<p>印度之前曾面临国际收支压力。早期的几次危机，包括 2013 年的危机，也是由于经常账户压力引发的，主要是由于贸易赤字的扩大。</p>
<p>石油和黄金进口再次对经常账户施加压力。更高的能源价格和西亚地区的地缘政治紧张局势只会使情况更加恶化。</p>
<p><strong><em>但当前挑战的不同之处在于，问题并不在于经常账户赤字本身。这一次的不同在于，印度在资本账户上没有产生足够的盈余来抵消这一赤字。</em></strong></p>
<p>大量的外资流出和较弱的净外商直接投资流入——由于对外投资和资金回流抵消了日益增长的总流入份额——在经常账户赤字扩大的同时造成了压力。</p>
<p>这使得印度面临两种广泛的选择。</p>
<p>第一种是实现经常账户的平衡，实际上意味着修复商品贸易赤字，因为印度在服务贸易和汇款方面已经实现了盈余。</p>
<p>第二种是产生足够的资本账户盈余。</p>
<p><strong>进口管制的无效性</strong></p>
<p>修复商品贸易赤字意味着要么减少进口，要么更积极地推动出口。</p>
<p>印度对原油、化肥和贵金属等大宗进口没有真正的替代品。</p>
<p>试图通过将进口关税提高到 15% 来限制黄金进口可能不会减少黄金需求。相反，可能会因推动黄金价格上涨而增加对黄金的投机，甚至更糟的是，鼓励走私进入印度以避免支付关税。同样，建议印度人避免出国旅行也不太可能有太大帮助。</p>
<p>使用进口关税和质量控制令（QCOs）可能有助于抑制进口，但也会损害下游产业的增值生产，进而影响出口。</p>
<p><strong>印度的主要出口具有高进口强度</strong></p>
<p>进口关税的另一个问题是，它们阻碍了进口，但对促进商品或服务的出口没有任何帮助，而这正是减少贸易赤字和经常账户赤字所需的。</p>
<p>同样，印度许多表现较好的出口，如电子产品和制药，都是进口密集型的。换句话说，更多的出口会导致更多的进口。</p>
<p>较弱的卢比有利于出口。批评者认为，尽管印度卢比贬值，印度的出口仍然面临困难。这只是部分正确，因为主要是商品出口表现不佳。</p>
<p><strong>有利的汇率无法抵消其他劣势</strong></p>
<p>有利的汇率有帮助，但无法替代解决其他劣势，如缺乏自由贸易协定、高电力成本和其他结构性瓶颈，除非允许卢比大幅贬值。</p>
<p><strong><em>目前，印度过于专注于通过提高进口关税和加强卢比来管理进口，以至于常常忘记，较弱的卢比可以抑制进口，同时激励出口，从而实现经常账户平衡。</em></strong></p>
<p>这也有助于解决与进口密集型出口相关的挑战，并通过正规渠道而非走私来鼓励汇款。因此，这是一种比不透明的进口关税更好的管理经常账户余额的政策工具。</p>
<p><strong><em>印度不需要更强的卢比，而是需要一个能够平衡美元流出和流入的汇率。</em></strong></p>
<p>但印度央行（RBI）常常通过频繁干预外汇市场来阻止这一点，尽管经济学家和贸易专家一再建议应提高汇率灵活性。</p>
<p>然而，修复贸易体制并不意味着不需要加强资本账户。</p>
<p><strong>印度需要欢迎中国的外商直接投资</strong></p>
<p>导致经常账户赤字的一个主要因素是与中国的贸易赤字不断上升，这是印度政府长期以来一直在努力应对的问题。</p>
<p>应对与中国贸易赤字上升的唯一实际方法是鼓励中国在所有行业的外商直接投资，除了少数战略性行业的负面清单。最近决定允许来自陆地边界国家的投资通过自动途径获得最多 10% 的实益所有权，是朝着正确方向迈出的一步，但还不够。</p>
<p><strong><em>印度过于担心税收规避，因此给予税务和海关官员过多的自由裁量权，以确保合规。结果是税收不确定性增加。</em></strong></p>
<p>但我们常常忘记，还有其他同样重要的目标，尤其是——引入更多的外商直接投资和外资投资，以弥补在高交易成本的经济中不断上升的贸易赤字，同时在私人资本支出仍然疲软的情况下提高国家的整体投资率。</p>
<p>当印度企业在企业所得税大幅削减和慷慨的生产链接激励（PLI）补贴下仍然投资不足时，几乎没有其他选择，只能欢迎外国投资。</p>
<p>这需要在一个竞争激烈的全球外资市场中，建立一个可预测和透明的税收制度。</p>
<p>这要求恢复基于居住地的资本利得税制度，并使有效的税收居住证明成为居住的充分证明。</p>
<p>加快与主要外资来源国的双边投资保护条约的签署，可以在短期和长期内显著推动资本账户流入。</p>
<p>为了遏制外资流出，政府除了减少或取消长期资本利得税外，几乎无能为力，同时保留较高的证券交易税（STT），以抑制散户参与者的投机性期货和期权交易。</p>
<p>由于持续的伊朗冲突对俄罗斯有利，俄罗斯从中受益于更高的原油价格，而中国则是折扣伊朗石油的主要买家，因此冲突不太可能在短期内结束。</p>
<p>因此，印度应该主张其能源独立，以保持能源进口账单在可控范围内。新德里在与俄罗斯的案例中部分展示了这一点。</p>
<p>印度应该明确表示，它不仅会从俄罗斯购买石油，还会从伊朗或其他任何具有成本效益的供应商那里购买。</p>
<p><strong><em>印度政策制定者应专注于治愈病症——疲软的商品出口——而不是其症状，贬值的印度卢比。</em></strong></p>
<p><strong><em>(Ritesh Kumar Singh 是一位商业经济学家，Indonomics Consulting Private Limited 的首席执行官。他的 X 账号是 @RiteshEconomist。)</em></strong></p>
<p><strong><em>观点仅代表个人，不代表本出版物的立场。</em></strong></p>

阿尼科伊格尔矿业

纽蒙特矿业

中金黄金

<p>印度面临国际收支挑战，主要由于贸易赤字扩大，尤其是来自石油和黄金进口的赤字。与以往危机不同，目前的经常账户赤字并未得到足够的资本账户盈余的抵消，外资投资流出和外商直接投资流入疲软加剧了这一问题。进口管制可能无法有效减少贸易赤字，反而可能损害出口。卢比贬值可能会刺激出口并更好地管理进口。为了解决与中国的贸易赤字，印度应鼓励中国的外商直接投资，同时确保税制的可预测性以吸引外国投资</p>

<p>India has faced balance of payments pressures before. Earlier episodes, including the 2013 crisis, were also driven by current account pressures arising from widening trade deficits.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>印度之前曾面临国际收支压力。早期的几次危机，包括 2013 年的危机，也是由于经常账户压力引发的，主要是由于贸易赤字的扩大。</p>
</div><p>Oil and gold imports are once again putting pressure on the current account. Higher energy prices and geopolitical tensions in West Asia have only made things worse.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>石油和黄金进口再次对经常账户施加压力。更高的能源价格和西亚地区的地缘政治紧张局势只会使情况更加恶化。</p>
</div><p><strong><em>But what makes the present challenge different is not the current account deficit itself. The difference this time is that India is not generating enough surplus on the capital account to offset it.</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>但当前挑战的不同之处在于，问题并不在于经常账户赤字本身。这一次的不同在于，印度在资本账户上没有产生足够的盈余来抵消这一赤字。</em></strong></p>
</div><p>Large FPI outflows and weaker net FDI inflows — as outward investments and repatriation offset a growing share of gross inflows — are creating pressure at the same time when the current account deficit is widening.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>大量的外资流出和较弱的净外商直接投资流入——由于对外投资和资金回流抵消了日益增长的总流入份额——在经常账户赤字扩大的同时造成了压力。</p>
</div><p>This leaves India with two broad choices.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这使得印度面临两种广泛的选择。</p>
</div><p>The first is achieving balance on the current account, which in reality means fixing the goods trade deficit, as India is already running surplus on services trade and remittances.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>第一种是实现经常账户的平衡，实际上意味着修复商品贸易赤字，因为印度在服务贸易和汇款方面已经实现了盈余。</p>
</div><p>The second is generating enough surplus on the capital account.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>第二种是产生足够的资本账户盈余。</p>
</div><p><strong>Futility of import controls</strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong>进口管制的无效性</strong></p>
</div><p>Fixing the goods trade deficit means either cutting imports or pushing exports harder.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>修复商品贸易赤字意味着要么减少进口，要么更积极地推动出口。</p>
</div><p>India has no real substitute for large imports such as crude oil, chemical fertilisers and precious metals.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>印度对原油、化肥和贵金属等大宗进口没有真正的替代品。</p>
</div><p>Trying to restrict gold imports by raising import duty to as high as 15% may not reduce gold demand. Instead, by driving gold prices up, it may increase speculation in gold and, worse, encourage smuggling into India to avoid payment of customs duty. Similarly, advising Indians to avoid foreign travel is unlikely to help much.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>试图通过将进口关税提高到 15% 来限制黄金进口可能不会减少黄金需求。相反，可能会因推动黄金价格上涨而增加对黄金的投机，甚至更糟的是，鼓励走私进入印度以避免支付关税。同样，建议印度人避免出国旅行也不太可能有太大帮助。</p>
</div><p>The use of import duties and quality control orders (QCOs) may help check imports, but they also hurt value-added production in downstream industries and, in turn, exports.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>使用进口关税和质量控制令（QCOs）可能有助于抑制进口，但也会损害下游产业的增值生产，进而影响出口。</p>
</div><p><strong>India’s leading exports have high import intensity</strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong>印度的主要出口具有高进口强度</strong></p>
</div><p>The other problem with import duties is that they block imports but do nothing to encourage exports of goods or services, which is what is needed to reduce the trade deficit and, in turn, the current account deficit.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>进口关税的另一个问题是，它们阻碍了进口，但对促进商品或服务的出口没有任何帮助，而这正是减少贸易赤字和经常账户赤字所需的。</p>
</div><p>Again, many of India’s better-performing exports, such as electronics and pharmaceuticals, are import intensive. In other words, more exports lead to more imports.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>同样，印度许多表现较好的出口，如电子产品和制药，都是进口密集型的。换句话说，更多的出口会导致更多的进口。</p>
</div><p>A weaker rupee supports exports. Critics argue that despite the weakening INR, India’s exports continue to struggle. That is only partly true because it is mainly goods exports that are underperforming.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>较弱的卢比有利于出口。批评者认为，尽管印度卢比贬值，印度的出口仍然面临困难。这只是部分正确，因为主要是商品出口表现不佳。</p>
</div><p><strong>A favourable exchange rate cannot offset other disadvantages</strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong>有利的汇率无法抵消其他劣势</strong></p>
</div><p>A favourable exchange rate helps, but it cannot substitute for addressing other disadvantages such as lack of FTAs, high power costs and other structural bottlenecks unless the rupee is allowed to decline substantially.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>有利的汇率有帮助，但无法替代解决其他劣势，如缺乏自由贸易协定、高电力成本和其他结构性瓶颈，除非允许卢比大幅贬值。</p>
</div><p><strong><em>As of now, India is too focused on managing imports through a combination of higher import duties and a stronger rupee that it often forgets a weaker rupee can rein in imports while simultaneously incentivising exports needed to achieve current account balance.</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>目前，印度过于专注于通过提高进口关税和加强卢比来管理进口，以至于常常忘记，较弱的卢比可以抑制进口，同时激励出口，从而实现经常账户平衡。</em></strong></p>
</div><p>It also helps address the challenges associated with import-intensive exports, and encourages inward remittances through formal channels instead of hawala. Therefore, it is a better policy tool for managing current account balances than opaque import duties.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这也有助于解决与进口密集型出口相关的挑战，并通过正规渠道而非走私来鼓励汇款。因此，这是一种比不透明的进口关税更好的管理经常账户余额的政策工具。</p>
</div><p><strong><em>India does not need a stronger rupee but an exchange rate that balances its dollar outflows with inflows.</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>印度不需要更强的卢比，而是需要一个能够平衡美元流出和流入的汇率。</em></strong></p>
</div><p>But the RBI has often prevented this through frequent interventions in the forex market despite repeated advice from economists and trade experts in favour of greater exchange-rate flexibility.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但印度央行（RBI）常常通过频繁干预外汇市场来阻止这一点，尽管经济学家和贸易专家一再建议应提高汇率灵活性。</p>
</div><p>Nevertheless, fixing the trade regime does not do away with the need to strengthen the capital account.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>然而，修复贸易体制并不意味着不需要加强资本账户。</p>
</div><p><strong>India needs to welcome Chinese FDI</strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong>印度需要欢迎中国的外商直接投资</strong></p>
</div><p>One major factor behind the current account deficit is the rising trade deficit with China, something the Indian government has been struggling to deal with for a long time.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>导致经常账户赤字的一个主要因素是与中国的贸易赤字不断上升，这是印度政府长期以来一直在努力应对的问题。</p>
</div><p>The only practical way to deal with the rising trade deficit with China is to encourage Chinese FDI in all sectors, except a small negative list of strategic sectors. The recent decision to allow investments with up to 10% beneficial ownership from land-border countries through the automatic route is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>应对与中国贸易赤字上升的唯一实际方法是鼓励中国在所有行业的外商直接投资，除了少数战略性行业的负面清单。最近决定允许来自陆地边界国家的投资通过自动途径获得最多 10% 的实益所有权，是朝着正确方向迈出的一步，但还不够。</p>
</div><p><strong><em>India worries too much about tax avoidance and, as a result, gives tax and customs officials too free a hand through increased discretionary powers to ensure compliance. The result is increased tax uncertainties.</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>印度过于担心税收规避，因此给予税务和海关官员过多的自由裁量权，以确保合规。结果是税收不确定性增加。</em></strong></p>
</div><p>But we often forget that there are other equally important objectives especially — bringing in more FDI and FPI needed to make up for a steadily rising trade deficit in an economy burdened with high transaction costs, while also improving the country’s overall investment rates at a time when private capex remains weak.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>但我们常常忘记，还有其他同样重要的目标，尤其是——引入更多的外商直接投资和外资投资，以弥补在高交易成本的经济中不断上升的贸易赤字，同时在私人资本支出仍然疲软的情况下提高国家的整体投资率。</p>
</div><p>When Indian businesses are not investing enough despite slashed corporate income tax and generous PLI subsidies, there is little option but to welcome foreign investment.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>当印度企业在企业所得税大幅削减和慷慨的生产链接激励（PLI）补贴下仍然投资不足时，几乎没有其他选择，只能欢迎外国投资。</p>
</div><p>That requires, among other things, a predictable and transparent tax regime in an intensely competitive global market for foreign investment.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这需要在一个竞争激烈的全球外资市场中，建立一个可预测和透明的税收制度。</p>
</div><p>That calls for restoration of a residence-based capital gains taxation regime and making a valid tax residency certificate sufficient proof of residence.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>这要求恢复基于居住地的资本利得税制度，并使有效的税收居住证明成为居住的充分证明。</p>
</div><p>Along with expediting bilateral investment protection treaties with major foreign investment source countries, this can give a significant boost to capital account inflows in both the short and long run.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>加快与主要外资来源国的双边投资保护条约的签署，可以在短期和长期内显著推动资本账户流入。</p>
</div><p>To tame FPI outflows, the government cannot do much except reduce or remove long-term capital gains tax while retaining higher securities transaction taxes (STT) to discourage speculative futures and options trading by retail participants.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>为了遏制外资流出，政府除了减少或取消长期资本利得税外，几乎无能为力，同时保留较高的证券交易税（STT），以抑制散户参与者的投机性期货和期权交易。</p>
</div><p>As the lingering Iran conflict suits both Russia, which benefits from higher crude oil prices, and China, which remains the dominant buyer of discounted Iranian oil, the conflict is unlikely to end anytime soon.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>由于持续的伊朗冲突对俄罗斯有利，俄罗斯从中受益于更高的原油价格，而中国则是折扣伊朗石油的主要买家，因此冲突不太可能在短期内结束。</p>
</div><p>It is therefore time for India to assert its energy independence to keep its energy import bill manageable. New Delhi partially demonstrated this in the case of Russia.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>因此，印度应该主张其能源独立，以保持能源进口账单在可控范围内。新德里在与俄罗斯的案例中部分展示了这一点。</p>
</div><p>India should make it clear that it will buy oil not only from Russia but also from Iran or any other cost-effective supplier.</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>印度应该明确表示，它不仅会从俄罗斯购买石油，还会从伊朗或其他任何具有成本效益的供应商那里购买。</p>
</div><p><strong><em>Indian policymakers should focus on curing the disease — sluggish goods exports — and not its symptom, the declining INR.</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>印度政策制定者应专注于治愈病症——疲软的商品出口——而不是其症状，贬值的印度卢比。</em></strong></p>
</div><p><strong><em>(Ritesh Kumar Singh is a business economist and CEO, Indonomics Consulting Private Limited. His X account @RiteshEconomist.)</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>(Ritesh Kumar Singh 是一位商业经济学家，Indonomics Consulting Private Limited 的首席执行官。他的 X 账号是 @RiteshEconomist。)</em></strong></p>
</div><p><strong><em>Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.</em></strong></p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p><strong><em>观点仅代表个人，不代表本出版物的立场。</em></strong></p>
</div>

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印度面临的国际收支挑战需要更多的资本支持，而不是加强进口管制