<div id="readability-page-1"><div><div><div id="article-index-0">  <p>As a response, in September last year, three well-known corporations adopted a co-CEO (co-chief executive officer) system: Oracle, Comcast, and Spotify. The two CEOs divided up the responsibilities; in a particular case, one CEO took on existing and new projects, while the other took on global growth opportunities and new business development. This seems to work for them, though it is unclear where the buck stops. Earlier, Netflix, Waymo, Marks &amp; Spencer, and Deutsche Bank had been adopters.</p> </div><div id="article-index-1">  <p>  During the 25 years from 1996 to 2020, among the S&amp;P 1,200 companies, fewer than 100 were run by co-CEOs. Hence, the concept is rare in the real world. Some published research suggests that of the 87 American companies that researchers analysed, the co-CEO system cohort delivered 40 per cent higher returns than the cohort with solo CEOs. This management research seems to be a dubious conclusion, at least to me!<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-2">  <p>  There are many consultants and opinions on how companies should cope with tumultuous times. Like many experienced leaders, I too speak to curious corporate leaders. However, the recent article by Pilita Clark (Financial Times, May 3), exploring why co-CEOs might suit tumultuous times, caught my attention. That had not been viewed by me as a panacea for tumultuous times. However, I do have experience of working in a co-CEO environment; hence, I have had a longtime interest in such institutional duality.<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-3">  <p>  Unilever globally had a CEO structure of three directors, which it called a “Special Committee”. This operated continuously from 1929, when the British and Dutch arms merged into one. After 70 years, this three-man CEO structure was scrapped because the organisation was tardy in responding to customer and market demands. In 2026, even after scrapping the Special Committee, Unilever’s search for agility and speed continues. Maybe the Special Committee was one of several problems — or maybe not the problem at all!<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-4">  <p>  How did the Special Committee operate? My perception is based on my professional interactions. The British arm, Unilever plc, and the Dutch Unilever NV each had a chairman. The legal relationship between the British and Dutch arms was encoded in complex agreements, which the lawyers supervised. There were, as always, personal and cultural peccadillos. The board was common and accounts were presented together. The two chairmen took turns at chairing the Unilever board meetings. The third director had the unobtrusive title “Member, Special Committee”.<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-5">  <p>  The third member played a valuable and balancing role between two opinionated and strong-willed chairmen. The third member rarely became chairman of either company but played a constructively collaborative role. Differences between the two chairmen would arise, as they do between corporate leaders (even husband and wife). Resolution inevitably requires that discussion is never abandoned. This helps the institution to be effective, though the process could be inefficient. Unipolar and efficient CEO stewardship is not without attendant risks such as ego, rigidity, and power intoxication.<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-6">  <p>  When I was heading Unilever Arabia, I had visits from both chairmen, Mike Perry and Floris Maljers. Floris was aware of Mike’s visit notes, and he focused on a complementary agenda. When I had to present my action plan for the Arab market to the Unilever CEO, all three members of the Special Committee were present with Ronnie Archer as the third member.<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-7">  <p>  Things changed at Unilever. The company first abandoned the co-CEO structure and opted for a single CEO; later, it changed the listing of Unilever from London and Rotterdam to one stock exchange, London. My impressions of events thereafter have been shaped by the views of former directors who had experienced both the co-CEO and single-CEO structures. Several bemoaned the abandonment of the co-CEO structure, which they felt offered a fine balancing pivot through the unique third member. Others held that the change was necessary and relevant for the tumultuous times. The debate perhaps continues.<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-8">  <p>  When I worked at Tata Sons, I encountered a different sort of structure of dual influence. For Tata Sons and Tata Trusts, enterprise and philanthropy were integral to the deeply held organisational philosophy. For many decades, the same person chaired both, effectively making it a seamless system. Currently, Tata has been experiencing the pangs of separate chairmen, a duality that is new to Tata.<small> </small></p> </div><div id="article-index-9">  <p>  The solution does not lie in thinking about public listing or surname. That would be missing the wood for the trees. Moving from a single-influence structure to a dual one needs great maturity, conversation, and, I emphasise, privacy. Leaders must be rich in listening skills and diplomatic in speaking skills. Everyone must know where the buck stops in the dual structure. These are lessons that can be learnt with great benefit.</p> </div><div id="article-index-10">  <div> <hr/> <p><strong>The author’s new book, <em>CHANAKYA AND SUN TZU: A Business Lens on Trade, Thought, and Travel</em>, has been coauthored by Nirmala Isaac.</strong></p></div> </div><div id="article-index-11">  <p><strong>gopal.mindworks@gmail.com</strong></p> </div></div></div></div>

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甲骨文

康卡斯特

<p>为了应对动荡的时代，像甲骨文、康卡斯特和 Spotify 这样的公司采用了共同首席执行官制度，将责任分配给不同的领导者。研究表明，共同首席执行官可能带来更高的回报，尽管这一概念仍然较为罕见。文章回顾了联合利华历史上的共同首席执行官结构及其最终转变为单一首席执行官的过程，突显了双重领导的复杂性和潜在好处。作者强调，在领导结构转型中，成熟和有效沟通的重要性</p>

共享的角落办公室可能会减轻动荡领导带来的风险