<p>在《穿普拉达的女王 2》中，最终落脚于 Coach 是一个失败时尚生涯的笑话。然而，Tapestry（Coach 的母公司）的投资者可能会有不同的看法。在过去五年中，他们的股票飙升，而更高端的博柏利的股东则目睹了他们的投资大约减半。因此，历史悠久的英国品牌开始借鉴其中端竞争对手的做法。通过放下架子和降低价格，博柏利终于成功稳定了曾经萎缩的销售。博柏利的问题始于它试图进入奢侈品的顶级市场。在前首席执行官 Jonathan Akeroyd 的领导下，公司变得越来越雄心勃勃，商店里充斥着越来越昂贵的时尚单品：根据 Berenberg 的研究，到 2023 年 11 月，博柏利近 30% 的库存定价超过£2,000（约合 US$2,675；S$3,417）。其稀有的外观未能销售：收入下降，重度折扣使得该年最后两个季度的毛利率低至 62%。相比之下，Coach 的可负担奢侈品在 2022 年相比去年销售增长了 5%，毛利率高达 75%。因此，这家公司——在 2023 年初市值为 80 亿美元，约等于博柏利——现在的规模是其英国竞争对手的六倍半。这部分可能与地理位置有关。强劲的美国经济大约占 Coach 销售的 60%；而博柏利则更依赖中国，那里对奢侈品的需求减弱。产品组合也有利于 Coach。它几乎 60% 的收入来自于高毛利的手袋。围巾，博柏利的传统强项，难以大幅提价。不过，博柏利的新战略应该在一定程度上缩小差距。在现任首席执行官 Joshua Schulman 的领导下——他曾在 Coach 和 Michael Kors 工作——公司已推出其前卫产品，并回归经典的风衣、围巾和格纹图案。根据 Berenberg 的数据，现在只有约 3% 的库存定价超过£2,000，这意味着它可以在不依赖折扣的情况下销售。去年其毛利率上升了超过 5 个百分点。博柏利新策略的唯一缺点是，可负担奢侈品的交易价格低于真正的顶级奢侈品：Moncler，另一家成功重新定位的外套公司，在前瞻市盈率基础上对 Coach 的估值溢价近 20%。尽管如此，即使将博柏利预计到 2030 年 3 月的收益与 Coach 放在同一倍数上，也能带来 50% 的上涨空间。时尚人士可能会对这种比较嗤之以鼻，但股东们绝对不应该。© 2026《金融时报》。本文最初出现在《金融时报》上。</p>

博柏利

<p>博柏利正在将其战略转向经典产品，如风衣和围巾，此前该品牌在高端奢侈品方面遇到困难，导致收入大幅下降。在新任首席执行官 Joshua Schulman 的领导下，该品牌旨在通过降低价格和专注于更实惠的奢侈品来稳定销售，这与 Coach 的成功模式形成对比。这一变化发生在博柏利的股价已经减半，而 Coach 的股价却大幅上涨，突显了该英国品牌在奢侈品市场疲软，尤其是在中国面临的挑战</p>

<p>In The Devil Wears Prada 2, ending up at Coach is the punchline to a failed fashion career. Investors in Tapestry, Coach’s owner, may see things differently. Over the past five years, their shares have surged, while the more upmarket Burberry’s shareholders have watched their investment roughly halve. Little wonder, then, that the historic UK brand is taking a leaf out of its mid-market competitor’s book. By dropping some airs, and prices, it has finally managed to stabilise its formerly-shrinking sales. Burberry’s problems began when it tried to play in the top tier of luxury. Under former chief executive Jonathan Akeroyd, the company got ever more aspirational, filling stores with increasingly expensive fashion pieces: by November 2023, nearly 30 per cent of Burberry’s stock was priced above £2,000 (US$2,675; S$3,417), according to Berenberg research. Its rarefied look failed to sell: revenue fell, and heavy discounting pushed gross margins as low as 62 per cent in the last two quarters of that year.Compare that with Coach, whose affordable luxury sold 5 per cent more last year compared to 2022, at a plush 75 per cent gross margin. As a result, the company — which at the start of 2023 was worth US$8 billion, or about the same as Burberry — is now six and a half times bigger than its British rival. Some of that might come down to geography. The strong American economy accounts for roughly 60 per cent of Coach’s sales: Burberry relies far more on China, where demand for luxury goods has weakened. Product mix favours Coach, too. It makes almost 60 per cent of its money from higher-margin handbags. Scarves, Burberry’s traditional stronghold, are hard to mark up as much. Still, Burberry’s new strategy should go some way towards bridging the gap. Under current chief executive Joshua Schulman — formerly of Coach and Michael Kors — the company has pushed out its avant-garde products and is returning to its classic trench coats, scarves and check pattern. Only about 3 per cent of its stock now sits above £2,000, according to Berenberg, meaning it can shift it without resorting to discounts. Its gross margin last year was up over 5 percentage points. The only drawback to Burberry’s new approach is that affordable luxury trades at a discount to the true top notch: Moncler, another outerwear company that successfully managed to reposition itself, is valued at a near 20 per cent premium to Coach on a forward price to earnings basis. Still, even putting Burberry’s expected earnings for the year ending in March 2030 on the same multiple as Coach yields a 50 per cent upside. Fashionistas may sneer at the comparison, but shareholders certainly shouldn’t. © 2026 The Financial Times. This article originally appeared in The Financial Times.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>在《穿普拉达的女王 2》中，最终落脚于 Coach 是一个失败时尚生涯的笑话。然而，Tapestry（Coach 的母公司）的投资者可能会有不同的看法。在过去五年中，他们的股票飙升，而更高端的博柏利的股东则目睹了他们的投资大约减半。因此，历史悠久的英国品牌开始借鉴其中端竞争对手的做法。通过放下架子和降低价格，博柏利终于成功稳定了曾经萎缩的销售。博柏利的问题始于它试图进入奢侈品的顶级市场。在前首席执行官 Jonathan Akeroyd 的领导下，公司变得越来越雄心勃勃，商店里充斥着越来越昂贵的时尚单品：根据 Berenberg 的研究，到 2023 年 11 月，博柏利近 30% 的库存定价超过£2,000（约合 US$2,675；S$3,417）。其稀有的外观未能销售：收入下降，重度折扣使得该年最后两个季度的毛利率低至 62%。相比之下，Coach 的可负担奢侈品在 2022 年相比去年销售增长了 5%，毛利率高达 75%。因此，这家公司——在 2023 年初市值为 80 亿美元，约等于博柏利——现在的规模是其英国竞争对手的六倍半。这部分可能与地理位置有关。强劲的美国经济大约占 Coach 销售的 60%；而博柏利则更依赖中国，那里对奢侈品的需求减弱。产品组合也有利于 Coach。它几乎 60% 的收入来自于高毛利的手袋。围巾，博柏利的传统强项，难以大幅提价。不过，博柏利的新战略应该在一定程度上缩小差距。在现任首席执行官 Joshua Schulman 的领导下——他曾在 Coach 和 Michael Kors 工作——公司已推出其前卫产品，并回归经典的风衣、围巾和格纹图案。根据 Berenberg 的数据，现在只有约 3% 的库存定价超过£2,000，这意味着它可以在不依赖折扣的情况下销售。去年其毛利率上升了超过 5 个百分点。博柏利新策略的唯一缺点是，可负担奢侈品的交易价格低于真正的顶级奢侈品：Moncler，另一家成功重新定位的外套公司，在前瞻市盈率基础上对 Coach 的估值溢价近 20%。尽管如此，即使将博柏利预计到 2030 年 3 月的收益与 Coach 放在同一倍数上，也能带来 50% 的上涨空间。时尚人士可能会对这种比较嗤之以鼻，但股东们绝对不应该。© 2026《金融时报》。本文最初出现在《金融时报》上。</p>
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博柏利的高端时尚策略受挫，现在它重新专注于风衣和格纹设计