預測者、經濟學家和分析師在這一點上達成了廣泛共識：歐洲經濟的增長速度低於美國或亞洲，未來幾年這一差距不太可能縮小，反而可能擴大。這也可能對一些歐洲貨幣聯盟成員的債務可持續性產生負面影響，特別是那些已經處於不良狀態的國家，如法國。然而，投資者對財務管理鬆散的國家政府債券與一流證券之間所要求的信用利差仍然較低。這如何解釋呢？
finews 尋找答案，並在 Nicola Mai 身上找到了答案。Mai 自 2012 年以來一直在倫敦的固定收益專家 Pimco（德國安聯集團的一部分）擔任經濟學家和信用分析師，目前負責歐洲的主權信用研究。他負責制定該地區的關鍵宏觀觀點，並識別和分析投資趨勢。Mai 的職業生涯始於近 25 年前，作為英國政府的一名經濟學家，參與了由英國財政部主辦的項目。在加入 PIMCO 之前，他在摩根大通擔任了七年的高級歐元區經濟學家。他還被認為是 2010 年至 2012 年震撼歐元區的主權債務危機的專家。與 Mai 的採訪在 Pimco 的蘇黎世辦公室進行。
<hr/>
Mai 先生，在 15 年前的危機中，信用利差被視為嚴重受損的貨幣聯盟的温度計。今天，再次出現關於一些成員國國債和債務可持續性的激烈辯論，但這次市場保持相對平靜，儘管經濟相對疲弱。發生了什麼變化？
從宏觀經濟角度來看，歐洲確實面臨長期的重大挑戰。增長潛力將進一步下降。原因包括不利的人口結構、高能源價格以及創新技術的滯後。在貿易關係緊張和日益分化的情況下，強大的出口導向也成為了一個絆腳石，尤其是面臨來自中國的競爭。然而，從短期來看，情況則更加樂觀：德國的財政刺激正在推動經濟，而歐洲中央銀行（ECB）通過降息創造了有利的環境。然而，對於政府債券市場而言，另一個發展更為重要。
哪個發展？
自危機以來，在歐元區的協調性和制度框架方面取得的諸多進展：每當需要穩定時，政治家們都會採取行動。我們可能還沒有完全的財政聯盟，但通過下一代歐盟、疫情後恢復基金和共同債券，整合已經取得了進展。對財政協調與合作的信心增強。此外，歐洲央行已經制定了一系列債券購買計劃的工具包，使其能夠在必要時充當國家的最後貸款人。所有這些都使得今天的歐元區更加穩定，這反映在更緊的利差和更少的波動性上。
 «市場對財政協調與合作的信心增強。這反映在更緊的利差和更少的波動性上。」
那麼法國也不需要擔心嗎？
事情並不那麼簡單。法國的赤字相對於其國內生產總值（GDP）較高，債務水平也很高。税負已經相當沉重，幾乎沒有跡象表明政治家們能夠成功整頓公共財政。因此，我們對法國政府債券的配置持低於市場的態度。
為什麼不簡單依賴歐洲央行通過其購買計劃在緊急情況下穩定市場呢？
如果出現明顯的壓力跡象，歐洲央行最終會介入。但這個看跌期權目前處於深度虛值狀態，這意味着在介入之前，系統中需要出現顯著更多的壓力。目前沒有跡象表明會出現如此嚴重的加劇。歐洲央行也不會過早介入，因為它不想覆蓋市場力量。如果市場壓力增加，這可能會對政治家產生約束效應，類似於我們在美國所看到的。美國政府也不想失去對國債市場的控制。因此，它會小心翼翼，以免嚴重損害聯邦儲備的獨立性。
 «在法國的情況下，看跌期權目前處於深度虛值狀態，這意味着在歐洲央行介入之前，系統中需要出現顯著更多的壓力。」
赤字和債務佔 GDP 的比例是 1992 年在達成貨幣聯盟時設定的馬斯特裏赫特標準的關鍵指標，後來也用於穩定公約。當時，它們被設定為 3% 和 60%。這些數值在評估債務可持續性時仍然相關嗎？
在疫情衝擊後，大多數國家的債務都超過了 60%。即使是德國也將通過其支出計劃超過這一數字，這沒問題，因為他們之前投資不足。關鍵是債務可以穩定，即使超過 60%。債務可持續性的關鍵參數是名義利率與名義 GDP 增長的比率、通貨膨脹和國家預算的初級餘額，即不包括利息支出。
直到最近，經濟學家們不斷找到新的理由，認為只能估計的實際均衡利率 r* 應該結構性地低於過去。難道目前長期政府債券的相對高收益率並不表明他們錯了嗎？
這是一個我們正在密切分析的關鍵變量。它確實可能略有上升。在經濟中，r* 平衡儲蓄和投資。我們目前正經歷由人工智能、國防、基礎設施以及對韌性和本土化的渴望驅動的投資熱潮。然而，人口統計數據顯示，r* 不太可能回到金融危機前的較高水平。在美國，r* 目前可能在 1% 左右。然而，如果新技術確實能顯著提升生產力，這也可能推動均衡利率上升。
<blockquote>
«由於利差較窄，企業債券整體上並不是特別有吸引力。」
</blockquote>
讓我們繼續討論投資實踐。歐洲政府債券最大的競爭對手是什麼？
我們會考慮整個市場，儘管當然必須考慮貨幣風險。由於其高潛在利率下調，英國政府債券具有吸引力，美國國債也是如此。考慮到歐洲央行已接近或即將結束降息週期，以及預計債券供應將增加，德國政府債券在邊際上吸引力較低。日本的情況很有趣，利率上升，但我們在等待進一步的發展，因為未來財政政策的指導方針仍不完全明確。由於利差較窄，企業債券整體上並不是特別有吸引力。然而，在某些細分市場，如抵押貸款債券和其他擔保債券中，仍然存在機會。另一方面，股票的估值較高，因此價格昂貴，因此我們持謹慎態度。
當然，企業債券與政府債券之間的利差在歷史標準下是較窄的。但這難道不是因為許多公司的信用評級改善，而許多國家的信用評級惡化嗎？
我並不覺得這個論點令人信服。政府債券和企業債券之間的差異在於利差。企業的資產負債表今天可能確實比以前好。但如果一個政府陷入債務危機，那麼該國所有公司都可能面臨重大問題。在信用分析中，政府與銀行之間不僅存在聯繫，政府與企業之間也存在聯繫。我並不是説企業債券沒有機會。但市場本身並不是特別有吸引力。
<blockquote>
«在信用質量方面，政府與企業之間也存在聯繫。」
</blockquote>
您提到的日益增加的財政一體化，更多的共同債券，對投資者意味着什麼？這是否意味着缺乏已久的安全歐洲投資的開始？我們應該如何評估歐盟相關機構（如歐洲穩定機制（ESM））發行的其他債券？
不，我們還沒有達到可以談論新的歐洲安全資產的地步。但我們正在朝這個方向前進，包括安全武裝計劃。歐盟債券市場變得更加流動。然而，這並不意味着徹底的信用分析變得多餘。
為什麼不呢？
首先，發行債券的各種機構具有自身的結構特徵，需要加以考慮。其次，歐洲委員會發行的債券和在歐盟預算中承擔的支付義務也必須得到充分考慮。歐盟的債務在上升，這本身導致收益率上升。然而，這一效應目前正被改善的可交易性部分抵消：信用溢價在上升，而流動性溢價在下降。共同債券也減輕了主權國家的預算壓力，這就是為什麼像法國這樣的國家對此如此熱衷。最終，歐盟的信用質量仍然取決於其成員國的信用狀況。

華安法國CAC40ETF

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歐洲斯托克 50 指數 ETF - SPDR

Pimco 信用分析師 Nicola Mai 討論了歐洲的經濟挑戰，強調增長落後於美國和亞洲，這可能會惡化法國等國的債務可持續性。儘管如此，自金融危機以來，歐元區的凝聚力有所改善，導致政府債券的信用利差收窄。Mai 指出，雖然歐洲央行擁有穩定市場的工具，但它更傾向於不提前干預，讓市場力量引導政治家的財政紀律。他對法國政府債券表示謹慎，原因是高額的赤字和債務水平

There is broad consensus among forecasters, economists, and analysts on this point: Europe's economy is growing more slowly than that of the US or Asia, and the gap is unlikely to narrow in the coming years, but rather widen. This could also have a negative impact on the debt sustainability of some members of the European Monetary Union, particularly those such as France that are already in poor shape. However, the credit spreads that investors demand for government bonds from countries with lax financial management compared to first-class securities remain low. How can this be explained?
<div class="lb-trans">預測者、經濟學家和分析師在這一點上達成了廣泛共識：歐洲經濟的增長速度低於美國或亞洲，未來幾年這一差距不太可能縮小，反而可能擴大。這也可能對一些歐洲貨幣聯盟成員的債務可持續性產生負面影響，特別是那些已經處於不良狀態的國家，如法國。然而，投資者對財務管理鬆散的國家政府債券與一流證券之間所要求的信用利差仍然較低。這如何解釋呢？
</div>finews looked for answers and found them in Nicola Mai. Mai has been an economist and credit analyst at fixed income specialist Pimco (part of the German Allianz Group) in London since 2012 and now heads Sovereign Credit Research for Europe. He is responsible for formulating key macro views for the region and for identifying and analyzing investment trends. Mai began his career almost 25 years ago as an economist in the UK government, in a program run by the UK Treasury. Prior to joining PIMCO, he was senior euro area economist at J.P. Morgan for seven years. He is also considered an expert on the sovereign debt crisis that shook the eurozone from 2010 to 2012. The interview with Mai took place at Pimco's Zurich office.
<div class="lb-trans">finews 尋找答案，並在 Nicola Mai 身上找到了答案。Mai 自 2012 年以來一直在倫敦的固定收益專家 Pimco（德國安聯集團的一部分）擔任經濟學家和信用分析師，目前負責歐洲的主權信用研究。他負責制定該地區的關鍵宏觀觀點，並識別和分析投資趨勢。Mai 的職業生涯始於近 25 年前，作為英國政府的一名經濟學家，參與了由英國財政部主辦的項目。在加入 PIMCO 之前，他在摩根大通擔任了七年的高級歐元區經濟學家。他還被認為是 2010 年至 2012 年震撼歐元區的主權債務危機的專家。與 Mai 的採訪在 Pimco 的蘇黎世辦公室進行。
</div><hr/>
<div class="lb-trans"><hr/>
</div>Mr Mai, during the crisis 15 years ago, credit spreads were seen as the thermometer for the severely battered monetary union. Today, there is once again heated debate about the national debt and debt sustainability of some members, but this time the markets remain fairly calm, even though the economy is comparatively weak. What has changed?
<div class="lb-trans">Mai 先生，在 15 年前的危機中，信用利差被視為嚴重受損的貨幣聯盟的温度計。今天，再次出現關於一些成員國國債和債務可持續性的激烈辯論，但這次市場保持相對平靜，儘管經濟相對疲弱。發生了什麼變化？
</div>In macroeconomic terms, Europe does indeed face major challenges in the long term. Growth potential will decline further. Reasons for this include unfavorable demographics, high energy prices, and the lag in innovative technologies. Strong export orientation is also proving to be a stumbling block at a time of tense trade relations and growing segmentation, compounded by competition from China. In the short term, however, the picture is brighter: Germany's fiscal stimulus is boosting the economy, and the European Central Bank (ECB) has created a favorable environment with its interest rate cuts. For the government bond markets, however, another development is more important.
<div class="lb-trans">從宏觀經濟角度來看，歐洲確實面臨長期的重大挑戰。增長潛力將進一步下降。原因包括不利的人口結構、高能源價格以及創新技術的滯後。在貿易關係緊張和日益分化的情況下，強大的出口導向也成為了一個絆腳石，尤其是面臨來自中國的競爭。然而，從短期來看，情況則更加樂觀：德國的財政刺激正在推動經濟，而歐洲中央銀行（ECB）通過降息創造了有利的環境。然而，對於政府債券市場而言，另一個發展更為重要。
</div>Which one?
<div class="lb-trans">哪個發展？
</div>The many advances made since the crisis in terms of coherence and the institutional framework of the eurozone: whenever stabilisation required it, politicians took action. We may not yet have full fiscal union, but integration has progressed with Next Generation EU, the post-pandemic recovery fund, and joint bonds. Confidence in fiscal coordination and cooperation has grown. In addition, the ECB has developed a toolkit of various bond-buying programmes, enabling it to act as a lender of last resort for countries if necessary. All of this has contributed to the eurozone being more stable today, which is reflected in tighter spreads and less volatility.
<div class="lb-trans">自危機以來，在歐元區的協調性和制度框架方面取得的諸多進展：每當需要穩定時，政治家們都會採取行動。我們可能還沒有完全的財政聯盟，但通過下一代歐盟、疫情後恢復基金和共同債券，整合已經取得了進展。對財政協調與合作的信心增強。此外，歐洲央行已經制定了一系列債券購買計劃的工具包，使其能夠在必要時充當國家的最後貸款人。所有這些都使得今天的歐元區更加穩定，這反映在更緊的利差和更少的波動性上。
</div><blockquote>
«Market confidence in fiscal coordination and cooperation has grown. This is reflected in tighter spreads and less volatility.»
</blockquote>
<div class="lb-trans"> «市場對財政協調與合作的信心增強。這反映在更緊的利差和更少的波動性上。」
</div>So there is no need to worry about France either?
<div class="lb-trans">那麼法國也不需要擔心嗎？
</div>It's not that simple. France has a high deficit relative to its gross domestic product (GDP) and also high levels of debt. The tax burden is already quite heavy, and there are few signs that politicians will succeed in consolidating public finances. We are therefore underweight in French government bonds.
<div class="lb-trans">事情並不那麼簡單。法國的赤字相對於其國內生產總值（GDP）較高，債務水平也很高。税負已經相當沉重，幾乎沒有跡象表明政治家們能夠成功整頓公共財政。因此，我們對法國政府債券的配置持低於市場的態度。
</div>Why don't you simply rely on the ECB stepping in with its purchase programmes to stabilise the market in an emergency?
<div class="lb-trans">為什麼不簡單依賴歐洲央行通過其購買計劃在緊急情況下穩定市場呢？
</div>If there are clear signs of stress, the ECB will ultimately intervene. But this put option is currently well out of the money, meaning that there would need to be significantly more stress in the system before it would intervene. There are currently no signs of such a serious intensification. The ECB will also not intervene early because it does not want to override market forces. If market pressure increases, this is likely to have a disciplining effect on politicians, similar to what we are seeing in the US. The US government does not want to lose control of the Treasury market either. It will therefore be careful not to seriously damage the independence of the Federal Reserve.
<div class="lb-trans">如果出現明顯的壓力跡象，歐洲央行最終會介入。但這個看跌期權目前處於深度虛值狀態，這意味着在介入之前，系統中需要出現顯著更多的壓力。目前沒有跡象表明會出現如此嚴重的加劇。歐洲央行也不會過早介入，因為它不想覆蓋市場力量。如果市場壓力增加，這可能會對政治家產生約束效應，類似於我們在美國所看到的。美國政府也不想失去對國債市場的控制。因此，它會小心翼翼，以免嚴重損害聯邦儲備的獨立性。
</div><blockquote>
«In the case of France the put option is currently well out of the money, meaning that there would need to be significantly more stress in the system before the ECB would intervene.»
</blockquote>
<div class="lb-trans"> «在法國的情況下，看跌期權目前處於深度虛值狀態，這意味着在歐洲央行介入之前，系統中需要出現顯著更多的壓力。」
</div>Deficit and debt as a proportion of GDP are key indicators for the Maastricht criteria, which were established in 1992 when monetary union was agreed, and later for the Stability Pact. At that time, they were set at 3 per cent and 60 per cent. Are these values still relevant for assessing debt sustainability?
<div class="lb-trans">赤字和債務佔 GDP 的比例是 1992 年在達成貨幣聯盟時設定的馬斯特裏赫特標準的關鍵指標，後來也用於穩定公約。當時，它們被設定為 3% 和 60%。這些數值在評估債務可持續性時仍然相關嗎？
</div>After the shock of the pandemic, debt in most countries is above 60 per cent. Even Germany will exceed this figure with its spending programmes, which is fine because they were underinvesting. The key thing is that debt can be stabilised, even if above 60 per cent. Important parameters for debt sustainability are the ratio of nominal interest rates to nominal GDP growth, inflation and the primary balance of the national budget, i.e. excluding interest expenditure.
<div class="lb-trans">在疫情衝擊後，大多數國家的債務都超過了 60%。即使是德國也將通過其支出計劃超過這一數字，這沒問題，因為他們之前投資不足。關鍵是債務可以穩定，即使超過 60%。債務可持續性的關鍵參數是名義利率與名義 GDP 增長的比率、通貨膨脹和國家預算的初級餘額，即不包括利息支出。
</div>Until recently, economists kept finding new reasons why the real equilibrium interest rate r*, which can only be estimated, should be structurally lower than in the past. Don't the currently relatively high yields on long-term government bonds show that they were wrong?
<div class="lb-trans">直到最近，經濟學家們不斷找到新的理由，認為只能估計的實際均衡利率 r* 應該結構性地低於過去。難道目前長期政府債券的相對高收益率並不表明他們錯了嗎？
</div>This is a critical variable that we are analysing closely. It may indeed have increased slightly. In an economy, r* balances savings and investment. We are currently experiencing an investment boom, driven by AI, defence, infrastructure and the desire for resilience and onshoring. However, demographics suggest that r* is unlikely to return to the higher level seen before the financial crisis. In the US, r* is currently likely to be around 1 per cent. However, if new technologies do indeed lead to a noticeable boost in productivity, this could also push up the equilibrium interest rate.
<div class="lb-trans">這是一個我們正在密切分析的關鍵變量。它確實可能略有上升。在經濟中，r* 平衡儲蓄和投資。我們目前正經歷由人工智能、國防、基礎設施以及對韌性和本土化的渴望驅動的投資熱潮。然而，人口統計數據顯示，r* 不太可能回到金融危機前的較高水平。在美國，r* 目前可能在 1% 左右。然而，如果新技術確實能顯著提升生產力，這也可能推動均衡利率上升。
</div><blockquote>
«Corporate bonds are not particularly attractive overall due to the narrow spreads.»
</blockquote>
<div class="lb-trans"><blockquote>
«由於利差較窄，企業債券整體上並不是特別有吸引力。」
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</div>Let's move on to investment practice. What are the biggest competitors for European government bonds?
<div class="lb-trans">讓我們繼續討論投資實踐。歐洲政府債券最大的競爭對手是什麼？
</div>We look at the entire universe, although currency risk must of course be taken into account. British government bonds are attractive because of their high potential for interest rate cuts, as are US Treasuries. German government bonds are less attractive at the margin given that the ECB is at, or near, the end of its cutting cycle, and due to the expected increase in bond supply. Japan is an interesting case with rising interest rates, but we are waiting to see what happens because the guidelines for future fiscal policy are still not fully clear. Corporate bonds are not particularly attractive overall due to the narrow spreads. However, there are opportunities in certain segments such as mortgage bonds and other secured bonds. Equities, on the other hand, are highly valued and therefore expensive, so we are cautious.
<div class="lb-trans">我們會考慮整個市場，儘管當然必須考慮貨幣風險。由於其高潛在利率下調，英國政府債券具有吸引力，美國國債也是如此。考慮到歐洲央行已接近或即將結束降息週期，以及預計債券供應將增加，德國政府債券在邊際上吸引力較低。日本的情況很有趣，利率上升，但我們在等待進一步的發展，因為未來財政政策的指導方針仍不完全明確。由於利差較窄，企業債券整體上並不是特別有吸引力。然而，在某些細分市場，如抵押貸款債券和其他擔保債券中，仍然存在機會。另一方面，股票的估值較高，因此價格昂貴，因此我們持謹慎態度。
</div>Sure, the spreads between corporate bonds and government bonds are narrow by historical standards. But could that not be due to the fact that the credit ratings of many companies have improved while those of many countries have deteriorated?
<div class="lb-trans">當然，企業債券與政府債券之間的利差在歷史標準下是較窄的。但這難道不是因為許多公司的信用評級改善，而許多國家的信用評級惡化嗎？
</div>I don't really find this argument convincing. The difference between government and corporate bonds is the spread. It may well be that corporate balance sheets are fundamentally better today than they used to be. But if a government gets into a debt crisis, then all companies in that country are likely to have a big problem. In credit analysis, there is not only a link between the government and banks, but also between the government and companies. I'm not saying that there are no opportunities in corporate bonds. But the market as such is not very attractive.
<div class="lb-trans">我並不覺得這個論點令人信服。政府債券和企業債券之間的差異在於利差。企業的資產負債表今天可能確實比以前好。但如果一個政府陷入債務危機，那麼該國所有公司都可能面臨重大問題。在信用分析中，政府與銀行之間不僅存在聯繫，政府與企業之間也存在聯繫。我並不是説企業債券沒有機會。但市場本身並不是特別有吸引力。
</div><blockquote>
«In credit quality there is a link between the government and companies, too.»
</blockquote>
<div class="lb-trans"><blockquote>
«在信用質量方面，政府與企業之間也存在聯繫。」
</blockquote>
</div>What does the increasing fiscal integration you mentioned, with more joint bonds, mean for investors? Is this the start of the secure European investment that has been lacking until now? And how should we assess the other bonds that have been issued for some time by EU-related institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)?
<div class="lb-trans">您提到的日益增加的財政一體化，更多的共同債券，對投資者意味着什麼？這是否意味着缺乏已久的安全歐洲投資的開始？我們應該如何評估歐盟相關機構（如歐洲穩定機制（ESM））發行的其他債券？
</div>No, we are not yet at the point where we can talk about a new European safe asset. But we are on the way there, including with the Safe armament programme. The market for EU bonds has become much more liquid. However, this does not make a thorough credit analysis superfluous.
<div class="lb-trans">不，我們還沒有達到可以談論新的歐洲安全資產的地步。但我們正在朝這個方向前進，包括安全武裝計劃。歐盟債券市場變得更加流動。然而，這並不意味着徹底的信用分析變得多餘。
</div>Why not?
<div class="lb-trans">為什麼不呢？
</div>Firstly, the various institutions that issue bonds have their own structural characteristics that need to be taken into account. And secondly, the bonds issued by the European Commission and the payment obligations entered into in the EU budget must also be taken into account sufficiently. The EU's debt is rising, which in itself leads to higher yields. However, this effect is currently being partially offset by improved tradability: the credit premium is rising, while the liquidity premium is falling. The joint bonds also take some pressure off the sovereigns' budgets, which is why countries such as France are so enthusiastic about them. Ultimately, however, the EU's credit quality continues to depend on the creditworthiness of its members.
<div class="lb-trans">首先，發行債券的各種機構具有自身的結構特徵，需要加以考慮。其次，歐洲委員會發行的債券和在歐盟預算中承擔的支付義務也必須得到充分考慮。歐盟的債務在上升，這本身導致收益率上升。然而，這一效應目前正被改善的可交易性部分抵消：信用溢價在上升，而流動性溢價在下降。共同債券也減輕了主權國家的預算壓力，這就是為什麼像法國這樣的國家對此如此熱衷。最終，歐盟的信用質量仍然取決於其成員國的信用狀況。
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Nicola Mai: «我們正在邁向一個新的歐洲安全資產»