<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png"/></p>
<p>上周，油价突破 100 美元，因为霍尔木兹海峡的运输流量减缓。油轮犹豫不决，保险公司提高了保费，交易员开始调整投资组合。</p>
<p>美国要求其盟友确保通行——在以往的危机中，这是一个简单的请求。这一次，回应几乎是普遍的否定。</p>
<p>这种拒绝超越了霍尔木兹海峡。它标志着一个更长故事中最新和最明显的信号——美国总统与传统伙伴日益疏远，影响从外交到市场。</p>
<h2>保护主义如何重塑联盟</h2>
<p>当特朗普在 2025 年重新上任时，他恢复了许多在其第一任期内引发争议的政策。对竞争对手和盟友都征收了关税。</p>
<p>贸易协议围绕交易逻辑重新构建：<em>“你受益，你付费。”</em></p>
<p>欧洲和亚洲的伙伴面临反复的经济压力，从汽车出口到技术获取。</p>
<p>思路很简单——为美国提供更多杠杆，更好的国内结果。</p>
<p>对联盟的影响远没有那么明显。</p>
<p>随着时间的推移，反复的单边行动侵蚀了信任。</p>
<p>华盛顿的请求不再自动获得重视。盟友开始将每个请求与日益增长的不可预测性和自利意识进行权衡。</p>
<p>现在，每次谈判都引发同样的问题：被卷入美国主导的行动的风险是什么？</p>
<h2>和平委员会与多边主义的幻觉</h2>
<p>在 2026 年初，特朗普推出了和平委员会。</p>
<p>乍一看，它像是一个重建和冲突管理机构。到年中，其职权范围已扩展至全球。</p>
<p>会员资格需要财务贡献，决策权集中在总统办公室。</p>
<p>传统的多边机构如联合国实际上被边缘化。</p>
<p>欧洲国家对该委员会持怀疑态度。新兴大国选择性加入，更多是出于合同或获取资源的动机，而非共同目标。</p>
<p>然而，该委员会揭示的是，美国领导层越来越优先考虑控制而非协调。</p>
<p>盟友被邀请但未被赋权。合作变得交易化、有条件，最终变得选择性。</p>
<h2>霍尔木兹海峡作为测试</h2>
<p>与伊朗的冲突在 2026 年 3 月急剧升级。伊朗干扰了霍尔木兹海峡，约 20% 的全球石油供应通过该海峡。</p>
<p>价格立即飙升，但外交后果更为明显。</p>
<p>当美国请求盟友提供海军支持以确保通行时，答案大多是否定的。</p>
<p>德国、法国和英国拒绝了。日本、韩国和印度避免直接参与。</p>
<p>中国与德黑兰展开谈判，而不是加入美国主导的努力。即使是北约伙伴也保持在旁观者的角色。</p>
<p>这些拒绝是经过深思熟虑的。各国政府划清了捍卫经济流动与参与未经授权的战争之间的界限。</p>
<p>他们的风险评估将升级、地区冲突和直接报复的危险置于供应中断的成本之上。</p>
<p>对华盛顿目标的怀疑加剧了犹豫。实际上，世界允许一场美国发起的冲突在没有协调支持的情况下展开——即使风险达到了全球重要的水平。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png"/></p>
<p>来源：Invezz</p>
<h2>市场和投资者调整</h2>
<p>市场反应反映的不仅仅是失去的桶——交易员现在正在定价长期的干扰。</p>
<p>航运保险费飙升。</p>
<p>油轮已重新航线或停泊等待，进一步收紧供应。绕过霍尔木兹的管道和来自美洲和非洲的替代来源引起了新的关注。</p>
<p>股票市场清晰地显示出分歧：能源生产商正在获得巨额利润，而化工和航空等燃料密集型行业面临利润缩减。</p>
<p>中央银行在通胀压力和经济增长放缓之间感到不安。</p>
<p>供应链冲击、价格波动和地缘政治裂痕不再受到假定的美国主导协调的缓冲。</p>
<p>盟友支持的乘数效应——曾经是关键的稳定因素——正在迅速消退。</p>
<h2>为什么这个时刻独特？</h2>
<p>特朗普的孤立并非一夜之间产生。保护主义政策造成了摩擦；和平委员会将单边控制制度化。</p>
<p>霍尔木兹危机现在清晰地体现了后果。</p>
<p>盟友通过新的过滤器评估美国的请求——合法性、风险和共同利益。自动对齐已消失。</p>
<p>战略自主正在加速：欧洲在追求超越美国主导框架的外交；亚洲经济体则采取对冲而非对齐；中国则将自己定位为平行的对话者。</p>
<p>这些不是边缘的变化，而是更为多极化体系的基础——在这个体系中，美国的军事力量仍然无与伦比，但联盟能力，真正的影响力放大器，正在减弱。</p>
<p>这一变化也改变了风险的定价方式。市场、投资者和政策制定者现在将干扰视为更持久和更具传染性。能源供应风险和地缘政治风险日益交织。</p>
<p>油价冲击不再被视为由联盟存在缓冲的暂时异常。投资者策略现在必须考虑美国主导干预的结构性限制。</p>
<h2>更大的洞察</h2>
<p>特朗普的做法强调了联盟行为的根本变化。军事力量仍在；而联盟建设却不复存在。经济相互依存不再保证政治一致。</p>
<p>即使在威胁全球贸易的危机中，盟友现在在行动之前也会权衡合法性、暴露和国家利益。</p>
<p>霍尔木兹海峡已不仅仅是一个瓶颈——它成为了当前全球秩序的试金石。谈判桌上的空位、拒绝参与和选择性接触揭示了一个新现实：美国仍然可以行动，但不再能假设其他国家会跟随。</p>
<p>市场反应，投资者调整，地缘政治格局实时重新校准。</p>
<p>在实际操作中，石油流动最终会恢复。战略储备、替代路线和外交将缓解压力。</p>
<p>但美国的影响力现在是有条件的。曾经放大美国力量的联盟乘数效应正在减弱。</p>
<p>而这种减弱对市场、供应链和全球风险评估的影响远超波斯湾。</p>
<p>这篇文章的标题是《霍尔木兹海峡危机是否暴露了美国力量的局限性？》，最初发布在 Invezz 上。</p>

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美国石油设备与服务 ETF - iShares

<p>霍尔木兹海峡危机突显了美国影响力的减弱，因油价因流量减缓而飙升至 100 美元以上。美国请求盟友确保通行的要求遭到广泛拒绝，反映出与传统伙伴关系的日益疏远。特朗普政府的保护主义政策削弱了信任，导致对联盟的交易性看法。此次危机促使市场进行调整，航运保险费上涨，供应链发生变化，表明向一个多极化体系的转变，其中美国主导的协调作用正在减弱</p>

<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png"/></p>
<p>Oil prices surged past $100 last weekas flows through the Strait of Hormuz slowed. Tankers hesitated, insurers raised premiums, and traders began adjusting portfolios.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>上周，油价突破 100 美元，因为霍尔木兹海峡的运输流量减缓。油轮犹豫不决，保险公司提高了保费，交易员开始调整投资组合。</p>
</div><p>The US asked its allies to secure the passage — a straightforward request in any previous crisis. This time, the response was almost universally negative.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>美国要求其盟友确保通行——在以往的危机中，这是一个简单的请求。这一次，回应几乎是普遍的否定。</p>
</div><p>That refusal goes beyond Hormuz. It marks the latest and most visible signal in a longer story — one of a US president increasingly estranged from traditional partners, with consequences stretching from diplomacy to markets.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这种拒绝超越了霍尔木兹海峡。它标志着一个更长故事中最新和最明显的信号——美国总统与传统伙伴日益疏远，影响从外交到市场。</p>
</div><h2>How protectionism reshaped alliances</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>保护主义如何重塑联盟</h2>
</div><p>When Trump returned to office in 2025, he revived many of the policies that proved controversial during his first term.Tariffs were imposed on rivals and allies alike.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>当特朗普在 2025 年重新上任时，他恢复了许多在其第一任期内引发争议的政策。对竞争对手和盟友都征收了关税。</p>
</div><p>Trade deals were recast around transactional logic: <em>“You benefit, you pay.”</em></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>贸易协议围绕交易逻辑重新构建：<em>“你受益，你付费。”</em></p>
</div><p>European and Asian partners came under repeated economic pressure, from automotive exports to technology access.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>欧洲和亚洲的伙伴面临反复的经济压力，从汽车出口到技术获取。</p>
</div><p>The thinking was simple — more leverage for the US, better domestic outcomes.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>思路很简单——为美国提供更多杠杆，更好的国内结果。</p>
</div><p>The effect on alliances was far less so.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>对联盟的影响远没有那么明显。</p>
</div><p>Over time, repeated unilateral actions eroded trust.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>随着时间的推移，反复的单边行动侵蚀了信任。</p>
</div><p>Requests from Washington no longer carried automatic weight. Allies began to weigh each appeal against a growing perception of unpredictability and self‑interest.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>华盛顿的请求不再自动获得重视。盟友开始将每个请求与日益增长的不可预测性和自利意识进行权衡。</p>
</div><p>Now, every negotiation prompts the same question: What is the risk of being dragged into a US‑led action?</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>现在，每次谈判都引发同样的问题：被卷入美国主导的行动的风险是什么？</p>
</div><h2>The Board of Peace and the illusion of multilateralism</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>和平委员会与多边主义的幻觉</h2>
</div><p>In early 2026, Trumpintroduced the Board of Peace.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在 2026 年初，特朗普推出了和平委员会。</p>
</div><p>At first glance, it looked like a reconstruction and conflict‑management body. By mid‑year, its remit had expanded globally.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>乍一看，它像是一个重建和冲突管理机构。到年中，其职权范围已扩展至全球。</p>
</div><p>Membership required financial contributions, and decision‑making was centralised in the president’s office.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>会员资格需要财务贡献，决策权集中在总统办公室。</p>
</div><p>Traditional multilateral institutions such as the UN were effectively sidelined.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>传统的多边机构如联合国实际上被边缘化。</p>
</div><p>European nations viewed the board with scepticism. Emerging powers joined selectively, motivated more by contracts or access than by shared purpose.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>欧洲国家对该委员会持怀疑态度。新兴大国选择性加入，更多是出于合同或获取资源的动机，而非共同目标。</p>
</div><p>What the board revealed, however, is that US leadership increasingly prioritises control over coordination.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，该委员会揭示的是，美国领导层越来越优先考虑控制而非协调。</p>
</div><p>Allies were invited but not empowered. Cooperation became transactional, conditional, and ultimately selective.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>盟友被邀请但未被赋权。合作变得交易化、有条件，最终变得选择性。</p>
</div><h2>The Strait of Hormuz as a test</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>霍尔木兹海峡作为测试</h2>
</div><p>Theconflict with Iran escalatedsharply in March 2026.Iran disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly 20% of the global oil supply.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>与伊朗的冲突在 2026 年 3 月急剧升级。伊朗干扰了霍尔木兹海峡，约 20% 的全球石油供应通过该海峡。</p>
</div><p>Prices spiked immediately, but the diplomatic fallout was even more telling.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>价格立即飙升，但外交后果更为明显。</p>
</div><p>When the US requested naval support from allies to secure the passage, the answer was largely negative.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>当美国请求盟友提供海军支持以确保通行时，答案大多是否定的。</p>
</div><p>Germany, France, and the United Kingdom declined. Japan, South Korea, and India avoided direct involvement.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>德国、法国和英国拒绝了。日本、韩国和印度避免直接参与。</p>
</div><p>China opened talks with Tehran rather than joining a US‑led effort. Even NATO partners stayed on the sidelines.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中国与德黑兰展开谈判，而不是加入美国主导的努力。即使是北约伙伴也保持在旁观者的角色。</p>
</div><p>These refusals were calculated. Governments drew a line between defending economic flows and joining a war they had not authorised.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这些拒绝是经过深思熟虑的。各国政府划清了捍卫经济流动与参与未经授权的战争之间的界限。</p>
</div><p>Their risk assessments placed the danger of escalation, regional conflict, and direct retaliation above the cost of supply disruptions.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>他们的风险评估将升级、地区冲突和直接报复的危险置于供应中断的成本之上。</p>
</div><p>Doubt over Washington’s objectives compounded the hesitation. In effect, the world allowed a US‑initiated conflict to unfold without coordinated support — even as the stakes reached globally significant levels.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>对华盛顿目标的怀疑加剧了犹豫。实际上，世界允许一场美国发起的冲突在没有协调支持的情况下展开——即使风险达到了全球重要的水平。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Invezz</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>来源：Invezz</p>
</div><h2>Markets and investors adjust</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>市场和投资者调整</h2>
</div><p>The market reaction reflects more than lost barrels — traders are now pricing in prolonged disruption.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>市场反应反映的不仅仅是失去的桶——交易员现在正在定价长期的干扰。</p>
</div><p>Shipping insurance premiums have surged.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>航运保险费飙升。</p>
</div><p>Tankers have rerouted or anchored in wait, tightening supply further. Pipelines bypassing Hormuz and alternative sourcing from the Americas and Africa have drawn new attention.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>油轮已重新航线或停泊等待，进一步收紧供应。绕过霍尔木兹的管道和来自美洲和非洲的替代来源引起了新的关注。</p>
</div><p>Equities show the split clearly: energy producers are reaping windfalls, while fuel‑intensive sectors such as chemicals and airlines face shrinking margins.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>股票市场清晰地显示出分歧：能源生产商正在获得巨额利润，而化工和航空等燃料密集型行业面临利润缩减。</p>
</div><p>Central banks sit uncomfortably between inflationary pressure and slowing growth.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中央银行在通胀压力和经济增长放缓之间感到不安。</p>
</div><p>Supply chain shocks, price volatility, and geopolitical fractures are no longer cushioned by assumed US‑led coordination.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>供应链冲击、价格波动和地缘政治裂痕不再受到假定的美国主导协调的缓冲。</p>
</div><p>The multiplier effect of allied support — once the key stabiliser — is fading fast.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>盟友支持的乘数效应——曾经是关键的稳定因素——正在迅速消退。</p>
</div><h2>Why is this moment unique?</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>为什么这个时刻独特？</h2>
</div><p>Trump’s isolation did not emerge overnight. Protectionist policies created friction; the Board of Peace institutionalised unilateral control over shared initiatives.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>特朗普的孤立并非一夜之间产生。保护主义政策造成了摩擦；和平委员会将单边控制制度化。</p>
</div><p>The Hormuz crisis now crystallises the consequences.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>霍尔木兹危机现在清晰地体现了后果。</p>
</div><p>Allies evaluate US requests through a new filter — legitimacy, risk, and shared interest. Automatic alignment has vanished.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>盟友通过新的过滤器评估美国的请求——合法性、风险和共同利益。自动对齐已消失。</p>
</div><p>Strategic autonomy is accelerating: Europe is pursuing diplomacy beyond US‑led frameworks; Asian economies hedge rather than align; and China positions itself as a parallel interlocutor.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>战略自主正在加速：欧洲在追求超越美国主导框架的外交；亚洲经济体则采取对冲而非对齐；中国则将自己定位为平行的对话者。</p>
</div><p>These are not marginal shifts but the foundations of a more multipolar system — one in which US military power remains unmatched, but coalition capability, the true amplifier of influence, is waning.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这些不是边缘的变化，而是更为多极化体系的基础——在这个体系中，美国的军事力量仍然无与伦比，但联盟能力，真正的影响力放大器，正在减弱。</p>
</div><p>This shift also changes how risk is priced. Markets, investors, and policymakers now treat disruptions as longer‑lasting and more contagious. Energy supply risk and geopolitical risk are increasingly intertwined.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这一变化也改变了风险的定价方式。市场、投资者和政策制定者现在将干扰视为更持久和更具传染性。能源供应风险和地缘政治风险日益交织。</p>
</div><p>Oil shocks are no longer viewed as temporary anomalies cushioned by coalition presence. Investor strategy must now account for the structural limits of US‑led intervention.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>油价冲击不再被视为由联盟存在缓冲的暂时异常。投资者策略现在必须考虑美国主导干预的结构性限制。</p>
</div><h2>The larger insight</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>更大的洞察</h2>
</div><p>Trump’s approach underscores a fundamental shift in alliance behaviour. Military power remains; coalition‑building does not. Economic interdependence no longer guarantees political alignment.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>特朗普的做法强调了联盟行为的根本变化。军事力量仍在；而联盟建设却不复存在。经济相互依存不再保证政治一致。</p>
</div><p>Even in crises that threaten global trade, allies now weigh legitimacy, exposure, and national interest before acting.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>即使在威胁全球贸易的危机中，盟友现在在行动之前也会权衡合法性、暴露和国家利益。</p>
</div><p>The Strait of Hormuz has become more than a chokepoint — it is a test of the current global order. Empty seats at negotiation tables, refusals to join, and selective engagement reveal a new reality: the US can still act, but it can no longer assume others will follow.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>霍尔木兹海峡已不仅仅是一个瓶颈——它成为了当前全球秩序的试金石。谈判桌上的空位、拒绝参与和选择性接触揭示了一个新现实：美国仍然可以行动，但不再能假设其他国家会跟随。</p>
</div><p>Markets react, investors adjust, and the geopolitical landscape recalibrates in real time.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>市场反应，投资者调整，地缘政治格局实时重新校准。</p>
</div><p>In practical terms, oil flows will resume eventually. Strategic reserves, alternative routes, and diplomacy will ease the pressure.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在实际操作中，石油流动最终会恢复。战略储备、替代路线和外交将缓解压力。</p>
</div><p>But US influence is now conditional. The coalition multiplier — the mechanism that once amplified American power — is eroding.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但美国的影响力现在是有条件的。曾经放大美国力量的联盟乘数效应正在减弱。</p>
</div><p>And its erosion carries consequences for markets, supply chains, and global risk assessment far beyond the Persian Gulf.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>而这种减弱对市场、供应链和全球风险评估的影响远超波斯湾。</p>
</div><p>The post Is the Strait of Hormuz crisis exposing the limits of US power? appeared first on Invezz</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这篇文章的标题是《霍尔木兹海峡危机是否暴露了美国力量的局限性？》，最初发布在 Invezz 上。</p>
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霍尔木兹海峡危机是否揭示了美国力量的局限性？