<p>倫敦：中國 2026 年的經濟增長目標為 4.5% 至 5%，是幾十年來最低的，脱離了過去三年疫情後 5% 的基準。這被廣泛解讀為一個重要的時刻。這個目標是在全國兩會期間公佈的，這是中國一年一度最大的政治集會，同時還公佈了世界第二大經濟體的第十五個五年規劃的細節，這一點非常重要。這不僅僅是年度的調整，而是一個戰略框架的開場白。但需要注意的數字實際上是 2% 到 3%。這是 Enodo Economics 對中國潛在增長率的估計——經濟在不產生通脹壓力的情況下可以擴張的速度。這個數字與官方目標之間的差距反映了北京所面臨的困境，以及它仍需走的路。潛在增長為何較低潛在增長由經濟的長期生產能力決定，這取決於勞動力、資本投資和生產率的增長。在中國的情況下，前兩者同時對增長產生了負面影響，這使得一切都寄託在第三個因素上。中國的勞動力供應已經在縮減。自 2010 年代初以來，勞動年齡人口一直在下降，而全國總人口已經連續四年下降。隨着年輕人進入勞動力市場的人數減少，人口老齡化，可用工人的池子逐漸縮小。這種不可逆轉的人口結構變化減少了中國過去增長的一個關鍵驅動力，並且在未來幾年內極難逆轉。資本不太可能為增長提供太多支持。多年的重資產投資於房地產和基礎設施使中國積累了大量未充分利用且回報率低的資產。消化這些過剩產能將需要時間。因此，新投資只會在邊際上增加生產能力，而大量現有資本正在變得過時。這使得生產率增長成為唯一的引擎。北京對此心知肚明。第十五個五年規劃將 “新質量生產力”——技術創新、先進製造、人工智能和數字化轉型——置於其增長框架的中心。投資正被引導向半導體、量子技術、具身人工智能和下一代數字基礎設施，核心數字經濟目標是達到 GDP 的 12.5%。戰略意圖明確，中國在大規模執行產業政策方面的良好記錄意味着這一雄心不應被忽視。實際上，我比大多數人更樂觀。經濟現狀如何？但在建立世界級產業與產生足以抵消兩個同時存在的結構性拖累的生產率增長之間存在差異。這種增長在歷史上是異常的——可能，但不應作為基線預測。接近 5% 的目標似乎是政治妥協，而不是對現實的全面審視。它也指向一個很少有人預期的結果：通脹。一些分析師看到三年價格下跌，得出中國經濟仍在遠低於其產能運行，因此北京需要更大力度刺激以擺脱通縮的結論。這種推理可以理解，但具有誤導性。可以這樣想：一個從低迷中復甦的經濟不會在一夜之間從疲弱轉為強勁。在復甦過程中，價格停止快速下跌——通縮變得不那麼嚴重，甚至在完全消失之前。這種緩和是信號。它表明經濟正在接近或已經達到其極限——而不是仍然需要更多的燃料。中國的通縮悄然結束這正是中國數據所顯示的。生產者價格仍在下降，但幅度越來越小。核心消費價格在緩慢上升。以 GDP 平減指數衡量的通縮正在縮小。綜合來看，這些趨勢表明經濟在 2 月份的數據到來之前已經在或接近滿負荷運行。中國國家統計局的最新數據進一步證實了這一點。關鍵的信號不在於價格水平，而在於價格方向的變化。2 月份 CPI 同比增長 1.3%——三年來的最高水平，比 1 月份的 0.2% 大幅上升。核心通脹飆升至 1.8%——自 2019 年 3 月以來的最高水平。2 月份生產者價格同比下降 0.9%，較 1 月份的 1.4% 降幅大幅縮小。工廠門口的通縮正在緩解。從生產者到消費者價格的傳導鏈條開始填補。春節的需求和旅行發揮了作用。但這個節日每年都會到來。不同的是它所放大的潛在趨勢。中國的通縮時代並不是以轟鳴聲結束，而是以一種漸進的、幾乎看不見的潮流轉變結束——只有在觀察變化率而不是水平時才能看出。伊朗的衝突預計將使油價保持高位，並進一步對生產者和消費者價格施加上行壓力——但國內動態已經在發揮作用。穩定還是衰退？在明顯的跡象表明正在走出通縮螺旋的情況下，中國最低的增長目標應被視為一個正在穩定的成熟經濟，還是一個正在衰退並降低增長預期的經濟？這兩種框架都不完全適用。中國並沒有衰退。其生產能力正在重新定向，而不是耗盡，第十五個五年規劃中藴含的雄心是真實的。但這也不是簡單的穩定。這是向更慢、更平衡增長的結構性轉型的開始——這一轉型的全部影響北京尚未完全接受。這在新目標附加的 “努力實踐更好” 這一警告中顯而易見。這一逃生條款表明領導層仍然傾向於在增長令人失望時尋求舊的刺激手冊。更深層的諷刺是，更緊迫的風險並不是中國經濟放緩過多，而是過熱。市場尚未建立一個框架，以應對中國在通脹而非通縮方面帶來的意外。2 月份的數據表明，他們應該開始。戴安娜·喬伊列娃是 Enodo Economics 的創始人兼首席經濟學家，也是全球宏觀經濟、中國及美中戰略競爭的主題演講者。她還是亞洲協會政策研究所中國分析中心的高級研究員。</p>

上證指數

中概股 ETF - PowerShares

滬深300

<p>中國將 2026 年的經濟增長目標設定為 4.5% 至 5%，這是幾十年來的最低水平，反映出與之前 5% 的基準的顯著變化。分析師估計，由於勞動力減少和資本未充分利用，該國的潛在增長率僅為 2% 至 3%。第十五個五年規劃強調技術創新和數字轉型作為主要增長動力。最近的數據表明，通縮逐漸結束，消費者價格上漲暗示經濟可能接近滿負荷運轉，儘管仍面臨結構性挑戰</p>

<p>LONDON: China’s 2026 economic growth target of 4.5 to 5 per cent is its lowest in decades, moving off the 5 per cent anchor of the past three post-pandemic years. This has been widely read as a moment of reckoning. That the target was unveiled during the Two Sessions , China’s biggest annual political gathering, alongside details of the 15th Five-Year Plan for the world’s second-largest economy is important context. This is not just an annual calibration but the opening statement of a strategic framework. But the number to note is actually 2 to 3 per cent. That is Enodo Economics’ estimate of China’s potential growth rate - the speed at which the economy can expand without generating inflation pressure. The gap between that figure and the official target captures the bind Beijing is in, and how far it still has to travel.WHY POTENTIAL GROWTH IS LOWER Potential growth is determined by the economy’s long-run productive capacity, which depends on growth in the labour force, capital investments and productivity. In China’s case, the first two are working against growth simultaneously, which leaves everything riding on the third. China’s labour supply is already shrinking. The working-age population has been declining since the early 2010s, and the country’s total population has now fallen for four consecutive years. As fewer young people enter the labour market and the population ages, the pool of available workers gradually contracts. The inexorable demographic shift has reduced one of the key drivers of China’s past growth and is extremely hard to reverse in the next few years. Capital is unlikely to provide much support to growth. Years of heavy investment in property and infrastructure have left China with a vast stock of underutilised and often low-return assets. Absorbing this excess capacity will take time. New investment therefore adds to productive capacity only at the margin, while a large share of existing capital is becoming obsolete. That leaves productivity growth as the only engine. Beijing knows this. The 15th Five-Year Plan places “new quality productive forces” – technological innovation, advanced manufacturing, AI and digital transformation – at the centre of its growth framework. Investment is being directed toward semiconductors, quantum technology, embodied AI and next-generation digital infrastructure, with the core digital economy targeted to reach 12.5 per cent of GDP. The strategic intent is clear, and China’s track record of executing industrial policy at scale means the ambition should not be dismissed. Indeed, I am more optimistic than most. WHERE IS THE ECONOMY NOW? But there is a difference between building world-class industries and generating productivity gains large enough to offset two simultaneous structural drags. Growth of that kind would be historically exceptional – possible, but not something to embed in a baseline forecast. A target near 5 per cent seems a political compromise rather than a full reckoning with that reality. It also points toward an outcome very few are expecting: inflation. Some analysts look at three years of falling prices and conclude that China's economy must still be running well below its capacity and that Beijing therefore needs to stimulate harder to escape deflation. That reasoning is understandable but misleading. Think of it this way: An economy emerging from a slump does not flip overnight from weak to strong. As it recovers, prices stop falling as fast – deflation becomes less severe, even before it disappears altogether. That easing is the signal. It says the economy is approaching, or has already reached, its limits – not that it still needs more fuel. CHINA’S DEFLATION IS QUIETLY ENDING That is precisely what China's data has been showing. Producer prices were still falling, but by less and less. Core consumer prices were creeping higher. Deflation, measured by the GDP deflator, was narrowing. Taken together, these trends pointed to an economy already running at or close to full capacity even before February's figures arrived. The latest data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics adds to the evidence. The key signal lies not in the level of prices but in the change in their direction. February CPI came in at 1.3 per cent year-on-year - a three-year high and a sharp jump from 0.2 per cent in January. Core inflation surged to 1.8 per cent - its highest reading since March 2019. Producer prices fell 0.9 per cent year-on-year in February, narrowing sharply from the 1.4 per cent decline in January. Factory-gate deflation is easing. The pipeline from producer to consumer prices is beginning to fill. Chinese New Year demand and travel played a role. But this festive season comes every year. What is different is the underlying trend it has been amplifying. China’s deflationary era is not ending with a bang but with a gradual, almost invisible turning of the tide - visible only if you were watching the rate of change rather than the level. The conflict in Iran is expected to keep oil prices elevated and add further upward pressure on producer and consumer prices - but the domestic dynamics were already doing the work. STABILISATION OR DECLINE? Amid clear signs of exiting the deflationary spiral, should China’s lowest growth target be seen as a maturing economy that is stabilising – or one that is in decline and dialing back on growth ambitions? Neither framing quite fits. China is not in decline. Its productive capacity is being redirected, not exhausted, and the ambition embedded in the 15th Five-Year Plan is genuine. But this is not simple stabilisation either. It is the beginning of a structural transition toward slower, more balanced growth – one whose full implications Beijing has not yet fully accepted. This is plain to see in the caveat “striving for better in practice” attached to the new target. That escape clause signals a leadership still tempted to reach for the old stimulus playbook the moment growth disappoints. The deeper irony is that the more pressing risk is not that China’s economy slows too much. It is that it overheats. Markets have yet to build a framework for a China that surprises on inflation rather than deflation. The February data suggests they should start. Diana Choyleva is founder and chief economist of Enodo Economics and a keynote speaker on global macroeconomics, China, and U.S.–China strategic competition. She is also a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>倫敦：中國 2026 年的經濟增長目標為 4.5% 至 5%，是幾十年來最低的，脱離了過去三年疫情後 5% 的基準。這被廣泛解讀為一個重要的時刻。這個目標是在全國兩會期間公佈的，這是中國一年一度最大的政治集會，同時還公佈了世界第二大經濟體的第十五個五年規劃的細節，這一點非常重要。這不僅僅是年度的調整，而是一個戰略框架的開場白。但需要注意的數字實際上是 2% 到 3%。這是 Enodo Economics 對中國潛在增長率的估計——經濟在不產生通脹壓力的情況下可以擴張的速度。這個數字與官方目標之間的差距反映了北京所面臨的困境，以及它仍需走的路。潛在增長為何較低潛在增長由經濟的長期生產能力決定，這取決於勞動力、資本投資和生產率的增長。在中國的情況下，前兩者同時對增長產生了負面影響，這使得一切都寄託在第三個因素上。中國的勞動力供應已經在縮減。自 2010 年代初以來，勞動年齡人口一直在下降，而全國總人口已經連續四年下降。隨着年輕人進入勞動力市場的人數減少，人口老齡化，可用工人的池子逐漸縮小。這種不可逆轉的人口結構變化減少了中國過去增長的一個關鍵驅動力，並且在未來幾年內極難逆轉。資本不太可能為增長提供太多支持。多年的重資產投資於房地產和基礎設施使中國積累了大量未充分利用且回報率低的資產。消化這些過剩產能將需要時間。因此，新投資只會在邊際上增加生產能力，而大量現有資本正在變得過時。這使得生產率增長成為唯一的引擎。北京對此心知肚明。第十五個五年規劃將 “新質量生產力”——技術創新、先進製造、人工智能和數字化轉型——置於其增長框架的中心。投資正被引導向半導體、量子技術、具身人工智能和下一代數字基礎設施，核心數字經濟目標是達到 GDP 的 12.5%。戰略意圖明確，中國在大規模執行產業政策方面的良好記錄意味着這一雄心不應被忽視。實際上，我比大多數人更樂觀。經濟現狀如何？但在建立世界級產業與產生足以抵消兩個同時存在的結構性拖累的生產率增長之間存在差異。這種增長在歷史上是異常的——可能，但不應作為基線預測。接近 5% 的目標似乎是政治妥協，而不是對現實的全面審視。它也指向一個很少有人預期的結果：通脹。一些分析師看到三年價格下跌，得出中國經濟仍在遠低於其產能運行，因此北京需要更大力度刺激以擺脱通縮的結論。這種推理可以理解，但具有誤導性。可以這樣想：一個從低迷中復甦的經濟不會在一夜之間從疲弱轉為強勁。在復甦過程中，價格停止快速下跌——通縮變得不那麼嚴重，甚至在完全消失之前。這種緩和是信號。它表明經濟正在接近或已經達到其極限——而不是仍然需要更多的燃料。中國的通縮悄然結束這正是中國數據所顯示的。生產者價格仍在下降，但幅度越來越小。核心消費價格在緩慢上升。以 GDP 平減指數衡量的通縮正在縮小。綜合來看，這些趨勢表明經濟在 2 月份的數據到來之前已經在或接近滿負荷運行。中國國家統計局的最新數據進一步證實了這一點。關鍵的信號不在於價格水平，而在於價格方向的變化。2 月份 CPI 同比增長 1.3%——三年來的最高水平，比 1 月份的 0.2% 大幅上升。核心通脹飆升至 1.8%——自 2019 年 3 月以來的最高水平。2 月份生產者價格同比下降 0.9%，較 1 月份的 1.4% 降幅大幅縮小。工廠門口的通縮正在緩解。從生產者到消費者價格的傳導鏈條開始填補。春節的需求和旅行發揮了作用。但這個節日每年都會到來。不同的是它所放大的潛在趨勢。中國的通縮時代並不是以轟鳴聲結束，而是以一種漸進的、幾乎看不見的潮流轉變結束——只有在觀察變化率而不是水平時才能看出。伊朗的衝突預計將使油價保持高位，並進一步對生產者和消費者價格施加上行壓力——但國內動態已經在發揮作用。穩定還是衰退？在明顯的跡象表明正在走出通縮螺旋的情況下，中國最低的增長目標應被視為一個正在穩定的成熟經濟，還是一個正在衰退並降低增長預期的經濟？這兩種框架都不完全適用。中國並沒有衰退。其生產能力正在重新定向，而不是耗盡，第十五個五年規劃中藴含的雄心是真實的。但這也不是簡單的穩定。這是向更慢、更平衡增長的結構性轉型的開始——這一轉型的全部影響北京尚未完全接受。這在新目標附加的 “努力實踐更好” 這一警告中顯而易見。這一逃生條款表明領導層仍然傾向於在增長令人失望時尋求舊的刺激手冊。更深層的諷刺是，更緊迫的風險並不是中國經濟放緩過多，而是過熱。市場尚未建立一個框架，以應對中國在通脹而非通縮方面帶來的意外。2 月份的數據表明，他們應該開始。戴安娜·喬伊列娃是 Enodo Economics 的創始人兼首席經濟學家，也是全球宏觀經濟、中國及美中戰略競爭的主題演講者。她還是亞洲協會政策研究所中國分析中心的高級研究員。</p>
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評論：中國下調增長目標——但這仍然不夠低