Trump has recently sent frequent positive signals, and the possibility of the US and Iran reaching an agreement in April is rising. According to CCTV News citing US sources on the 15th, US President Trump stated that it is &#34;very likely&#34; in late April to reach an agreement with Iran before UK King Charles III visits the US.
Earlier this statement, the Industrial Securities strategy team released a research report on the 15th stating: Both objective and subjective conditions for successful US-Iran negotiations are now present, and a &#34;Big Deal&#34; is expected within April; the negotiations may represent a final arrangement. The essence of maximum pressure is &#34;bluffing,&#34; and Trump's strategy of &#34;using war to promote negotiations&#34; has shown initial results.
Specifically, the US faces a hard time constraint regarding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Trump's March 30 statement about &#34;destroying&#34; facilities has locked himself into a track of quickly reaching an agreement. Meanwhile, the US-Iran conflict has not escalated into ground war, and both Trump's strategic goals and tactical means for further escalation remain unclear. The opportunity cost of de-escalation is far lower than expanding the conflict. Additionally, the TACO index has rapidly fallen back to pre-conflict levels, while Trump still sent signals on April 14 that the war was &#34;over.&#34; His statement has decoupled from the index for the first time, signaling that substantive geopolitical easing is occurring.
As two key nodes approach—April 22 (ceasefire deadline) and April 28 (Congressional authorization date)—the negotiation rhythm is expected to be &#34;slow at first, then urgent.&#34; Iran cherishes the negotiation window under its identity as &#34;victim + victor,&#34; and economic difficulties have created high consensus on lifting sanctions. The US faces greater time pressure due to Trump's declining support rate dropping to 41%. The core demands of both sides form a bottom-line support. Notably, according to a Xinhua report on the 15th, the US and Iran are considering extending the ceasefire by two weeks.
<h2>Why the US Must Accelerate Negotiations: Three Hard Constraints Bearing Down</h2>
1. Time Hard Constraint on Reopening the Strait of Hormuz
This round of negotiations differs fundamentally from historical cases such as the Korean War or the Russia-Ukraine conflict, primarily because the US faces a hard time constraint on reopening the strait. On March 30, Trump publicly pressured, stating that if negotiations could not be &#34;reached in the short term&#34; and the strait could not be &#34;opened immediately,&#34; he would &#34;destroy all Iranian power plants, oil fields, and Kish Island.&#34; This statement has locked Trump himself onto a track of quickly reaching an agreement.
2. Conflict Has Not Escalated to Ground War; De-escalation Costs Are Low
As of the report's release, the US-Iran conflict has not evolved into ground war. Compared to further escalation, the opportunity cost for Trump to push for de-escalation is lower. More critically, his strategic goals for further escalating the conflict are unclear, and feasible tactical means are also undefined, leading to &#34;high resistance but insufficient motivation&#34; to expand the conflict. The US could completely abandon conditions reflecting Israel's demands, such as &#34;not supporting resistance forces&#34; and &#34;limiting ballistic missiles,&#34; and proactively advance negotiations through a &#34;total retreat.&#34;
3. TACO Index Shows Historical &#34;Decoupling&#34; Signal
The TACO index (composed of the inverse of the S&amp;P 500, 10-year US Treasury yield, US gasoline prices, the inverse of Trump's approval rating, and 1-year inflation swap prices) surged to a peak of Trump's second term at the end of March, then rapidly fell following Trump's nationwide address on April 1 and the US-Iran announcement of a ceasefire on April 7, approaching pre-conflict levels.
The key signal lies in this: against the backdrop of the TACO index rapidly falling, Trump still sent signals in an interview on April 14 that the war was &#34;over&#34; and &#34;very close to being over&#34; — this marks the first decoupling between his statements and the TACO index, potentially indicating that substantive easing of geopolitical conflict is underway.
<img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://wpimg-wscn.awtmt.com/9397fa7c-03fd-4602-bf06-66b84e02ae78.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://wpimg-wscn.awtmt.com/9397fa7c-03fd-4602-bf06-66b84e02ae78.png"/>
<h2>Negotiation Rhythm &#34;Slow First, Then Urgent&#34;: Two Bottom Lines Prevent Breakdown</h2>
With April 22 and April 28 approaching, the negotiation rhythm is expected to present a &#34;slow first, then urgent&#34; trend. The report argues that the core demands of both sides form a bottom-line support preventing a breakdown in negotiations.
Iran's Core Demand: Lifting Sanctions. Lifting all energy and financial sanctions is Iran's primary concern. The US showed strong sincerity early in the negotiations; the Trump administration remains open to re-signing a ceasefire agreement in 2026 containing clauses on lifting sanctions and does not view &#34;lifting sanctions&#34; as a non-negotiable chip.
US Core Demand: Ensuring Strait Transit. The report points out that Trump does not care whether Iran possesses sovereignty over the strait; his core goal is to curb overly rapid oil price increases and prevent transmission to the US financial markets via stock market declines in Japan, South Korea, and Europe. For this reason, the US has a motive to &#34;retreat again and again,&#34; potentially tacitly allowing Iran to establish a toll system for the Strait of Hormuz as a substitute for economic compensation, provided normal vessel transit is guaranteed.
Nuclear Weapons Issue Has Room for Flexibility. Iran has pledged not to develop nuclear weapons, though specific details remain negotiable. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any non-nuclear weapon state shall not develop nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapon states shall not continue nuclear tests. Iran previously signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Before the war began on February 28, there was sufficient negotiation with the US. The report suggests that &#34;trading partial denuclearization for lifted sanctions&#34; could be a small step Iran is willing to take. For the US, verbal denuclearization is already enough to satisfy domestic audiences.
According to Xinhua, citing a report from Mehr News Agency on the 13th, Nikzad, Deputy Speaker of the Islamic Parliament of Iran, stated that Iran had prepared to demonstrate goodwill toward negotiations with the US by diluting approximately 450 kilograms of enriched uranium domestically.
<h2>Both Parties Cherish the Negotiation Window, But Time Pressure Is Asymmetric</h2>
Regarding Iran: The report believes that Iran is unlikely to &#34;make sky-high demands&#34; given its favorable position. Judging by the luxurious delegation it sent to the first round of negotiations, the Iranian side values the opportunity to secure a comprehensive agreement under the dual identity of &#34;victim + victor.&#34; Current economic difficulties are highly correlated with sanctions, further enhancing the feasibility of reaching consensus on lifting sanctions.
Regarding the US: Time is not on the US side. Trump's approval rating has accelerated its decline to 41% (as of April 14), and political pressure will transmit to the negotiation delegation, pushing them to quickly use negotiation outcomes to sustain the political narrative of &#34;winning through talks.&#34;
Additionally, there is a structural constraint often overlooked: given the US capital market's heavy reliance on the global semiconductor supply chain, Trump must be wary of disruptions to imported LNG for power generation and helium, which could impact chain-leading enterprises — shortages of electricity or helium could lead to production stoppages at TSMC, thereby undermining the current high valuation logic of US stocks.
<img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://wpimg-wscn.awtmt.com/24fce3c8-f95c-41a5-9561-d1fd0049fe02.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://wpimg-wscn.awtmt.com/24fce3c8-f95c-41a5-9561-d1fd0049fe02.png"/>
<img src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://wpimg-wscn.awtmt.com/8de54ead-ea5d-4220-b3eb-2b142053e38c.png?x-oss-process=image/auto-orient,1/interlace,1/resize,w_1440,h_1440/quality,q_95/format,jpg" alt="" original-src="https://imageproxy.pbkrs.com/https://wpimg-wscn.awtmt.com/8de54ead-ea5d-4220-b3eb-2b142053e38c.png"/>

In an interview with Sky News, Trump stated that a deal between the US and Iran is "very likely" to be reached before King Charles III's visit to the US from April 27th to 30th. Currently, mediators are close to reaching an agreement on extending the ceasefire, and the US and Iran have "agreed in principle" to extend the interim agreement, which expires on April 22nd. Do you think the agreement can be finalized before the King's visit?

In an interview with Sky News, Trump stated that a deal between the US and Iran is "very likely" to be reached before King Charles III's visit to the US from April 27th to 30th. Currently, mediators are close to reaching an agreement on extending the ceasefire, and the US and Iran have "agreed in principle" to extend the interim agreement, which expires on April 22nd. Do you think the agreement can be finalized before the King's visit?

King’s US Visit Imminent, US-Iran Ceasefire in Sight

Industrial Securities believes that an agreement between the US and Iran is possible in April, and Trump's strategy of 'using war to promote negotiations' has shown initial results. Hard time constraints on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, lower costs for de-escalation than escalation, a drop in election approval ratings to 41%, and the impact of high oil prices on US stocks collectively constitute the motivations driving Trump to rush negotiations. Key nodes to watch are the April 22 ceasefire deadline and the April 28 Congressional authorization date

- Recent signals suggest an increasing likelihood of a U.S.-Iran agreement in April, with President Trump indicating a potential deal before King Charles III's visit to the U.S.  
- The U.S. is experiencing time constraints regarding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, while both nations are under pressure to reach an agreement due to their respective economic and political situations.  
- As critical deadlines approach, the negotiation pace is expected to initially slow before accelerating, with both sides recognizing the importance of securing a deal that addresses sanctions and U.S. strategic interests.

Trump Gets Anxious! Is the US-Iran Big Deal in April Really Worth Expecting?