<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="1152" height="720" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png"/></p>
<p>在過去的二十年中，中國經濟可以通過三種手段來解決緩慢增長的問題。它可以推動投資、提升房地產，或向世界其他地方銷售更多商品。</p>
<p>如今，一種手段已經失效，另一種受到政治限制，而第三種則在國外引發抵制。</p>
<p>儘管經濟仍在擴張，但可靠的選擇正在迅速減少。</p>
<h2>投資不再能像以前那樣產生反應</h2>
<p>投資曾是中國擺脱困境的最快方式。今年前 11 個月，固定資產投資與 2024 年同期相比下降了 2.6%。</p>
<p>拖累主要來自房地產，房地產投資在同期下降了近 16%。</p>
<p>曾經佔經濟活動四分之一的房地產，在相關行業被納入後，已從增長引擎轉變為結構性約束。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="631" height="341" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png"/></p>
<p>來源：彭博社</p>
<p>該行業曾大規模吸納資本並迅速傳遞增長。現在卻恰恰相反，拉低了信心。</p>
<p>基礎設施曾是常規的後備選擇，但現在也受到限制。</p>
<p>地方政府面臨更嚴格的借貸限制，更多的融資能力用於再融資現有債務，而不是啓動新項目。</p>
<p>投資並沒有消失，但變得更慢、更具選擇性，作為增長引擎的力量也減弱了。</p>
<p>減速背後也有意圖。政策制定者已變得更加明確，旨在遏制低效投資和過剩產能。</p>
<p>這縮小了粗放型刺激的範圍。增長不再是簡單通過增加建設來加速的事情。</p>
<h2>儘管有針對性支持，消費仍然疲軟</h2>
<p>家庭支出證明難以復甦。11 月份零售銷售同比僅增長 1.3%。</p>
<p>這低於 10 月份的 2.9%，也是疫情期間以外的最低增速。</p>
<p>然而，更令人擔憂的是，零售增長已連續六個月放緩，這是自 2020 年以來最長的持續下滑。</p>
<p>消費構成顯示出問題。根據行業和官方數據，汽車銷售同比下降約 8%，家電銷售下降近 19%。</p>
<p>這兩個類別之前曾因以舊換新補貼而受到提振。當這些效應消退時，需求也隨之下降。</p>
<p>這並不是流動性短缺的問題。消費者只是對消費持謹慎態度。</p>
<p>11 月份城市失業率保持在 5.1%，而青年失業率仍高於 17%，限制了對收入增長的信心。</p>
<p>更重要的是，房地產價格下跌繼續影響家庭行為。</p>
<p>11 月份主要城市的平均房價再次下降，延續了多年的下滑趨勢。</p>
<p>國際貨幣基金組織估計，約 70% 的家庭財富與房地產相關，即使是適度的價格下跌也會對消費決策產生過大的影響。</p>
<p>補貼可以改變購買的時機，但無法抵消持續的財富感知侵蝕。</p>
<h2>出口支撐增長，並引發關注</h2>
<p>在國內需求承壓的情況下，出口吸收了大部分的閒置產能。</p>
<p>11 月份工業生產同比增長 4.8%，表現優於消費和投資，得益於強勁的海外訂單。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="737" height="420" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png"/></p>
<p>來源：路透社</p>
<p>根據海關數據，2025 年前 11 個月的貿易順差創下約 1.1 萬億美元的紀錄。</p>
<p>從增長核算的角度來看，出口在保持 GDP 接近政府 5% 目標方面發揮了決定性作用。</p>
<p>出口也帶來了較少的直接財政成本。它們繞過家庭信心，不依賴地方政府的資產負債表，並迅速交付產出。</p>
<p>在政策環境受限的情況下，這使得出口變得具有吸引力。</p>
<p>但成本正在累積。持續的過剩供應使得生產者價格在三年多的時間裏處於通縮狀態。</p>
<p>在外部，貿易伙伴正以關税威脅和新壁壘作出回應，不僅在美國，還在歐洲和新興市場。</p>
<p>曾經緩解壓力的出口強勁，現在卻越來越產生壓力。</p>
<h2>市場改善速度快於基本面</h2>
<p>儘管實體經濟努力恢復動力，中國的金融市場卻朝着相反的方向發展。</p>
<p>股票、人民幣和在岸政府債券都在 2025 年有望實現增長，這是近年來未曾見過的組合。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" width="644" height="352" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png"/></p>
<p>來源：彭博社</p>
<p>截至第三季度，外國投資者以自 2020 年以來最快的速度增加了對中國股票的持有，而儘管收益率較低，離岸主權債券的需求仍然強勁。</p>
<p>人民幣正朝着自 2021 年以來首次對美元實現年度升值的方向發展。</p>
<p>也許這與政策有關，政府推出流動性工具以支持股票市場，減輕對私營部門某些部分的監管壓力，並強調增長穩定。</p>
<p>估值也發揮了作用，中國資產仍以折扣價交易於全球同行。</p>
<p>然而，市場的反彈並沒有轉化為更廣泛的經濟提升。</p>
<p>家庭在過去兩年中從股價上漲中獲得了約 4.5 萬億元的收益，但與同期住宅物業價值約 20 萬億元的下降相比，這一數字顯得微不足道，市場分析師的估計顯示。</p>
<p>股票的財富效應被住房損失所淹沒。</p>
<h2>為什麼明年看起來比今年更困難</h2>
<p>政策制定者承諾通過財政支出、超長期債券和適度的貨幣寬鬆繼續提供支持。</p>
<p>與此同時，他們也在實踐剋制。</p>
<p>大規模刺激有可能重燃債務問題，並削弱遏制過剩產能的努力。</p>
<p>直接的收入轉移將促進消費，但需要財政和制度上的轉變，而北京長期以來一直避免。</p>
<p>結果是一個專注於穩定而非加速的策略。</p>
<p>增長得到了支持，但並未重新設計。市場對此表示放心。家庭和企業依然保持謹慎。</p>
<p>中國正在耗盡過去生成增長的低成本方式。</p>
<p>數據顯示，經濟仍在生產、仍在出口、仍在吸引資本，但越來越難以將這些優勢轉化為國內信心。</p>
<p>中國能夠做到的與其可以依賴的之間的差距，現在已成為其經濟前景的決定性特徵。</p>
<p>關於中國經濟增長選項耗盡的文章最早出現在 Invezz 上。</p>

<p>中國經濟面臨有限的增長選擇，因為投資、房地產和出口等傳統槓桿受到制約。投資放緩，房價下跌，出口面臨國際阻力。儘管有針對性的支持，消費依然疲軟，零售銷售和汽車銷售均出現下降。出口曾推動增長，但在國外受到審查。金融市場有所改善，但這並未轉化為更廣泛的經濟復甦。政策制定者專注於遏制低效投資，縮小刺激範圍。經濟對出口和市場收益的依賴與國內挑戰形成對比</p>

<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/20251111_105701_NSu9G.png"/></p>
<p>For most of the past two decades, China’s economy could solve slow growth by pulling one of three levers. It could push investment, lift property, or sell more to the rest of the world.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在過去的二十年中，中國經濟可以通過三種手段來解決緩慢增長的問題。它可以推動投資、提升房地產，或向世界其他地方銷售更多商品。</p>
</div><p>Today, one lever is broken, another is politically constrained, and the third is provoking resistance abroad.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>如今，一種手段已經失效，另一種受到政治限制，而第三種則在國外引發抵制。</p>
</div><p>Though the economy is still expanding, the menu of reliable options is shrinking fast.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>儘管經濟仍在擴張，但可靠的選擇正在迅速減少。</p>
</div><h2>Investment no longer delivers the response it once did</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>投資不再能像以前那樣產生反應</h2>
</div><p>Investment used to be China’s fastest way out of trouble. Fixed asset investment fell 2.6% in the first 11 months of the year compared with the same period in 2024.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投資曾是中國擺脱困境的最快方式。今年前 11 個月，固定資產投資與 2024 年同期相比下降了 2.6%。</p>
</div><p>The drag is dominated by property, where investment fell nearly 16% over the same period.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>拖累主要來自房地產，房地產投資在同期下降了近 16%。</p>
</div><p>Once a quarter of economic activity when related sectors were included, property has shifted from growth engine to structural restraint.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>曾經佔經濟活動四分之一的房地產，在相關行業被納入後，已從增長引擎轉變為結構性約束。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-169.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Bloomberg</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>來源：彭博社</p>
</div><p>The sector once absorbed capital at scale and transmitted growth quickly. Now it does the opposite, pulling confidence down.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>該行業曾大規模吸納資本並迅速傳遞增長。現在卻恰恰相反，拉低了信心。</p>
</div><p>Infrastructure used to be the usual fallback, but now it’s also constrained.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>基礎設施曾是常規的後備選擇，但現在也受到限制。</p>
</div><p>Local governments face tighter borrowing limits and are using more funding capacity to refinance existing obligations rather than start new projects.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>地方政府面臨更嚴格的借貸限制，更多的融資能力用於再融資現有債務，而不是啓動新項目。</p>
</div><p>Investment has not disappeared, but it has become slower, more selective, and less powerful as a growth engine.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投資並沒有消失，但變得更慢、更具選擇性，作為增長引擎的力量也減弱了。</p>
</div><p>There is also intent behind the slowdown. Policymakers have become more explicit about curbing inefficient investment and excess capacity.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>減速背後也有意圖。政策制定者已變得更加明確，旨在遏制低效投資和過剩產能。</p>
</div><p>This has narrowed the scope for blunt stimulus. Growth is no longer something that can be accelerated simply by building more.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這縮小了粗放型刺激的範圍。增長不再是簡單通過增加建設來加速的事情。</p>
</div><h2>Consumption is weak despite targeted support</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>儘管有針對性支持，消費仍然疲軟</h2>
</div><p>Household spending has proven stubbornly difficult to revive. Retail sales grew just 1.3% in November from a year earlier.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>家庭支出證明難以復甦。11 月份零售銷售同比僅增長 1.3%。</p>
</div><p>That was down from 2.9% in October and the weakest pace outside the pandemic period.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這低於 10 月份的 2.9%，也是疫情期間以外的最低增速。</p>
</div><p>The worrying part, however is that retail growth has slowed for six straight months, the longest such run since 2020.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，更令人擔憂的是，零售增長已連續六個月放緩，這是自 2020 年以來最長的持續下滑。</p>
</div><p>The composition of spending is telling. Auto sales fell around 8% year on year, and home appliance sales dropped close to 19%, based on industry and official data.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>消費構成顯示出問題。根據行業和官方數據，汽車銷售同比下降約 8%，家電銷售下降近 19%。</p>
</div><p>Both categories had been lifted earlier by trade-in subsidies. When those effects faded, demand followed.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這兩個類別之前曾因以舊換新補貼而受到提振。當這些效應消退時，需求也隨之下降。</p>
</div><p>This is not a story of liquidity shortages. Consumers are simply hesitant to spend.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這並不是流動性短缺的問題。消費者只是對消費持謹慎態度。</p>
</div><p>Urban unemployment rate held at 5.1% in November, while youth unemployment remains elevated above 17%, limiting confidence in income growth.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>11 月份城市失業率保持在 5.1%，而青年失業率仍高於 17%，限制了對收入增長的信心。</p>
</div><p>More importantly, falling property prices continue to affect household behavior.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>更重要的是，房地產價格下跌繼續影響家庭行為。</p>
</div><p>Average home prices across major cities declined again in November, extending a multi-year slide.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>11 月份主要城市的平均房價再次下降，延續了多年的下滑趨勢。</p>
</div><p>With the International Monetary Fund estimating that around 70% of household wealth is tied to real estate, even modest price declines have outsized effects on spending decisions.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>國際貨幣基金組織估計，約 70% 的家庭財富與房地產相關，即使是適度的價格下跌也會對消費決策產生過大的影響。</p>
</div><p>Subsidies can shift the timing of purchases, but they cannot offset a sustained erosion of perceived wealth.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>補貼可以改變購買的時機，但無法抵消持續的財富感知侵蝕。</p>
</div><h2>Exports are carrying growth, and attracting scrutiny</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>出口支撐增長，並引發關注</h2>
</div><p>With domestic demand under pressure, exports have absorbed much of the slack.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在國內需求承壓的情況下，出口吸收了大部分的閒置產能。</p>
</div><p>Industrial production grew 4.8% year on year in November, outperforming consumption and investment, supported by strong overseas orders.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>11 月份工業生產同比增長 4.8%，表現優於消費和投資，得益於強勁的海外訂單。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-170.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Reuters</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>來源：路透社</p>
</div><p>The result has been a record trade surplus of roughly $1.1 trillion in the first eleven months of 2025, according to customs data.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>根據海關數據，2025 年前 11 個月的貿易順差創下約 1.1 萬億美元的紀錄。</p>
</div><p>From a growth accounting perspective, exports have been decisive in keeping GDP near the government’s 5% target.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>從增長核算的角度來看，出口在保持 GDP 接近政府 5% 目標方面發揮了決定性作用。</p>
</div><p>Exports also carry fewer immediate fiscal costs. They bypass household confidence, do not rely on local government balance sheets, and deliver output quickly.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>出口也帶來了較少的直接財政成本。它們繞過家庭信心，不依賴地方政府的資產負債表，並迅速交付產出。</p>
</div><p>In a constrained policy environment, that makes them attractive.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在政策環境受限的情況下，這使得出口變得具有吸引力。</p>
</div><p>But the costs are accumulating. Persistent excess supply has kept producer prices in deflation for more than three years.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但成本正在累積。持續的過剩供應使得生產者價格在三年多的時間裏處於通縮狀態。</p>
</div><p>Externally, trade partners are responding with tariff threats and new barriers, not only in the United States but across Europe and emerging markets.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在外部，貿易伙伴正以關税威脅和新壁壘作出回應，不僅在美國，還在歐洲和新興市場。</p>
</div><p>Export strength that once relieved pressure is increasingly generating it.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>曾經緩解壓力的出口強勁，現在卻越來越產生壓力。</p>
</div><h2>Markets are improving faster than fundamentals</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>市場改善速度快於基本面</h2>
</div><p>While the real economy struggles to regain momentum, China’s financial markets have moved in the opposite direction.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>儘管實體經濟努力恢復動力，中國的金融市場卻朝着相反的方向發展。</p>
</div><p>Equities, the yuan, and onshore government bonds are all on track to post gains in 2025, a combination not seen in several years.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>股票、人民幣和在岸政府債券都在 2025 年有望實現增長，這是近年來未曾見過的組合。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/image-171.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Bloomberg</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>來源：彭博社</p>
</div><p>Foreign investors increased holdings of Chinese equities at the fastest pace since 2020 as of the third quarter, while demand for offshore sovereign bonds remained strong despite low yields.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>截至第三季度，外國投資者以自 2020 年以來最快的速度增加了對中國股票的持有，而儘管收益率較低，離岸主權債券的需求仍然強勁。</p>
</div><p>The yuan is heading toward its first annual gain against the dollar since 2021.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>人民幣正朝着自 2021 年以來首次對美元實現年度升值的方向發展。</p>
</div><p>Perhaps this was about policy, with authorities rolling out liquidity tools to support equities, easing regulatory pressure on parts of the private sector, and emphasizing growth stability.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>也許這與政策有關，政府推出流動性工具以支持股票市場，減輕對私營部門某些部分的監管壓力，並強調增長穩定。</p>
</div><p>Valuations also played a role, with Chinese assets still trading at a discount to global peers.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>估值也發揮了作用，中國資產仍以折扣價交易於全球同行。</p>
</div><p>Yet the market rally has not translated into a broader economic lift.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，市場的反彈並沒有轉化為更廣泛的經濟提升。</p>
</div><p>Households have gained an estimated 4.5 trillion yuan from rising equity prices over the past two years, but that is small compared with the roughly 20 trillion yuan decline in residential property values over the same period, based on estimates cited by market analysts.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>家庭在過去兩年中從股價上漲中獲得了約 4.5 萬億元的收益，但與同期住宅物業價值約 20 萬億元的下降相比，這一數字顯得微不足道，市場分析師的估計顯示。</p>
</div><p>The wealth effect from stocks is simply overwhelmed by losses in housing.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>股票的財富效應被住房損失所淹沒。</p>
</div><h2>Why next year looks harder than this one</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>為什麼明年看起來比今年更困難</h2>
</div><p>Policymakers have pledged continued support through fiscal spending, ultra-long-term bonds, and moderate monetary easing.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>政策制定者承諾通過財政支出、超長期債券和適度的貨幣寬鬆繼續提供支持。</p>
</div><p>At the same time, they are practicing restraint.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>與此同時，他們也在實踐剋制。</p>
</div><p>Large-scale stimulus risks reviving debt problems and undermining efforts to curb overcapacity.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>大規模刺激有可能重燃債務問題，並削弱遏制過剩產能的努力。</p>
</div><p>Direct income transfers would boost consumption but require fiscal and institutional shifts Beijing has long avoided.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>直接的收入轉移將促進消費，但需要財政和制度上的轉變，而北京長期以來一直避免。</p>
</div><p>The result is a strategy focused on stabilization rather than acceleration.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>結果是一個專注於穩定而非加速的策略。</p>
</div><p>Growth is supported, but not re-engineered. Markets respond to that reassurance. Households and firms remain cautious.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>增長得到了支持，但並未重新設計。市場對此表示放心。家庭和企業依然保持謹慎。</p>
</div><p>China is running out of low-cost ways to generate growth, as it has done in the past.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中國正在耗盡過去生成增長的低成本方式。</p>
</div><p>The data show an economy that still produces, still exports, and still attracts capital, but increasingly struggles to turn those strengths into confidence at home.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>數據顯示，經濟仍在生產、仍在出口、仍在吸引資本，但越來越難以將這些優勢轉化為國內信心。</p>
</div><p>That gap between what China can do and what it can rely on is now the defining feature of its economic outlook.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中國能夠做到的與其可以依賴的之間的差距，現在已成為其經濟前景的決定性特徵。</p>
</div><p>The post China’s economy is running out of growth options appeared first on Invezz</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>關於中國經濟增長選項耗盡的文章最早出現在 Invezz 上。</p>
</div>

中國經濟正在失去增長的選擇