某些要求；这是一个漏洞，但必须明确的是，这个漏洞是为金融机构保留的。7. 与以往的监管政策相比，2.6 通知的格式增加了 “法律责任”，字面意思并不复杂，不会详细解读。</p>

<p>2026 年 2 月 6 日，比特币大幅下跌，恰逢八个中国监管机构发布《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币相关风险的通知》。该通知立即生效，废除了之前的规定，并扩大了对虚拟货币的风险管理范围。值得注意的是，通知中指出，与法定货币挂钩的稳定币可以履行法定货币的某些功能，这引发了对交易潜在法律影响的担忧。通知中缺少最高人民法院和检察院的身影也颇具意义，暗示着关于虚拟货币监管的持续讨论</p>

<p>On February 6, 2026, what was initially thought to be an ordinary day before the Lunar New Year saw Bitcoin plummet in the morning, reaching a low near the $60,000 mark. That evening, eight departments, including the People's Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the State Financial Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, jointly issued the &#34;Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks Related to Virtual Currencies&#34; (Yinfa [2026] No. 42, hereinafter referred to as the &#34;2.6 Notice&#34;). &#34;2.6&#34; is destined to be recorded in the history of virtual currencies, and it seems to have provided the reason for this sharp drop. 1. Unlike previous regulatory documents such as the 94 Announcement and the 924 Notice, the 2.6 Notice added a clause at the end: This notice shall take effect from the date of its issuance. The &#34;Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks of Virtual Currency Trading and Speculation&#34; (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) issued by the People's Bank of China and ten other departments is hereby repealed. This is the first time in the history of virtual currency regulation that a previous regulatory document has been repealed. At the Financial Street Forum at the end of last year, Pan Gongsheng, Governor of the People's Bank of China, specifically mentioned stablecoins and RWA, and emphasized that the regulatory policies since 2017 remain effective. Now, with eight departments jointly issuing a document repealing the &#34;924 Notice,&#34; the earlier regulatory document, the &#34;94 Announcement,&#34; should naturally also be repealed. Judging from the titles, the 924 Notice is titled &#34;Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks of Virtual Currency Trading and Speculation,&#34; emphasizing the risks of trading and speculation. The 2.6 Notice, on the other hand, is simply summarized as &#34;Risks Related to Virtual Currencies,&#34; with a significantly broader scope. Furthermore, regarding the issuing authorities, compared to the 924 Notice involving ten departments, the 2.6 Notice lacks the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court, which was quite unexpected. Since 2024, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court have successively intervened, using the investigation of the handling of virtual currency cases as a starting point, and have carried out a great deal of work. In my view, the legal policies regarding the handling of virtual currency cases are likely to be among the earliest to be promulgated. The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission's working conference explicitly stated the need for forward-looking research and legislation on virtual currencies, making the absence of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate from this meeting all the more surprising. However, the February 6th notice also explicitly states, &#34;After reaching an agreement with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council,&#34; a statement not seen in previous virtual currency regulatory documents. The specific reasons and intentions are currently difficult to interpret and analyze. My understanding is that while the relevant content is agreed upon in principle, the specific wording may not have been finalized yet. 3. Compared to previous statements, the biggest breakthrough in Notice 2.6 is that it explicitly states for the first time that &#34;stablecoins pegged to legal tender effectively fulfill some of the functions of legal tender in circulation. Without the consent of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations, no domestic or foreign entity or individual may issue stablecoins pegged to RMB overseas.&#34; The second half of this sentence is not difficult to understand; the literal meaning is clear. The most crucial part is the first half, &#34;effectively fulfilling some of the functions of legal tender.&#34; As a criminal defense lawyer, my biggest concern is whether, in judicial practice, this will be used as a basis to consider the exchange between legal tender and stablecoins as &#34;disguised foreign exchange trading.&#34; It's important to understand that disguised foreign exchange trading constitutes the crime of illegal business operations, which can be punished with a fine of one to five times the illegal gains, and the illegal gains must be turned over to the national treasury. This provision targets OTC (over-the-counter) trading. The key is whether the implementation will be distorted, deviate from, or overstretched. If the measures are too forceful, the risks to the entire OTC industry will surge. As we all know, OTC is an indispensable industry in the virtual currency field. Regarding RWA (Real-Time Exchange), in short, it is strictly prohibited within China, and domestic entities are strictly prohibited from engaging in it. Foreign companies and individuals are also prohibited from engaging in or providing services to domestic entities. However, a loophole has been left for engaging in it overseas. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has issued the &#34;Regulatory Guidelines on the Issuance of Asset-Backed Securities Tokens Overseas by Domestic Assets,&#34; which will be interpreted later. 5. Compared to previous regulatory documents, Notice 2.6 devotes more space to standardizing and improving working mechanisms, strengthening risk monitoring, prevention, and handling. Firstly, it follows the &#34;8+3&#34; principle, with the central government overseeing local authorities. Eight departments, together with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Supreme People's Court, are providing overall guidance to various regions in carrying out risk prevention and handling work related to illegal financial activities involving virtual currencies. Second, strengthen local implementation, forming a working pattern of central-local coordination and combined vertical and horizontal approaches to actively prevent and properly handle issues, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability. Third, strengthen risk monitoring, continuously improve monitoring technologies and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish and improve information sharing and cross-verification mechanisms, and ensure that provincial governments fully utilize local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial management departments, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial management departments, as well as departments such as cyberspace administration and public security, should effectively coordinate online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund monitoring to establish a rapid response mechanism for efficient and accurate identification, investigation, and handling. Technology companies may be poised for a boom in business. Fourthly, strengthen the management of financial, intermediary, and technology service institutions, and prohibit the inclusion of virtual currencies and related financial products in the scope of collateral. Strengthen the management of internet information content and access, and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and investigative work. Strengthen the registration and advertising management of business entities. Continue to rectify virtual currency &#34;mining&#34; activities. Close existing ones and strictly prohibit new ones. Severely crack down on related illegal financial activities, and transfer those suspected of crimes to judicial organs for handling according to law. Severely crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, and illegal fundraising, as well as related illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets. 6. Domestic entities conducting related business overseas are inherently subject to certain restrictions. First, they cannot issue virtual currencies, even overseas. Second, domestic entities engaging in RWA (Real-Time Warranty) should be subject to regulation according to the principle of &#34;same business, same risk, same rules.&#34; Third, overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing RWA services overseas must comply with certain requirements; this is a loophole, but it must be clear that this loophole is reserved for financial institutions. 7. Compared to previous regulatory policies, the format of Notice 2.6 adds &#34;legal liability,&#34; the literal meaning of which is not complicated and will not be interpreted in detail.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>2026 年 2 月 6 日，原本被认为是春节前的普通一天，比特币在早晨暴跌，跌至接近 60,000 美元的低点。当天晚上，包括中国人民银行、国家发展和改革委员会、工业和信息化部、公安部、市场监管总局、国家金融监管总局、中国证券监督管理委员会和国家外汇管理局在内的八个部门联合发布了《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币相关风险的通知》（银发〔2026〕42 号，以下简称 “2.6 通知”）。&#34;2.6&#34;注定将载入虚拟货币的历史，似乎为此次剧烈下跌提供了理由。1. 与之前的监管文件如 94 公告和 924 通知不同，2.6 通知在最后增加了一条条款：本通知自发布之日起生效。中国人民银行及其他十个部门发布的《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币交易和投机风险的通知》（银发〔2021〕237 号）在此被废止。这是虚拟货币监管历史上首次废止之前的监管文件。在去年年底的金融街论坛上，中国人民银行行长潘功胜特别提到稳定币和 RWA，并强调自 2017 年以来的监管政策仍然有效。现在，随着八个部门联合发布文件废止 “924 通知”，早期的监管文件 “94 公告” 自然也应当被废止。从标题来看，924 通知的标题为《进一步防范和处置虚拟货币交易和投机风险的通知》，强调交易和投机的风险。而 2.6 通知则简单总结为 “与虚拟货币相关的风险”，范围显著更广。此外，关于发布机构，与涉及十个部门的 924 通知相比，2.6 通知缺少了最高人民检察院和最高人民法院，这让人颇感意外。自 2024 年以来，最高人民检察院和最高人民法院相继介入，以调查处理虚拟货币案件为切入点，开展了大量工作。在我看来，关于处理虚拟货币案件的法律政策可能是最早出台的。中央政法委员会的工作会议明确表示需要对虚拟货币进行前瞻性研究和立法，使得最高人民法院和最高人民检察院缺席此次会议更显得令人惊讶。然而，2 月 6 日的通知也明确指出，“在与中国网络空间管理局、最高人民法院和最高人民检察院达成一致，并经国务院批准后”，这一表述在以往的虚拟货币监管文件中并未出现。具体原因和意图目前难以解读和分析。我的理解是，虽然相关内容原则上达成一致，但具体措辞可能尚未最终确定。3. 与以往声明相比，2.6 通知最大的突破在于首次明确指出 “与法定货币挂钩的稳定币有效地履行了法定货币在流通中的某些功能。未经相关部门依法批准，任何国内外实体或个人不得在境外发行与人民币挂钩的稳定币。” 这句话的后半部分不难理解，字面意思清晰。最关键的部分是前半部分，“有效履行了法定货币的某些功能”。作为一名刑事辩护律师，我最担心的是，在司法实践中，这是否会被用作将法定货币与稳定币之间的交换视为 “变相外汇交易” 的依据。需要理解的是，变相外汇交易构成非法经营罪，可处以一至五倍的非法所得罚款，且非法所得必须上缴国库。该条款针对的是场外交易（OTC）。关键在于实施是否会被扭曲、偏离或过度解读。如果措施过于强硬，整个 OTC 行业的风险将激增。众所周知，OTC 是虚拟货币领域不可或缺的行业。关于 RWA（实时担保），简而言之，在中国境内是严格禁止的，国内实体被严格禁止参与。外国公司和个人也被禁止参与或为国内实体提供服务。然而，留有一个在海外参与的漏洞。中国证券监督管理委员会（CSRC）发布了《境内资产在境外发行资产支持证券代币的监管指引》，后续将进行解读。5. 与以往的监管文件相比，2.6 通知在规范和完善工作机制、加强风险监测、预防和处置方面投入了更多的篇幅。首先，遵循 “8+3” 原则，由中央政府对地方进行监督。八个部门与中国网络空间管理局、最高人民检察院和最高人民法院共同为各地区开展与虚拟货币相关的非法金融活动的风险防范和处置工作提供总体指导。其次，加强地方实施，形成中央与地方协调、纵向与横向结合的工作模式，积极防范和妥善处理问题，维护经济金融秩序和社会稳定。第三，加强风险监测，持续改善监测技术和系统支持，增强跨部门数据分析和共享，建立和完善信息共享和交叉验证机制，确保省级政府充分利用地方监测和预警机制。地方金融管理部门应与国务院金融管理部门的分支机构和机构，以及网络空间管理和公安等部门有效协调线上监测、线下调查和资金监测，建立快速响应机制，以高效准确地识别、调查和处理问题。科技公司可能会迎来业务的繁荣。第四，加强对金融、中介和技术服务机构的管理，禁止将虚拟货币及相关金融产品纳入抵押范围。加强对互联网信息内容和访问的管理，为相关调查和侦查工作提供技术支持和协助。加强对商业实体的注册和广告管理。继续整治虚拟货币 “挖矿” 活动，关闭现有的并严格禁止新的。严厉打击相关非法金融活动，并将涉嫌犯罪的移交司法机关依法处理。严厉打击与虚拟货币及真实世界资产代币化相关的非法和犯罪活动，如诈骗、洗钱、非法经营、传销和非法募资，以及以虚拟货币和真实世界资产代币化为幌子的相关非法和犯罪活动。6. 在海外开展相关业务的国内实体本质上受到一定限制。首先，他们不能发行虚拟货币，即使是在海外。其次，参与 RWA（实时担保）的国内实体应根据 “同业、同风险、同规则” 的原则接受监管。第三，提供 RWA 服务的国内金融机构的海外子公司和分支机构必须遵守某些要求；这是一个漏洞，但必须明确的是，这个漏洞是为金融机构保留的。7. 与以往的监管政策相比，2.6 通知的格式增加了 “法律责任”，字面意思并不复杂，不会详细解读。</p>
</div>

Detailed Explanation of the "Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks Related to Virtual Currencies"

- 2026 年 2 月 6 日，比特币大跌至 60,000 美元。  
- 八个部门联合发布《2.6 通知》，废止此前的监管文件。  
- 新政策对虚拟货币风险防控及非法金融活动管理进行了强化。

关于进一步防范和处理虚拟货币相关风险的通知的详细解释