<p>歐盟已正式終止與中國在世界貿易組織的長期爭端，該爭端圍繞北京在 2021 年對立陶宛的所謂脅迫展開。\n 在一份發給 WTO 成員國的聲明中，歐盟表示，考慮到這一爭端背後的關鍵目標已實現，相關貿易已恢復，因此決定放棄該案件。\n 該案件源於立陶宛允許在其首都維爾紐斯開設一個名為 “台灣代表處” 的爭議性辦公室。\n 辦公室開設後不久，立陶宛出口商發現他們無法再向中國大陸運輸產品。他們表示，該國的詳細信息已從中國海關係統中刪除。\n2021 年 11 月，海關數據顯示，貨物運輸的價值與一年前相比下降了 91.4%。這種幾乎完全的消失促使負責管理歐盟 27 個成員國貿易政策的委員會在 WTO 提起訴訟。\n\n\n 北京始終否認對立陶宛商品實施任何官方抵制，儘管它與維爾紐斯的外交關係降級。在多個時刻，北京聲稱中國人只是沒有興趣購買這個小型波羅的海國家的商品，而立陶宛則努力與台北建立聯繫。\n 北京視台灣為中國的一部分，必要時將通過武力實現統一。大多數國家，包括美國和所有歐盟成員國，並不承認台灣是一個獨立國家，但華盛頓反對任何試圖以武力奪取這個自我治理島嶼的行為，並承諾向其提供武器。\n 除了立陶宛外，台灣在歐盟的辦事處通常避免在名稱中提及該島，而是使用首都台北的名稱。\n 儘管布魯塞爾和柏林私下游説維爾紐斯不要開設該辦公室，正確地擔心這會損害與北京的關係，但歐盟被迫介入，聲明對任何歐盟成員國的攻擊都危及單一市場。\n 但該案件在日內瓦貿易法庭的辯論中證明困難重重。儘管有報道稱中國還施壓其他歐洲公司的供應鏈，要求他們放棄立陶宛產品以便在中國銷售，但歐盟在説服他們提供證據方面遇到了困難。\n 在布魯塞爾與北京就該案件進行磋商期間，歐盟官員注意到，當他們提到某個立陶宛出口商報告的被阻止的貨物時，該貨物會迅速被釋放。當時，歐盟消息人士抱怨他們的中國對話者在 “實時攪渾水”。\n 該案件在歐盟貿易總局內部引發分歧，正統思想者認為該案件無法勝訴，但一羣崛起的地緣政治思想者堅持認為，必須對他們認為的經濟欺凌進行指責。\n2024 年 1 月，當 WTO 提交新證據的截止日期臨近時，歐盟暫停了該案件的程序。一年後，案件重新啓動，但幾天後又迅速暫停。\n 委員會聲稱 “相關貿易已恢復” 的説法可能會受到批評。\n 中國海關數據顯示，今年前 10 個月，立陶宛的進口量與 2021 年同期相比下降了 53%，而 2021 年正是貿易幾乎崩潰的時期。然而，與 2022 年同期相比，貿易卻有顯著反彈，增長了 156%。\n 儘管如此，研究顯示立陶宛的整體貿易幾乎未受影響，這表明其出口商在當時設法找到新的市場來替代中國。\n2022 年啓動了一項價值近 1.4 億美元的歐盟支持計劃，鼓勵受此事件影響的立陶宛企業申請貸款。當地媒體報道稱，在 2023 年該計劃結束之前，僅有不到 400 萬美元被分配給兩家公司。\n 儘管如此，這一事件被視為歐盟與中國關係的轉折點，並加劇了歐洲部分地區對北京的懷疑。這種懷疑在幾個月後因俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭和中國與莫斯科的密切關係而進一步加劇。\n 這促使了反脅迫工具的採用——俗稱 “貿易大炮”，使歐盟能夠在未來對感知到的欺凌進行反擊。\n 然而，這一工具至今未被使用，儘管觀察人士和立法者要求布魯塞爾在 2025 年對美國總統唐納德·特朗普的貿易關税或中國的稀土出口管制啓動 ACI。\n 週三，委員會將提出一項新的 “經濟安全原則”，試圖重新調整歐洲對其領導層所稱的 “地緣經濟時代” 的應對方式。\n“我們每天都看到傳統國家治理工具被用來武器化相互依賴和利用聯盟。對國家和行業施加控制和強迫，” 歐盟委員會主席烏爾蘇拉·馮德萊恩在 10 月的演講中表示。</p>

<p>歐盟已結束與中國的世貿組織爭端，原因是指控中國對立陶宛進行脅迫，並提到貿易已恢復。該案件始於立陶宛開設台灣辦事處，導致對中國的出口下降。儘管面臨挑戰，歐盟的這一舉動標誌着與中國關係的轉變，受到地緣政治緊張局勢和反脅迫工具採用的影響</p>

<p>The European Union has formally terminated a long-running dispute with China at the World Trade Organization, centred on Beijing’s alleged coercion of Lithuania in 2021.\nIn a statement circulated to WTO members, the bloc said it was abandoning the case “considering the key objectives behind this dispute have been met and relevant trade has resumed”.\nThe case arose after Lithuania permitted the opening of a controversially named “Taiwanese Representative Office” in its capital, Vilnius.\nSoon after the office opened, Lithuanian exporters found they could no longer ship products to mainland China. The country’s details had been wiped from the official Chinese customs system, they said.\nIn November 2021, customs data showed the value of shipments fell by 91.4 per cent compared to a year earlier. The virtual wipeout led the commission, which manages the trade policies of the EU’s 27 member states, to launch a case at the WTO.\n\n\nBeijing always denied that there was any official boycott of Lithuanian goods, even as it downgraded diplomatic ties with Vilnius. At several junctures, it claimed that Chinese people just did not want to buy goods from the tiny Baltic country, which had made concerted efforts to grow ties with Taipei.\nBeijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US and all EU member states, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.\nWith the exception of Lithuania, Taiwan’s offices across the EU have traditionally avoided mentioning the island in their name, bearing the name of the capital city, Taipei, instead.\nWhile Brussels and Berlin had privately lobbied Vilnius not to open the office, rightly fearing that it would hurt ties with Beijing, the EU was forced to intervene, stating that any attack on an EU member compromised the single market.\nBut the case proved difficult to argue in the Geneva trade courts. Despite reports that China had also pressured companies from elsewhere in Europe to drop Lithuanian products from their supply chains if they wanted to sell in the country, the EU struggled to convince them to give evidence on the record.\nDuring consultations between Brussels and Beijing over the case, EU officials noticed that when they raised a particular cargo that a Lithuanian exporter had reported as being blocked, it would quickly be released. At the time, EU sources complained that their Chinese interlocutors were “muddying the waters in real time”.\nThe case divided the EU’s directorate of trade, with orthodox thinkers arguing that it was unwinnable, but an ascendant group of geopolitical thinkers insisting that what they considered to be economic bullying must be called out.\nIn January 2024, when a WTO deadline was approaching to submit a new tranche of evidence, the EU paused proceedings for a year. A year later, it restarted the case only to quickly pause it again days later.\nThe commission’s claims that the “relevant trade has resumed” could be contested by critics.\nChinese customs data for the first 10 months of this year show that imports from Lithuania are down 53 per cent compared to the equivalent period in 2021, when the wipeout occurred. There is, however, a significant rebound – 156 per cent – on the same period of 2022, when the trade had virtually ground to a halt.\nNonetheless, research shows that Lithuania’s overall trade was barely affected, suggesting its exporters managed to find new markets to replace China at the time.\nAn EU support scheme worth almost US$140 million was launched in 2022, with Lithuanian businesses encouraged to apply for loans if they were affected by the affair. Local media reported that under US$4 million was allocated from the pot to two companies, before it was wound down in 2023.\nNonetheless, the episode was seen as a turning point in EU-China relations and added to rising suspicion towards Beijing in parts of Europe. This was aggravated further months later by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s close ties with Moscow.\nIt galvanised the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument – known colloquially as the “trade bazooka” – that would enable the bloc to punch back against perceived bullying in the future.\nThat tool, however, has never been used, even as observers and lawmakers demanded that Brussels trigger the ACI against US President Donald Trump’s trade tariffs or China’s rare earth export controls over the course of 2025.\nOn Wednesday, the commission will propose a new “economic security doctrine”, which will attempt to recalibrate Europe’s approach to what its leadership has described as “an era of geoeconomics”.\n“Every day, we see how the tools of traditional statecraft are being used to weaponise interdependencies and leverage alliances. To create chokeholds on countries and industries. To exert control and impose coercion on others,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an October speech.\n</p>
<div class="lb-trans"><p>歐盟已正式終止與中國在世界貿易組織的長期爭端，該爭端圍繞北京在 2021 年對立陶宛的所謂脅迫展開。\n 在一份發給 WTO 成員國的聲明中，歐盟表示，考慮到這一爭端背後的關鍵目標已實現，相關貿易已恢復，因此決定放棄該案件。\n 該案件源於立陶宛允許在其首都維爾紐斯開設一個名為 “台灣代表處” 的爭議性辦公室。\n 辦公室開設後不久，立陶宛出口商發現他們無法再向中國大陸運輸產品。他們表示，該國的詳細信息已從中國海關係統中刪除。\n2021 年 11 月，海關數據顯示，貨物運輸的價值與一年前相比下降了 91.4%。這種幾乎完全的消失促使負責管理歐盟 27 個成員國貿易政策的委員會在 WTO 提起訴訟。\n\n\n 北京始終否認對立陶宛商品實施任何官方抵制，儘管它與維爾紐斯的外交關係降級。在多個時刻，北京聲稱中國人只是沒有興趣購買這個小型波羅的海國家的商品，而立陶宛則努力與台北建立聯繫。\n 北京視台灣為中國的一部分，必要時將通過武力實現統一。大多數國家，包括美國和所有歐盟成員國，並不承認台灣是一個獨立國家，但華盛頓反對任何試圖以武力奪取這個自我治理島嶼的行為，並承諾向其提供武器。\n 除了立陶宛外，台灣在歐盟的辦事處通常避免在名稱中提及該島，而是使用首都台北的名稱。\n 儘管布魯塞爾和柏林私下游説維爾紐斯不要開設該辦公室，正確地擔心這會損害與北京的關係，但歐盟被迫介入，聲明對任何歐盟成員國的攻擊都危及單一市場。\n 但該案件在日內瓦貿易法庭的辯論中證明困難重重。儘管有報道稱中國還施壓其他歐洲公司的供應鏈，要求他們放棄立陶宛產品以便在中國銷售，但歐盟在説服他們提供證據方面遇到了困難。\n 在布魯塞爾與北京就該案件進行磋商期間，歐盟官員注意到，當他們提到某個立陶宛出口商報告的被阻止的貨物時，該貨物會迅速被釋放。當時，歐盟消息人士抱怨他們的中國對話者在 “實時攪渾水”。\n 該案件在歐盟貿易總局內部引發分歧，正統思想者認為該案件無法勝訴，但一羣崛起的地緣政治思想者堅持認為，必須對他們認為的經濟欺凌進行指責。\n2024 年 1 月，當 WTO 提交新證據的截止日期臨近時，歐盟暫停了該案件的程序。一年後，案件重新啓動，但幾天後又迅速暫停。\n 委員會聲稱 “相關貿易已恢復” 的説法可能會受到批評。\n 中國海關數據顯示，今年前 10 個月，立陶宛的進口量與 2021 年同期相比下降了 53%，而 2021 年正是貿易幾乎崩潰的時期。然而，與 2022 年同期相比，貿易卻有顯著反彈，增長了 156%。\n 儘管如此，研究顯示立陶宛的整體貿易幾乎未受影響，這表明其出口商在當時設法找到新的市場來替代中國。\n2022 年啓動了一項價值近 1.4 億美元的歐盟支持計劃，鼓勵受此事件影響的立陶宛企業申請貸款。當地媒體報道稱，在 2023 年該計劃結束之前，僅有不到 400 萬美元被分配給兩家公司。\n 儘管如此，這一事件被視為歐盟與中國關係的轉折點，並加劇了歐洲部分地區對北京的懷疑。這種懷疑在幾個月後因俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭和中國與莫斯科的密切關係而進一步加劇。\n 這促使了反脅迫工具的採用——俗稱 “貿易大炮”，使歐盟能夠在未來對感知到的欺凌進行反擊。\n 然而，這一工具至今未被使用，儘管觀察人士和立法者要求布魯塞爾在 2025 年對美國總統唐納德·特朗普的貿易關税或中國的稀土出口管制啓動 ACI。\n 週三，委員會將提出一項新的 “經濟安全原則”，試圖重新調整歐洲對其領導層所稱的 “地緣經濟時代” 的應對方式。\n“我們每天都看到傳統國家治理工具被用來武器化相互依賴和利用聯盟。對國家和行業施加控制和強迫，” 歐盟委員會主席烏爾蘇拉·馮德萊恩在 10 月的演講中表示。</p>
</div>

歐盟放棄了在世貿組織對中國提起的案件，該案件指控中國對立陶宛進行脅迫