<p>伦敦：中国 2026 年的经济增长目标为 4.5% 至 5%，是几十年来最低的，脱离了过去三年疫情后 5% 的基准。这被广泛解读为一个重要的时刻。这个目标是在全国两会期间公布的，这是中国一年一度最大的政治集会，同时还公布了世界第二大经济体的第十五个五年规划的细节，这一点非常重要。这不仅仅是年度的调整，而是一个战略框架的开场白。但需要注意的数字实际上是 2% 到 3%。这是 Enodo Economics 对中国潜在增长率的估计——经济在不产生通胀压力的情况下可以扩张的速度。这个数字与官方目标之间的差距反映了北京所面临的困境，以及它仍需走的路。潜在增长为何较低潜在增长由经济的长期生产能力决定，这取决于劳动力、资本投资和生产率的增长。在中国的情况下，前两者同时对增长产生了负面影响，这使得一切都寄托在第三个因素上。中国的劳动力供应已经在缩减。自 2010 年代初以来，劳动年龄人口一直在下降，而全国总人口已经连续四年下降。随着年轻人进入劳动力市场的人数减少，人口老龄化，可用工人的池子逐渐缩小。这种不可逆转的人口结构变化减少了中国过去增长的一个关键驱动力，并且在未来几年内极难逆转。资本不太可能为增长提供太多支持。多年的重资产投资于房地产和基础设施使中国积累了大量未充分利用且回报率低的资产。消化这些过剩产能将需要时间。因此，新投资只会在边际上增加生产能力，而大量现有资本正在变得过时。这使得生产率增长成为唯一的引擎。北京对此心知肚明。第十五个五年规划将 “新质量生产力”——技术创新、先进制造、人工智能和数字化转型——置于其增长框架的中心。投资正被引导向半导体、量子技术、具身人工智能和下一代数字基础设施，核心数字经济目标是达到 GDP 的 12.5%。战略意图明确，中国在大规模执行产业政策方面的良好记录意味着这一雄心不应被忽视。实际上，我比大多数人更乐观。经济现状如何？但在建立世界级产业与产生足以抵消两个同时存在的结构性拖累的生产率增长之间存在差异。这种增长在历史上是异常的——可能，但不应作为基线预测。接近 5% 的目标似乎是政治妥协，而不是对现实的全面审视。它也指向一个很少有人预期的结果：通胀。一些分析师看到三年价格下跌，得出中国经济仍在远低于其产能运行，因此北京需要更大力度刺激以摆脱通缩的结论。这种推理可以理解，但具有误导性。可以这样想：一个从低迷中复苏的经济不会在一夜之间从疲弱转为强劲。在复苏过程中，价格停止快速下跌——通缩变得不那么严重，甚至在完全消失之前。这种缓和是信号。它表明经济正在接近或已经达到其极限——而不是仍然需要更多的燃料。中国的通缩悄然结束这正是中国数据所显示的。生产者价格仍在下降，但幅度越来越小。核心消费价格在缓慢上升。以 GDP 平减指数衡量的通缩正在缩小。综合来看，这些趋势表明经济在 2 月份的数据到来之前已经在或接近满负荷运行。中国国家统计局的最新数据进一步证实了这一点。关键的信号不在于价格水平，而在于价格方向的变化。2 月份 CPI 同比增长 1.3%——三年来的最高水平，比 1 月份的 0.2% 大幅上升。核心通胀飙升至 1.8%——自 2019 年 3 月以来的最高水平。2 月份生产者价格同比下降 0.9%，较 1 月份的 1.4% 降幅大幅缩小。工厂门口的通缩正在缓解。从生产者到消费者价格的传导链条开始填补。春节的需求和旅行发挥了作用。但这个节日每年都会到来。不同的是它所放大的潜在趋势。中国的通缩时代并不是以轰鸣声结束，而是以一种渐进的、几乎看不见的潮流转变结束——只有在观察变化率而不是水平时才能看出。伊朗的冲突预计将使油价保持高位，并进一步对生产者和消费者价格施加上行压力——但国内动态已经在发挥作用。稳定还是衰退？在明显的迹象表明正在走出通缩螺旋的情况下，中国最低的增长目标应被视为一个正在稳定的成熟经济，还是一个正在衰退并降低增长预期的经济？这两种框架都不完全适用。中国并没有衰退。其生产能力正在重新定向，而不是耗尽，第十五个五年规划中蕴含的雄心是真实的。但这也不是简单的稳定。这是向更慢、更平衡增长的结构性转型的开始——这一转型的全部影响北京尚未完全接受。这在新目标附加的 “努力实践更好” 这一警告中显而易见。这一逃生条款表明领导层仍然倾向于在增长令人失望时寻求旧的刺激手册。更深层的讽刺是，更紧迫的风险并不是中国经济放缓过多，而是过热。市场尚未建立一个框架，以应对中国在通胀而非通缩方面带来的意外。2 月份的数据表明，他们应该开始。戴安娜·乔伊列娃是 Enodo Economics 的创始人兼首席经济学家，也是全球宏观经济、中国及美中战略竞争的主题演讲者。她还是亚洲协会政策研究所中国分析中心的高级研究员。</p>

上证指数

中概股 ETF - PowerShares

沪深300

<p>中国将 2026 年的经济增长目标设定为 4.5% 至 5%，这是几十年来的最低水平，反映出与之前 5% 的基准的显著变化。分析师估计，由于劳动力减少和资本未充分利用，该国的潜在增长率仅为 2% 至 3%。第十五个五年规划强调技术创新和数字转型作为主要增长动力。最近的数据表明，通缩逐渐结束，消费者价格上涨暗示经济可能接近满负荷运转，尽管仍面临结构性挑战</p>

<p>LONDON: China’s 2026 economic growth target of 4.5 to 5 per cent is its lowest in decades, moving off the 5 per cent anchor of the past three post-pandemic years. This has been widely read as a moment of reckoning. That the target was unveiled during the Two Sessions , China’s biggest annual political gathering, alongside details of the 15th Five-Year Plan for the world’s second-largest economy is important context. This is not just an annual calibration but the opening statement of a strategic framework. But the number to note is actually 2 to 3 per cent. That is Enodo Economics’ estimate of China’s potential growth rate - the speed at which the economy can expand without generating inflation pressure. The gap between that figure and the official target captures the bind Beijing is in, and how far it still has to travel.WHY POTENTIAL GROWTH IS LOWER Potential growth is determined by the economy’s long-run productive capacity, which depends on growth in the labour force, capital investments and productivity. In China’s case, the first two are working against growth simultaneously, which leaves everything riding on the third. China’s labour supply is already shrinking. The working-age population has been declining since the early 2010s, and the country’s total population has now fallen for four consecutive years. As fewer young people enter the labour market and the population ages, the pool of available workers gradually contracts. The inexorable demographic shift has reduced one of the key drivers of China’s past growth and is extremely hard to reverse in the next few years. Capital is unlikely to provide much support to growth. Years of heavy investment in property and infrastructure have left China with a vast stock of underutilised and often low-return assets. Absorbing this excess capacity will take time. New investment therefore adds to productive capacity only at the margin, while a large share of existing capital is becoming obsolete. That leaves productivity growth as the only engine. Beijing knows this. The 15th Five-Year Plan places “new quality productive forces” – technological innovation, advanced manufacturing, AI and digital transformation – at the centre of its growth framework. Investment is being directed toward semiconductors, quantum technology, embodied AI and next-generation digital infrastructure, with the core digital economy targeted to reach 12.5 per cent of GDP. The strategic intent is clear, and China’s track record of executing industrial policy at scale means the ambition should not be dismissed. Indeed, I am more optimistic than most. WHERE IS THE ECONOMY NOW? But there is a difference between building world-class industries and generating productivity gains large enough to offset two simultaneous structural drags. Growth of that kind would be historically exceptional – possible, but not something to embed in a baseline forecast. A target near 5 per cent seems a political compromise rather than a full reckoning with that reality. It also points toward an outcome very few are expecting: inflation. Some analysts look at three years of falling prices and conclude that China's economy must still be running well below its capacity and that Beijing therefore needs to stimulate harder to escape deflation. That reasoning is understandable but misleading. Think of it this way: An economy emerging from a slump does not flip overnight from weak to strong. As it recovers, prices stop falling as fast – deflation becomes less severe, even before it disappears altogether. That easing is the signal. It says the economy is approaching, or has already reached, its limits – not that it still needs more fuel. CHINA’S DEFLATION IS QUIETLY ENDING That is precisely what China's data has been showing. Producer prices were still falling, but by less and less. Core consumer prices were creeping higher. Deflation, measured by the GDP deflator, was narrowing. Taken together, these trends pointed to an economy already running at or close to full capacity even before February's figures arrived. The latest data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics adds to the evidence. The key signal lies not in the level of prices but in the change in their direction. February CPI came in at 1.3 per cent year-on-year - a three-year high and a sharp jump from 0.2 per cent in January. Core inflation surged to 1.8 per cent - its highest reading since March 2019. Producer prices fell 0.9 per cent year-on-year in February, narrowing sharply from the 1.4 per cent decline in January. Factory-gate deflation is easing. The pipeline from producer to consumer prices is beginning to fill. Chinese New Year demand and travel played a role. But this festive season comes every year. What is different is the underlying trend it has been amplifying. China’s deflationary era is not ending with a bang but with a gradual, almost invisible turning of the tide - visible only if you were watching the rate of change rather than the level. The conflict in Iran is expected to keep oil prices elevated and add further upward pressure on producer and consumer prices - but the domestic dynamics were already doing the work. STABILISATION OR DECLINE? Amid clear signs of exiting the deflationary spiral, should China’s lowest growth target be seen as a maturing economy that is stabilising – or one that is in decline and dialing back on growth ambitions? Neither framing quite fits. China is not in decline. Its productive capacity is being redirected, not exhausted, and the ambition embedded in the 15th Five-Year Plan is genuine. But this is not simple stabilisation either. It is the beginning of a structural transition toward slower, more balanced growth – one whose full implications Beijing has not yet fully accepted. This is plain to see in the caveat “striving for better in practice” attached to the new target. That escape clause signals a leadership still tempted to reach for the old stimulus playbook the moment growth disappoints. The deeper irony is that the more pressing risk is not that China’s economy slows too much. It is that it overheats. Markets have yet to build a framework for a China that surprises on inflation rather than deflation. The February data suggests they should start. Diana Choyleva is founder and chief economist of Enodo Economics and a keynote speaker on global macroeconomics, China, and U.S.–China strategic competition. She is also a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>伦敦：中国 2026 年的经济增长目标为 4.5% 至 5%，是几十年来最低的，脱离了过去三年疫情后 5% 的基准。这被广泛解读为一个重要的时刻。这个目标是在全国两会期间公布的，这是中国一年一度最大的政治集会，同时还公布了世界第二大经济体的第十五个五年规划的细节，这一点非常重要。这不仅仅是年度的调整，而是一个战略框架的开场白。但需要注意的数字实际上是 2% 到 3%。这是 Enodo Economics 对中国潜在增长率的估计——经济在不产生通胀压力的情况下可以扩张的速度。这个数字与官方目标之间的差距反映了北京所面临的困境，以及它仍需走的路。潜在增长为何较低潜在增长由经济的长期生产能力决定，这取决于劳动力、资本投资和生产率的增长。在中国的情况下，前两者同时对增长产生了负面影响，这使得一切都寄托在第三个因素上。中国的劳动力供应已经在缩减。自 2010 年代初以来，劳动年龄人口一直在下降，而全国总人口已经连续四年下降。随着年轻人进入劳动力市场的人数减少，人口老龄化，可用工人的池子逐渐缩小。这种不可逆转的人口结构变化减少了中国过去增长的一个关键驱动力，并且在未来几年内极难逆转。资本不太可能为增长提供太多支持。多年的重资产投资于房地产和基础设施使中国积累了大量未充分利用且回报率低的资产。消化这些过剩产能将需要时间。因此，新投资只会在边际上增加生产能力，而大量现有资本正在变得过时。这使得生产率增长成为唯一的引擎。北京对此心知肚明。第十五个五年规划将 “新质量生产力”——技术创新、先进制造、人工智能和数字化转型——置于其增长框架的中心。投资正被引导向半导体、量子技术、具身人工智能和下一代数字基础设施，核心数字经济目标是达到 GDP 的 12.5%。战略意图明确，中国在大规模执行产业政策方面的良好记录意味着这一雄心不应被忽视。实际上，我比大多数人更乐观。经济现状如何？但在建立世界级产业与产生足以抵消两个同时存在的结构性拖累的生产率增长之间存在差异。这种增长在历史上是异常的——可能，但不应作为基线预测。接近 5% 的目标似乎是政治妥协，而不是对现实的全面审视。它也指向一个很少有人预期的结果：通胀。一些分析师看到三年价格下跌，得出中国经济仍在远低于其产能运行，因此北京需要更大力度刺激以摆脱通缩的结论。这种推理可以理解，但具有误导性。可以这样想：一个从低迷中复苏的经济不会在一夜之间从疲弱转为强劲。在复苏过程中，价格停止快速下跌——通缩变得不那么严重，甚至在完全消失之前。这种缓和是信号。它表明经济正在接近或已经达到其极限——而不是仍然需要更多的燃料。中国的通缩悄然结束这正是中国数据所显示的。生产者价格仍在下降，但幅度越来越小。核心消费价格在缓慢上升。以 GDP 平减指数衡量的通缩正在缩小。综合来看，这些趋势表明经济在 2 月份的数据到来之前已经在或接近满负荷运行。中国国家统计局的最新数据进一步证实了这一点。关键的信号不在于价格水平，而在于价格方向的变化。2 月份 CPI 同比增长 1.3%——三年来的最高水平，比 1 月份的 0.2% 大幅上升。核心通胀飙升至 1.8%——自 2019 年 3 月以来的最高水平。2 月份生产者价格同比下降 0.9%，较 1 月份的 1.4% 降幅大幅缩小。工厂门口的通缩正在缓解。从生产者到消费者价格的传导链条开始填补。春节的需求和旅行发挥了作用。但这个节日每年都会到来。不同的是它所放大的潜在趋势。中国的通缩时代并不是以轰鸣声结束，而是以一种渐进的、几乎看不见的潮流转变结束——只有在观察变化率而不是水平时才能看出。伊朗的冲突预计将使油价保持高位，并进一步对生产者和消费者价格施加上行压力——但国内动态已经在发挥作用。稳定还是衰退？在明显的迹象表明正在走出通缩螺旋的情况下，中国最低的增长目标应被视为一个正在稳定的成熟经济，还是一个正在衰退并降低增长预期的经济？这两种框架都不完全适用。中国并没有衰退。其生产能力正在重新定向，而不是耗尽，第十五个五年规划中蕴含的雄心是真实的。但这也不是简单的稳定。这是向更慢、更平衡增长的结构性转型的开始——这一转型的全部影响北京尚未完全接受。这在新目标附加的 “努力实践更好” 这一警告中显而易见。这一逃生条款表明领导层仍然倾向于在增长令人失望时寻求旧的刺激手册。更深层的讽刺是，更紧迫的风险并不是中国经济放缓过多，而是过热。市场尚未建立一个框架，以应对中国在通胀而非通缩方面带来的意外。2 月份的数据表明，他们应该开始。戴安娜·乔伊列娃是 Enodo Economics 的创始人兼首席经济学家，也是全球宏观经济、中国及美中战略竞争的主题演讲者。她还是亚洲协会政策研究所中国分析中心的高级研究员。</p>
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评论：中国下调增长目标——但这仍然不够低