<p>当一群外国投资者在 2007 年向一家曾经领先的中国猪肉加工企业投资数百万美元时，他们可能没有预料到这笔投资会导致他们陷入长达数年的法律斗争。</p>
<p>投资者表示，他们实际上被锁定在公司外，直到后来才发现他们所称的欺诈性破产重组和一系列由公司创始人操控的模糊交易。</p>
<p>当他们试图在中国主张股东权利时，不仅遭遇了公司的阻碍，还遇到了地方当局的障碍。</p>
<p>他们的经历成为了一个警示故事，提醒外国投资者在投资中国公司时可能遇到的危险，以及他们在寻求地方当局帮助时可能面临的困难。</p>
<h2>一个有希望的开始</h2>
<p>初鸣集团由石华山于 1990 年代末在辽宁省大连市创立，2007 年左右因其为业务扩展而承担的债务，遭遇了现金流问题。</p>
<p>石华山是大连食品行业的一个有影响力的人物。他在多个行业协会担任高级职务，甚至曾作为大连市最高政治咨询机构的成员参与政治。</p>
<p>在地方政府的帮助下，一家外国投资者财团于 2007 年通过一家注册在英属维尔京群岛的公司向石的公司投资了近 1540 万美元。根据《财新》看到的股东名单，投资者中包括美国和加拿大的公司，如 Hunter Wise Financial Group 和 Redwood Capital。</p>
<p>尽管初鸣面临财务问题，投资者仍然相信值得支持。</p>
<p>“当时，初鸣在大连的市场份额超过 50%，在整个东北市场享有良好的声誉，” 投资者之一的股东的儿子金正鑫说，他后来深度参与了他们的法庭斗争。</p>
<p>随后发生了一系列复杂的公司操作，其中初鸣的三个关键子公司——肉类加工、食品和销售——最终归入一家名为大连珍宝投资咨询有限公司（PSIC）的公司，其母公司将石华山和外国投资者都视为股东。</p>
<p>“外国股东愿意作为纯粹的财务投资者进行投资，而不干预运营，更不用说试图争夺公司的控制权，” 金正鑫说。</p>
<p>目标是赴美上市。这一目标在 2007 年晚些时候实现，当时 PSIC 的母公司与一家在场外交易所上市的美国公司 Energroup Holdings 完成了反向并购。</p>
<p>石华山被任命为 Energroup 的董事长，领导一个由七名成员组成的董事会，其中包括他的四位合伙人。由于石华山在初鸣经营多年，对猪肉业务的许多方面都很熟悉，外国投资者对他充满信心，金正鑫告诉《财新》。</p>
<h2>马拉松式的法律斗争</h2>
<p>这种信任并没有持续多久。仅仅几年后，外国投资者开始感到警报声响起。2010 年，Energroup 停止了与美国证券交易委员会的报告。分红被暂停。</p>
<p>事实证明，石华山在反向并购后不久就开始进行幕后操作，金正鑫说，驱逐独立董事并解雇投资者聘请的财务人员。</p>
<p>经过多年的多次失败尝试直接与石华山接触以获取公司财务健康状况的信息，投资者在 2014 年发起了将成为马拉松式法律斗争的行动。</p>
<p>争取信息的斗争揭露了石华山的一系列背叛。在海外的法庭程序后，投资者在 2015 年赢得了一场重大胜利，美国法院授予他们对 Energroup 的控制权。</p>
<p>这一胜利导致更多关于石华山在未通知投资者的情况下进行的操控的发现。根据投资者提供的声明，这些操控包括使用金坤（即金正鑫的父亲）的伪造签名来签署文件，改变 PSIC 的董事会和投资公司的股权结构。</p>
<p>与此同时，PSIC 的银行记录显示，到 2021 年中期，收到外国投资者最初 1540 万美元投资的账户中仅剩不到 4 万元人民币（7300 新元）。</p>
<p>几份股权转让协议显示，2014 年，PSIC 同意将其在食品和销售子公司的全部股份以 1000 万元的价格出售给石华山及其妻子。金正鑫表示，投资者从未被告知这些交易，而 PSIC 的银行记录显示没有收到相应的付款。</p>
<h2>重组之谜</h2>
<p>然而，许多投资者最大的谜团是 2019 年初鸣及其最初控制的三家子公司的破产重组公告。</p>
<p>投资者甚至在次年才得知这一公告。</p>
<p>金正鑫将这一重组视为一种空壳游戏——并不是由债权人提出，而是由债务人自己提出的。</p>
<p>对于投资者来说，重组的真正原因——如果有的话——仍然是个谜，因为他们无法获得与此事相关的材料。</p>
<p>金正鑫暗示，这四家公司在申请破产重组时可能夸大了其负债。他引用了大连中级人民法院最初确认的负债与法院指定管理员审查后同一法院后来确认的负债之间大约 120 亿元的差异。</p>
<p>自 2020 年以来，投资者审查重组文件的尝试在辽宁遭遇了障碍，包括来自地方市场监管机构和法院的阻碍。</p>
<p>例如，在那年晚些时候，金坤向地方市场监管机构申请注册 PSIC 的公司注册变更，《财新》看到的投资者声明显示。然而，该请求因官僚技术问题延迟了几个月，投资者表示。</p>
<p>声明称，这一延误有效阻止了外国投资者在破产重组程序的关键阶段投票，给他们的利益造成了实质性损害。</p>
<h2>碰壁</h2>
<p>投资者声称，肉类加工公司的盈利业务——在 2014 年交易后唯一剩下的楚鸣品牌公司——于 2017 年外包给了由施团队设立的贸易公司。</p>
<p>该贸易公司于 2021 年以 100 万元的价格出售给了大连的诚三集团。</p>
<p>根据案件文件和《财新》的采访，诚三的收购发生在其退出肉类加工公司的破产重组之后，按照重组投资者的要求，它本应投资近 9000 万元。</p>
<p>投资者声明称，此举是对肉类加工公司资产的 “恶意转让”，并补充说这是法院指定的管理人忽视的重要事实。</p>
<p>现在被称为 SGLA 律师事务所的管理人拒绝对此事发表评论。</p>
<p>在 2022 年的裁决中，法院驳回了 PSIC 对审查肉类加工公司会计凭证的要求。</p>
<p>金正鑫辩称，外国投资者无法确定肉类加工公司的业务到底发生了什么，除非他们能够查看相关记录。</p>
<p>在上诉该决定后，PSIC 赢得了审查公司会计凭证的权利，但辽宁省高级人民法院将审查时间限制为 15 天。</p>
<p>考虑到公司有超过十年的记录，投资者认为这一时间限制不合理。</p>
<p>然而，这一点最终变得无关紧要。金正鑫表示，在裁决发布时，肉类加工厂已被诚三收购，PSIC 无法访问记录。</p>
<p>除此之外，外国投资者仍不清楚他们最初的 1540 万美元投资发生了什么。在对法院指定的管理人的诉讼中，大连法院驳回了投资者获取肉类加工公司债务登记文件的请求。</p>
<p>投资者在执法方面也没有得到太多帮助。金坤在 2021 年提出了指控挪用公款和伪造的刑事投诉，但警方后来因证据不足拒绝立案。尽管该决定在复审后被撤销，但根据投资者的说法，该案件自此没有取得任何实质性进展。</p>
<p>在公司破产清算结束几年后，监管和登记记录显示其仍然活跃。对于投资者来说，这使得整个事件更加令人烦恼。</p>
<p>“整个破产过程最令人震惊的方面是，从肉类加工公司的破产重组案被法院受理的那天起，到清算完成，再到今天，该公司没有一天停止运营，” 投资者声明中写道。</p>
<p>如果是这样，他们就问为什么他们没有权利获得一部分利润。“如果公司在清算完成后继续运营，那么它的运营利润去了哪里？” 声明问道。CAIXIN GLOBAL</p>

ENHD

<p>一群在 2007 年投资了近 1540 万美元于中国猪肉加工商楚鸣集团的外国投资者，因发现公司创始人石华山的欺诈行为而面临漫长的法律斗争。最初对投资持乐观态度的投资者在主张权利时遇到了障碍，最终被锁出公司。尽管与 Energroup Holdings 成功进行了反向并购，投资者却发现自己被误导和背叛，导致 2015 年在法庭上获胜，揭露了更多的不当行为。此案突显了外国投资者在中国面临的风险</p>

<p>WHEN a group of foreign investors put millions of dollars into a once-leading Chinese pork processor in 2007, they probably did not expect that the investment would lead them into a years-long legal battle.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>当一群外国投资者在 2007 年向一家曾经领先的中国猪肉加工企业投资数百万美元时，他们可能没有预料到这笔投资会导致他们陷入长达数年的法律斗争。</p>
</div><p>The investors said they were effectively locked out of the company and only later discovered what they called a fraudulent bankruptcy restructuring and a series of murky transactions orchestrated by the company’s founder.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资者表示，他们实际上被锁定在公司外，直到后来才发现他们所称的欺诈性破产重组和一系列由公司创始人操控的模糊交易。</p>
</div><p>When they tried to assert their shareholder rights in China, they encountered obstacles not only from the company but also from local authorities.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>当他们试图在中国主张股东权利时，不仅遭遇了公司的阻碍，还遇到了地方当局的障碍。</p>
</div><p>Their ordeal stands as a cautionary tale about the perils that foreign investors can encounter when investing in Chinese companies, as well as the difficulties they can face getting help from local authorities.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>他们的经历成为了一个警示故事，提醒外国投资者在投资中国公司时可能遇到的危险，以及他们在寻求地方当局帮助时可能面临的困难。</p>
</div><h2>A promising start</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>一个有希望的开始</h2>
</div><p>Founded in the late 1990s by Shi Huashan in Dalian, Liaoning province, Chuming Group ran into cash-flow problems around 2007, partly due to the debt it took on to acquire land for business expansion.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>初鸣集团由石华山于 1990 年代末在辽宁省大连市创立，2007 年左右因其为业务扩展而承担的债务，遭遇了现金流问题。</p>
</div><p>Shi was an influential figure in Dalian’s food industry. He held senior roles at several trade bodies, and even did a stint in politics as a member of Dalian’s top political advisory body.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>石华山是大连食品行业的一个有影响力的人物。他在多个行业协会担任高级职务，甚至曾作为大连市最高政治咨询机构的成员参与政治。</p>
</div><p>With the help of the local government, a consortium of foreign investors invested nearly US$15.4 million in Shi’s company in 2007 through a company registered in the British Virgin Islands. Among the investors were US and Canadian companies, including Hunter Wise Financial Group and Redwood Capital, according to a shareholder list seen by Caixin.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在地方政府的帮助下，一家外国投资者财团于 2007 年通过一家注册在英属维尔京群岛的公司向石的公司投资了近 1540 万美元。根据《财新》看到的股东名单，投资者中包括美国和加拿大的公司，如 Hunter Wise Financial Group 和 Redwood Capital。</p>
</div><p>Despite Chuming’s financial issues, the investors believed it was worth backing.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>尽管初鸣面临财务问题，投资者仍然相信值得支持。</p>
</div><p>“At the time, Chuming held more than 50 per cent of the market share in Dalian, and had a good reputation across the entire north-eastern China market,” said Jin Zhengxin, the son of a shareholder in one of the investors who would later become deeply involved in their court battle.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>“当时，初鸣在大连的市场份额超过 50%，在整个东北市场享有良好的声誉，” 投资者之一的股东的儿子金正鑫说，他后来深度参与了他们的法庭斗争。</p>
</div><p>A convoluted series of corporate manoeuvres followed, in which three key Chuming subsidiaries – for meat processing, food and sales – ended up in a company called Dalian Precious Sheen Investments Consulting (PSIC), whose parent company counted both Shi and the foreign investors as shareholders.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>随后发生了一系列复杂的公司操作，其中初鸣的三个关键子公司——肉类加工、食品和销售——最终归入一家名为大连珍宝投资咨询有限公司（PSIC）的公司，其母公司将石华山和外国投资者都视为股东。</p>
</div><p>“The foreign shareholders were willing to invest purely as financial investors, without interfering in operations, let alone trying to compete for control of the company,” Jin said.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>“外国股东愿意作为纯粹的财务投资者进行投资，而不干预运营，更不用说试图争夺公司的控制权，” 金正鑫说。</p>
</div><p>The goal was to go public in the US. That took place later in 2007, when PSIC’s parent completed a reverse merger with Energroup Holdings, an American company traded on an over-the-counter exchange.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>目标是赴美上市。这一目标在 2007 年晚些时候实现，当时 PSIC 的母公司与一家在场外交易所上市的美国公司 Energroup Holdings 完成了反向并购。</p>
</div><p>Shi was appointed chairman of Energroup, leading a seven-member board that included four of his associates. The foreign investors had a lot of faith in Shi because he had operated Chuming for years and was familiar with many aspects of the pork business, Jin told Caixin.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>石华山被任命为 Energroup 的董事长，领导一个由七名成员组成的董事会，其中包括他的四位合伙人。由于石华山在初鸣经营多年，对猪肉业务的许多方面都很熟悉，外国投资者对他充满信心，金正鑫告诉《财新》。</p>
</div><h2>Marathon legal battle</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>马拉松式的法律斗争</h2>
</div><p>That trust didn’t last. Just a few years later, alarm bells began to go off for the foreign investors. In 2010, Energroup discontinued its reporting with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Dividends were halted.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这种信任并没有持续多久。仅仅几年后，外国投资者开始感到警报声响起。2010 年，Energroup 停止了与美国证券交易委员会的报告。分红被暂停。</p>
</div><p>As it turned out, Shi had started making behind-the-scenes moves shortly after the reverse merger, Jin said, driving out independent directors and dismissing financial staff hired by the investors.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>事实证明，石华山在反向并购后不久就开始进行幕后操作，金正鑫说，驱逐独立董事并解雇投资者聘请的财务人员。</p>
</div><p>After years of repeated failed attempts to engage directly with Shi to obtain information about the company’s financial health, the investors in 2014 launched what would become a marathon legal battle.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>经过多年的多次失败尝试直接与石华山接触以获取公司财务健康状况的信息，投资者在 2014 年发起了将成为马拉松式法律斗争的行动。</p>
</div><p>The fight for information uncovered a series of betrayals by Shi. After court proceedings overseas, the investors won a major victory in 2015 when a US court granted them control of Energroup.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>争取信息的斗争揭露了石华山的一系列背叛。在海外的法庭程序后，投资者在 2015 年赢得了一场重大胜利，美国法院授予他们对 Energroup 的控制权。</p>
</div><p>The victory led to more discoveries of the machinations that Shi had carried out without informing investors. They included using forged signatures of Jin Kun, Jin Zhengxin’s father, to sign off on documents that changed PSIC’s board of directors and altered the equity structure of invested companies, according to a statement provided by investors.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这一胜利导致更多关于石华山在未通知投资者的情况下进行的操控的发现。根据投资者提供的声明，这些操控包括使用金坤（即金正鑫的父亲）的伪造签名来签署文件，改变 PSIC 的董事会和投资公司的股权结构。</p>
</div><p>Meanwhile, PSIC’s bank records showed that by mid-2021, less than 40,000 yuan (S$7,300) remained in the account that received the foreign investors’ initial US$15.4 million investment.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>与此同时，PSIC 的银行记录显示，到 2021 年中期，收到外国投资者最初 1540 万美元投资的账户中仅剩不到 4 万元人民币（7300 新元）。</p>
</div><p>Several share transfer agreements showed that in 2014, PSIC had agreed to sell its entire stakes in its food and sales subsidiaries to Shi and his wife, for a total of 10 million yuan. Jin Zhengxin said investors were never informed about the transactions, and PSIC’s bank records showed that no corresponding payments were ever received.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>几份股权转让协议显示，2014 年，PSIC 同意将其在食品和销售子公司的全部股份以 1000 万元的价格出售给石华山及其妻子。金正鑫表示，投资者从未被告知这些交易，而 PSIC 的银行记录显示没有收到相应的付款。</p>
</div><h2>The restructuring mystery</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>重组之谜</h2>
</div><p>The biggest puzzle for many investors, however, was the 2019 announcement of the bankruptcy restructuring of Chuming and the three subsidiaries it initially controlled.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，许多投资者最大的谜团是 2019 年初鸣及其最初控制的三家子公司的破产重组公告。</p>
</div><p>The investors didn’t even know about the announcement until the following year.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资者甚至在次年才得知这一公告。</p>
</div><p>Jin Zhengxin viewed the restructuring – filed not by creditors but by the debtors themselves – as a shell game.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>金正鑫将这一重组视为一种空壳游戏——并不是由债权人提出，而是由债务人自己提出的。</p>
</div><p>For the investors, the true cause of the restructuring – if there was one – remains a mystery because they have been unable to obtain related materials about the matter.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>对于投资者来说，重组的真正原因——如果有的话——仍然是个谜，因为他们无法获得与此事相关的材料。</p>
</div><p>Jin Zhengxin suggested that the four companies may have inflated their liabilities when filing for bankruptcy restructuring. He cited a roughly 12 billion yuan discrepancy between the liabilities initially recognised by the Dalian Intermediate People’s Court and those later confirmed by the same court following a review by the court-appointed administrator.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>金正鑫暗示，这四家公司在申请破产重组时可能夸大了其负债。他引用了大连中级人民法院最初确认的负债与法院指定管理员审查后同一法院后来确认的负债之间大约 120 亿元的差异。</p>
</div><p>Since 2020, the investors’ attempts to review the restructuring documents have encountered obstacles in Liaoning, including from the local market regulator and courts.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>自 2020 年以来，投资者审查重组文件的尝试在辽宁遭遇了障碍，包括来自地方市场监管机构和法院的阻碍。</p>
</div><p>For example, late that year, Jin Kun applied to the local market watchdog to register for a change in PSIC’s corporate registration, an investor statement seen by Caixin showed. The request, however, was delayed for several months over bureaucratic technicalities, investors said.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>例如，在那年晚些时候，金坤向地方市场监管机构申请注册 PSIC 的公司注册变更，《财新》看到的投资者声明显示。然而，该请求因官僚技术问题延迟了几个月，投资者表示。</p>
</div><p>The delay effectively prevented foreign investors from voting at a critical stage of the bankruptcy restructuring proceedings, causing material harm to their interests, the statement said.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>声明称，这一延误有效阻止了外国投资者在破产重组程序的关键阶段投票，给他们的利益造成了实质性损害。</p>
</div><h2>Hitting a brick wall</h2>
<div class="lb-trans"><h2>碰壁</h2>
</div><p>The investors alleged that the profitable operations of the meat processing company – the only Chuming-branded company left with PSIC after the 2014 deals – had been outsourced in 2017 to a trading company set up by Shi’s team.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资者声称，肉类加工公司的盈利业务——在 2014 年交易后唯一剩下的楚鸣品牌公司——于 2017 年外包给了由施团队设立的贸易公司。</p>
</div><p>The trading company was later sold to Dalian-based Chengsan Group for one million yuan in 2021.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>该贸易公司于 2021 年以 100 万元的价格出售给了大连的诚三集团。</p>
</div><p>Chengsan’s acquisition took place after it withdrew from the meat processor’s bankruptcy restructuring, under which it would have been required to invest nearly 90 million yuan as a restructuring investor, according to case documents and Caixin interviews.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>根据案件文件和《财新》的采访，诚三的收购发生在其退出肉类加工公司的破产重组之后，按照重组投资者的要求，它本应投资近 9000 万元。</p>
</div><p>The investor statement called the move a “malicious transfer” of the meat processor’s assets, adding that it was an important fact ignored by the court-appointed administrator.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资者声明称，此举是对肉类加工公司资产的 “恶意转让”，并补充说这是法院指定的管理人忽视的重要事实。</p>
</div><p>The administrator, now known as SGLA Law Firm, has refused to comment on the matter.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>现在被称为 SGLA 律师事务所的管理人拒绝对此事发表评论。</p>
</div><p>In a 2022 ruling, the court rejected a demand from PSIC to review the meat processing company’s accounting vouchers.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在 2022 年的裁决中，法院驳回了 PSIC 对审查肉类加工公司会计凭证的要求。</p>
</div><p>Jin Zhengxin argued that the foreign investors could not ascertain what was really going on with the meat processor’s business unless they could see the records in question.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>金正鑫辩称，外国投资者无法确定肉类加工公司的业务到底发生了什么，除非他们能够查看相关记录。</p>
</div><p>After appealing the decision, PSIC won the right to review the company’s accounting vouchers, but the Liaoning Provincial Higher People’s Court limited the time allowed for the review to 15 days.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在上诉该决定后，PSIC 赢得了审查公司会计凭证的权利，但辽宁省高级人民法院将审查时间限制为 15 天。</p>
</div><p>Given that the company had more than a decade of records, the investors considered the time limit unreasonable.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>考虑到公司有超过十年的记录，投资者认为这一时间限制不合理。</p>
</div><p>The point turned out to be moot, however. By the time the ruling was issued, the meat processor’s factory had been acquired by Chengsan, leaving PSIC without access to the records, Jin Zhengxin said.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，这一点最终变得无关紧要。金正鑫表示，在裁决发布时，肉类加工厂已被诚三收购，PSIC 无法访问记录。</p>
</div><p>On top of all that, the foreign investors were still unclear about what happened to their initial US$15.4 million investment. In their lawsuit against the court-appointed administrator, the Dalian court rejected the investors’ request for access to the meat processing company’s debt registration documents.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>除此之外，外国投资者仍不清楚他们最初的 1540 万美元投资发生了什么。在对法院指定的管理人的诉讼中，大连法院驳回了投资者获取肉类加工公司债务登记文件的请求。</p>
</div><p>The investors didn’t get much help from law enforcement either. Jin Kun filed a criminal complaint in 2021 alleging embezzlement and forgery, but police later declined to open a case, citing a lack of evidence. Although that decision was later revoked on review, the case has seen no meaningful progress since, according to the investors.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>投资者在执法方面也没有得到太多帮助。金坤在 2021 年提出了指控挪用公款和伪造的刑事投诉，但警方后来因证据不足拒绝立案。尽管该决定在复审后被撤销，但根据投资者的说法，该案件自此没有取得任何实质性进展。</p>
</div><p>Several years after the conclusion of the company’s bankruptcy liquidation, regulatory and registration records show it remains active. For investors, that’s what makes the whole saga so vexing.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在公司破产清算结束几年后，监管和登记记录显示其仍然活跃。对于投资者来说，这使得整个事件更加令人烦恼。</p>
</div><p>“The most astonishing aspect of the entire bankruptcy process is that from the day the meat processing company’s bankruptcy restructuring case was accepted by the court, through the completion of liquidation and up to today, the company has not suspended operations for a single day,” the investor statement read.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>“整个破产过程最令人震惊的方面是，从肉类加工公司的破产重组案被法院受理的那天起，到清算完成，再到今天，该公司没有一天停止运营，” 投资者声明中写道。</p>
</div><p>And if that’s the case, they ask why they’re not entitled to a portion of the profits. “If the company continued operating after the completion of the liquidation, then where did its operating profits go?” the statement asked. CAIXIN GLOBAL</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>如果是这样，他们就问为什么他们没有权利获得一部分利润。“如果公司在清算完成后继续运营，那么它的运营利润去了哪里？” 声明问道。CAIXIN GLOBAL</p>
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一笔价值 1500 万美元的中国猪肉交易如何演变成外国投资者的警示案例