<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png"/></p>
<p>上週，油價突破 100 美元，因為霍爾木茲海峽的運輸流量減緩。油輪猶豫不決，保險公司提高了保費，交易員開始調整投資組合。</p>
<p>美國要求其盟友確保通行——在以往的危機中，這是一個簡單的請求。這一次，回應幾乎是普遍的否定。</p>
<p>這種拒絕超越了霍爾木茲海峽。它標誌着一個更長故事中最新和最明顯的信號——美國總統與傳統夥伴日益疏遠，影響從外交到市場。</p>
<h2>保護主義如何重塑聯盟</h2>
<p>當特朗普在 2025 年重新上任時，他恢復了許多在其第一任期內引發爭議的政策。對競爭對手和盟友都徵收了關税。</p>
<p>貿易協議圍繞交易邏輯重新構建：<em>“你受益，你付費。”</em></p>
<p>歐洲和亞洲的夥伴面臨反覆的經濟壓力，從汽車出口到技術獲取。</p>
<p>思路很簡單——為美國提供更多槓桿，更好的國內結果。</p>
<p>對聯盟的影響遠沒有那麼明顯。</p>
<p>隨着時間的推移，反覆的單邊行動侵蝕了信任。</p>
<p>華盛頓的請求不再自動獲得重視。盟友開始將每個請求與日益增長的不可預測性和自利意識進行權衡。</p>
<p>現在，每次談判都引發同樣的問題：被捲入美國主導的行動的風險是什麼？</p>
<h2>和平委員會與多邊主義的幻覺</h2>
<p>在 2026 年初，特朗普推出了和平委員會。</p>
<p>乍一看，它像是一個重建和衝突管理機構。到年中，其職權範圍已擴展至全球。</p>
<p>會員資格需要財務貢獻，決策權集中在總統辦公室。</p>
<p>傳統的多邊機構如聯合國實際上被邊緣化。</p>
<p>歐洲國家對該委員會持懷疑態度。新興大國選擇性加入，更多是出於合同或獲取資源的動機，而非共同目標。</p>
<p>然而，該委員會揭示的是，美國領導層越來越優先考慮控制而非協調。</p>
<p>盟友被邀請但未被賦權。合作變得交易化、有條件，最終變得選擇性。</p>
<h2>霍爾木茲海峽作為測試</h2>
<p>與伊朗的衝突在 2026 年 3 月急劇升級。伊朗干擾了霍爾木茲海峽，約 20% 的全球石油供應通過該海峽。</p>
<p>價格立即飆升，但外交後果更為明顯。</p>
<p>當美國請求盟友提供海軍支持以確保通行時，答案大多是否定的。</p>
<p>德國、法國和英國拒絕了。日本、韓國和印度避免直接參與。</p>
<p>中國與德黑蘭展開談判，而不是加入美國主導的努力。即使是北約夥伴也保持在旁觀者的角色。</p>
<p>這些拒絕是經過深思熟慮的。各國政府劃清了捍衞經濟流動與參與未經授權的戰爭之間的界限。</p>
<p>他們的風險評估將升級、地區衝突和直接報復的危險置於供應中斷的成本之上。</p>
<p>對華盛頓目標的懷疑加劇了猶豫。實際上，世界允許一場美國發起的衝突在沒有協調支持的情況下展開——即使風險達到了全球重要的水平。</p>
<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png"/></p>
<p>來源：Invezz</p>
<h2>市場和投資者調整</h2>
<p>市場反應反映的不僅僅是失去的桶——交易員現在正在定價長期的干擾。</p>
<p>航運保險費飆升。</p>
<p>油輪已重新航線或停泊等待，進一步收緊供應。繞過霍爾木茲的管道和來自美洲和非洲的替代來源引起了新的關注。</p>
<p>股票市場清晰地顯示出分歧：能源生產商正在獲得鉅額利潤，而化工和航空等燃料密集型行業面臨利潤縮減。</p>
<p>中央銀行在通脹壓力和經濟增長放緩之間感到不安。</p>
<p>供應鏈衝擊、價格波動和地緣政治裂痕不再受到假定的美國主導協調的緩衝。</p>
<p>盟友支持的乘數效應——曾經是關鍵的穩定因素——正在迅速消退。</p>
<h2>為什麼這個時刻獨特？</h2>
<p>特朗普的孤立並非一夜之間產生。保護主義政策造成了摩擦；和平委員會將單邊控制制度化。</p>
<p>霍爾木茲危機現在清晰地體現了後果。</p>
<p>盟友通過新的過濾器評估美國的請求——合法性、風險和共同利益。自動對齊已消失。</p>
<p>戰略自主正在加速：歐洲在追求超越美國主導框架的外交；亞洲經濟體則採取對沖而非對齊；中國則將自己定位為平行的對話者。</p>
<p>這些不是邊緣的變化，而是更為多極化體系的基礎——在這個體系中，美國的軍事力量仍然無與倫比，但聯盟能力，真正的影響力放大器，正在減弱。</p>
<p>這一變化也改變了風險的定價方式。市場、投資者和政策制定者現在將干擾視為更持久和更具傳染性。能源供應風險和地緣政治風險日益交織。</p>
<p>油價衝擊不再被視為由聯盟存在緩衝的暫時異常。投資者策略現在必須考慮美國主導干預的結構性限制。</p>
<h2>更大的洞察</h2>
<p>特朗普的做法強調了聯盟行為的根本變化。軍事力量仍在；而聯盟建設卻不復存在。經濟相互依存不再保證政治一致。</p>
<p>即使在威脅全球貿易的危機中，盟友現在在行動之前也會權衡合法性、暴露和國家利益。</p>
<p>霍爾木茲海峽已不僅僅是一個瓶頸——它成為了當前全球秩序的試金石。談判桌上的空位、拒絕參與和選擇性接觸揭示了一個新現實：美國仍然可以行動，但不再能假設其他國家會跟隨。</p>
<p>市場反應，投資者調整，地緣政治格局實時重新校準。</p>
<p>在實際操作中，石油流動最終會恢復。戰略儲備、替代路線和外交將緩解壓力。</p>
<p>但美國的影響力現在是有條件的。曾經放大美國力量的聯盟乘數效應正在減弱。</p>
<p>而這種減弱對市場、供應鏈和全球風險評估的影響遠超波斯灣。</p>
<p>這篇文章的標題是《霍爾木茲海峽危機是否暴露了美國力量的侷限性？》，最初發布在 Invezz 上。</p>

能源業 ETF - Vanguard

標普全球能源股指數 ETF - iShares

美國石油設備與服務 ETF - iShares

<p>霍爾木茲海峽危機突顯了美國影響力的減弱，因油價因流量減緩而飆升至 100 美元以上。美國請求盟友確保通行的要求遭到廣泛拒絕，反映出與傳統夥伴關係的日益疏遠。特朗普政府的保護主義政策削弱了信任，導致對聯盟的交易性看法。此次危機促使市場進行調整，航運保險費上漲，供應鏈發生變化，表明向一個多極化體系的轉變，其中美國主導的協調作用正在減弱</p>

<p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/ChatGPT-Image-Mar-17-2026-08_48_37-AM.png"/></p>
<p>Oil prices surged past $100 last weekas flows through the Strait of Hormuz slowed. Tankers hesitated, insurers raised premiums, and traders began adjusting portfolios.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>上週，油價突破 100 美元，因為霍爾木茲海峽的運輸流量減緩。油輪猶豫不決，保險公司提高了保費，交易員開始調整投資組合。</p>
</div><p>The US asked its allies to secure the passage — a straightforward request in any previous crisis. This time, the response was almost universally negative.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>美國要求其盟友確保通行——在以往的危機中，這是一個簡單的請求。這一次，回應幾乎是普遍的否定。</p>
</div><p>That refusal goes beyond Hormuz. It marks the latest and most visible signal in a longer story — one of a US president increasingly estranged from traditional partners, with consequences stretching from diplomacy to markets.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這種拒絕超越了霍爾木茲海峽。它標誌着一個更長故事中最新和最明顯的信號——美國總統與傳統夥伴日益疏遠，影響從外交到市場。</p>
</div><h2>How protectionism reshaped alliances</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>保護主義如何重塑聯盟</h2>
</div><p>When Trump returned to office in 2025, he revived many of the policies that proved controversial during his first term.Tariffs were imposed on rivals and allies alike.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>當特朗普在 2025 年重新上任時，他恢復了許多在其第一任期內引發爭議的政策。對競爭對手和盟友都徵收了關税。</p>
</div><p>Trade deals were recast around transactional logic: <em>“You benefit, you pay.”</em></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>貿易協議圍繞交易邏輯重新構建：<em>“你受益，你付費。”</em></p>
</div><p>European and Asian partners came under repeated economic pressure, from automotive exports to technology access.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>歐洲和亞洲的夥伴面臨反覆的經濟壓力，從汽車出口到技術獲取。</p>
</div><p>The thinking was simple — more leverage for the US, better domestic outcomes.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>思路很簡單——為美國提供更多槓桿，更好的國內結果。</p>
</div><p>The effect on alliances was far less so.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>對聯盟的影響遠沒有那麼明顯。</p>
</div><p>Over time, repeated unilateral actions eroded trust.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>隨着時間的推移，反覆的單邊行動侵蝕了信任。</p>
</div><p>Requests from Washington no longer carried automatic weight. Allies began to weigh each appeal against a growing perception of unpredictability and self‑interest.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>華盛頓的請求不再自動獲得重視。盟友開始將每個請求與日益增長的不可預測性和自利意識進行權衡。</p>
</div><p>Now, every negotiation prompts the same question: What is the risk of being dragged into a US‑led action?</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>現在，每次談判都引發同樣的問題：被捲入美國主導的行動的風險是什麼？</p>
</div><h2>The Board of Peace and the illusion of multilateralism</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>和平委員會與多邊主義的幻覺</h2>
</div><p>In early 2026, Trumpintroduced the Board of Peace.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在 2026 年初，特朗普推出了和平委員會。</p>
</div><p>At first glance, it looked like a reconstruction and conflict‑management body. By mid‑year, its remit had expanded globally.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>乍一看，它像是一個重建和衝突管理機構。到年中，其職權範圍已擴展至全球。</p>
</div><p>Membership required financial contributions, and decision‑making was centralised in the president’s office.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>會員資格需要財務貢獻，決策權集中在總統辦公室。</p>
</div><p>Traditional multilateral institutions such as the UN were effectively sidelined.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>傳統的多邊機構如聯合國實際上被邊緣化。</p>
</div><p>European nations viewed the board with scepticism. Emerging powers joined selectively, motivated more by contracts or access than by shared purpose.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>歐洲國家對該委員會持懷疑態度。新興大國選擇性加入，更多是出於合同或獲取資源的動機，而非共同目標。</p>
</div><p>What the board revealed, however, is that US leadership increasingly prioritises control over coordination.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，該委員會揭示的是，美國領導層越來越優先考慮控制而非協調。</p>
</div><p>Allies were invited but not empowered. Cooperation became transactional, conditional, and ultimately selective.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>盟友被邀請但未被賦權。合作變得交易化、有條件，最終變得選擇性。</p>
</div><h2>The Strait of Hormuz as a test</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>霍爾木茲海峽作為測試</h2>
</div><p>Theconflict with Iran escalatedsharply in March 2026.Iran disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly 20% of the global oil supply.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>與伊朗的衝突在 2026 年 3 月急劇升級。伊朗干擾了霍爾木茲海峽，約 20% 的全球石油供應通過該海峽。</p>
</div><p>Prices spiked immediately, but the diplomatic fallout was even more telling.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>價格立即飆升，但外交後果更為明顯。</p>
</div><p>When the US requested naval support from allies to secure the passage, the answer was largely negative.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>當美國請求盟友提供海軍支持以確保通行時，答案大多是否定的。</p>
</div><p>Germany, France, and the United Kingdom declined. Japan, South Korea, and India avoided direct involvement.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>德國、法國和英國拒絕了。日本、韓國和印度避免直接參與。</p>
</div><p>China opened talks with Tehran rather than joining a US‑led effort. Even NATO partners stayed on the sidelines.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中國與德黑蘭展開談判，而不是加入美國主導的努力。即使是北約夥伴也保持在旁觀者的角色。</p>
</div><p>These refusals were calculated. Governments drew a line between defending economic flows and joining a war they had not authorised.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這些拒絕是經過深思熟慮的。各國政府劃清了捍衞經濟流動與參與未經授權的戰爭之間的界限。</p>
</div><p>Their risk assessments placed the danger of escalation, regional conflict, and direct retaliation above the cost of supply disruptions.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>他們的風險評估將升級、地區衝突和直接報復的危險置於供應中斷的成本之上。</p>
</div><p>Doubt over Washington’s objectives compounded the hesitation. In effect, the world allowed a US‑initiated conflict to unfold without coordinated support — even as the stakes reached globally significant levels.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>對華盛頓目標的懷疑加劇了猶豫。實際上，世界允許一場美國發起的衝突在沒有協調支持的情況下展開——即使風險達到了全球重要的水平。</p>
</div><p><img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png" alt="" original-src="https://invezz-wp-media.lon1.digitaloceanspaces.com/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-us-allies-1.png"/></p>
<p>Source: Invezz</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>來源：Invezz</p>
</div><h2>Markets and investors adjust</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>市場和投資者調整</h2>
</div><p>The market reaction reflects more than lost barrels — traders are now pricing in prolonged disruption.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>市場反應反映的不僅僅是失去的桶——交易員現在正在定價長期的干擾。</p>
</div><p>Shipping insurance premiums have surged.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>航運保險費飆升。</p>
</div><p>Tankers have rerouted or anchored in wait, tightening supply further. Pipelines bypassing Hormuz and alternative sourcing from the Americas and Africa have drawn new attention.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>油輪已重新航線或停泊等待，進一步收緊供應。繞過霍爾木茲的管道和來自美洲和非洲的替代來源引起了新的關注。</p>
</div><p>Equities show the split clearly: energy producers are reaping windfalls, while fuel‑intensive sectors such as chemicals and airlines face shrinking margins.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>股票市場清晰地顯示出分歧：能源生產商正在獲得鉅額利潤，而化工和航空等燃料密集型行業面臨利潤縮減。</p>
</div><p>Central banks sit uncomfortably between inflationary pressure and slowing growth.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>中央銀行在通脹壓力和經濟增長放緩之間感到不安。</p>
</div><p>Supply chain shocks, price volatility, and geopolitical fractures are no longer cushioned by assumed US‑led coordination.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>供應鏈衝擊、價格波動和地緣政治裂痕不再受到假定的美國主導協調的緩衝。</p>
</div><p>The multiplier effect of allied support — once the key stabiliser — is fading fast.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>盟友支持的乘數效應——曾經是關鍵的穩定因素——正在迅速消退。</p>
</div><h2>Why is this moment unique?</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>為什麼這個時刻獨特？</h2>
</div><p>Trump’s isolation did not emerge overnight. Protectionist policies created friction; the Board of Peace institutionalised unilateral control over shared initiatives.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>特朗普的孤立並非一夜之間產生。保護主義政策造成了摩擦；和平委員會將單邊控制制度化。</p>
</div><p>The Hormuz crisis now crystallises the consequences.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>霍爾木茲危機現在清晰地體現了後果。</p>
</div><p>Allies evaluate US requests through a new filter — legitimacy, risk, and shared interest. Automatic alignment has vanished.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>盟友通過新的過濾器評估美國的請求——合法性、風險和共同利益。自動對齊已消失。</p>
</div><p>Strategic autonomy is accelerating: Europe is pursuing diplomacy beyond US‑led frameworks; Asian economies hedge rather than align; and China positions itself as a parallel interlocutor.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>戰略自主正在加速：歐洲在追求超越美國主導框架的外交；亞洲經濟體則採取對沖而非對齊；中國則將自己定位為平行的對話者。</p>
</div><p>These are not marginal shifts but the foundations of a more multipolar system — one in which US military power remains unmatched, but coalition capability, the true amplifier of influence, is waning.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這些不是邊緣的變化，而是更為多極化體系的基礎——在這個體系中，美國的軍事力量仍然無與倫比，但聯盟能力，真正的影響力放大器，正在減弱。</p>
</div><p>This shift also changes how risk is priced. Markets, investors, and policymakers now treat disruptions as longer‑lasting and more contagious. Energy supply risk and geopolitical risk are increasingly intertwined.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這一變化也改變了風險的定價方式。市場、投資者和政策制定者現在將干擾視為更持久和更具傳染性。能源供應風險和地緣政治風險日益交織。</p>
</div><p>Oil shocks are no longer viewed as temporary anomalies cushioned by coalition presence. Investor strategy must now account for the structural limits of US‑led intervention.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>油價衝擊不再被視為由聯盟存在緩衝的暫時異常。投資者策略現在必須考慮美國主導干預的結構性限制。</p>
</div><h2>The larger insight</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>更大的洞察</h2>
</div><p>Trump’s approach underscores a fundamental shift in alliance behaviour. Military power remains; coalition‑building does not. Economic interdependence no longer guarantees political alignment.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>特朗普的做法強調了聯盟行為的根本變化。軍事力量仍在；而聯盟建設卻不復存在。經濟相互依存不再保證政治一致。</p>
</div><p>Even in crises that threaten global trade, allies now weigh legitimacy, exposure, and national interest before acting.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>即使在威脅全球貿易的危機中，盟友現在在行動之前也會權衡合法性、暴露和國家利益。</p>
</div><p>The Strait of Hormuz has become more than a chokepoint — it is a test of the current global order. Empty seats at negotiation tables, refusals to join, and selective engagement reveal a new reality: the US can still act, but it can no longer assume others will follow.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>霍爾木茲海峽已不僅僅是一個瓶頸——它成為了當前全球秩序的試金石。談判桌上的空位、拒絕參與和選擇性接觸揭示了一個新現實：美國仍然可以行動，但不再能假設其他國家會跟隨。</p>
</div><p>Markets react, investors adjust, and the geopolitical landscape recalibrates in real time.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>市場反應，投資者調整，地緣政治格局實時重新校準。</p>
</div><p>In practical terms, oil flows will resume eventually. Strategic reserves, alternative routes, and diplomacy will ease the pressure.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在實際操作中，石油流動最終會恢復。戰略儲備、替代路線和外交將緩解壓力。</p>
</div><p>But US influence is now conditional. The coalition multiplier — the mechanism that once amplified American power — is eroding.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但美國的影響力現在是有條件的。曾經放大美國力量的聯盟乘數效應正在減弱。</p>
</div><p>And its erosion carries consequences for markets, supply chains, and global risk assessment far beyond the Persian Gulf.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>而這種減弱對市場、供應鏈和全球風險評估的影響遠超波斯灣。</p>
</div><p>The post Is the Strait of Hormuz crisis exposing the limits of US power? appeared first on Invezz</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>這篇文章的標題是《霍爾木茲海峽危機是否暴露了美國力量的侷限性？》，最初發布在 Invezz 上。</p>
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霍爾木茲海峽危機是否揭示了美國力量的侷限性？