<div id="readability-page-1" class="page"><div><ul><li>Key insight: Calls to replace proposed deposit insurance reforms with a revived Transaction Account Guarantee program would make the federal government's role in a bank run purely reactive. </li><li>What's at stake: By the time emergency tools are deployed, the system has already absorbed the shock. Policymakers are left stabilizing outcomes rather than preventing them. </li><li>Forward look: A modern financial system requires both crisis response and crisis prevention. The former stops panic once it begins. The latter reduces the likelihood that panic starts in the first place.</li></ul>In the debate over deposit insurance reform, one argument has gained traction: Rather than modernizing the system, policymakers should rely on emergency authorities — like the Transaction Account Guarantee, or TAG, program — to stabilize deposits when the next crisis hits.There is truth in that view. Emergency tools matter. In March 2023, regulators used extraordinary authorities to contain a rapidly unfolding situation.Without them, the outcome could have been far worse. But treating emergency powers as a substitute for reform confuses crisis response with system design. Emergency authorities are essential. They are not enough.The events of 2023 made one fact unmistakably clear: Money now moves faster than policy. Deposits no longer trickle out — they leave in hours, sometimes minutes. Businesses do not wait to see whether regulators will act, how they will act or whether their bank will be included. They move immediately, because they must.That behavior is not irrational. It is responsible.A CFO managing a payroll account is not in the business of assessing regulatory intent or timing. They are in the business of making sure employees get paid on Friday. When confidence wavers, they don't pause for clarity — they seek certainty.And today, that certainty is not evenly distributed. In March 2023, uninsured operating deposits did not leave the banking system — they moved upstream to the largest institutions. Those flows were not driven by pricing or performance. They were driven by a simple perception: Where will my money be safest if something goes wrong?Emergency authorities did not prevent that movement. They followed it.That is the core limitation of a response-only framework. By the time emergency tools are deployed, the system has already absorbed the shock. Deposits have moved, funding has shifted, and confidence has fractured. Policymakers are left stabilizing outcomes rather than preventing them. This is why crisis response, by itself, is not a strategy.A modern financial system requires both crisis response and crisis prevention. The former stops panic once it begins. The latter reduces the likelihood that panic starts in the first place.The structural issue is straightforward. The accounts most prone to flight — large, non-interest-bearing business operating balances — are also the least protected under the current framework. These are not speculative funds. They are payroll accounts, vendor payments and working capital. They exist because businesses must operate, not because they are seeking yield.When those balances exceed the insurance cap — as they routinely do — depositors are forced into a choice: Accept uncertainty, or move to an institution perceived as safer. In 2023, they chose movement. And that movement had consequences. Deposits concentrated at the largest institutions. Midsize and regional banks lost stable funding. Lending capacity tightened. The system became more concentrated — not less.Relying solely on emergency authorities going forward would repeat that pattern. It would leave depositors guessing whether a crisis has been declared, whether regulators have acted and whether their institution will be included. It would also reinforce the perception that safety depends on size — that protection ultimately flows to those institutions deemed too large to fail.A credible framework requires something more durable: clarity before the crisis. That is the role of targeted deposit insurance modernization. By extending coverage specifically to non-interest-bearing business operating accounts — payroll, payables and working capital — we can provide depositors with a clear answer to a simple question: Is my operating cash safe where it sits?That answer must be known in advance.This is not about insuring everything. It is about insuring the category of deposits whose instability creates system-wide risk. It is a targeted solution to a specific vulnerability — one that regulators, economists and industry participants have all identified.Importantly, it does not replace emergency authorities. It complements them. Emergency tools will still be needed. Crises will still occur. Policymakers must retain the ability to act decisively when unexpected shocks arise. But those tools should serve as the backstop, not the foundation.The foundation should be a system that reduces the incentive for panic-driven movement, keeps confidence distributed across institutions of all sizes, and allows banks to compete on service, relationships, and performance — not on perceived government support.The alternative is a system that continues to rely on after-the-fact intervention — one that stabilizes crises once they begin but does little to prevent them. We have already seen where that leads.The lesson of 2023 is not that emergency powers worked. It is that they were needed at all. A modern deposit insurance framework should make their use less likely, not more inevitable.The path forward is not choosing between prevention and response. It is recognizing that we need both — and designing a system that reflects that reality.</div></div>

金融指数 MSCI ETF - Fidelity

超大盘股成长 ETF - Vanguard

核心美国价值 ETF - iShares

这篇文章主张应现代化存款保险，以防止银行挤兑，而不仅仅是对其进行反应。文章强调金融系统中既需要危机应对，也需要预防，指出当前的应急工具不足。重点应放在扩大对非利息-bearing 商业运营账户的覆盖范围，以为存款人提供确定性。这种方法旨在减少因恐慌驱动的资金流动，维护各机构之间的信心，而不是仅仅依赖于危机期间的被动措施

BankThink Deposit insurance should prevent bank runs, not just react to them

- 现代金融系统需要危机应对与危机预防兼备。  
- 仅依赖应急工具会导致信心损失与资金集中化。  
- 目标是扩展保险覆盖，确保非利息商业账户安全。

American Banker

金融业 ETF - Vanguard

全美成长股指数 MSCI ETF - Vanguard

全美价值股指数 ETF - Vanguard

金融指数 ETF - iShare

标普 500 ETF - Vanguard

超大盘股价值 ETF - Vanguard

核心标普美国增长 ETF - iShares

标普区域银行指数 ETF - SPDR

State Street Corp.

标普银行业 ETF - SPDR

美国小盘价值股 ETF - Vanguard

美国大盘成长股 ETF - Charles Schwab

美国经纪商&证券交易所 ETF - iShares

银行 ETF - PowerShares KBW

标普 500 ETF - SPDR

金融业 ETF - SPDR

大盘指数 MSCI ETF - Vanguard

存款保险应当在银行挤兑发生之前进行预防，而不仅仅是在挤兑发生后才采取措施