Pure war.

$Alibaba(BABA.US) $JD.com(JD.US) $MEITUAN(03690.HK) 
 

Meituan's earnings report was delayed.

Q3 revenue was 95.5 billion yuan, up 2%, with an operating loss of 19.8 billion yuan, compared to a profit of 13.7 billion yuan last year—a net loss of 33.5 billion yuan.

Core local commerce (food delivery + flash sales + in-store) revenue was 67.4 billion yuan, down 2.8% YoY; loss of 14.1 billion yuan, compared to a profit of 14.6 billion yuan last year. Without the food delivery war, revenue would have grown at least 10% this year, with profit growth of 15-20%—meaning competition has cost over 30 billion yuan in losses.

In the same Q3 food delivery war, JD.com lost 14 billion yuan in profits, Taobao lost 35 billion yuan, and the three companies collectively burned 80 billion yuan.

In Q2, the three companies each lost about 15 billion yuan in profits.

Over two quarters, they’ve already burned over 100 billion yuan! Even if they scale back in Q4, this year’s losses could reach 150 billion yuan.

100 billion yuan—the internet industry hasn’t seen such a pure, head-on war in a long time.

No one has backed down, no one has called a truce. Everyone is talking about user growth, traffic growth, synergies, and healthy development.

So the glaring question is: After 100+ billion yuan, what have the giants actually achieved?

1.

100 billion yuan has burned away the industry’s stable narrative.

Before the war, food delivery was one of China’s most stable internet sectors. Meituan held 65-70% market share, while Ele.me defended its ~30% position. User habits were entrenched, merchant ecosystems mature, and fulfillment systems solid. It was an industry so stable that even capital found it "boring": slowing growth, high barriers, rigid costs, and locked-in user mindsets.

As calm as a windless lake. And stability is the biggest enemy of new players. In such a market, no one could easily enter or expand.

But the 100-billion-yuan war has cracked this lake for the first time.

In just two quarters, the market landscape has shifted dramatically. By GTV, Meituan lost ~20%, Taobao gained ~15%, and JD.com gained ~5%. By order volume, Taobao’s share is even higher.

And merchants and users seem to have little loyalty. User mindsets have been rewritten: "Food delivery can be this cheap? You can buy daily essentials, electronics, and fresh food via delivery? Switching between platforms isn’t that hard?"

Comparing the three companies’ losses, subsidies, and efficiency at different scales and stages isn’t meaningful. What matters is the industry’s structural shifts.

2.

Meituan has still proven its efficiency. While maintaining order volume, Meituan’s UE loss was 2.6 yuan in Q3, Alibaba’s was 5 yuan, and JD.com’s was worse. Management touts GTV share—two-thirds of orders are above 15 yuan, 70% above 30 yuan. But isn’t that expected? Being the leader isn’t easy.

But Meituan’s price is its once-dominant market share erosion and doubts about its food delivery moat. How is it a moat if it crumbles into massive losses in two quarters? Worse, long-term profit potential is suppressed—if rivals spend, you lose profits. Meanwhile, Douyin quietly stole in-store market share amid the chaos, with its ads now everywhere in restaurants and entertainment venues—Meituan is too busy to counter.

If the food delivery moat isn’t high, Alibaba and JD.com face another question: Is spending so much to dominate a low-moat, hyper-competitive, low-margin business worth it? They must create synergies beyond food delivery—"the wool comes from the dog"—but the market isn’t fully convinced yet.

JD.com’s pressure is greater, with lackluster order volume. Its efficiency lags rivals, UE can’t break even, scale is hard to catch up, and synergies are even tougher.

But the 100+ billion yuan wasn’t wasted—it birthed an instant retail market, where e-commerce growth is scarce. Now, food delivery isn’t just "food delivery"—it’s a city’s 30-minute logistics system, the last-mile infrastructure for all online businesses. If, as CEO Wang Xing says, it adds 1 trillion GMV long-term, the spending was worth it.

Alternatively, this war has ironically deepened the moat. Now, any new entrant must ask: Do we have tens of billions to burn?

3.

Whether 100 billion yuan was well-spent will only be clear in hindsight.

But clearly, to these companies, some things matter more than short-term accounting. If keyboard warriors like us can see these issues, can’t they?

Alibaba isn’t fighting for food delivery—it’s saving Taobao. This is about shifting user mindsets from "shelves → instant retail." Taobao’s goal isn’t subsidies—it’s preventing user aging. Spending 35 billion yuan a quarter is to re-train users to open Taobao for food, flash sales, and shopping. Lose users, lose the future. Alibaba isn’t buying into food delivery—it’s rebuilding a consumption platform.

JD.com isn’t chasing users—it’s transforming its business foundation. This is about buying a second growth curve: "supply chain → high-frequency." JD’s supply chain and warehousing need higher frequency to reduce costs. Food delivery + instant retail is the "high-frequency gateway" it must own—the same logic behind its offline supermarkets, convenience stores, dining, travel, and stablecoin efforts.

Meituan is both expanding and fighting for survival. It wants to own the "gatekeeper role in local life." With no sibling businesses to back it, Meituan fights alone. If users shift to Taobao/JD.com for instant needs, its advantage erodes slowly but surely. The 30 billion yuan loss is a "city defense fee"—a customer acquisition cost for Alibaba, a marketing budget for JD.com, but a real loss for Meituan. In this war, Meituan has the most to lose.

Corporate DNA pushes them forward, like tides driving waves.

This is a war they can’t avoid.

It’s destiny.