<p>欧盟已正式终止与中国在世界贸易组织的长期争端，该争端围绕北京在 2021 年对立陶宛的所谓胁迫展开。\n 在一份发给 WTO 成员国的声明中，欧盟表示，考虑到这一争端背后的关键目标已实现，相关贸易已恢复，因此决定放弃该案件。\n 该案件源于立陶宛允许在其首都维尔纽斯开设一个名为 “台湾代表处” 的争议性办公室。\n 办公室开设后不久，立陶宛出口商发现他们无法再向中国大陆运输产品。他们表示，该国的详细信息已从中国海关系统中删除。\n2021 年 11 月，海关数据显示，货物运输的价值与一年前相比下降了 91.4%。这种几乎完全的消失促使负责管理欧盟 27 个成员国贸易政策的委员会在 WTO 提起诉讼。\n\n\n 北京始终否认对立陶宛商品实施任何官方抵制，尽管它与维尔纽斯的外交关系降级。在多个时刻，北京声称中国人只是没有兴趣购买这个小型波罗的海国家的商品，而立陶宛则努力与台北建立联系。\n 北京视台湾为中国的一部分，必要时将通过武力实现统一。大多数国家，包括美国和所有欧盟成员国，并不承认台湾是一个独立国家，但华盛顿反对任何试图以武力夺取这个自我治理岛屿的行为，并承诺向其提供武器。\n 除了立陶宛外，台湾在欧盟的办事处通常避免在名称中提及该岛，而是使用首都台北的名称。\n 尽管布鲁塞尔和柏林私下游说维尔纽斯不要开设该办公室，正确地担心这会损害与北京的关系，但欧盟被迫介入，声明对任何欧盟成员国的攻击都危及单一市场。\n 但该案件在日内瓦贸易法庭的辩论中证明困难重重。尽管有报道称中国还施压其他欧洲公司的供应链，要求他们放弃立陶宛产品以便在中国销售，但欧盟在说服他们提供证据方面遇到了困难。\n 在布鲁塞尔与北京就该案件进行磋商期间，欧盟官员注意到，当他们提到某个立陶宛出口商报告的被阻止的货物时，该货物会迅速被释放。当时，欧盟消息人士抱怨他们的中国对话者在 “实时搅浑水”。\n 该案件在欧盟贸易总局内部引发分歧，正统思想者认为该案件无法胜诉，但一群崛起的地缘政治思想者坚持认为，必须对他们认为的经济欺凌进行指责。\n2024 年 1 月，当 WTO 提交新证据的截止日期临近时，欧盟暂停了该案件的程序。一年后，案件重新启动，但几天后又迅速暂停。\n 委员会声称 “相关贸易已恢复” 的说法可能会受到批评。\n 中国海关数据显示，今年前 10 个月，立陶宛的进口量与 2021 年同期相比下降了 53%，而 2021 年正是贸易几乎崩溃的时期。然而，与 2022 年同期相比，贸易却有显著反弹，增长了 156%。\n 尽管如此，研究显示立陶宛的整体贸易几乎未受影响，这表明其出口商在当时设法找到新的市场来替代中国。\n2022 年启动了一项价值近 1.4 亿美元的欧盟支持计划，鼓励受此事件影响的立陶宛企业申请贷款。当地媒体报道称，在 2023 年该计划结束之前，仅有不到 400 万美元被分配给两家公司。\n 尽管如此，这一事件被视为欧盟与中国关系的转折点，并加剧了欧洲部分地区对北京的怀疑。这种怀疑在几个月后因俄罗斯入侵乌克兰和中国与莫斯科的密切关系而进一步加剧。\n 这促使了反胁迫工具的采用——俗称 “贸易大炮”，使欧盟能够在未来对感知到的欺凌进行反击。\n 然而，这一工具至今未被使用，尽管观察人士和立法者要求布鲁塞尔在 2025 年对美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的贸易关税或中国的稀土出口管制启动 ACI。\n 周三，委员会将提出一项新的 “经济安全原则”，试图重新调整欧洲对其领导层所称的 “地缘经济时代” 的应对方式。\n“我们每天都看到传统国家治理工具被用来武器化相互依赖和利用联盟。对国家和行业施加控制和强迫，” 欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩在 10 月的演讲中表示。</p>

<p>欧盟已结束与中国的世贸组织争端，原因是指控中国对立陶宛进行胁迫，并提到贸易已恢复。该案件始于立陶宛开设台湾办事处，导致对中国的出口下降。尽管面临挑战，欧盟的这一举动标志着与中国关系的转变，受到地缘政治紧张局势和反胁迫工具采用的影响</p>

<p>The European Union has formally terminated a long-running dispute with China at the World Trade Organization, centred on Beijing’s alleged coercion of Lithuania in 2021.\nIn a statement circulated to WTO members, the bloc said it was abandoning the case “considering the key objectives behind this dispute have been met and relevant trade has resumed”.\nThe case arose after Lithuania permitted the opening of a controversially named “Taiwanese Representative Office” in its capital, Vilnius.\nSoon after the office opened, Lithuanian exporters found they could no longer ship products to mainland China. The country’s details had been wiped from the official Chinese customs system, they said.\nIn November 2021, customs data showed the value of shipments fell by 91.4 per cent compared to a year earlier. The virtual wipeout led the commission, which manages the trade policies of the EU’s 27 member states, to launch a case at the WTO.\n\n\nBeijing always denied that there was any official boycott of Lithuanian goods, even as it downgraded diplomatic ties with Vilnius. At several junctures, it claimed that Chinese people just did not want to buy goods from the tiny Baltic country, which had made concerted efforts to grow ties with Taipei.\nBeijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US and all EU member states, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.\nWith the exception of Lithuania, Taiwan’s offices across the EU have traditionally avoided mentioning the island in their name, bearing the name of the capital city, Taipei, instead.\nWhile Brussels and Berlin had privately lobbied Vilnius not to open the office, rightly fearing that it would hurt ties with Beijing, the EU was forced to intervene, stating that any attack on an EU member compromised the single market.\nBut the case proved difficult to argue in the Geneva trade courts. Despite reports that China had also pressured companies from elsewhere in Europe to drop Lithuanian products from their supply chains if they wanted to sell in the country, the EU struggled to convince them to give evidence on the record.\nDuring consultations between Brussels and Beijing over the case, EU officials noticed that when they raised a particular cargo that a Lithuanian exporter had reported as being blocked, it would quickly be released. At the time, EU sources complained that their Chinese interlocutors were “muddying the waters in real time”.\nThe case divided the EU’s directorate of trade, with orthodox thinkers arguing that it was unwinnable, but an ascendant group of geopolitical thinkers insisting that what they considered to be economic bullying must be called out.\nIn January 2024, when a WTO deadline was approaching to submit a new tranche of evidence, the EU paused proceedings for a year. A year later, it restarted the case only to quickly pause it again days later.\nThe commission’s claims that the “relevant trade has resumed” could be contested by critics.\nChinese customs data for the first 10 months of this year show that imports from Lithuania are down 53 per cent compared to the equivalent period in 2021, when the wipeout occurred. There is, however, a significant rebound – 156 per cent – on the same period of 2022, when the trade had virtually ground to a halt.\nNonetheless, research shows that Lithuania’s overall trade was barely affected, suggesting its exporters managed to find new markets to replace China at the time.\nAn EU support scheme worth almost US$140 million was launched in 2022, with Lithuanian businesses encouraged to apply for loans if they were affected by the affair. Local media reported that under US$4 million was allocated from the pot to two companies, before it was wound down in 2023.\nNonetheless, the episode was seen as a turning point in EU-China relations and added to rising suspicion towards Beijing in parts of Europe. This was aggravated further months later by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s close ties with Moscow.\nIt galvanised the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument – known colloquially as the “trade bazooka” – that would enable the bloc to punch back against perceived bullying in the future.\nThat tool, however, has never been used, even as observers and lawmakers demanded that Brussels trigger the ACI against US President Donald Trump’s trade tariffs or China’s rare earth export controls over the course of 2025.\nOn Wednesday, the commission will propose a new “economic security doctrine”, which will attempt to recalibrate Europe’s approach to what its leadership has described as “an era of geoeconomics”.\n“Every day, we see how the tools of traditional statecraft are being used to weaponise interdependencies and leverage alliances. To create chokeholds on countries and industries. To exert control and impose coercion on others,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an October speech.\n</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>欧盟已正式终止与中国在世界贸易组织的长期争端，该争端围绕北京在 2021 年对立陶宛的所谓胁迫展开。\n 在一份发给 WTO 成员国的声明中，欧盟表示，考虑到这一争端背后的关键目标已实现，相关贸易已恢复，因此决定放弃该案件。\n 该案件源于立陶宛允许在其首都维尔纽斯开设一个名为 “台湾代表处” 的争议性办公室。\n 办公室开设后不久，立陶宛出口商发现他们无法再向中国大陆运输产品。他们表示，该国的详细信息已从中国海关系统中删除。\n2021 年 11 月，海关数据显示，货物运输的价值与一年前相比下降了 91.4%。这种几乎完全的消失促使负责管理欧盟 27 个成员国贸易政策的委员会在 WTO 提起诉讼。\n\n\n 北京始终否认对立陶宛商品实施任何官方抵制，尽管它与维尔纽斯的外交关系降级。在多个时刻，北京声称中国人只是没有兴趣购买这个小型波罗的海国家的商品，而立陶宛则努力与台北建立联系。\n 北京视台湾为中国的一部分，必要时将通过武力实现统一。大多数国家，包括美国和所有欧盟成员国，并不承认台湾是一个独立国家，但华盛顿反对任何试图以武力夺取这个自我治理岛屿的行为，并承诺向其提供武器。\n 除了立陶宛外，台湾在欧盟的办事处通常避免在名称中提及该岛，而是使用首都台北的名称。\n 尽管布鲁塞尔和柏林私下游说维尔纽斯不要开设该办公室，正确地担心这会损害与北京的关系，但欧盟被迫介入，声明对任何欧盟成员国的攻击都危及单一市场。\n 但该案件在日内瓦贸易法庭的辩论中证明困难重重。尽管有报道称中国还施压其他欧洲公司的供应链，要求他们放弃立陶宛产品以便在中国销售，但欧盟在说服他们提供证据方面遇到了困难。\n 在布鲁塞尔与北京就该案件进行磋商期间，欧盟官员注意到，当他们提到某个立陶宛出口商报告的被阻止的货物时，该货物会迅速被释放。当时，欧盟消息人士抱怨他们的中国对话者在 “实时搅浑水”。\n 该案件在欧盟贸易总局内部引发分歧，正统思想者认为该案件无法胜诉，但一群崛起的地缘政治思想者坚持认为，必须对他们认为的经济欺凌进行指责。\n2024 年 1 月，当 WTO 提交新证据的截止日期临近时，欧盟暂停了该案件的程序。一年后，案件重新启动，但几天后又迅速暂停。\n 委员会声称 “相关贸易已恢复” 的说法可能会受到批评。\n 中国海关数据显示，今年前 10 个月，立陶宛的进口量与 2021 年同期相比下降了 53%，而 2021 年正是贸易几乎崩溃的时期。然而，与 2022 年同期相比，贸易却有显著反弹，增长了 156%。\n 尽管如此，研究显示立陶宛的整体贸易几乎未受影响，这表明其出口商在当时设法找到新的市场来替代中国。\n2022 年启动了一项价值近 1.4 亿美元的欧盟支持计划，鼓励受此事件影响的立陶宛企业申请贷款。当地媒体报道称，在 2023 年该计划结束之前，仅有不到 400 万美元被分配给两家公司。\n 尽管如此，这一事件被视为欧盟与中国关系的转折点，并加剧了欧洲部分地区对北京的怀疑。这种怀疑在几个月后因俄罗斯入侵乌克兰和中国与莫斯科的密切关系而进一步加剧。\n 这促使了反胁迫工具的采用——俗称 “贸易大炮”，使欧盟能够在未来对感知到的欺凌进行反击。\n 然而，这一工具至今未被使用，尽管观察人士和立法者要求布鲁塞尔在 2025 年对美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的贸易关税或中国的稀土出口管制启动 ACI。\n 周三，委员会将提出一项新的 “经济安全原则”，试图重新调整欧洲对其领导层所称的 “地缘经济时代” 的应对方式。\n“我们每天都看到传统国家治理工具被用来武器化相互依赖和利用联盟。对国家和行业施加控制和强迫，” 欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩在 10 月的演讲中表示。</p>
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欧盟放弃了在世贸组织对中国提起的案件，该案件指控中国对立陶宛进行胁迫