<p>滙豐銀行對中國住宅房地產市場的相對樂觀觀點被認為是市場上最勇敢的判斷之一，該行在 2 月份表示，2025 年將標誌着這個疲軟行業的拐點。滙豐當時表示：“我們早已預見到政府幹預、被壓抑的需求以及必要的市場修正將推動房地產銷售的逐步復甦——而我們現在看到所有這些跡象正在顯現。”\n 然而，這些復甦的跡象僅限於一線城市，更多地與新房和二手房價格的輕微下跌有關，而不是房價的明顯上漲。此外，今年第一季度末，收縮速度重新加快的跡象已經顯現。\n 在 11 月 13 日的一份報告中，滙豐表示 “在復甦後開始出現一些裂痕”，同時 “去庫存的速度未能達到我們的預期，主要是由於銷售勢頭減弱”。現實是，根本就沒有真正的復甦。即使是中國房地產市場的穩定也證明是難以實現的。這部分解釋了為何國有的中國萬科——迄今為止最後一個避免違約的大型開發商之一——正處於財務崩潰的邊緣。\n11 月 26 日，萬科首次提出推遲償還一筆以人民幣計價的債券，導致其部分以美元計價的債券價格跌入困境區域，並加劇了人們對北京是否願意支持即使是最大的脆弱開發商的擔憂。\n 在萬科宣佈後，標準普爾全球評級表示，未來六個月 “困境重組” 的風險上升，並且萬科的債務——包括在 2026 年 5 月之前到期的 114 億元人民幣（16 億美元）的債務到期牆——由於其流動性疲弱而 “不可持續”。兩年前，萬科違約的前景會在中國市場引發動盪。現在，跟蹤在國內外上市的中國公司的 MSCI 中國指數上週上漲了 2.8%。\n 微不足道的溢出效應顯示了自 2021 年房地產危機爆發以來，中國政策和市場環境的變化程度。首先，自 2023 年以來，北京對該行業的政策顯著放鬆，宣佈了幾輪刺激需求的措施。進一步的寬鬆，包括對抵押貸款借款人的利率補貼和所得税減免，可能正在醖釀之中。\n\n\n 清理大量未售出和未完成房屋的更全面措施成本高昂且複雜。這些措施與政府將高端製造業作為增長核心驅動力的優先事項相悖。然而，在市場對進一步支持中國房地產市場的預期較低的情況下，滙豐表示，“任何關於政策的消息都被視為好消息”。\n 其次，儘管面臨美國總統特朗普的貿易戰，出口在今年表現相當良好。摩根士丹利預計，淨出口將對今年整體 GDP 增長貢獻 1.4 個百分點，與 2024 年持平。這有助於彌補住宅房地產下滑帶來的多年來的拖累。\n 中國出口的韌性加劇了貿易緊張局勢，國家的經常賬户盈餘在上個季度創下歷史新高，主要是由於創紀錄的商品貿易盈餘。這也突顯了國家供應鏈的強大和競爭力，以及其技術實力。\n 第三，受科技驅動的中國股市飆升——MSCI 中國指數今年上漲超過 30%，而基準標準普爾 500 指數上漲 16.5%——改變了市場對中國的敍述。房地產危機在關於中國的股票研究報告中幾乎沒有提及。\n\n\n 摩根士丹利表示，人們對中國的看法已經從 “通縮/宏觀放緩故事轉變為創新和硬核技術突破的故事”。此外，股市的強勁反彈使得北京不願在房地產領域採取更強有力的行動。野村證券表示，政策制定者擔心如果他們加大政策支持，股市將變得 “過度膨脹”。\n 第四，大多數投資者不再暴露於中國房地產，這限制了萬科財務困境的影響。該行業的違約潮和價值破壞減少了中國房地產在亞洲高收益或非投資級公司債券指數中的權重。\n 在 2021 年第二季度，中國開發商佔亞洲高收益債券指數的 35%，而到 2024 年第二季度，其份額已降至不到 10%。此外，排除中國開發商的亞洲高收益發行人的違約率歷來低於美國高收益市場。\n\n 然而，儘管市場和政策環境發生了變化，家庭、開發商和債權人仍在承受房地產行業再次加劇下滑的後果，即使是在一線城市。\n 野村認為，北京最終將被迫採取更積極的措施來穩定該行業，包括更強的去庫存重點。儘管如此，它承認 “易於實施的政策已經用盡”，而更全面措施的時機 “高度不確定”。\n 中國住宅房地產行業的崩潰是一場漫長而拖延的危機。市場缺乏壓力以及政府不願採取更強有力的行動，使得危機更有可能持續很長時間。</p>

強邦新材

萬科A

萬科企業

<p>萬科企業，一家主要開發商，正面臨財務崩潰，提議推遲債券償還。儘管如此，由於政策變化、強勁的出口和科技驅動的股票上漲，中國市場依然保持穩定。萬科的困境突顯了自 2021 年房地產危機以來投資者風險敞口和市場動態的變化。MSCI 中國指數上漲 2.8%，顯示市場影響有限</p>

<p>HSBC, whose relatively bullish view on China’s residential property sector ranks as one of the bravest calls in markets, said in February that 2025 would mark an inflection point for the ailing industry. “We’ve long anticipated government intervention, pent-up demand and a necessary market correction to drive a gradual recovery in property sales – and we’re seeing signs of all of that playing out now,” HSBC said at the time.\nThese green shoots, however, were confined to first-tier cities and had more to do with shallower declines in the prices of new and second-hand properties than with outright increases in home values. Moreover, signs of a reacceleration in the pace of contraction were already apparent at the end of the first quarter of this year.\nIn a report on November 13, HSBC said “some cracks are starting to surface after a recovery”, while “the pace of destocking is falling short of our expectations, primarily due to weakening sales momentum”. The reality is that there was never a recovery in the first place. Even a stabilisation of China’s housing market has proved elusive. This partly explains why state-backed China Vanke – one of the last big developers to have so far averted a default – is teetering on the brink of financial collapse.\nOn November 26, Vanke proposed delaying repayment on a yuan-denominated bond for the first time, causing the prices of some of its dollar-denominated bonds to fall into distressed territory and heightening concerns over Beijing’s willingness to support even the largest vulnerable developers.\nFollowing Vanke’s announcement, S&amp;P Global Ratings said the risk of a “distressed restructuring” in the next six months had risen and that Vanke’s debts – which include a bond maturity wall of 11.4 billion yuan (US$1.6 billion) between December and May 2026 – were “unsustainable due to its weak liquidity”. Two years ago, the prospect of Vanke defaulting would have caused turmoil in China’s markets. Now, the MSCI China Index, which tracks Chinese companies listed at home and abroad, rose 2.8 per cent last week.\nThe negligible spillover effects show the extent to which the policy and market landscape in China has changed since the eruption of the housing crisis in 2021. First, Beijing has loosened policy towards the sector significantly since 2023, announcing several rounds of measures to stimulate demand. Further easing, including interest rate subsidies and income tax rebates for mortgage borrowers, is likely to be in the works.\n\n\nMore comprehensive measures to clear the huge backlog of unsold and unfinished homes are costly and complex. They also sit uncomfortably with the government’s prioritisation of high-end manufacturing as the core driver of growth. Still, at a time when market expectations for further support for China’s property market are low, “any news on policy is viewed as good news”, HSBC said.\nSecond, exports have performed remarkably well this year in the face of US President Donald Trump’s trade war. Morgan Stanley expects net exports to make a 1.4 percentage point contribution to overall GDP growth this year, on a par with 2024. This has helped compensate for the multi-year drag from the downturn in residential property.\nThe resilience of China’s exports has inflamed trade tensions, with the country’s current account surplus hitting an all-time high last quarter, driven by a record goods trade surplus. It has also underscored the strength and competitiveness of the country’s supply chains, as well as its technological prowess.\nThird, the tech-driven surge in Chinese stocks – the MSCI China index is up more than 30 per cent this year, compared with a 16.5 per cent rise for the benchmark S&amp;P 500 index – has changed the market narrative around China. The property crisis barely gets a mention in equity research reports on China.\n\n\nMorgan Stanley said there had been a shift in the perception of China as “a deflationary/macro-slowdown story towards one of an innovation and hard-core technology breakthrough”. Moreover, the fierceness of the stock market rally has made Beijing reluctant to act more forcefully in the property sector. Policymakers feared the equity market would become “overly inflated if they step up policy support”, Nomura said.\nFourth, most investors are no longer exposed to Chinese real estate, which limits the fallout from Vanke’s financial woes. The wave of defaults and value destruction in the sector has reduced Chinese real estate’s weighting in Asian high-yield, or non-investment grade, corporate bond indices.\nWhile Chinese developers accounted for 35 per cent of Asia’s high-yield bond index in the second quarter of 2021, their share had fallen to less than 10 per cent by the second quarter of 2024. Furthermore, the default rate of Asian high-yield issuers excluding Chinese developers has historically been lower than in the US high-yield market.\n\nHowever, while the market and policy landscape has changed, households, developers and creditors are suffering the consequences of a renewed intensification of the downturn in the property sector, even in first-tier cities.\nNomura believes Beijing will eventually be forced to introduce more aggressive measures to stabilise the sector, including a stronger focus on destocking. Even so, it admits the “easy-to-implement policies have been used up” and that the timing of more comprehensive measures is “highly uncertain”.\nThe collapse of China’s residential real estate sector has been a long, drawn-out crisis. The lack of pressure from markets and the government’s reluctance to take much more forceful action make it more likely that the crisis will drag on for a long time yet.\n</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>滙豐銀行對中國住宅房地產市場的相對樂觀觀點被認為是市場上最勇敢的判斷之一，該行在 2 月份表示，2025 年將標誌着這個疲軟行業的拐點。滙豐當時表示：“我們早已預見到政府幹預、被壓抑的需求以及必要的市場修正將推動房地產銷售的逐步復甦——而我們現在看到所有這些跡象正在顯現。”\n 然而，這些復甦的跡象僅限於一線城市，更多地與新房和二手房價格的輕微下跌有關，而不是房價的明顯上漲。此外，今年第一季度末，收縮速度重新加快的跡象已經顯現。\n 在 11 月 13 日的一份報告中，滙豐表示 “在復甦後開始出現一些裂痕”，同時 “去庫存的速度未能達到我們的預期，主要是由於銷售勢頭減弱”。現實是，根本就沒有真正的復甦。即使是中國房地產市場的穩定也證明是難以實現的。這部分解釋了為何國有的中國萬科——迄今為止最後一個避免違約的大型開發商之一——正處於財務崩潰的邊緣。\n11 月 26 日，萬科首次提出推遲償還一筆以人民幣計價的債券，導致其部分以美元計價的債券價格跌入困境區域，並加劇了人們對北京是否願意支持即使是最大的脆弱開發商的擔憂。\n 在萬科宣佈後，標準普爾全球評級表示，未來六個月 “困境重組” 的風險上升，並且萬科的債務——包括在 2026 年 5 月之前到期的 114 億元人民幣（16 億美元）的債務到期牆——由於其流動性疲弱而 “不可持續”。兩年前，萬科違約的前景會在中國市場引發動盪。現在，跟蹤在國內外上市的中國公司的 MSCI 中國指數上週上漲了 2.8%。\n 微不足道的溢出效應顯示了自 2021 年房地產危機爆發以來，中國政策和市場環境的變化程度。首先，自 2023 年以來，北京對該行業的政策顯著放鬆，宣佈了幾輪刺激需求的措施。進一步的寬鬆，包括對抵押貸款借款人的利率補貼和所得税減免，可能正在醖釀之中。\n\n\n 清理大量未售出和未完成房屋的更全面措施成本高昂且複雜。這些措施與政府將高端製造業作為增長核心驅動力的優先事項相悖。然而，在市場對進一步支持中國房地產市場的預期較低的情況下，滙豐表示，“任何關於政策的消息都被視為好消息”。\n 其次，儘管面臨美國總統特朗普的貿易戰，出口在今年表現相當良好。摩根士丹利預計，淨出口將對今年整體 GDP 增長貢獻 1.4 個百分點，與 2024 年持平。這有助於彌補住宅房地產下滑帶來的多年來的拖累。\n 中國出口的韌性加劇了貿易緊張局勢，國家的經常賬户盈餘在上個季度創下歷史新高，主要是由於創紀錄的商品貿易盈餘。這也突顯了國家供應鏈的強大和競爭力，以及其技術實力。\n 第三，受科技驅動的中國股市飆升——MSCI 中國指數今年上漲超過 30%，而基準標準普爾 500 指數上漲 16.5%——改變了市場對中國的敍述。房地產危機在關於中國的股票研究報告中幾乎沒有提及。\n\n\n 摩根士丹利表示，人們對中國的看法已經從 “通縮/宏觀放緩故事轉變為創新和硬核技術突破的故事”。此外，股市的強勁反彈使得北京不願在房地產領域採取更強有力的行動。野村證券表示，政策制定者擔心如果他們加大政策支持，股市將變得 “過度膨脹”。\n 第四，大多數投資者不再暴露於中國房地產，這限制了萬科財務困境的影響。該行業的違約潮和價值破壞減少了中國房地產在亞洲高收益或非投資級公司債券指數中的權重。\n 在 2021 年第二季度，中國開發商佔亞洲高收益債券指數的 35%，而到 2024 年第二季度，其份額已降至不到 10%。此外，排除中國開發商的亞洲高收益發行人的違約率歷來低於美國高收益市場。\n\n 然而，儘管市場和政策環境發生了變化，家庭、開發商和債權人仍在承受房地產行業再次加劇下滑的後果，即使是在一線城市。\n 野村認為，北京最終將被迫採取更積極的措施來穩定該行業，包括更強的去庫存重點。儘管如此，它承認 “易於實施的政策已經用盡”，而更全面措施的時機 “高度不確定”。\n 中國住宅房地產行業的崩潰是一場漫長而拖延的危機。市場缺乏壓力以及政府不願採取更強有力的行動，使得危機更有可能持續很長時間。</p>
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為什麼中國萬科的債務困境幾乎沒有在市場上引起波動